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Preface
This study has a dual objective. On the one hand, it seeks to contribute to a more 
complex of understanding of modernisation and social change. In this respect, my case- 
study of the Romanian experience with modernity might be o f interest to scholars 
working in other fields, as the particularities of the Romanian case could have relevance 
for other Tater modernising countries’, i.e. those countries that did not take part in the 
emergence o f Western modernity. On the other hand, the study attempts to contribute to 
a fuller understanding of the Romanian history of modernisation, in that it seeks to 
provide theoretically informed interpretations of its pattern of modernisation. It is 
claimed that particular experiences that are usually understood as non-modem should be 
interpreted as contributing to the overall modem experience in Romania.1
It should be noted that only in a more advanced stage of my research I was able to 
consult sources in the Romanian language, as I started out without any knowledge of 
Romanian. This also means that in some instances I have relied on translated sources.
Thanks are due to many persons for their advice and help in the writing of this thesis. I 
will be able to list only a few. M y supervisor, Peter Wagner, has provided me with 
many insights on questions of modernity and modernisation. At the University of 
Amsterdam, I thank Otto Holman and Kees van der Pijl for their support in the early 
stages of my research (I am afraid I drifted rather far away from my original 
‘moorings’). In (and outside) Romania many people helped me in invaluable ways, in 
particular: Cristian Mureçeanu, Adina Stefan, Liana Stefan, Isabela Corduneanu, Larisa 
Dragomir, Floarea Virban, and Florin Bilbiie. Further, I thank Dorel Çandor at the 
Center for Political Studies and Comparative Analysis, and the collaborators of the 
Institute of Sociology, the Institute of the Quality of Life, the Library of the Group for
1 I have published a number of publications based on work done for the thesis in an earlier stage: 
‘Economic reform in Romania: continuity in change’, in: A.E. Fernández-Jilberto and M. Riethof (eds), 
Labour Relations in Development, London: Routledge, 2002; 'Romania’s first experience with modernity: 
the liberal attempt and its adversaries', in: K. Treptow (ed.), Romania: a crossroads o f Europe, Iasi: The 
Center for Romanian Studies, pp. 95-122, 2002; and ’Romanian liberalism and its discontents', Working 
Paper, SPS 2003/02, Florence: European University Institute, 2003.
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Social Dialogue, and the New Europe College, all in Bucharest. I would further like to 
thank Maarten Keune, Sean Chabot, Patricia Chiantera-Stutte, Prof. Arfon Rees, Alina 
Mungiu-Pippidi, Margaret MantI, the organisers and participants of the Summer School 
on Multiple Modernities at the ASSR, Amsterdam, 2001, and Umut Korkut for useful 
comments and interesting discussions. Finally, I thank my father, Jan Blokker, for his 
research ‘contributions’, and m y wife, Elena Maddalena, for her unlimited support.
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Introduction
After the experiment of communism, the ’return to normalcy' of the countries in Eastern 
Europe2 was widely regarded as a confirmation of the failed nature of communism as an 
alternative to Western modernity. By the same token, it was also understood as a 
verification of the uniqueness and exclusivity of the Western modem experience. 
During the 1990s, both these assumptions strongly informed the debate on the 
'transitions' or, better, the 'transformations’ of the formerly communist countries. In this 
debate, the understanding of Western modernity as the only viable configuration of 
modernity has been a predominant assumption, while theoretical approaches often 
presupposed the normative desirability of the convergence of East with West, translated 
in more practical terms as the 'transfer of institutions'. As such, the debate on 
transformation often seemed to uncritically draw on insights of classical modernisation 
theory. In the latter, as in the former, modernisation has predominantly been understood 
as the convergence of non-modem or not-yet-modem societies towards the self- 
proclaimed modem Western model. On an institutional level, this model is archetypally 
portrayed as consisting of a democratic political system, a market economy, and the 
nation-state. From this perspective, the process of modernisation becomes a uni-linear 
transition from the non-modem or traditional to the modem, a process in which non- 
rational traditions, arbitrary despotic rule, and homogeneity gradually make place for 
instrumental rationality, a procedural-legal basis for modem institutions, and a 
continuous social and institutional differentiation.
By postulating convergence and (implicitly) adopting many tenets of classical 
modernisation theory, the greater part of intellectual activity has been oblivious to the 
supposition of possible diversity in the recently redirected process of becoming modem 
in Eastern Europe. Only recently have some approaches (path dependency, neo-classical 
sociology) taken diversity as their point of departure and, as a consequence, become 
more sensitive to history. In doing so, they seem to have heralded 'the end of the 
transition paradigm’ altogether (Bônker et a l 2002; Carothers 2002), although some
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residual aspects of the convergence thesis and modernisation as Westernisation seem to 
have persisted (see chapter 2).
In this study, I concur with these critical approaches towards the contemporary 
projects of modernisation in Eastern Europe, but I will also depart more radically from 
the 'transition paradigm'. An effective point of departure for studying and analysing the 
current transformations in Eastern Europe can be found in the wider sociological debate 
on Varieties of modernity’ or 'multiple modernities'. Although this debate has not (as 
yet) resulted in the clear crystallisation of a theoretical approach (cf. Amason 2000a), its 
radical departure from classical modernisation theory and its key assumption o f 
diversity in the experience o f modernity offer promising leads for a more critical 
analysis of contemporary modernisation. An approach of Varieties of modernity' not 
only offers the perspective o f different pathways to modernity (as already proposed in 
the 1960s by critical exponents o f modernisation theory, such as Barrington Moore and 
Bendix), but also a more critical and complex understanding of modernity itself. As one 
contributor puts it: ' [T]he view o f modernity as a uniform, unambiguously structured 
and self-contained pattern in progress towards full realization and harmonious 
integration is contested' (Amason n.d.). Such an approach seeks a radical move away 
from uni-linear and teleological understandings o f history, singular understandings o f 
modernity, and allows for the identification o f distinct and alternative versions of 
modernity, such as the communist-Soviet types and the fascist/national-socialist type 
(cf. Amason 1993; Eisenstadt 2000; Wittrock 2000).
My own analysis will not attempt to fully incorporate the extensive agenda set by some 
contributors to the debate (see, for instance, Eisenstadt’s formulation of a civilisational 
approach). I will rather select some of the insights of 'varieties of modernity’ in order to 
construct an alternative approach to the transformations in Eastern Europe. The most 
valuable perceptive shift is from a structural and evolutionary understanding o f social 
change to a focus on major social actors and the conceptions and 'ontological "visions" 
that inform the activities of these élites and that are derived from the major cultural 
orientations or codes prevalent in a society' (Eisenstadt 1992: 413). The attitude of 2
2 I prefer to use the designation Eastern Europe rather than the more awkward Central and Eastern 
Europe; the term will be used throughout the whole study.
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human agents towards the social order is thus fundamentally one of reflexivity, meaning 
that the social order is not taken for granted A second insight moves away from the 
understanding of modem society as a unified and integrated whole and underlines 
instead its conflictual nature. To understand modernisation one must understand the 
major conflicts between social actors over the construction of modem society. The 
proposition of diversity that derives from these assumptions forms the starting point for 
my case-study of Romanian modernisation.
The key assumption in this study is that the transformations in Eastern Europe and 
modernisation in general should not be taken as predetermined processes working 
towards an already identified modem end-state (consisting of an archetypal 
understanding of the Western democratic market economy), but rather that 
modernisation (and therefore also contemporary transformation) can best be understood 
as a variety of modernising political projects, implemented by modernising agents in 
specific temporal-spatial contexts (cf. Eisenstadt 1992).
At least three general hypotheses can be derived from such an assumption, which 
will inform my general approach towards modernisation:
1. Modernisation cannot be equated with Westernisation nor with convergence towards 
an end-state of modem society as embodied by Western societies.
2. Modernisation is not a process or bundling o f processes (industrialisation, 
individualisation, rationalisation, urbanisation) which lead to an ultimately 
integrated and unified modem society, but consists o f successive political projects 
pursued by modernising agents who seek to reconstruct society on the basis o f their 
specific understanding of modernity. This also means that conflict over the 
understanding of modernity is an immanent factor of modernisation and that 
institutionalised projects of modernisation are always open to critique.
3. With regard to modernisation in Eastern Europe (perhaps also relevant to other 'later 
modernising' societies), modernisation projects are for a significant part constructed 
under the influence of external ideas and models. This observation does not,
7
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however, entail that modernisation in these societies is necessarily expressed in the 
indiscriminate emulation o f external models, but rather that modernisation takes the 
form  of a selection of elements from external models in an encounter with local 
(traditional) components.
In this study, specifically concerning 'later modernising societies', modernisation is 
defined as: a political project initiated by political élites, aiming at the reconstruction o f  
the social order on the basis o f  the idea o f human autonomy. Modernisation occurs 
when domestic actors, often under the influence o f  foreign models and ideas, attempt to 
reconstruct the existing political and social order on the basis of the conception that 
society is in principle malleable and that its structures should be the result of human 
self-determination, rather than transcendental principles (such as religion) o r 
subordination to larger entities (empires). Such a definition of modernisation leads to a 
number of insights that move away from classical modernisation theory as well as 
current-day 'transitology'. Firstly, an understanding of history as ultimately open-ended 
and contingent will be substituted for a strong teleological reading of history (as 
apparent in the understanding of modernisation as moving from the traditional to the 
modem, from particularism to universalism, from substantive to formal rationality). 
Nevertheless, my assumption is that history is not completely open, but partly 
'patterned', as modernising agents draw on previously formed interpretations of modem 
society as well as react against earlier understandings and their institutional 
sedimentations. What matters in the analysis of modernisation in a given society is not 
only the identification of continuities and discontinuities, but also the specific origins o f 
the experience of modernity (this refers in particular to state-formation and nation­
building in the nineteenth century). In addition, as indicated above, a historical analysis 
of modernisation in Eastern Europe cannot be completed without analysing the 
encounters with extraneous models and ideas, which in themselves constitute a further 
structural element in projects of modernisation. Secondly, modernising agents cannot be 
reduced to 'functional' and 'dynamic' 'change agents' related to Westernising projects 
(archetypally associated with the bourgeoisie, or substitutive collective agents such as 
the managerial class). Modernising agency can take varied forms and it is rather in the 
identification of particular constellations of actors and conflicts between significant
8
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actors that the nature of modernisation can be understood. Thirdly, in close relation to 
the latter remark, the conceptions and meaning-givings of modernisation by these 
various actors should be the starting-point for any analysis of modernisation. This is so 
because it is by gaining insights into the understandings of modernisation in particular 
societies that we can start to understand the particular patterns or pathways taken in 
different contexts.
In order to give my approach historical-empirical substance, I apply this conception of 
modernisation as a subject-driven, locally embedded as well as externally induced 
project to a single - relatively under-researched -  case of an Eastern European country: 
Romania (see below for a description of the particularly interesting and relevant 
components of the Romanian case). In order to study the dynamics, sequence and 
emerging pattern in Romania's experience with modernity, I use a historical- 
sociological approach with an emphasis on the conceptual analysis of modernising 
discourses. The political-institutional part of this historical-sociological analysis is 
concerned with the identification of major modernising agents (political élites and 
intellectuals), their nature and self-positioning towards modernisation, and the 
institutional patterns (political-legal institutions and socio-economic structures) created 
by these modernisers. The analysis of agency and institutions is 'embedded' in an 
attempt to reconstruct understandings of modernisation held by modernising agents. 
Rather than following a fully elaborated discourse analysis or a comprehensive history 
of ideas, I attempt to define various discourses of modernisation by means of a limited 
number of categories of key concepts (see chapter 3). In order to differentiate between 
the normative (values, principled beliefs, and identities) and the cognitive aspects of 
ideas, I propose a distinction between two levels within discourses: a politico- 
philosophical level, which concerns the normative premises of modernisation, and an 
institutional-strategic level, which entails cognitive prescriptions for identifying the 
means to the ends of modernisation. It is important to note that cognitive prescriptions 
are derived from the normative level, but the latter is not reducible to the former. In 
other words, various cognitive expressions of the normative are possible. In this way, I 
seek to 'capture' the hierarchy of values and priorities in discourses of modernisation. In 
addition, a conceptual approach enables me to compare various projects of
9
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modernisation in Romania diachronically, exposing continuities and discontinuities in 
understandings of modernity. At the same time, I will use this 'minimal' conceptual 
approach to compare Romanian discourses synchronically with what I call ’transnational 
discursive paradigms' (liberalism, fascism, communism, and neoliberalism) to highlight 
the specificity of the Romanian pattern of modernisation.
I should underline that I do not consider the Romanian experience as constituting an 
alternative, distinct modernity as such. I rather consider its variety or diversity the 
outcome of the encounter between (re-invented) Romanian culture and various 
alternative modernities. It is the specific Romanian pathway emerging from these 
encounters that has resulted in the specific Romanian interpretation, which should 
nevertheless be considered a 'variation on the theme' of Western modernity. Rather than 
understanding Romania's experience with modernity as 'failed modernisation’, its 
diversity should be acknowledged.
Modernisation in Romania has often been understood in direct contradistinction to 
tradition. The two dominant currents of thought that reflect Romania's experience with 
modernity since the early 19th century have been named 'modemismyEuropeanism' and 
'traditionalism'/'indigenism' (cf. Hitchins 1994; Jowitt 1978; Omea 1995; Verdery 
1991). The first of these comprises those conceptions that are affirmative towards 
Western modernity, open to Europe and the West at large, and generally favour an 
emulation of Western ideas and practices. The second tradition includes those strands of 
thought that are sceptical towards Western modernity, emphasise Eastern traditions to 
the detriment of Western European ones, and generally favour a construction of society 
on the basis of local traditions and values and/or Eastern ones. While the conventional 
reading of Romanian history regards 19th century liberalism as the origin of Romanian 
modernisation, subsequent, more critical understandings of modernity (the most radical 
of these is interwar fascism) are predominantly measured against the Europeanist 
tradition and as such regarded as exclusively non- or anti-modem (cf. Omea 1995). 
Although it is tempting to equate Europeanism and traditionalism with pro- and anti- 
modernism respectively, in my view both these strands constitute reactions to Western 
modernity. As such they constitute very different but not necessarily mutually exclusive 
conceptions of modernisation. If  modernisation is not equated with emulating the West,
1 0
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but rather understood as the desire of modernising agents to construct a modem society, 
modernisation can take various forms and apparent anti-modem movements and 
projects can be made more intelligible as both reactions and alternatives to one reading 
of modernity, that of Western individualist liberalism. Starting from this assumption, I 
identify at least four projects of modernisation in Romanian modem history, i.e., 19th 
century national Liberalism, interwar fascism, national communism as it emerged in the 
1960s, and a contemporary project which is still in the process of crystallisation, but 
which is clearly only with difficulty identifiable as either pro- or anti-Western.
The organisation of the thesis is as follows. The study is divided into four parts. The 
first deals with theoretical approaches towards modernisation and transition in Eastern 
Europe, to end in an outline o f my conceptually driven historical-sociological 
approach3. The second part consists of a historical case-study of three projects of 
modernisation in Romania. The third part contains a conceptual and comparative 
analysis of the discourses of modernisation that underpin various projects of 
modernisation. And finally, in the fourth part, the post-communist period is analysed in 
the light of historical (discursive) legacies.
Chapter 1 contains a general introduction to conceptualisations of modernisation and 
revisits classical modernisation theory and its problems. I focus on perceptions of 
history, agency, and the dichotomy of tradition-modem in classical modernisation 
theory. By giving due attention to more critical positions within modernisation theory 
(in particular of Reinhard Bendix and Barrington Moore) I begin to outline an 
alternative approach.
In chapter 2 the focus is on transition theory as it has been developed in the context 
of the transformations in Eastern Europe since 1989. In this chapter the main purpose is 
to underline the return of untenable presuppositions of classical modernisation theory in 
contemporary theorising. Again, by analysing the more critical approaches towards 
transformation (neo-classical sociology and path-dependency approaches), I try to 
further clarify my own position.
3 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers of my working paper based on a part of this study 
(Blokker 2003) for this formulation.
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In chapter 3, I outline my own approach by elaborating on my understanding o f  
history, agency, and understandings of modernisation. I develop my conceptual analysis 
of discourses of modernisation by constructing a conceptual map, which is based on  
divisions between the normative and cognitive levels of ideas, and in threefold 
distinctions between categories of ideas within these levels.
Part 2 consists of the case-study of Romania’s experience with modernity. In chapter 
4, the emergence of the first project with the intention to construct a modem society is 
analysed. Initiated predominantly by the Romanian Liberal movement, the national- 
Liberal project was above all an attempt by Romanian nationalists to rid their territories 
of foreign influence (both the Ottoman and the Russian empires having made claims on 
the territory of what is now Romania) and to establish a modem polity on the basis o f 
Romania self-rule. National emancipation was the result of the combined efforts o f 
’progressive' Liberals and Conservatives, two partly antagonistic political movements 
who nevertheless shared a strong idea of national identity. The national Liberal project 
and its institutionalisation provoked criticism reproaching Liberalism for its 
emulationism. Chapter 5 deals with the continuation and emerging critique of the 
national Liberal project in the interwar period. Although Romania was politically and 
institutionally dominated throughout the period by the national-Liberal movement, 
whose attitude towards modernisation was increasingly one of conserving its 
achievements, the period also witnessed the rise of a potent counter-movement in the 
form of Fascism. Although this movement hardly knew a moment of political rule and 
institutionalisation (its ideology was anyhow of an ’under-institutionalised’ nature), its 
impact on Romanian political and cultural life was immense. Chapter 6 confronts the 
national Communist project. Although I do not regard the first decade of Communism 
as a Romanian project of modernisation (it did not explicitly consist of a local project, 
but was part of the internationalist Soviet one). The Stalinist project of the 1950s did lay 
the foundation for the emergence of a fully national project of modernisation. The sui 
generis nature of this project was not merely the repeated invocation of national 
independence by Ceauçescu, but, perhaps more importantly, its ideological syncretism 
of Marxism-Leninism and radical nationalism/particularism.
W hile the three empirical-historical chapters dealt with modernising agents and 
institutional patterns, in Part 3 I attempt to systematically compare the modernising
12
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discourses o f Liberalism, Fascism, and national Communism with what I call the 
transnational discursive paradigms, i.e., an analytical reconstruction of the dominant 
discourses that influenced Romanian modernisers. In the chapters 7 -9 ,1 seek both to 
compare Romanian and transnational discourse synchronically, and to discover 
diachronic continuities and discontinuities between Romanian discourses.
Finally, part 4 regards the contemporary post-1989 conflict over yet another project 
of modernisation in the light of the historical legacies as analysed in part 2 and 3. 
Chapter 10 focuses on both the attempts of the post-communists and the self-proclaimed 
democratic opposition to define modernisation in the 1990s (the analysis ends in 
December 2000). The conflict has taken the apparent guise of conservatism versus 
progressivism, as the post-communist project primarily entailed resistance against 
Western definitions of transformation, whereas the democratic coalition promulgated a 
highly Europeanist/emulationist project. Nevertheless, where the post-communists- 
tumed-social-democrats successfully managed to create a syncretic ideology based on 
particularist, indigenist components as well as including primary components of the 
Westernising programme (European integration, marketisation of the economy), the 
largely neoliberal programme of the democratic coalition foundered on the lack of a 
‘positive consensus* and a failure to indigenise neoliberal discourse (chapter 11).
13
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Conceptualisations of modernisation
1. Conceptualisations of modernisation
1.1 Introduction
The social sciences developed as a response and a reflection of deep structural changes 
in Western societies that manifested themselves particularly at the end of the eighteenth 
and beginning of the nineteenth centuries.4 Classical sociology occupied itself with 
assessing these changes, their origins and consequences, while it was at the same time 
reflexive of the contradictory aspects of the ‘project of modernity’. The preoccupation 
of the social sciences with modem society, social change and its relations with deep 
structural changes in the Western world is still highly visible today and has found its 
latest expression in the overwhelming attention focused on the changes in countries that 
until recently formed part of the Soviet sphere of influence. Theorising social change 
has however come a long way since the advent of what we now call ‘classical 
sociology’. Nevertheless, the insights provided by many of the current mainstream 
theories do not necessarily provide us with a deeper understanding of the complexity 
and diversity of the social world. This latter aspect -  diversity - becomes particularly 
important for the analysis of current social change in the post-communist countries. 
Instead of building on the subtleties and insights into the down-sides of modernity of 
classical sociology, the transformations in the former communist world are 
predominantly interpreted as an affirmation of the Western modem project, foregoing 
the particularities and distinct histories of the societies involved.
In the approaches towards social change (referred to as ‘transition’) in Eastern 
Europe, the normative affirmation of the Western modem project has been a diffused, 
but mostly unproblematised element.5 Until recently, the debate on ‘transition’ or, 
preferably, ‘transformation’, has been dominated by approaches that shared a number of 
elementary assumptions on the general nature of social change in Eastern Europe: the
4 The roots of these major transformations, however, can be traced back much further (Amason 
2000a; Lepsius 1990).
5 Some recent publications indicate that such an affirmation is increasingly considered untenable 
(see Bonker et al. 2002; Carothers 2002).
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convergence of the post-communist countries with the West, rather than divergence; a  
teleological view of social change towards the end-state of a democratic m ark e t 
economy; a predominant attention to formal, procedural institutions (democracy, m ark e t 
economy) to the relative negligence of substantive issues (national identity, culture); a n  
overall negative appreciation of the past (communism). As many could not fail to  
notice, this ‘consensus’ shows a strong affinity with assumptions of ‘classical’ 
modernisation theory developed in the 1940s and 1950s.6 The re-emergence o f  
modernisation theory, or at least some of its central tenets, means that those  
assumptions that had been held as untenable in the debate on ‘classical’ modernisation 
theory were re-inserted into studies on post-communism (cf. Knöbl 2001). A deeper 
understanding of those ‘errors’ ingrained in the concept of modernisation thus becomes 
a necessity for the eventual rehabilitation of the concept and for the construction o f an  
alternative approach to social change.
1.2 O n e  route, various routes, or varieties of modernity?
The debate on social change in post-1989 Eastern Europe has been dominated by, on the 
one hand, modernist approaches7 that start from ideas on modernisation and 
development derived from experiences in other parts of the world that took place in 
other eras, and which are mainly concerned with the transfer of Western models and 
institutions, assuming a universal quality to modernity and modernisation. On the other
6 Altvater is one example: ‘[m]odemization theory only knows the extremes of inefficient socialist 
systems and efficient modem market capitalism and the transition from one system to the other. The 
possibility of a mixed economy or a ‘third way’ between capitalism and communism is viewed as a 
theoretically unjustified idea. Transition, is, thus, no more than the implantation of market 
mechanisms and of the functioning mode of money (which requires the institutionalization of a two 
tier banking system and a politically independent central bank), the building of political institutions 
o f the nation state for making democratic participation possible and, last but not least, the 
development of a pluralistic civil society’ (Altvater 1998: 592).
7 I understand modernism as the affirmative reading of the dominant Western program of 
modernity, embodied by the Enlightenment and individualist liberalism. In terms of the attainment 
o f social knowledge, modernist approaches tend to ‘conflate the imaginary signification of 
modernity with the reality o f social life in Western societies’ (Wagner 2001a: 4).
18
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hand, modernist approaches have been critiqued by historically informed approaches 
which acknowledge that the transformations contain unique elements as a result of the 
particular (communist) experiences of the Eastern European countries (I elaborate on 
the critique o f modernist approaches and attempts to overcome its deficiencies in this 
chapter and chapter 2 respectively).
The modernist approach is ahistorical in that it largely ignores distinct historical 
legacies which might have an important impact on the current transformations and thus 
render these transformations different from other experiences, whereas the historical 
approaches show a sensitivity towards historical legacies but often understand these 
legacies in the light of a rather narrowly circumscribed vision of modem society. In 
sum, modernist approaches assume that there is essentially one pathway towards 
modem society; the post-communist societies can follow this pathway by closely 
implementing Western models and ideas. The historical approaches question the 
modernist notion of a singular pathway and see various routes emerging out of the 
confrontation between the immediate past and the present, although they leave a 
singular definition of modem society largely unquestioned.
Put in this way, the debate on transformation in Eastern Europe looks highly similar 
to the debate on modernisation that emerged in the post war era. From the Second 
World War until the late 1970s, modernisation has been defined in three ways 
(following Janos 1978; see also Harrison 1988 and Tiryakian 1991): first, the so-called 
‘evolutionist* interpretation, which identified one historical pathway available to 
modernising countries, i.e. the repetition by the ‘late developing countries’ of the 
experiences of Western capitalist countries or ‘early modernisers’ (modernisation 
theory); second, an interpretation that claims the Western experience as the end-goal for 
modernising countries, but identifies different ways of reaching that end-state 
(Barrington Moore; Bendix); third, the interpretation of the Western experience as 
historically and essentially unique, which leads to a denial of its validity for 
modernising countries (dependency and world-system theory).8
8 If we would accept this last stance, we would have at least two patterns of modernisation, i.e., the 
experiences of the ‘successful’ Western countries, and the reactions of the rest o f the world to these 
experiences (Janos 1978: 73-74).
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A  critical view of these various perceptions of modernisation holds that a singular 
view o f Western modernity as a universal phenomenon runs into problems; 
modernisation cannot mean one road to a singular end-state o f societal evolution, as 
even the experiences of the Western states themselves are too diversified to justify  
assumptions of a global convergence (as also highlighted in current discussions about 
varieties of capitalism, see Hall and Soskice 2001). Additionally, modernisation m ight 
vary in form and content not only in spatial terms but also over time.
In the 1990s, two approaches have attempted to reformulate modernisation as a  
concept by explicitly starting from a rejection of the modernist assumptions o f  
modernisation theory. Neo-modemisation theory has tried to amend and change original 
modernisation theory, but has left the singular view of modernity largely 
unproblematised (see below). The approach of ‘varieties of modernity’ tries to break 
with modernisation theory in the most radical way in that it denies modernisation to be a 
purely Western phenomenon and sees several ‘modernities’, of which the Western is 
only one variant. Rather than understanding modernisation as leading to the 
convergence of modernising societies towards a unified, homogenised modernity, it 
perceives modernisation as creating conflict. Furthermore, it assumes that various 
patterns and visions of modernity have developed rather than a single main pattern o f  
W estern modernity (see chapter 3).
Whereas the classical sociologists mainly dealt with the advent of modernity in the 
West and the shift from non-modem to modem societies, with all the upheavals but also 
continuities involved, after the Second World War a major part of the attention of the 
social sciences interested in social change shifted to non-Westem societies, mainly as a 
result o f the decolonisation process. Not only did the huge developmental differences 
between the former colonies and the colonising states come to the fore, but also the 
difficulties o f state-building, and the impact of the period of colonisation on the newly 
independent countries. So-called modernisation theories emerged in the 1940s and dealt 
explicitly with the problems of underdevelopment in deco Ionising states in Africa and 
Asia. Modernisation theory saw modernity as a Westernising and homogenising project 
(Kaya 2004: 30). In order to converge to the socio-economic level o f  Western states 
late-developing states had to adopt Western institutions and dismantle traditional
Conceptualisations of modernisation
‘barriers*. The logic of the economic development of states could be captured in the 
concept of ‘stages or sequences of development*, the most important being the phase of 
‘take-off into self-sustained growth’, in which the transformation of a formerly 
traditional society into a modem, capitalist one would be secured.9 According to 
modernisation theorists the world consists of ‘relatively autonomous societies 
developing in relation to one another roughly along the same path although with 
differing starting times and at different speeds.*10 The convergence of underdeveloped 
countries was deemed possible because the imitation of Western practices could 
ultimately lead to learning effects and catching up in terms of not only economic, but 
also social and political modernisation. More specifically, modernisation theory 
assumed that the arising middle class would be the main agent of modernisation and the 
flag-bearer of democracy (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 5). In this sense, development was 
seen as a repetition of the experience o f Western countries, starting with England, in the 
16th century.
In modernisation theory the experience of Western countries with modernity was 
mainly regarded as a positive one, and the variety o f roads to modernity was 
amalgamated as one, smooth road without many upheavals, based on a specific reading 
of Western history since the dual revolution. This rosy picture of Western modernity 
was then used as a mirror for the non-Westem societies, who should follow the same 
road towards ‘modem society*. This picture of modernity and the understanding of 
modernisation as imitation found in various types of modernisation theory can partly be 
traced back to the specific origins o f these theories, i.e. in the United States of the 
1940s/50s. Disproportionately practised by American and American-educated 
sociologists (Parsons, Rostow) modernisation theory used a model of modernisation that 
was ‘to an important extent an unreflexive projection of the liberal, secular, 
individualising values of ‘establishment’ intellectuals* (Tiryakian 1991: 170; see also 
Lepsius 1990 [1977], Alexander 1995). The perceived end-state of any modernisation 
‘process* was seen as the American societal model that existed after the Second World
9 See Rostow 1960, mentioned in: van der Pijl 1992: 238. See also Harrison 1988: 26-8.
10 Hopkins and Wallerstein 1977, quoted in: Linklater 1990. Notice the striking similarity with 
approaches towards the former communist countries today (this will be more exhaustively explored 
at the end of the chapter).
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War, thereby equating history with the historical developments in the United States an d  
the Western world at large, and ignoring important spatial varieties in reactions to  
modernity. In part, the negation o f ‘deviating cases’ from the Western path to modernity 
-  exhibited by countries like China and Russia - in modernisation theory had th e  
character of a strategy of ideological immunisation (Lepsius 1990: 215).11
N ot surprisingly, modernisation theories ranging from Rostow’s stages to Parsons’ 
functional-structural approach were fiercely criticised from the outside because of their 
unproblematic stance towards Western modem society as well as the limited insights it 
provided in the analysis of the experiences of non-Westem societies. Simultaneously, 
the development of the theory was characterised by the continuous confrontation o f  
anomalies and problems by modernisation theorists themselves and would eventually 
lead to  massive self-criticism. The main elements o f contention within modernisation 
theory were about the usage and substantive elaboration of the strict dichotomy between 
traditional and modem societies, the identification of actors who initiate modernisation, 
and the singular nature of modernity (Knobl 2001: 155-220; I will deal with these 
aspects in chapter 3, in the context of the construction of an alternative approach). 
Critique also came from without, especially in the form of neo-Marxist, structural 
theories, which denounced the modernists’ negligence of the implications of the world 
economic system for modernisation in individual countries. In the 1950s dependencia 
theory emerged, partly as a consequence of the experiences of Latin American countries 
with import-substitution models (van der PijI 1992). Modernisation theory’s 
presupposition that integration into Western structures would lead to development was 
refuted by dependencia theorists. It was exactly the international economic context and 
the role of Western states in the development of the less-developed states that was seen
11 In spite of the domination o f the social sciences by the modernisation paradigm in the 1950s and 
60s, countercurrents did exist in the form of intellectuals influenced by the Frankfurt School and 
people like Hannah Ahrendt, who turned around the teleological picture of global history ending in  
American society, i.e. they ‘[criticised] what they called the new mass society as forcing individuals 
into an amoral, egotistical mode. They inverted modernization theory’s binary code, viewing 
American rationality as instrumental rather than moral and expressive, big science as technocratic 
than inventive. They saw conformity rather than independence; power élites rather than democracy; 
and deception and disappointment rather than authenticity, responsibility, and romance’ (Alexander 
1995: 18).
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as the crucial factor hindering further development. Dependencia theorists argued that 
peripheral economies would be better off outside the capitalist economy, because 
otherwise the gap between centre and periphery would not only survive but become 
larger in due time (Linklater 1990: 97). According to the dependencia perspective, local 
élites in the peripheral countries ‘co-operated’ with élites in the core countries. This 
‘comprador bourgeoisie’, however, was weakly rooted in the domestic economic 
structure and functioned as a direct commercial and financial intermediary for foreign 
capital, i.e. it was perceived as completely subordinated to foreign capital (Holman 
1996: 10). Thus, whereas modernisation theorists argued that the primary agent for 
national development was the emergent bourgeoisie, dependencia theorists claimed the 
opposite. The bourgeoisie merely perpetuated uneven exchange relations between the 
underdeveloped peripheral states and the developed core instead of promoting national 
socio-economic and political development. Consequently, major parts of the domestic 
industry served metropolitan interests rather than the needs of the local population 
(Linklater 1990: 103).
Whereas modernisation theory took an uncritical affirmative stance towards Western 
modernity, dependencia theory asserted the impossibility for non-Westem countries to 
reproduce this modernity. The reading of history in dependencia theory thus reversed 
that of modernisation theory. The historical developments that had led to Western 
modernity were seen as negative for non-Westem societies and therefore a radically 
alternative pathway of development was deemed necessary. A theory that followed the 
arguments o f the dependencia school but also amended them was world-systems theory, 
whose main exponent is Immanuel Wallerstein (the most important statement of the 
theory is Wallerstein 1974). Dependency theory used a structural and systemic analysis 
to explain national underdevelopment by placing different societies into the world- 
system of core and peripheral countries in the overriding context of the world capitalist 
system. World-systems theory built upon the same premises of core-periphery relations. 
However, the possibility for states to tear from the dependent relationship of 
underdevelopment to a position of higher status in the global hierarchy was 
acknowledged in the form of semi-peripheral states, states that had acquired some forms 
of independent development, and therefore slowly moved to the level of the core states. 
Ultimately, the world-systems theorists argued that autonomous development of
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individual states was possible within the global capitalist system.12 World-systems 
theorists, therefore, did not reject convergence to Western modernity outright as being 
detrimental for the modernisation of non-Westem countries, as a certain upward 
mobility was indeed deemed possible for non-Westem countries. In the end, however, 
the capitalist world-system was seen as a functional whole and in this way particular 
experiences of non-Westem societies were analysed not as reciprocal to modernity, but 
merely as responses to the logic of the world system. Cultural heritages, internal 
adoption and adaptation to modernity as spread from the West were within such as 
theoretical model not possible.
Modernisation, dependencia and world-systems theory show in this respect strong 
parallels, i.e., both strands employ a singular view of modernity as the experience of the 
Western world to which non-Westem societies must respond, either by adopting 
Western institutions or by contending Western hegemony; a modernity, however, to 
which these societies ultimately do not contribute. As Altvater remarks: ‘Although the 
theoretical and political orientation of modernization and dependency theory are not 
reconcilable, the normative objective of an efficient market economy, of a rich civil 
society and a functioning democratic political system are unanimously shared by both 
approaches’ (1998: 593).
The failure o f Third World countries to take a stand against core countries in the 
1970s - partly a result of the ascent o f the so-called East-Asian tigers and the subsequent 
disintegration o f the Non-Allied Movement and, possibly more importantly, as a result 
of significant changes in the Western world - led to a shift of the dominant paradigm 
towards underdevelopment into the direction of neo-classical ideas in economy and 
démocratisation theory in political science. The collapse of the ‘really existing 
alternative’ o f Soviet communism seemed to reconfirm the singular worldview of 
modernisation theory and therefore the possibility of a rehabilitation of classical notions
1 7 In the final instance, however, world system theory only recognises the establishment of a world 
socialist order as the means to ensure the simultaneous development of all peripheral societies and 
the supersession of unequal development (Linklater 1990: 108). In theory, it never becomes clear 
though how a world socialist order could actually arise out of a capitalist one (van der Pijl 1998: 
346).
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of modernisation (Knöbl 2001: 13). Both neo-classical economics and démocratisation 
theory are expressions of a revival of liberal individualist values (the former focussing 
on inter-subjective exchange relations and the latter on negative liberty), and a re- 
evaluation of modernity, i.e. a re-emergence of a positive, affirmative stance towards 
modernity as developed in the West. Markets as well as democracy were revived and 
combined in a new narrative. Analysing this narrative shift, Alexander remarks: ‘in 
response to economic developments, different groupings of contemporary intellectuals 
have reinflated the emancipatory narrative of the market, in which they inscribe a new 
past (anti-market society) and a new present/future (market transition, full-blown 
capitalism) that makes liberation dependent upon privatization, contracts, monetary 
inequality, and competition.’ (1995: 32) Alnog with the revival of the narrative of the 
market, the narratives of democracy and civil society also revived. After positively 
describing experiences in Latin America and Southern Europe, social scientists have 
now turned to Eastern Europe, turning the various experiences with social upheaval and 
dramatic change into ‘waves of démocratisation’ (Huntington 1991).
Since the 1980s, the social sciences have witnessed the reincorporation of the 
assumptions of modernisation theory into démocratisation theory (with its focus on the 
‘transfer of institutions’), comparative sociology, and neo-classical economics. These 
recent embodiments of modernisation theory have remained largely unreflective 
towards earlier raised criticisms and problématiques. In the context of post-communist 
Eastern Europe, these ‘first-generation’ theories have dominated much of the initial 
debate about transformation (cf. Bonker et a l 2002). Nevertheless, some steps have 
been taken towards the formulation of a revised neo-modemisation theory, most 
importantly by Edward Tiryakian (Tiryakian 1991; 1995; 1996), Piotr Sztompka 
(Sztompka 1993; 1995), and Klaus Müller (Müller 1991; 1992; 1995). The purpose here 
is not to give an exhaustive elaboration of these authors’ attempts at reformulation, but 
to show that, though important new elements have been incorporated or are at least 
reflected upon, other problems of modernist theorising have remained (cf. Alexander 
1995).13
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13 In chapter 2, the importance of this revival for the debate on Eastern Europe wil become clear.
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Sztompka, in an initiation to reconstruct a theory of social change that can 
incorporate the experiences of the former communist societies, proposes to steer away 
from the paradigmatic focus of ‘transitology’ on institutional and political-economic 
change, in short, on a transition to a democratic and economic system, towards a 
‘cultural-civilizational’ approach (Sztompka 1995). While introducing a wider agenda 
than the economic reductionism of many transition approaches, and emphasising the 
lasting impact of ‘cultural-civilizationar elements (values, rules, standards) -  and 
thereby underlining the historicity o f current changes - Sztompka seems, however, to be 
unable to overcome an essentially singular view of modernity. Culture, in his view, 
becomes the equivalent o f mental obstacles to democratic reforms in the form of a 
‘cultural civilizational syndrome’, ‘civilizational incompetence’ or a ‘bloc culture’, and 
a ‘socialist habitus’ that proves detrimental to democracy and capitalism by inducing 
political passivity and corrupt practices. Modernity thus entails - similarly to the view of 
classical modemisationists — the universal nature and superiority o f modem Western 
norms and values (for a similar critique, see Borocz 2000). Sztompka’s usage of the 
designation ‘fake modernity’ for socialism, as opposed to the Western ‘authentic 
modernity’ further underlines this argument (Sztompka 1993: 137,140).
Another author that has sought to formulate a neo-modemisation approach is Edward 
Tiryakian (1995), who strives for an update of classical modernisation theory in order to 
shed light on the endogenous factors of the changes in Eastern Europe. Similar to 
Sztompka’s approach, Tiryakian identifies cultural hindrances to political and economic 
change, most importantly in collective mentalities bred during decades of autocratic 
regimes, and in the lack o f individualism and entrepeneurialism in Eastern Europe 
(Tiryakian 1995: 258-9). Despite the acceptance of a traditional-modem dichotomy that 
one might read into this, Tiryakian acknowledges that there are numerous routes to 
modernity (1995: 259-60; 1996: 3), and refers to different ‘centres of modernity’ or a 
‘cyclical nature’ of modernity. He thus introduces an element o f historicity in his view 
of modernity. At the same time, however, he seems to implicitly reproduce a singular 
view of modernity, i.e., an equation of modernisation with the modem society most 
successful in 'upgrading* (Tiryakian 1996: 3). Tiryakian defines modernisation as ’the 
purposeful, reflective, intended upgrading of a unit or a set of units to increase the 
productivity of that unit, or in social terms, to increase the wantsatisfaction of concerned
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actors and to increase the number of social actors concerned* (Tiryakian 1996: 3). One 
may read this as an affirmative stance towards Western modernity, also because ' 
"upgrading" translates into improving the quality of life in various sectors of the human 
condition1, whereas ' "downgrading" is not considered an 'underlying process of 
modernity* (Tiryakian 1996: 12, fn 5). The tension between increasing human autonomy 
and the simultaneous circumscription of that autonomy in any modem project seems 
absent here. Acknowledgement of the historical-situational meaning of modernity 
seems confined to the identification of different - historically relevant - routes to an 
essentially singular modernity. A further element introduced by Tiryakian is a theory of 
action (‘bringing the subject back in’), in rejection of the notions of societal 
differentiation and systemic maintenance of earlier modernists (Tiryakian 1991).14
Probably the most sustained effort to criticise modernisation theory in the context of 
transition theory has been made by Klaus Müller. Müller emphasises the ‘politics of 
modernisation’ and the dynamic forces that create modernisation, as classical 
modernisation theory systematically ignores political and social conflict (Müller 1991: 
270-1; 1992: 115). Moreover, Müller is sceptical of the one-dimensional ‘market- 
induced’ conception of modernisation that dominates the analysis of the changes in 
post-communist Eastern Europe, and which is based on the assumptions of spontaneous 
reorganisation, the ‘transfer of institutions’, and a negligence of the geo-temporal 
context in which the transformations take place (Müller 1992: 119; see also Bônker et 
al 2002). Transformation cannot be reduced to economic liberalisation, as social norms
14 This shift from a societal perspective to one placing the individual in the centre of social change is 
observable in Neo-Parsonian theorisation in general, which again takes an affirmative stance 
towards modernity and modernisation, this time by devising a theory of the individual, who plays 
the main part as the driving force of social change in a competitive environment of markets and 
flexibility (Wagner 2001b). Hence the focus on ‘civil society* in which the ‘individualised* 
individual can set his own boundaries by acting within different collectivities. Nevertheless, these 
efforts are testimonies to a return to modernist ideas in civil society that idealises ‘qualities like 
rationality, individuality, trust, and truth as essential qualities for inclusion in the modem, civil 
sphere, while identifying qualities such as irrationality, conformity, suspicion, and deceit as 
traditional traits that demand exclusion and punishment. There is a striking overlap between these 
ideological constructions and the explanatory categories of modernization theory, for example 
Parsons’s pattern variables’ (Alexander 1995:14).
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Pand cultural values are crucial in the construction of modem society (Müller 1995: 283, 
following Parsons here). Although he does not construct a detailed new approach to 
modernisation, Müller points to crucial aspects that a revised theory o f modernisation 
should incorporate. Like Tiryakian, Müller underlines the importance of a theory of 
action, i.e. the crucial role of political agency and strategic interaction or conflict over 
reforms, an emphasis which would correct the structural and functionalist assumptions 
of modernist approaches (Müller 1995: 282). This would also mean that, instead of 
departing from utilitarian assumptions towards actors' behaviour, one should consider 
‘the interpretative patterns with which the actors of transformation perceive themselves' 
(Müller 1995: 284).
These last remarks point to some aspects fundamental to an interpretative approach 
towards the transformations in Eastern Europe, and to modernisation and modernity in a 
general sense. Such an approach finds an effective point o f departure in approaches that 
underline the potential varieties of modernity, something that will form the basis for my 
own approach. Before turning to the elaboration of this approach, I will identify some 
essential assumptions of classical modernisation theory, as well as the re-emergence of 
these assumptions in transition theory in order to have a stable ground on which to 
construct an alternative approach.
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1.3 Presuppositions of m odernisation theory
The role o f  history in the modernist conception o f  social change
Modernisation and history are inextricably bound up with one another. As history 
evolves, the process of modernisation proceeds with it, or, at least, this is often assumed 
in the modernist view of modernisation. If viewed in this way, modernisation is not the 
outcome of human action, but, on the contrary, its evolutionary nature gains a Hegelian 
logic, as a universally valid and a-historical given of progress, irrespective of the 
individual actions of those that are struggling within the process of modernisation.15
15 History is then reduced to a: ‘mode of knowledge which equates history with a clear progression 
through determinate stages. One of the key legacies of nineteenth-century positivism in this sense 
has been to naturalize and objectify history as a quarry for the social sciences, able to provide inert 
material for the formation o f general laws. The flaw in this use of history is to present it as a
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Although actors (especially élites in non-modem countries) perform a special, 
‘functional’, role in initiating modernisation, after its actual beginning, i.e. after the 
actual adoption by a given society of the necessary instruments for modernisation, the 
process as such is assumed to take on an autonomous form and beget a sequential logic. 
The objective, evolutionary nature of modernisation is perhaps most visible in Parsons’ 
and Smelser’s widely used notion of ‘functional’ or ‘structural differentiation’. The 
notion of differentiation implies that the main logic by which traditional society evolves 
into a modem one is the division of society into evermore specialised units or sub­
systems. Through societal specialisation into four sub-systems (politics, economy, 
integration and value-maintenance), and the increasing functional specialisation of these 
sub-systems (according to functional exigencies), society obtains an ever-higher level of 
societal integration and coherence (see, e.g., Parsons and Smelser 1956: 39-51; Parsons 
1964; cf. Knöbl 2001).16
Despite an overall determinism and evolutionary approach present in modernisation 
theory, some authors that could be placed broadly within the modernist approach did 
point to the diversifying and non-linear nature of history, and argued that, although 
similarities in historical experiences can be identified, different trajectories in pursuing a 
modem society were possible, as was the non-achievement of modernity. Reinhard 
Bendix criticised the uni-linear nature and presumed inherent logic of modernisation. 
According to Bendix, two phenomena preclude any uni-linear reading of history.
First of all, as societies are not only subject to internal processes o f social change, but 
also receive external stimuli, modernisation is bound to take a different shape in 
societies in which modernisation is initiated at a later point than in the original modem 
societies. International emulation, which Bendix understands mainly as ‘the diffusion of 
ideas and technology*, plays a crucial role in modernisation, as, ‘modernization, once it
teleological account which ignores the unique standpoint of human agents as participants within 
history, and thus actively able to interpret and actualize history through thought. It is to visualize 
history as an objective context to be established and verified, rather than as a particular way of 
seeing, interpreting and ultimately acting’ (Amoore e ta l 2000: 58).
16 Another instance of determinism is found in the afore-mentioned Rostow’s proposal of a stage­
like character of societal historical development, in which different instances in the history of a 
given society can be ‘read’ as different instances of a pathway towards a ‘modem’ society.
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occurred anywhere, alters the conditions of all subsequent efforts at modernization’ 
(Bendix 1967: 328). Therefore, the Timing and sequence’ of modernisation matter 
greatly, and any modernisation project, in tum, cannot be exclusively dictated by an 
ever-progressing logic. Thus, Bendix points to the role o f  agency in modernisation as 
the ‘intervention’ of the government, particularly in ‘follower societies’, plays an 
important role in the direction modernisation takes (Bendix 1967: 327). Bendix further 
objects to a view of mutual exclusivity between the traditional and the modem, 
assuming a radical rupture between modernity and pre-modernity. A radical rupture 
makes possible the equation of what is ‘modem’ with the particular Western 
experiences of rationalisation, bureaucratisation, state-building, industrialisation and 
individualisation, observed in the Western world from the 16th century onwards and 
hence the proposed archetypal institutional stmcture for any modem society, consisting 
of a market economy, a democratic political system and a nation-state.17 The 
assumption of a decisive break in history obscures historical continuities, and its 
essentialisation of Western modernity into a universal experience ignores the possibility 
of changes in Western modernity over time. Moreover, the perception of an absolute 
break in time also makes it difficult to perceive the traditional in modem societies. 
Bendix, in contrast, assumed that the emergence of modem society was the result of 
‘culminations of specific European continuities’ and could thereby overcome the highly 
dichotomised vision of the traditional and the modem, and point to continuities of, for 
instance, collectivism and particularism in highly modem societies. Acknowledging the 
particularity o f Western modernity also allows for a more open understanding o f ‘later
17 The amalgamation of the Western experience of modernity with all others could also be found in 
the writings of the classical sociologists, such as Marx, Durkheim and Weber. As Wittrock puts it: 
‘...for a long time in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, modernization seemed almost 
self-evidently to be identical with Westernization. The champions of a triumphant European and 
American economic, political and cultural expansion and growth, at home and world-wide, but also 
its critics such as Marx, showed little inclination to question this equivocation of modernity with the 
development and diffusion of the cultural program of one type o f civilization1 (Wittrock 1999: 320). 
Similarly, Therbom remarks that ‘...neither sociology nor latter-day modernization theory was 
systematically concerned with the possibility and the eventual character of different routes to and 
through modernity. The former should be forgiven, as they dealt with the emergence of a new type 
of society or civilization, but later unilinearism has no excuse’ (Therbom 1995: 5).
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modernities’, which perhaps partly develop by following the Western experience 
(‘catching-up’), but always have creative space for interpretation and adaptation 
according to local circumstances.18
Where Bendix criticised the evolutionist nature of modernisation theory and 
acknowledged the possibility of ‘different routes’ to modernity, Barrington Moore 
empirically elaborated on these different routes in a major historical-comparative work, 
in which he analysed different revolutions -  in England, France, the United States, and 
China, Japan, and India -  and focused on the inter-linkages between social groups, 
especially the landed classes and the peasantry. He eventually came up with three ways 
in which societies have been transformed from agricultural into modem industrial 
societies, i.e. bourgeois revolutions leading to capitalist democracy, abortive bourgeois 
revolutions leading to fascism, and peasant revolutions leading to communism. 
According to him, ‘[t]he ways in which the landed upper classes and the peasants 
reacted to the challenge of commercial agriculture were decisive factors in determining 
the political outcome’ (1966: xvii). Barrington Moore acknowledged that modernisation 
does not necessarily entail the repetition of Western experience, and take a variety of 
forms. Modem societies do not necessarily have to be capitalist and the ‘partial truth 
emerges that non-democratic and even antidemocratic modernization works’ (1966: 
159), as seen as for instance in Soviet Russia, or the other socialist countries.19
18 The ‘forced choice nature of the binary categories* (Alexander 1995:15; Alexander calls the use 
of these dichotomies ‘binary coding’) makes the vision of alternatives to social life almost 
impossible.
19 Notwithstanding this more interpretative approach to social change, Barrington Moore did not 
seem to circumvent the problem of an evolutionary logic in his work. His ultimate persistence on a 
stage-like character of social change becomes clear in remarks such as ‘[t]he fact that any specific 
institutional complex develops first in one country and then in another... is no bar to a generally 
evolutionary conception of history. No single country goes through all the stages, but merely carries 
the development a certain distance within the framework of its own situation and institutions’ 
(1966: 427). Furthermore, similar to Bendix’s observation, Barrington Moore acknowledges but 
never works out systematically that ‘the methods of modernization chosen in one country change 
the dimensions of the problem for the next countries who take the step...* (1966: 414). Nevertheless, 
Barrington Moore mainly looks for explanations in the differences between the routes in an intra- 
societal way, focusing on commercialisation, the relations between the peasantry, the upper landed
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Whereas the original modernisation theories assumed a deterministic logic of the 
modernisation process, the theoretical counterpart o f these theories, i.e., structural 
theory in the form of world system theory, can be said to acquire a functional and 
systemic logic after the modem world system is in place. Although structural theory 
(together with its predecessor dependency theory) formed a direct reaction to 
modernisation theory and refuted its presupposition that integration into Western 
structures and the adoption of Western institutions by peripheral societies would lead to 
a repetition of Western ‘modernisation’, it became itself trapped in proposing a 
functional-structural logic to history. The behaviour of the basic units of the modem 
world system, states, is analysed only by referring to the logic of a system which is 
characterised by a periphery dependent on the core, and in which the only change 
possible is the succession of hegemonies (Wallerstein 1974: 349-50; see for similar 
critiques, Sewell 1996: 248-5120; van der Pijl 1998: 346). In this case, modernisation 
consists of the challenge to the hegemonic power at any given point in time, and a 
potential bid for replacing the hegemonic power in the world system.
The traditional versus the m odem
In the modernist approach, traditional and modem societies are conceived of as two, 
mutually exclusive, societal systems, each with entirely different sets of attributes. An 
almost infinite range of attributes for each kind of society has been proposed. In its most 
simple form tradition was equated with features such as irrationalism, particularism, and 
a religious world view, whereas modem features involved rationalism, universalism, 
and a secular, individualist world view.21 More sophisticated models involved, for 
instance, a diffused social structure as opposed to a specialised one, ascriptive forms of 
status as opposed to status based on achievement, particularist criteria of recruitment as 
opposed to universalist, meritocratic ones, collectivism as opposed to individualism, and
classes, and the nobility, without systematically regarding extraneous influences on domestic 
phenomena.
20 As Sewell puts it: ‘the fates of local communities are determined not by local causes but by the 
operation of global, system-level causes... But once we have begun to explain spatially and 
temporally localized events as a consequence of their place in a totality of world evolution, we are 
perilously close to teleological explanation* (1996: 249-50).
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affectivity as opposed to neutrality (the ones mentioned here are Parsons’ ‘pattern 
variables’, see Sztompka 1993: 74). By means of these attributes, one would be able to 
identify different forms of societies, and range them according to their level of 
modernity. As social change is understood as the transition of traditional societies into 
modem ones, traditional attributes must necessarily give way to modem ones. Under 
such assumptions of teleological social change, i.e. all social change is directed towards 
a given end-state, one is essentially only able to show the approximation o f a given 
society towards the generalised Western model.21 2 Yet, this identification forecloses the 
analysis of the potential occurrence of unprecedented phenomena, reinterpretations of 
modem features in local contexts, as well as social conflicts over modernisation and the 
possible contingent nature o f certain historical events. The often assumed 
interrelatedness of sets of attributes in ‘before-and-after’ models (Bendix 1967: 315) 
further complicates the identification of alternative experiences with modernity.
Agency and modernisation
In general, modernisation theory worked with an evolutionary understanding of social 
change, and was dominated by studies that engaged in large-scale, comparative and 
mostly quantitative research. The assumption of the general validity of Western modem 
society inherent in most modernist approaches, which provided the basis for an 
evolutionary understanding of history, was however constantly in tension with the 
particular constellations that had brought about Western modernity itself. In other 
words, even if a general logic of modernisation could be detected, it was always 
embodied by specific modernising agents. Within the debate on modernisation, one 
tried to identify those actors or constellations thereof that were held to be the initiators 
of social change as they would embody a necessary 'dynamic potential' within a 
traditional environment (Harrison 1988: 30-1; Knobl 2001: 179-87). Such agents would 
emulate modem institutions, which would subsequently be diffused throughout 
traditional society. Various contenders for the role of 'change agents’ were proposed. 
For the most part, the popular and rural masses were ignored, in favour of a focus on the
21 That this was not true for all modernist theorists is shown by Knöbl (2001).
22 Modernists could thus understand the 'alternative' strategy o f modernisation in the Soviet Union 
as 'fallfing] within the general pattern’ (see Müller 1997: 16).
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higher strata of society, and especially political élites and intellectuals, from whom the 
diffusion of cultural values to the larger masses and the capacity for mobilisation were 
expected to emanate (Harrison 1988: 30-1; Knobl 2001). As, in an empirical sense, such 
actors often failed to live up to their role of 'functional élites', a safer agent o f 
modernisation seemed to be the urban middle class, which was deemed best capable to 
engage in the diffusion of modem values. In this sense, the expansion of the middle 
class was seen as a necessary condition for the moderation of social conflict and the 
development of democracy. In this assumption, modernisation theory came close to 
neo-Marxist approaches, which also see the bourgeoisie as the prime modernising agent 
in peripheral societies, albeit an agent that would prolong these societies' subjugation to 
core countries. The designation o f one, universally applicable, agent of modernisation 
proved hard to reconcile with reality in many societies, and was abandoned for a much 
more abstract approach towards social change, most prominently by means o f Parsons' 
and Smelser's introduction of structural differentiation as a way of both circumventing 
rigid uni-linearity and agentless social change (Knobl 2001). Nevertheless, in transition 
theories dealing with post-communist societies, assumptions on specific dynamic actors 
(entrepeneurs) that are identified as the carriers of modernity have reappeared.
Recurring ideas of modernisation
2. Recurring ideas of modernisation in transition theories
2.1 Introduction
The swift demise of communism as a real and viable alternative to Western modernity 
was widely interpreted as the apparent victory of a singular model o f modernity 
throughout the world. This is particularly visible in the way policy-makers and the 
academic world analyse the changes as such and prescribe policies to be implemented in 
order to ensure a smooth transition process for the countries concerned. Debates have, 
until recently, been dominated by various strands of what we could call (neo-) 
modernisation approaches (cf. Altvater 1998; Bönker et ai. 2002), which demonstrate a 
significant continuity with the modernisation approaches of the 1940s and 1950s. As 
elaborated above, modernist approaches perceive a unique answer to major social 
problems such as underdevelopment and poverty in the form of a transition and 
adaptation of the former socialist societies to a Western type of democratic market 
economy. The countries concerned need to adopt Western political, economic, legal and 
financial institutions and to rearrange their state structures and budgets according to 
Western n o n m J n  short, they have to transform their communist societies into Western- 
type capitalist and democratic ones.23 A partial revival of modernist theoretical ideas as 
well as ideas o f totalitarianism has occurred (the later approach of totalitarianism, that 
departed decisively from Hannah Arendt's initial historical-philosophical study, 
regarded communism as a pathology rather than as an extreme case of modernity). Both 
theories repudiated any ‘modem’ aspects of the socialist experiments and their revival 
pushes contemporary research towards normative and policy-oriented approaches that 
analyse current developments in terms of approximation to a Western model of society 
(cf. Müller 1997). Concerning the wider debate on Eastern Europe, the theorisation of
23 Cf. Alexander: ’Jeffrey Sachs and other simpliste expositors of the ‘big bang’ approach to 
transition seem to be advocating a rerun of Rostow’s earlier ‘take-off theory. Like that earlier 
species of modernization idea, this new monetarist modernism throws concerns of social solidarity 
and citizenship, let alone any sense of historical specificity, utterly to the winds* (Alexander 1995: 
44).
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changes has (perhaps until recently) been dominated by what has been termed 
‘transitology’, including descriptive as well as prescriptive approaches, both of which 
share some basic premises:
... the Soviet model is seen as having failed in competition with the west, and its legacy is 
reducible to after-effects: dysfunctional patterns of development and mentalities unadapted to 
the market continue to obstruct the progress of transformation. The victorious western model 
has, by the same token, become a blueprint for the future, and the agenda of the transition can 
be defined in terms of measures and policies which would bring the countries in question closer 
to this really existing ideal. ... The most fundamental -  albeit often latent - premise of 
transitology is that the current western constellation of capitalism, democracy, and the nation­
state (allowing for some differences of opinion on the relative weight of the last factor) 
represents a universal and definitive model on its way to global ascendancy (Amason 2000b).24
As noted at in chapter 1, theories about post-communist societies are informed by 
two different points of departure. The first one is the idea, as described above, that the 
collapse o f communism has confirmed a singular view o f modernity. For the 'transition 
countries', this means that their experiences are basically comparable and compatible 
with earlier experiences elsewhere (Latin America, Southern Europe; see for instance, 
Przeworski 1991). This means that theoretical concepts as well as models of 
modernisation developed for social change different in time and place can be applied to 
the current experiences without much amendment. The basic premise is that the 
'democratic market society’ is 'universally applicable' (Bönker et al. 2002). Despite the
24 These premises are to be found in different guises not only in the theoretical debate but also in the 
policy-making world. Assessments of the transformation of the countries concerned are made by the 
European Union (EU), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the 
Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations (ECE/UN), major rating agencies who 
assess countries’ credit-worthiness and investor-friendliness, the academic world itself, etc. As 
Miiller (quoting Giddens) argues, original modernisation theory -  despite major criticism from 
within and without - has survived in this ‘wide variety of comparative studies conducted under the 
auspices o f the international organisations, such as the reports of the International Labour Office 
(ILO), numerous special investigations by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World 
Bank’s annual Human Development Report...* (Miiller 1995: 269). All these analyses accrue from 
the idea that these countries are located on a specific point of a continuum which consists of a 
socialist centrally planned economy on the one hand and a capitalist democratic society on the
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dominant and paradigmatic position of modernist approaches, this view has been 
steadily criticised, not only on the basis of observed empirical deviations (prolonged 
socio-economic crises), but more importantly, on the basis of its primary theoretical 
assumptions, in particular modernism’s inherent teleology and singularity. Current 
critique25 - in a similar way as the critiques formulated on classical modernisation 
theory (see section 1.3) - focuses on the a-historical nature of modernist approaches, its 
passing over of diversity in terms of legacies and current experiences, and the 
modernists' theory of action. The critiques taken together form a second point of 
departure, in which post-communist societies are ultimately conceived of as being in a 
unique situation. This observation has led to the acceptance of varieties of experiences 
and different routes to modernity, and to the construction of theories dedicated to 
demonstrate the particularisms and divergence inherent in the transformation processes 
(these critiques comprise institutionalist approaches, political economy, and élite 
theories, as well as the neo-modemisation approaches referred to earlier in chapter 1; for 
the former, see Hyal et al. 1998; Eyal et al. 2003; Pickles and Smith 1998; Stark and 
Bruszt 1998).
A critique of ‘theorising the transition’ in Eastern Europe based both on the problems 
identified with modernist approaches, and problems specific to the ‘transitology’ debate 
will serve to further outline an alternative approach towards social change and 
modernisation in Eastern Europe. I will focus on concepts similar to those applied in 
chapter 1 to uncover the self-limiting nature o f the debate on social change in Eastern 
Europe. As my claim is that current realities in Eastern Europe cannot be properly 
understood without introducing a history of earlier projects of modernisation within the 
region, embedded in a broader global understanding of modernisation, I will focus on 
the perception of temporality in relevant theories, the understanding of the modem, and 
the actors involved in promoting modernity.
other. Assessments are made of where these countries are situated now and to what extent they 
approximate a final state, i.e. the Western democratic market economy.
25 For an early critique, see Stark 1990; see also Bryant and Mokrzycki 1994.
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2.2 Presuppositions of transition theory
H istory as past tense or history as continuity into the present?
Prior to 1989 communism was perceived -  almost without exception -  as a viable and 
stable system; its sudden collapse could not be accounted for in any theoretical way. 
Even the approach of totalitarianism, that regarded Soviet societies as ultimately 
unsustainable, perceived the same societies as completely centralised, its masses as 
completely atomised and thus incapable of action, and therefore radical change as not 
very likely to occur (see von Beyme 1994; Müller 1997). The downfall o f the 
communist systems proved this -  partially ideologically sustained -  insistence on the 
stability of totalitarian society as ultimately unfounded. Thus, in the post-1989 debate 
on social change in Eastern Europe, the legacies of that same communist system have 
been interpreted predominantly as institutions and cultural attitudes of either a 'failed 
alternative modernity', or as incapable of convergence with Western modernity. So, 
where before 1989 totalitarian institutions were perceived as bastions of power, after 
1989, the same institutions have been brushed aside as mere debris inhibiting the 
establishment o f a true ‘modem* society. In this context, shock therapies -  triple 
adjustment programmes of privatisation, price liberalisation and macro-economic 
stabilisation - are promoted that should do away with the non-functional remnants of the 
past order, and create as soon as possible a situation in which, with a clean slate, the 
new democratic market economies can arise.26 The totalitarian understanding of 
communism (i.e., as a pathology) has been re-adopted and complemented by neoliberal 
ideas that perceive the complete destruction of the old as a necessary condition for a 
new spontaneous market order. The triple package o f shock therapy is not only 
attractive in that it contributes to reaching the stage of 'institutional vacuum' (along the 
way eliminating political attachments to the old system), but also in its promise to create 
a Western type o f 'self-organising' market society (cf. Burawoy and Verdery 1999: 5).27
26 Even in the ever-present other ‘extreme’ of policy options for post-communist societies, 
gradualism, the notion of doing away with the old and starting anew is highly present.
27 The meagre results of these shock therapies are then interpreted as signs of success, i.e. if one 
promotes the idea that post-socialist countries first have to go through a ‘valley of tears’ in order to 
emerge as stable and prosperous societies. Alternatively, badly functioning shock therapies are 
interpreted as consequences of bad management by international agencies such as the IMF and the
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The ‘transfer o f institutions’, and in particular the creation of a ‘civil society* in post­
communist societies is presumed to result in both political and economic structures that 
closely resemble Western ones, so ‘transition is a relatively unproblematic 
implementation of a set of policies involving economic liberalisation and marketisation 
alongside democratisation, enabling the creation of a market economy and a liberal 
polity* (Pickles and Smith 1998: 1). The triple reform package should then primarily be 
read as a means to create efficiency and functional differentiation, i.e. dividing economy 
and politics, and politics and civil society in order to overcome the blockage of 
differentiation that apparently led to the implosion of communism (cf. Amason 2000a: 
73).
Transitology has been predominantly concerned with a radical and complete rupture 
with the communist past. The transition itself was meant to consist of the irreversible 
establishment of a differentiated democratic market economy, emphasising the end-state 
of systemic change, rather than the struggles and continuities involved in the change 
from one system to another (cf. Bryant and Mokrzycki 1994: 3-4). Two aspects become 
apparent here: first of all, history is read in a teleological way, as the evolving 
approximation towards an already known end-state, constituted by a single path or 'one 
best way'; second, this end destination is understood as the affirmation of Western 
modernity as a singular, universally applicable model. The normative rejection of 
alternatives to the Western model, as well as the unawareness of modem and potentially 
’functional' features of the communist societies, however, results in a negation of 
essential differences within and between the Eastern European countries (Burawoy 
1992), and at the same time to an a-historical homogenisation of the Western modem 
experiences. An instance of this is found in the notion o f a ‘return to Europe*. In one 
reading, it means the imaginary homogenisation of societal models into a singular 
vision of a democratic market economy to which the Eastern European societies are 
returning after a detour to communism. The revolutions are then seen as the 
confirmation of the authentic history of these countries: ‘[t]he movements away from 
dictatorship, motivated in practice by the most variegated of concerns, have been 
articulated mythically as a vast, unfolding ‘drama of democracy’ (Sherwood 1994),
World Bank, or as the outcome of obstructionist behaviour by members of the old communist 
nomenklatura (cf. Burawoy and Verdery 1999).
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literally as an opening up of the spirit of humanity* (Alexander 1995: 33). The idea of 
rejoining Europe can be attractive in a variety o f ways. Delegitimised conceptions of a 
state-socialist society, and of Marxism-Leninism, made ruling élites in these countries -  
at least initially -  seem very much attracted to the apparently neutral idea o f rejoining 
the Western project of modernity. However, in reality, the move away from 
communism did not necessarily entail the direct imitation of, or the unproblematic 
support for, Western liberalism and democracy. Such a single-minded explanation of 
the idea o f rejoining the West-European project of modernity stumbles across various 
problems (here, my comments are overlapping with the ones I made earlier). First of all, 
it is ‘[ejrstaunlich... in welcher Arglosigkeit sie in den geschichtsphilosophischen 
Tenor der älteren Modemisierungstheorie zurückfällt, um bei einer höchst riskanten 
Stilisierung historischer Verläufe anzukomm en/ (Müller 1991: 279; see also Mänicke- 
Gyögyösi 1995). In short, by taking an ideal and normative idea of Western society as a 
Leitmotiv for transformation in Eastern Europe, the actual dynamics and conflicts in the 
processes are lost from sight. Once again, the assumption of a universal, a-historical 
logic to social change is present here. Secondly, the idea of a ‘rückspülende Revolution* 
(rewinding revolution, as coined by Habermas 1990) that should enable a ‘nachholende 
Revolution* refers not only to a highly problematic past.28 More importantly, the idea of 
skipping over or erasing the socialist experiences as failed attempts o f counter- 
modernisation in itself fails to lead to meaningful insights in current empirical 
situations. Thirdly, the concept o f  ‘nachholende Modernisierung’ amalgamates the 
various Western experiences with modernity into an ideal-type that is not a direct 
reflection o f  current Western practices but rather a normative projection o f Western 
society on Eastern Europe. In concreto, this means that a  version of Western modernity 
is promoted that is seemingly stripped from its internal contradictions. In reality, 
however, one could equally argue that Western experiences with modernity are likewise 
made up o f partial modernisation, i.e. the Western project of modernity is not finished
28 The assumption of a direct return to the interwar Eastern Europe with its liberal and democratic 
traditions implies a romanticised view of history that is hardly worth upholding, not in the least 
because of the fascist and dictatorial tendencies that followed many of the democratic experiences 
in Eastern Europe (Mliller 1991: 280).
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as such and always retains a temporary and situational character, that is to say, is always 
open to contestation and alternative interpretations.
Modernist approaches generally fail to appreciate both historical diversity and the 
possibility o f contemporary diverging paths and interpretations of modernisation (von 
Beyme 1994). Prior to the by now seemingly self-evident downfall o f communism in 
Eastern Europe, many theorists regarded communism as an alternative strategy to 
construct a modem society. However, in current-day transition theory Bendix's and 
Barrington Moore’s critique of classical modernisation theory, in which they identified 
the potentiality of diverse ways in approaching the modernising project, is hardly 
incorporated. Instead, the triumph of the Western model as the only and therefore 
universal one has been widely recognised (without however being granted the status of 
'grand narrative'), whereas the communist systems are primarily understood 
negatively29. This failure to provide an insightful account of the different experiences in 
Eastern Europe, both before and after 1989, leads to a rather ‘restricted understanding of 
social change’ (Burawoy 1992: 774). As Müller (1995: 272) notes:
[wjithout too much exaggeration, one may discern a convenient merger between economic theory, 
political science and sociology; neo-classical economists argue on the basis of functional 
requirements of effective markets; political scientists cite the imperatives of Western-style 
democracy; sociologists refer to the institutional requisites for functioning markets. All this makes 
sense in discussion of what East European societies do not have. The real question, however, is how 
rudimentary markets with fragile democracies can operate in times of lost orientation and in an 
environment of delegitimized institutions. And the kind of dynamics that this triggers/
The main point for which modernist approaches have been criticised is exactly their 
assumption of uni-linearity and negligence of historical legacies. Alternative approaches 
take as their direct starting point the historical nature of the current transformations. 
They do not regard transformation as basically ‘a one-way process o f change from one
29 Indeed, Müller suggests using the term ‘negative sociology’ for approaches that use ‘a kind of 
applied theory of totalitarianism which maintains that, since the system of real socialism has totally 
failed, it will shortly totally disappear -  a process often labelled ‘creative destruction”  (Müller 
1995: 277).
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hegemonic system to another’ (Pickles and Smith 1998: 1). Rather, current social 
change is seen as directly bound up with old social relations and institutions, and 
therefore can only be understood in a historical way. The presentation of social change 
as a mere process of ‘catching up’, achieved by adopting the right institutions is rejected 
(see Pickles and Smith 1998, Burawoy and Verdery 1999, Amason 2000b). Instead, 
alternative approaches focus on diversity, particularity and continuity with the past in 
order to explain and understand (diversity in) contemporary social change in Eastern 
Europe. The communist world is not then regarded merely as an aberration (as in 
totalitarianism) leaving behind only structures that need to be dismantled as soon as 
possible. Rather, its modem features are (often implicitly) acknowledged. Here, I will 
identify three responses to the dominant paradigm of modernist neoliberalism.
The first response is an attempt, as we have seen earlier, to revitalise modernisation 
theory. The essentially uni-linear and Euro-centric understanding of modernisation is 
left behind in favour of a historicisation of modernity through the acknowledgement of 
'shifting centres of modernity' and the 'politics of modernisation'. As Müller has 
observed, ‘modernisation’ as a sociological concept and as a model for policy-makers, 
has undergone paradigmatic shifts in its short history: '[a] It hough the success of 
Western post-war modernization depended closely on a set of Keynesian policies until 
the 1960s, matters have radically changed in the last decade. In the early 1980s, 
'modernization* came to signify an international policy of deregulation which rendered it 
increasingly difficult for politics to  intervene in economic processes’ (1995: 273). 
Despite the insights one gains from  the actual historical-situational rootedness of 
projects of modernisation, it is less clear how one loses an essentially singular view of 
modernity in such a move. In other words, although the historical character of the 
current dominance of the neoliberal project becomes visible, potential diversity in 
dealing with contemporary modernity seems to be left unexplored.
In a second approach, it is precisely the acknowledgement of diversity in current 
transformations that constitutes the theory’s pinnacle. So-called path-dependency 
approaches point to the distinctiveness of the Eastern European experiences, in that 
current change is circumscribed by the endurance of older institutions. This means that a 30
30 Although Müller does hint at the role of actors and conflict in modernisation (see chapter 1, p.
28), he does not systematically work out this observation.
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new order is not built in an 'institutional void’, nor on top of the ruins of communism, 
but is rather constructed with the legacies of communism, leading to forms of 
institutional 'bricolage' which might end in some kind of innovation (Pickles and Smith 
1998: 1-4; Stark and Bruszt 1998: 7). Path dependency theory sees ‘political economic 
transformation’ as an ‘evolutionary and path-dependent process’, ‘based upon 
institutionalised forms of learning and struggles over pathways that emerge out of the 
intersection of old and new’ (Pickles and Smith 1998: 15). In other words, path 
dependency theory claims that current and future developments can only be fully 
understood if the past is reflected upon, so that the constraints and confinements as well 
as the possibilities for current transitions become clear (see for instance Stark and 
Bruszt 1998, Chavance and Magnin 1997, and some of the chapters in Pickles and 
Smith 1998). Despite this primary attention on contemporary diversity and the relation 
of this diversity with the past, the treatment of the past itself remains rather cursory in 
many path-dependency approaches. For Stark and Bruszt, the articulation of the past in 
the present has been confined to the moment of regime change that produces a variety 
of 'paths of extrication’. The specific ways societies emerged out of the revolutions of 
1989 (reunification in Germany, electoral competition in Hungary, compromise in 
Poland, and capitulation in Czechoslovakia), consequently shaped political institutions 
and forms of interest mediation between state and society (Stark and Bruszt 1998: 101). 
Thus the outcome of the interplay between dominant actors (reform and orthodox 
communists, and ruling élites and opposition) at the - admittedly crucial - moment of 
regime change is taken as the primary factor in explaining diverse pathways in the 
1990s (Burawoy 2001; Dobry 2000: 56). In short, the constellation of dominant actors 
at a particular intersection defines the specific pathway taken.31 Despite the 
acknowledgement of diversity, one can identify here a form of historical determinism in 
which the eventual outcome is defined by a designated earlier moment of change, 
between which the paths of extrication then merely run their pre-defined courses (Dobry 
2000: 62). What is more, it is not entirely clear why the moments of regime change 
embody the essentials of relevant history. Although the outcome of élite struggles in the 
moment of collapse of the old regime has important implications for the system that
31 As Burawoy remarks: 'the diverse ways of reworking the past spring from diverse political
conjunctures in the moments of dissolution' (2001:1108).
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emerges afterwards, the potentiality of the emergence of historical legacies in a later 
moment of the transition or the possibility for the occurrence of highly contingent 
events should not be ruled out.32 So, other (long-term) continuities that might shape 
actors* behaviour after regime change then seem foreclosed from view, perhaps most 
importantly historically formed cognitive frameworks that potentially shape the course 
of transition (for instance, in the form of non-liberal and non-capitalist discursive 
traditions and the dynamics these discourses can create).33
A third response to the uni-linearity and evolutionism o f modernist approaches picks 
up exactly this point. Neo-classical sociology (Eyal et a l  1998; 2001) explicitly 
underlines the importance o f long historical continuities in contemporary social change. 
Moreover, the outcome of the current transformations is considered 'an open question’ 
(Eyal et al. 1998: 39). The neo-classical approach, as path-dependency, problématisés 
the modernist assumption o f capitalism-by-design that can be imposed from above, 
creating institutions that will have similar outcomes everywhere. Instead, a potential 
diversity of outcomes is assumed, as capitalism itself can take the form of a 'diverse set 
of social actors and institutions'. According to neo-classical sociology, the particularity 
of post-communist (they refer to Central European, as distinct from Eastern European) 
capitalism is exactly a form of 'capitalism without capitalists', thus without the class that 
was historically significant in bringing about capitalism (Eyal et a l  1998: 3). Historicity 
is then a correction of the assumption of timeless social mechanisms and a way to bring 
out 'the historical specificity of our times’ (Eyal et a l  2003: 17). Eyal et a l  introduce a 
diachronic comparison of historical projects o f modernisation, as 'Central European 
intellectuals have been attracted to various ambitious historical projects to reshape their 
societies, and [...] whatever else may be, the power bloc that rules contemporary post­
communism is heir to their projects* (1998: 11). They identify different historical 
projects, in which different logics inform social agents: the nineteenth-century project of
32 As Dobry (2000: 58) asks: 'why, after all, the focus on "extrication paths", while details and 
descriptions frequently suggest the causal weight of the whole communist period, its social 
structures, and, in particular, the social networks generated during that period, which implies a 
whole other temporality than the short span of moments of "extrication”?’
33 The unawareness regarding such features is perhaps also a result of path-dependency's explicit 
focus on different capitalisms rather than other, alternative arrangements.
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a Bildungsbiirgertum creating a bourgeois society, a subsequent reaction to the slow 
modernisation in the region in the form of communism and fascism, and the current re- 
emergence o f bourgeois liberalism (Eyal et al. 1998: 24-36). These three projects have 
been shaped in different historical contexts, in which competing logics of social 
stratification existed, based on class and rank order. Different perceptions of the social 
order (legal-rational domination or clientelism) informed then the major social 
struggles, finding temporary solutions in institutionalised systems of stratification. 
Moreover, actors are seen as being endowed with different forms of capital (economic, 
social, and cultural) which provides them with different opportunities, depending on the 
dominant logic of the period. The particularity of Central Europe (and Germany) is 
considered to be the relative historical importance of cultural capital, as opposed to the 
significance of economic capital in Western Europe (Eyal et al. 1998: 25-6). In post­
communist Central Europe, it is then again a coalition of agents endowed with cultural 
capital that shape the current social structures. Diversity in post-communist pathways, 
but also continuity is thus the outcome of agency. In times of social change individual 
actors seek to preserve their social position (or to remain in their social trajectory) by 
learning to adapt to external changes, partly by referring back to their earlier formed 
habitus (Eyal et al. 1998: 8-9, 39). They do not leave these habituses intact, but adapt 
them to the best of their capabilities to the new circumstances (hence the term ’trajectory 
adjustment').
Though neoclassical sociology goes a long way in historicising the currently shaped 
societies in Central Europe, and is able to explain the specificity of post-communist 
societies by referring to historically formed attitudes and institutions, the primary 
emphasis on a cultural bourgeoisie ’whose project is to foster the transition from rank 
order to a system of class stratification’ (Eyal et al. 1998: 47) forecloses analyses of 
alternative projects of modernisation that might be pursued by actors with a very 
different mind-set. The insistence on the cultural bourgeoisie as the 'bearers of the 
project of modernization' (Eyal et al. 1998: 60) means that Eyal et al. see in Central 
Europe the emergence of a new project of modernisation, whereas Eastern Europe and 
Russia are characterised as being in the mere process of 'involution, i.e. a form of 
adaptation to the imposition of capitalism from above' (Eyal et al. 2003: 15).
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The traditional versus the m odem
The announcement of the 'end of history', which implied the triumph of a singular 
modernity, concomitantly recreated the modernist dichotomy between the traditional 
and the modem. From this perspective, the institutional and cultural legacies of 
communism embodied the traditional, whereas (a specific image of) Western society 
represented the ultimate goal of any modem project. Although modernists reproached 
the communist project for its self-acclaimed capacity to reshape society from above, 
they proposed an equally 'designer-type of project in which the post-communist élites 
should copy and impose key Western institutions on their societies, namely in the form 
of a market economy based on legally protected private property and free competition, 
and political democracy based on a constitutionally guaranteed pluralism and party 
competition. The centrally planned economy was placed in sharp contraposition with 
the self-organising market, thereby evaluating the philosophy of the scientific 
management o f society through the state as traditional and counterproductive, and the 
allegedly spontaneously evolving logic of the market as the archetypal modem 
solution.34 State planning was associated with inertia and de-differentiation, and market 
forces with dynamism and differentiation. This contraposition of the state to the market 
was further exemplified in the distinction between self-reliant, closed economies, as 
opposed to open market economies, that were deemed highly functional in a globalised 
economy. Similarly, in the political sphere, the vision of a totally subordinated and 
homogenous society to the monopolist party-state under communism was contrasted 
with the Western democratic pluralist party system of institutionalised political conflict 
and a counterweight to state power in an autonomous civil society. On the level of the 
individual, (implicit) assumptions are made of an atomised, apathetic, state-dependent 
individual under communism (homo sovieticus) as opposed to a participative, socially 
active, rationally calculating, and autonomously acting individual (homo economicus) 
in modem societies. The cultural legacies of communism are then predominantly 
assessed in their quality of obstructing the transition towards the pre-determined goal of 
a democratic market economy. The labelling of communist legacies as 'cultural-
34 Jeffrey Sachs has formulated the self-evidence of the superiority of market arrangements as 
follows: '[mjany of the economic problems solve themselves: markets spring up as soon as central 
planning bureaucrats vacate the field’ (Sachs in: Bônker et a i  2002: 7).
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civilisational syndrome' or t>loc culture’ - the outcome o f both being the internalisation 
of communist norms and values and adaptive individual reactions towards communism 
- further underline their identification in strictly negative terms, consisting of passivism, 
political apathy, illicit behaviour, and a tenacity o f 'welfarist' ideas (cf. Sztompka 1995).
The broad (but inflexible) distinction between communism as traditional and the 
democratic market economy as modem reproduces the risks inherent in classical 
modernisation theory, i.e. the construction of two mutually exclusive and ’generalizable 
systems of interrelated variables* (Bendix 1967: 309, for this critique on classical 
modernisation theory) which ultimately only allows for the identification of social 
change as the transition from one to the other. This risk has been acknowledged and 
problematised by those that emphasise diverse routes in transformation (just as Bendix 
identified the diversity of modem societies). Both Stark and Bruszt (1998) and Eyal et 
al. (1998) emphasize their concern for diversity in their inquiry into a possible variety 
of capitalisms. The diversity in transformation and outcome is, according to them, 
predominantly the outcome of different constellations of key actors and their 
perceptions.
Élites and social groups in transformation
One of the continuities in Eastern Europe is that the current renewed attempts at 
modernisation are to a great extent élite-driven projects, i.e. they are carried out by 
relatively small groups of individuals in society that are capable of initiating projects of 
social change (see Higley et al. 1998; Eyal et a l  1998). Whereas any definition of what 
an élite constitutes is difficult to uphold through time35, theories dealing with social 
change rarely completely ignore the role of certain groups in society that seek to 
promote their own visions of that society. In classical modernisation theory, as well as 
in Marxism, there was a focus on either the urban bourgeoisie or the entrepeneur as the 
promoting agent of modem society. In the modernist approaches of transition theory, 
'functional élites' or 'change agents' that will construct a new order on the basis of 
Western institutions are identified with radical reformers on a political level (in contrast
35 Discussions about relations between governing élites and society can traced back to as early as the
nineteenth century, most importantly held by political scientists such as Vilfredo Pareto and
Gaetano Mosca (see Bottomore 1993).
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to conservative, obstructionist forces tied to the old regime). By means of the transfer of 
the right institutions by these modernisers, the right actors which can sustain the new 
order can emerge, i.e., the citizen and the entrepeneur, who are believed to share rather 
similar characteristics that are conducive to the new order.36 37As Eyal et a l  argue, 
modernist thinking is based on the assumption that 'if you create the proper institutions, 
they will shape the individuals that occupy them so that individual behavior will 
conform to institutional constraints and imperatives* (Eyal et a l  1998: 8-9). This is so, 
because, by means of the withdrawal o f the state from society (organised by the radical 
reformers), economic, negative freedom is created, which in turn also enhances political 
freedom, as individuals are less restrained by the state in their actions. In this 
institutional context, citizens and entrepeneurs emerge who hold the right mind-sets for 
the reproduction of the new order, whereas the role of the radical reformers is of a 
transitional kind. The absence of sustaining social forces is then interpreted as the need 
to create these social groups, partially to legitimate the new societal project, partially to 
create groups that actually promote the right vision of society. However, the existence 
of the transformational élites identified with the modernising project is taken for granted 
in most cases (Amason 2000b: 89).
The deterministic understanding and pre-defined nature of agency present in 
modernisation approaches is seen as a key problem by the aforementioned path- 
dependency theory and neo-classical sociology. One could read Stark and Bruszt's 
objection to considering the Eastern European civil societies as the main actors in the 
revolution and subsequent transformation as a critique of the assumption that a singular 
'right* modernising agent can be identified (Stark and Bruszt 1998: 15-6). In this, they 
take issue with the exclusive focus on one set of actors supposed to bring about 
modernisation. Instead, they argue for an interactionist approach in \Vhich they focus on 
relations between actors and their perceptions of their opponents’ strategies (Stark and
36 As, for instance, Kaminski and Kurczewska note: 'The two roles [of citizens and entrepeneurs] 
relate to different functional areas in social life, but they share many of the same traits. They entail 
self-reliant, self-confident individuals endowed with a sense of self-respect’ (1995: 132).
37 For similar reasons, communist élites considered it necessary to create the working class, and 
Eastern European Liberal élites in the interwar period perceived the need to construct the urban 
middle class.
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Bruszt 1998: 16). They see 'these capacities, perceptions and strategies [as] fluid rather 
than fixed... [T]he political organizational identities of major social actors change as 
they react to and interact with other competing strategies in the political field.' Indeed, a 
historicisation of the role o f élites further shows that in particular moments in history, in 
different societal contexts, different constellations of actors play the role of pioneers in a 
new society. To pinpoint one particular, a-historical agent of social change seems an 
unnecessary and, indeed, restrictive exercise. Modem society does not necessarily 
arise with the development of a specific social group, but can take different forms 
throughout time depending on the actors that initiate a modem project. Neo-classical 
sociology indeed explicitly historicises the role of agency in modernisation. The 'right* 
agent of change, which according to Eyal et a l  is usually identified with a capitalist 
class o f private owners in theories of transition to capitalism, can take various historical 
guises. This assumption underpins their hypothesis that the specificity of contemporary 
Central Europe is that there is a capitalism without a propertied bourgeoisie in the 
making. In other words, they perceive post-communism as a new order in which the 
agent of change is not a bourgeoisie of private property owners, but a bourgeoisie which 
possesses culture or knowledge (technocrats and managers), thereby including 
technocratic-intellectual élites in the emergence of a new form of society (Eyal et a l  
1998: 1). Nevertheless, where neo-classical sociology does take an open-ended and 
interpretative view of agency, it is still confined to the identification of a specific 
'change agent*. The transformational élite sees itself as *a historical vanguard whose 
mission is to create capitalism - even to create a class of proprietors' (Eyal et a l  1998: 
163). Here they come close to modernist assumptions, and seem unable to identify 
qualitatively different projects of modernisation (or capitalism, for that matter) other 
than in terms of ’capitalists without capitalism* and 'involution*. 38
38 In Western societies too, various groups have been identified as harbingers of change. As 
Bottomore notes: '[ajmong the social groups which have risen to prominence in the tremendous 
social and political changes of the twentieth century, three élites -  the intellectuals, the managers of 
industry and the high government officials - have often been singled out as the inheritors of he 
functions of earlier ruling classes and as vital agents in the creation of new forms of society’ 
(Bottomore 1993: 52).
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Varieties of modernity
3. Varieties of modernity
3.1 Introduction
Recently, social theorists have become much more sensitive in historicising modernity 
and modernisation, and have acknowledged the possibility of temporal-spatial varieties 
(see for instance Amason 1999; Eisenstadt 1999; 2000; Kaya 2004; Sachsenmaier and 
Riedel 2002; Wagner 1994, 2001 b). Although many theorists accept that modernity has 
enjoyed ‘historical precedence* in the Western world and was eventually reflected in the 
‘dual revolutions’, this is not taken to mean that Western patterns are the only ‘ 
’’authentic” modernities’ (Eisenstadt 2000:3).
One way of interpreting the unique constellation that emerged in Western Europe 
and America is that all societies eventually have to come to terms with extensive 
changes and will therefore find themselves in a position of reactive or ‘later 
modernising societies’. While these observations are basically right, the idea that later 
experiences with modernity can only be expressed in terms of the direct adoption of the 
political programme and institutional constellation of ‘original’ modernity, and diversity 
at most entails a ‘short-cut’ to Western modernity, leaves little room for articulations of 
local interpretation and creativity. Such a singular understanding of modernity assumes 
a universal validity of and convergence towards the Western model. Modernisation is 
then interpreted as a way to live up to the exigencies o f the modem Western world, 
without paying systematic attention to the way in which different societies dealt or deal 
with different problématiques of modernisation over time.
Here, modernity is understood not as a singular programme in which essential 
modem features are promulgated (instrumental rationality, individualism, secularly) 
without the adoption of which individual societies cannot claim to be modem. Rather, I 
hold that modernity is open for different interpretations and therefore cannot be reduced 
to a narrow reading of modernity as the historical experience of the West. Nevertheless, 
if modernity as a concept is to have any heuristic validity for the analysis of different 
societies, it needs to be perceived as comprising at least some basic tenets and 
characteristics. Modernity is often defined in either a temporal and/or a substantive way.
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The first refers to the understanding of modernity as an epochal phenomenon, as a 
distinct period in time that has broken decisively with the preceding periods. The 
second focuses on modernity as a set of key characteristics, which makes modem ideas 
and practices distinct from pre-modem ones. Although both conceptions are useful, they 
should not be conflated (Yack 1997). Whereas by and large a modem epoch can 
identified, it should not be perceived as an era in which only a singular programme of 
(Western) modernity reigns, but rather as an epoch in which major conflicts over the 
interpretation o f modernity take place (cf. Amason, n.d.).
At least four interrelated characteristics o f modernity can be identified. A first 
important characteristic is the negation o f traditional authority and a religiously 
legitimated political order. By denying the foundation of political and societal order on 
other-worldly grounds, modernising agents claimed the possibility of constructing a 
new order on the basis of self-produced understandings o f such an order. The decisive 
departure from traditional understandings, however, simultaneously opened up the 
possibility for various, alternative visions o f how modem society could be shaped. In 
this sense, modernity can be understood as intrinsically generating conflict over its 
meaning. A second, strongly related, key characteristic of modernity is the emphasis on 
human autonomy, i.e. the idea of the human being as a subject who is able to understand 
the world and act on these understandings. A third characteristic is the idea that society 
(and nature) is malleable, and that human beings can therefore reconstruct their own 
societies on the basis of their own visions (the latter two characteristics, which could be 
referred to as autonomy and mastery, or liberty and discipline, can be interpreted in 
diverse ways and as in continuous tension, see Wagner 1994; 2001b). A fourth 
characteristic is the essentially future-oriented nature of modem ideas and programmes 
of modernisation. By creating (utopian) visions o f a better society, modem agents 
divide the present from the past, and claim that by means of decisive action these 
visions can be implemented in the present (cf. Eisenstadt 1999; Koselleck 1985; 
Therbom 1995).
If one were to follow an approach in which not so much the ‘catching up' o f other 
societies with Western modernity is emphasised, but instead the unique reaction o f later 
modernising societies is taken as a starting point, modernisation can be seen to entail a 
wide variety of responses to the problems inherent in the political project of
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constructing a modem society. It can then be acknowledged that original modernity 
takes the guise of a basic reference point for later modernising societies, without, 
however, exhausting the possibilities within modernity as such. An emphasis on 
particularities instead of commonalities creates the insight that ‘[historically different 
beginnings bring about different modernities, and different contexts do not permit 
modernizing states simply to imitate the Western model of modernity’ (Kaya 2004: 31). 
The origins of the modem experience of particular societies, the historical context and 
sequence of modem projects, the nature and position of modernising agents, and their 
specific interpretations and creativity are primary tools in such a perspective.39
3.2 Presuppositions of varieties of modernity
Historicity, agency, interpretations
Even if the origins of modernity or at least its most clear expressions as a historical 
phenomenon are predominantly identified with Western Europe and America, this does 
not mean that the Western experience can be essentialised into a universally valid 
pattern. Assumptions of ultimate global convergence towards a cultural and institutional 
model derived from a homogenised Western experience cannot be held up in the light of 
empirical-historical differentiation, both in the West and elsewhere (cf. Wittrock 2000). 
Projects of later modernisation are not simply repetitions of an already identified, 
singular pathway, which derives its ultimate historical significance from the two 
archetypal phenomena that ushered in the modem era, the Industrial and French 
Revolutions, but entail reactions, adaptations and interpretations. Three main 
assumptions of modernist approaches are difficult to maintain, if one accepts the 
historical nature of the construction of modem societies. First of all, a homogenising, 
converging and harmonising logic, immanent in the Western project of modernity 
(finding its latest expression in the notion of globalisation). Secondly, a singular and 
temporally constant interpretation o f what the cultural programme of modernity entails 
(restricting the main components of modernity to instrumental rationality and
39 The even wider temporal-spatial perspective proposed in the multiple modernities debate, that of 
a civilizational approach, is not followed in this study, mostly for reasons of vastness and 
intellectual faculty and familiarity required for such an enterprise.
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individualism). Thirdly, a singular interpretation of the political/institutional programme 
of modernity (consisting o f an archetypal range of institutions: capitalist economy, 
democracy, and nation-state).
A sociological approach that takes seriously the historical formation o f modem 
societies, and therefore the contingency of social change, has to consider potential 
plurality in social experience. In order to leave behind a singular, teleological model, 
other patterns of modernity, and perhaps even, as some claim, multiple modernities (see 
most significantly, Eisenstadt 1999; 2000), should be considered as constituting the 
modem experience. Societies that were reactive to, rather than constitutive of 'original 
modernity' can be seen as, on the one hand, responses to the increasing diffusion and 
importance o f Western modernity, thereby taking as the pivotal reference point the 
Western experience, and, on the other, as reworkings of key components of modernity 
(autonomy, rationality/mastery, identity) in specific spatial and temporal contexts, 
selectively incorporating some elements of the dominant Western programme, while 
rejecting others, and without necessarily discarding traditions (cf. Eisenstadt 2000: 14- 
5). Instead o f the assumption of a singular crystallisation o f modernity in the Western 
experience, despite its undeniable relevance for any other experience, the possibility of 
varying interpretations, priorities, and hiérarchisation of modern elements in projects of 
modernisation cannot be overlooked.40
Instead of leading to convergence, modernity can be seen to have invoked 
differentiation between societies (cf. Amason, n.d.). Different cultural and political 
patterns can be observed, which led, for instance, to the primacy of politics in some 
projects of modernisation (in which the state assumed a qualitatively specific role), 
whereas in the Western 'original' experience it was the primacy of the economy that 
formed one of the main foundations of the modem project. This means the 
acknowledgement of the possibility o f distinct patterns and routes to modernity, as has
40 As Amason (2000a) observes, the premise that the current western constellation of capitalism, 
democracy and the nation-state represents a universal and definitive model for the post-socialist 
countries excludes any consideration of different pathways to a modem society. Moreover, the 
specific features of building a capitalist and democratic society on historical legacies and in 
interaction with global dynamics, that lead to very different outcomes of what is expected, is largely 
left unconsidered.
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been recognised by the more critical exponents of modernisation and transition theory 
(Bendix 1967; Eyal et al. 1998; Moore 1966; Stark and Bruszt 1998). This also implies 
that a singular, deterministic logic to the formation of a modem society (as expressed in 
Parsons' notion of differentiation) cannot be observed, but rather a continual openness 
and conflict over the meaning of modernisation.41 Tensions and conflicting 
interpretations arise from the confrontation of the universalistically formulated Western 
project of modernity with local traditions, but also from the selectivity and transposition 
of particular components by modernising élites (thus, instrumental rationality was at the 
core of the communist project, but this led to the suppression of societal differentiation, 
rather than to its diffusion, see Amason 1993). Different logics feed into the emergence 
of distinct political and institutional patterns or experiences, not only in the form of 
temporary societal configurations, but also in their enduring impact on later 
modernising projects, often undertaken in reaction to earlier ones. Thus, as a final point, 
the potentiality of different emerging patterns leads to varying political and institutional 
outcomes of programmes of modernisation. This is so not only because local 
interpretations differ and are based on distinct cultural and historical experiences, but 
also because of the changing nature of 'original modernity’ itself42 and newly arising 
’alternative modernities’ that may become hegemonic in their own right. Even if later 
modernising societies are in principle always subject to universalistic representations of 
a dominant modernity, the changing nature of these representations or ’reference 
societies’ as well as the emergence of alternative reference points lead to distinct 
historical crystallisations of modernisation projects. This ultimately also means that
41 In the context of post-communist Eastern Europe, Robertson has remarked: ‘Thus although there 
is inevitably considerable interest in the practical problems of which kind of societal trajectory the 
largely post-communist societies of Eastern and Central Europe should follow, we need to know, 
more fundamentally, a great deal more about the -  inevitably complex -  ways in which actual 
comparisons of what Bendix has called “reference societies” are made. Such knowledge will clearly 
include competition and conflict within societies as to which societies -  if any -  should be, to 
different degrees, emulated; the institutional location of influential actors; the role of intellectuals; 
and so on. It is along such lines that we may “bring modernization back in” to social science.’ 
(Robertson 1995: 227).
42 For an account of the changing nature of Western modernity, see Wagner 1994.
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these crystallisations cannot be reduced to expressions o f a general historical pattern, 
but contain specific temporal-situational aspects.
A corrective to the central assumptions of modernist theorising mentioned above 
necessarily points to the crucial role o f agency in modernisation (as underlined most 
forcefully by Bendix 1967 in the classical debate and by Eyal et a l  in the transition 
debate), and, most significantly - yet not always acknowledged by the more critical 
voices - agency's interpretive and creative capacities.
In contrast with the assumptions of modernist approaches, the autonomy o f modem 
agency is not restricted to purposive action that is ultimately to end in the realisation of 
a universal programme of modernity. Instead, the agentiality in modernity is to be found 
exactly in the proposed autonomy and reflexivity of individual agents (free from the 
constraints o f the traditional order in the form of ruler-subject relation, the domination 
of religion, and nature). The presupposition of individual autonomy makes possible a 
potentially infinite range o f interpretations and realisations o f autonomy in a societal 
setting. The more or less coherent proposals for some kind of societal order put forward 
on a political level then constitute projects of modernisation. In this sense, modernising 
actors that initiate projects of modernisation are not merely promoting a unifying and 
universally applicable logic of modem society into their own, but are -  by means of 
their particular socio-cultural backgrounds, but also through their circumstantial 
interpretation of key components of modernity -  producing variety in modernisation. It 
is by reference to the autonomy and creativity o f modernising agents that one can speak 
of ‘different routes to and through modernity’ (Therbom 1995), or that one can presume 
that, ‘the best way to understand the contemporary world -  indeed to explain the history 
of modernity - is to see it as a story o f continual constitution and reconstitution of a 
multiplicity o f  cultural programs’ (in the words o f Eisenstadt, 2000). The subjectivity 
and creativity involved in modernisation means that instead of a process-like nature of 
becoming modem, one should instead speak of various projects of modernisation or 
‘modernisation offensives’:
...[T]he notion of a ‘modernization process* is inappropriately socially neutralizing. In its stead, one 
could speak of modernization offensives, which are regularly pursued by certain, often small, 
groups with certain expectations in mind, whereas other groups, often majorities, who are less well
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informed about the modernization effects, may have little to expect in terms of enablements, at least 
in the short run, and possibly do object, or would object if they had the necessary information and 
power... On a historical level, a major (though admittedly still crude) distinction between two kinds 
of modernization offensives should be made. Modernization offensives from above use the existing 
power differential to create enabling institutions, in which others will participate only later and often 
against the interest of the original promoters. Modernization offensives from below are counter­
moves to defend groups who are the objects of modernizations from above against the constraints 
and exclusions effected by those modernizations’ (Wagner 1994: 25).
What makes modernising agents modem is their intention to construct a new societal 
order that transcends and replaces the existing societal configuration. In such a view, 
society becomes ‘an object of active reconstruction by human beings’ (Eisenstadt 1999: 
41-2). It is in this sense that modem actors are profoundly political, in that they propose 
to construct a new polity which they argue in some way better represents the (collective) 
needs of the members of that polity. These projects of reconstruction are never 
completely detached from local circumstances but depend in their 'assertability on the 
validity of claims about the nature and history of human beings as members of the 
posited community* (Wittrock 2000: 7). What becomes clear from Wagner’s remark is 
that these ‘modernization offensives’ by their very nature -  that is, their historical and 
therefore partial interpretation o f modernity - create tensions as they produce 
‘constraints and exclusions’, and are therefore bound to evoke counter-reactions as well 
as counter-proposals. In order to study modernisation one therefore needs to include 
counter-élites and their alternative proposals into the analytical framework.
Further refinements concerning the nature of modernising actors and their proposals 
can be made. First of all, modernising projects are mostly carried by political élites and 
intellectuals, the former on the basis of their pivotal position in the political centre and 
the latter in the capacity of constructing world views and providing legitimation to the 
political centre (cf. Eisenstadt 1992). In reality, any clear-cut distinctions between these 
two groups o f actors are difficult to make, as their social roles tend to overlap to a large 
extent. However, at the same time, potential tensions do exist between these social 
actors, as modernising agents in their capacity as intellectuals tend to look for relative 
autonomy from the political center, thereby undermining political élites’ authority (cf. 
Eisenstadt 1999: 47-8). Further relevant preliminary divisions can be made concerning 
the position of modernising actors in terms of their substantive proposals. Modernising
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actors can take an affirmative stance towards the Western project, professing its 
universal and superior nature vis-à-vis traditional society, whereas counter-élites can 
strongly object to the presuppositions involved in the Western project. Here, a related 
distinction can be made, that is, some modernising actors tend to look beyond their own 
societies and traditions in order to modernise their own (referring to Western modernity 
or any other dominant, and inherently universalist, modem project, such as 
communism), and therefore to empower themselves in the local context by trying to 
implement similar modem programmes. In this, however, they always run up against 
other political actors with similar modernising ambitions, but who look to their own 
traditions for inspiration and who are concerned with contesting the universal nature of 
an extraneous project on the basis o f its presumed corrosive effects for ’authentic' local 
traditions, culture, and identity (cf. Eisenstadt 2000; Geertz I973).43 This is closely 
related to the actors’ perception o f time, i.e., in terms o f a primarily future-oriented 
conception o f the construction of modem society, often in combination with a strong 
rejection o f the order of the past, or a backward-looking conception, viewing the past as 
an ideal type of the common good (which can in itself also mean the projection into the 
future of an essentialised past). Finally, perceptions can entail totalising and utopian 
visions of modem society, professing a singular view of the common good, as well as 
more pluralistic perceptions, in which multiple understandings are basically accepted 
(Eisenstadt 1999: 68).
The consideration of relevant actors in any analysis o f modernisation should 
therefore involve those actors that are initiating a project of modernisation, but also 
those that react, criticise and in some cases construct an alternative vision of 
modernisation. Modernisation is then ultimately about the conflict over its meaning, 
embedded in local horizons of signification. It is the subjectivity of the actors involved 
and the possibility of creativity, which lead not only to particular interpretations of 
modernisation, but which also have an important bearing on particular outcomes. The 
interpretations o f modernisation are, however, not the result of unbounded and
43 Any universalist project contains an inherent tension between its striving for local autonomy and 
the universalist nature of its proposals. As Kaya remarks in the context of Turkish modernity: 
the view of modernity as a universal civilization created a contradiction within Kemalism, that of 
autonomy versus universality; the latter would assimilate the former if it was achieved' (2004: 46).
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completely voluntaristic discursive actions on behalf of modernising agents. 
Interpretations in themselves are the outcome of an interpretative process, which is 
bounded by: a) the position of the relevant actors in a political field (and thus related to 
interpretations and meaning-givings of other actors), b) the existing meaning-giving 
horizons in the local setting, and, c) externally available discourses.
The emphasis on plurality and diversification in the development of modem societies is 
a necessary correction to the overly unitary and uniform interpretation of modernity in 
classical modernisation theory and in current-day approaches to transition in post­
communist Eastern Europe, both of which share a basic assumption on societal 
convergence. A plurality of experiences in the construction of modem society in 
different spatial and temporal settings is in strong contrast with a mutually exclusive 
understanding of traditional society (and its characteristics) on the one hand and modem 
society on the other. Modem society can be and has historically been understood in a 
-variety of ways, depending on historical circumstances jind existing traditions as well as 
the specific modes of creativity and innovation by local actors. The latter aspect often 
had to do - in the situation of 'later modernising' societies - with the reception and 
interpretation of what was elsewhere defined as being modem. Here, social theorising 
often leaves a gap in assuming that either modem ideas or perceptions have a similar 
signification everywhere, and therefore the difference between the place of origin and 
the adopting side does not exist.44 Or, the stronger, normative assumption is made that 
some ideas are universally valid and therefore need to replace local, particularistic ones.
44 Cf. Robertson: ‘The trends and tendencies that have constituted the central ingredients of 
sociological -  more generally, social -  theory have actually been advanced and formulated on the 
(usually implicit) assumption that a theorist can detect and discern certain general features of life 
inside a few West European and/or North American societies and then posit them as of sociocultural 
life in toto. This is, in fact, die presupposition on which the principle of ‘grand narrativity’ has 
rested. I believe this is a significant point, particularly since cultural theorists (not simply 
postmodernists) have, for the most part, been uninterested in comprehending how so-called grand 
narratives arose in the first place; except for amorphous and simple-minded invocation of the idea of 
‘Western hegemony'. Nor have they been directly interested in the concrete relationships between 
different grand narratives. The theorization of the issue of inter-societal, comparative dynamics is 
one aspect of the problem’ (Robertson 1995: 219).
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In both cases variety is left unproblematised, either because it is seen as irrelevant, or 
because it is something that is seen to disappear the more modem ideas and practices 
come to penetrate non-modem societies.
Social theorisation not only leaves a gap in terms of underestimating possible 
varieties in perceptions of modem society and discernable historical patterns, but also in 
the attempts made to understand the dynam ics between extraneous ideas/models and 
perceptions o f local modernising actors. In ’later modernising' societies, what I call 
transnational discursive paradigms have not only formed the key inspiration for 
modernising programmes formulated to reconstruct society, but at the same time 
constituted the main reference point against which particularist and 'traditionalist' jview 
points were expressed. Such discourses of a universalistic nature have taken varied 
guises and have had a dominant influence45 at various moments in time. Transnational 
discursive paradigms can be seen to share a number of features deriving from their 
universalistic postulation:
1. As these discourses are formulated in universal terms, i.e., postulate a universal 
validity regardless of local settings, they dissimulate their historical 
origins/context (cf. Lefort 1986).
2. At the same time, these discourses have local relevance for existing problems or 
for clarifying the perception o f  new problems. This also means that the universal 
nature of discourses can in certain cases co-exist with particularistic discourses 
(such as nationalism).
45 Dominance means here that certain extraneous discourses have formed a crucial point of 
reference for internal debates on modernisation. Unlike the assumptions made on the nature of 
dominance elsewhere - for instance, in neo-Marxist debates on dominant ideology, i.e., as an 
expression of and non-materialistic mode of domination of the ruling class over the rest of society 
(Abercrombie, Hill and Turner: 1980) - I do not regard these external discourses as dominant 
because of their reflection of the distribution of social power in society (this is not always the case) 
or because of their ability to mystify these power relations. Instead, I regard certain discourses as 
dominant, because they go beyond national debates and form a crucial point of reference both for 
modernising élites and their adversaries in 'later modernising* societies. In this study, I will use the 
term transnational discursive paradigms.
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3. Universalistic discourses constitute a paradigm in the sense that they promulgate 
a strong validity for various societal situations, and therefore tend to constitute 
the reference point for other modernising discourses.
4. The universal pretensions o f these discourses do, however, make them vulnerable 
to 'unmasking' (Mannheim 1991), in that their historical and particularistic nature 
can always be exposed.
Universalistically formulated discourses of modernisation constitute a primary 
component of local programmes of modernisation. However, although local political 
actors emulate other modernities, they do not simply reproduce but also re-interpret and 
adapt universalistic models to the local context. Therefore, a ‘logical* flow of modernity 
from one societal sphere to another does not occur46 (cf. Kaviraj 2000: 140). In other 
words, a process-like and functional nature of modernity is historically and empirically 
difficult to observe. As observed above, the 'immigration of ideas’ 'separates cultural 
productions from the system of theoretical reference points in relation to which they are
46 The flow of ideas from one society to another is notoriously difficult to analyse (cf. Szacki 1995). 
Still, some useful though admittedly tentative suggestions have been made. Daniel Bell, for 
instance, refers to a qualitative difference in the interpretations of the nineteenth century ideologies 
outside of their originating context. In The end of ideology he sees a ‘distinctive difference* between 
the 19th century ideologies that were ‘universalistic, humanistic and fashioned by intellectuals’ and 
were concerned with ‘social equality... and freedom’, whereas the twentieth century ‘mass 
ideologies of Asia and Africa are parochial, instrumental and created by political leaders’, and deal 
with ’economic development and national power’ (Bell 1960: 403). I would propose to broaden this 
distinction to the experiences of Eastern European states in the second half of the nineteenth century 
and see the ‘closure’ of their ideologies as a reaction to ‘original modernity’. Similar observations in 
different contexts have been made, as for instance in Russell’s ‘general principle’, which he 
proposes when discussing the initial French reactions to English liberalism: ‘a philosophy 
developed in a politically and economically advanced country, which is, in its birthplace, little more 
than a clarification and systemization of prevalent opinion, may become elsewhere a source of 
revolutionary ardour, and ultimately of actual revolution. It is mainly through theorists that the 
maxims regulating the policy of advanced countries become known to less advanced countries. In 
the advanced countries practice inspires theory; in the others, theory inspires practice* (Russell 
1946: 581; cf. also Brown 1982: 271). See also Charles Taylor’s perception that nationalism arose 
as a reaction to the ‘two great inaugural revolutions of the liberal age’ (Taylor 1998: 202).
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consciously and unconsciously defined' (Bourdieu 1991: 164), recontextualising the 
ideas involved and changing their meaning and function. Actors involved in the 
importation of ideas use these ideas in a different social context (Mannheim calls this a 
social change o f function), but they can also introduce concepts into an existing body of 
thought (an immanent change o f function), thereby changing its ideational context 
(Mannheim 1971: 112-13). Modernity enters the local not only through the dominant 
nature of certain ideas and the attraction they provided for ‘later modernising’ countries, 
but also via the constitution of a direct reaction by the adopting societies to the original 
modernities.
3.3 A conceptual analysis of discourses of modernisation
M y historical-sociological approach towards modernisation is an attempt to circumvent 
the problems apparent in the modernist theorising mentioned above. I start from the 
assumption that history is always open to new initiatives by agents, thereby departing 
from structural approaches that essentially see a singular logic to historical change. At 
the same time, I see agents as bounded by their own societal context, with its 
historically formed dominant meanings, as well as by external structures, in the form of 
transnational^ dominant discourses o f modernisation, which can empower local agents, 
but also bind them to particular interpretations o f modernity.
In my case study of the modem experience of Romania, I will, in the first instance, 
give a historical-sociological analysis of four major projects of modernisation in 
Romania (national liberalism, fascism, communism, and post-communism) by 
identifying key modernising agents, conflicts over modernisation, and key aspects of 
political and economic institution-building (chapters 4-6 and 10). Secondly, I will 
synchronically and conceptually compare the discourses that underpin projects of 
modernisation with discourses of modernisation dominant on the transnational level, 
and which form a continuous point of reference in any project undertaken (see the 
chapters 7-9, and 11). And, thirdly, I will employ a diachronic comparison of the 
various local projects of modernisation. Between these projects, I will try to show 
continuity and discontinuity in interpretations o f modernisation to ultimately identify a
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Romanian pattern of modernisation. It is this particular pattern that constitutes the 
historical legacies that condition the post-communist project of modernisation.
I propose that contending political projects start out with a critique of existing society, 
what will be called here a crisis narrative (see for a similar concept, Hay 2001). I 
further assume that, starting from this critique, actors ultimately come up with 
alternative solutions to the basic problems of modem society. I understand the 
construction o f modem society to be based on particular basic problématiques of a 
political, economic and cultural kind. These problématiques refer to questions of the 
construction o f a viable political order (which involves state formation, state-society 
relations, membership of the polity), the generation and distribution of resources within 
society (economy and development), and the creation and diffusion of knowledge and 
meaning (these include definitions of collective identity, and the diffusion of societal 
models47) (see Amason 1993; Sewell 1999: 56; Wagner 2001c: 7). In the ways various 
political actors deal with these basic modem problems we can differentiate the basic 
commonalities and particularities of political projects.
In order to further explore the ways in which particular actors confront these 
problems, I distinguish analytically between two levels in modernising discourses (for 
similar distinctions, see Campbell 2001, 2002). The first level and perhaps the most 
fundamental level is the politico-philosophical level, which consists of three elements: 
critique, interpretation/normative premises and legitimation. On this abstract level, the 
(prior) existing societal order is criticised, modernity is (re-)interpreted in the local 
context, and legitimations for a new societal project are called upon. In principle it is the 
critique on existing societal structures that provides the basis for specific local 
interpretations and legitimations for the new order (in relatively small and dependent 
societies like Romania ’reference societies' or transnational discursive paradigms play a 
crucial role). Critique can be seen as a disembedding mechanism in that it seeks to 
undermine the legitimacy of an existing societal order or dominant project of
47 Sewell depicts the 'typical cultural strategy of dominant actors and institutions’ as 'efforts not 
only to normalize or homogenize but also to hierarchize, encapsulate, exclude, criminalize, 
hegemonize, or marginalize practices and populations that diverge from the sanctioned ideal' 
(Sewell 1999: 56).
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modernisation, whereas legitimation entails the embedding of a new project in the 
societal context by articulating its superior relevance to that context. A second level 
entails the formulation of the institutional or strategic objectives of the modem project, 
i.e., the way in which it contributes to the construction o f a new order. On this level the 
rather abstract assumptions of interpretation are translated into cognitive prescriptions 
or concrete solutions to identified priorities.48
Discourses o f modernisation can be understood as sets of ideas or concepts that together 
form a more or less coherent programme for the engineering of society (cf. Wittrock 
2000). As mentioned above, a primary distinction can be made within discourses, i.e., 
between two levels or qualities o f ideas (see figure 1). The first level concerns 
normative assumptions that identify the ends of projects of modernisation. In other 
words, this level concerns ideas that capture the normative, politico-philosophical 
foundations that inform projects of societal change. A second level o f ideas is that of 
cognitive ideas, i.e. strategic ideas more directly related to the institutions of social 
reality, and which identify the means for realising and institutionalising a project of 
modernisation.
Apart from the identification o f different levels of ideas, I will seek to reconstruct 
discourses with regard to the substantive value o f primary concepts in modernising 
discourses. I divide the normative and cognitive levels into conceptual categories in 
order to ‘capture* the essence of what I see as concepts significant for the understanding 
of modernisation, and to facilitate comparison between different discourses. On the 
level o f normative premises, I identify three categories: cultural inspiration; political 
foundations; and socio-political practices. Cultural inspiration refers to the orientations 
of particular programmes of modernisation, i.e., whether they depart predominantly
48 An analytical scheme such as this one, however, does not always translate directly into historical 
situations; certain elements may prevail in certain situations, whereas others may remain in the 
background. Even more importantly, the coherence proposed by such a scheme is in reality hard to 
observe. Despite the caution with which a scheme like this should be handled, it does provide us 
instruments to distinguish between the various intentions of modernising agents and their projects of 
modernisation in different temporal contexts, and can help us to indicate continuity and 
discontinuity at various levels.
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from a universal logic (adopting a model that is deemed universally valid) or primarily 
from a particularistic logic, in which modernisation is profoundly informed by local, 
intrinsic values. The conception of liberty/autonomy is central to any project of 
modernisation. It is exactly the idea that human beings can set their own rules and laws 
and can construct their own society, without the interference from others or without 
being oppressed by some form of tyranny or despotism, that forms the most crucial 
element in any project of modernisation (cf. Amason n.d.; Eisenstadt 1999; Wagner 
1994, 2001c). Nevertheless, what human autonomy entails and how it can be best 
realised is open to interpretation. The final normative category I employ, socio-political 
practices, regards the rationalities or logics that inform the construction of the political 
order, define relations between state and society, as well as membership of that society. 
Socio-political practices therefore regard the scope of authority as well as the intensity 
of its actions. The three normative categories do not exhaust discourses of 
modernisation by any means, but they are intended to give us some understanding of the 
orientations, intentions, and direction of projects of modernisation.
The three categories are interrelated and are congruent in the sense that taken 
together they often reveal a certain coherence. For instance, in fascist discourse, a 
particularist vision of society (as deriving its norms from its own traditions) is linked 
with a collectivist notion of freedom (an individual can only be free within its ‘own* 
society), which in tum is linked with a total vision of the state (a state dedicated to the 
furtherance of the substantive notion of the nation). Notwithstanding this interlinkage, 
the three categories point to three distinct aspects of modernity. Cultural inspiration is 
particularly relevant for later modernising societies in that it reveals the primary 
orientation of political élites towards the extemal/universal or towards the preservation 
of the intemal/particular. In other words, the emergence of Western modernity posed the 
later modernising societies with the question of their own position towards ‘original’ 
modernity (cf. Kaya 2004). Further, the category of political foundations is concerned 
with how freedom/autonomy is perceived in projects of modernisation, whereas socio­
political practices regard the construction of society or the mastery of the human 
environment.
On the cognitive level, I distinguish the categories societal progress, collective self- 
determination, and political representation and control. The category of societal
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progress refers to the nature and direction of social change as perceived in a project of 
modernisation. Progress can be defined in economic, political, or cultural terms and the 
configuration of a project of modernisation depends on the primacy of one of these 
spheres. Thus, for instance, in neoliberalism, the primacy o f the economic leads to the 
relative negligence of other societal spheres. Collective self-determination refers to 
conceptions of independence and sovereignty, which are strongly related to the vision of 
the collectivity as such (i.e. based on political-civic or substantive definitions). Finally, 
political representation and control refers to the nature of political authority, the nature 
and the scope of state functions, and the nature of political participation.
As with normative premises, the categories o f cognitive prescriptions are interlinked 
and tend to show a certain congruence and coherence among each other. Thus, the 
institutional organisation o f the state often relates to a concomitant vision on socio­
economic institutions (an interventionist state is congruent with an organised vision of 
the economy). Or, the vision of collective self-determination relates to a particular 
understanding of political institutions (the imperative of state sovereignty ‘needs* an 
authoritative and capable state). Despite certain congruence the categories refer to 
distinct institutional terrain, i.e., socio-economic institutions, the nation-state, and 
political structures.
The relation between the normative and cognitive is more complex. In a conceptual 
sense, the normative premises and cognitive prescriptions are related in a non-linear 
way but are simultaneously closely connected. On the one hand, while normative 
premises inform and circumscribe the cognitive prescriptions in political programmes, 
abstract concepts can at the same time be translated into cognitive schemes in various 
ways. Thus, general concepts are open for different interpretations which makes that 
they can find expression in different institutional configurations. On the other hand, a 
clear-cut distinction between the cognitive and normative is often difficult to make in 
practice (cf. Campbell 2002: 25), also because the politico-philosophical dimension and 
the ideological/actional dimension should be considered as ultimately linked in that the 
normative premises provide the general principles which specify the concrete criteria 
used for the creation of institutions (Wagner and Zimmerman 2003: 250-1).
In substantive terms, the normative premises formulated in a discourse of 
modernisation form as a relatively coherent ensemble the framework or horizon within
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which an institutional-strategic programme is formulated. In other words, the normative 
premises identify the hierarchy o f preferences and priorities of modernisation. At the 
same time, specific core concepts formulated at the normative level are congruent with 
and ‘precondition’ a particular range of choices on the cognitive level. This means, for 
instance, that a collective definition of freedom predisposes modernising agents to 
dedifferentiated forms o f political organisation. In a similar vein, a ‘thick’ 
understanding of membership correlates to a strong distinction between insiders and 
outsiders of a society and therefore to strictly defined membership criteria. Ultimately, 
however, the exact relations between normative core concepts and cognitive 
institutional programmes can only be assessed in historical-empirical terms, as the 
congruence between the normative and the cognitive is never fully predefined.
figure 1
Discourses of modernisation
N o r m a t iv e  p r e m is e s
Cultural inspiration Political foundations Socio-political practices
unrversalism - particularism individual - collective autonomy 
negative ■ positive liberty
- rationality 
(formal - substantive)
- state-society relations 
(thin - thick)
* state logic
(rational, substantive, total)
C o g n i t iv e  p r e s c r ip t io n s
Societal progress Collectiveself-determination
Political representation 
and control
Politico-philosophical premises
Cultural inspiration. I start from the assumption that projects of modernisation 
undertaken in societies outside the core of Western modernity (or, depending on the 
concrete historical situation, other significant modernities, such as Soviet communism) 
constitute a reaction against and/or an assimilation of modem ideas and practices. This 
assumption stems in itself from the consideration that modernisation is not an isolated
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process which exclusively evolves within a particular societal context (as often 
presumed in modernist approaches), and in order for modernising discourses to gain 
dominance they must (at least partially) be formulated in universalist terms. This is so 
because their dominant nature implies that they have to be applicable outside of the 
particular context in which they arise and represent values and ideas that are meaningful 
or reproducable in other societal contexts.
The universalistic nature of dominant discourses of modernisation meets two kinds 
of responses in receiving societies. As mentioned earlier, and as presupposed in 
modernist approaches, local actors can respond to the challenge o f modernity by 
emulating a dominant discourse and model (although emulation is always a partial and 
selective process) or they can respond by rejecting modernity in its entirety. Contrary to 
such a dichotomised approach, I understand local projects of modernisation as always 
combinations o f both universalistic components of the dominant model and 
particularistic components derived from local culture and history. Projects of 
modernisation can therefore never consist of a wholesale emulation of a dominant 
model of modernisation (as this would lead to the complete dissolution of the local into 
the universal), nor of a radical rejection o f every component of a dominant model. The 
latter is impossible because the dominant nature o f the external model always brings 
about some kind o f reaction from the receiving side. In other words, a society can never 
be completely protected from outside influences. Therefore, when I speak of radical 
particularism (for instance, in the case of Romanian fascism), this should not be 
understood as the complete absence of the influence of external models, but as the 
formulation of an alternative model which is purportedly based on purely local values, 
but in reality is formulated against the background of external models.
The tension between, on the one hand, the universalistic 'will to be modem’ and thus 
to emulate modernity and, on the other, the desire to preserve some unique, particular 
national identity constitutes the specific modem experience of ’later modem’ societies. 
Social struggle takes place between forces whose interpretation of modem society is 
profoundly (though not exclusively) shaped by emulation, and others who emphasise 
indigenous traditions as the basis for constructing modem society or deny the necessity
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of change.49 It is the outcome of this struggle between ideologies or interpretations that 
constitutes specific patterns of modernity. Clifford Geertz has called these two often 
antagonistic visions of society 'essentialism' and 'epochalism':
To deduce what the nation is from a conception of the world-historical situation in which it is 
thought to be enclosed - "epochalism" - produces one sort of moral-political universe; to 
diagnose the situation with which the nation is faced from a prior conception of what is 
intrinsically - "essentialism" - produces quite another; and to combine the two (the most 
common approach) produces confused assortment of mixed cases (Geertz 1973:251).
Political foundations. The objective of liberty or autonomy can be said to be the 
pinnacle of any project of modernisation (cf. Wagner 2001b). It is exactly the pursuit of 
extended liberty that underpins any political project directed against the old societal 
order. Nevertheless, rather than being fixed and well-defined political concepts, liberty 
and autonomy are open to interpretation. In this sense, they can be understood as 
political imaginaries. Imaginaries inform distinct political reasoning and action, but at 
the same time are always open for alternative interpretations. I will identify four 
understandings, or two pairings o f understandings, that seem to me significant ends of 
projects of modernisation: individual and collective liberty; and negative and positive 
liberty.
The predominant understanding of liberty in Western modernity posits as its 
exclusive point of departure the individual subject. Often, the individual is defined as an 
abstract individual, without considering characteristics other than its being a human 
being (’stripped of all particularity', Dumont 1986: 117). The condition of freedom 
depends here on the extent to which the individual is able to act according to its own 
will and to define its own needs, without outside interference, or is able to emancipate 
itself further on the basis of its own capacities. In contrast, the collectivist conception of 
liberty starts from a collective (a social group, people, or nation) whose emancipation is 
the precondition for the liberation o f the individual. In the collectivist understanding, it 
is the participation of the individual in and his sacrifice for the whole that ultimately 
makes him free. In other words, the freedom of the individual is a function of the
49 As Kaya notes, the rise of ‘original modernity’ led to the ‘radicalisation of dualities’ elsewhere, 
i.e., it led to the self-questioning of non-Westem countries that reacted by challenging Western 
modernity (Kaya 2004).
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emancipation of the whole. In a radical understanding, it is the rapprochement of the 
individual to an ultimate set of characteristics that are deemed collectively valid that 
results in liberty.
A further important distinction between understandings of freedom is between 
negative and positive freedom (see Berlin 1969; Taylor 1991). Negative freedom is 
defined as a 'minimal area of personal freedom’, i.e., as a space within which a person or 
a group of persons is left to act according to its own will, without being impeded by 
others or by some higher authority. This understanding of liberty is predominantly 
found in liberalism, in which a strong distinction between the public and the private is 
made, exactly with the idea in mind that what makes a person or group free is the ability 
to pursue unhindered its own good in its own way. In the negative understanding, 
nothing further is said of what should be a person's own good; this is deemed a private 
matter. The negative understanding o f liberty is therefore in potential tension with a 
positive understanding of liberty. The latter posits that a person or group of persons is 
free only when it has the capability to be its own master, i.e., ‘one is free only to the 
extent that one has effectively determined oneself and the shape of one’s life’ (Taylor 
1991: 143). The actual capacity to  self-mastery or self-governance then becomes 
important rather than the absence o f coercive authority in pursuing one's own ends. A 
positive conception of freedom thus refers to a set of significant motivations and regards 
freedom as the outcome of the realisation of one’s true will (Taylor 1991: 148). In this, 
conceptions o f positive freedom can be combined with collectivist visions of freedom, 
from which it follows that only by realising a certain kind of society can the individual 
be made free (cf. Taylor 1991; such conceptions can be found in collectivist ideologies 
such as communism and fascism).
Socio-political practices. Two ‘logics’ or rationalities are particularly important in 
different perceptions of modernisation, i.e., the often invoked formal and substantive 
rationalities (taken from the classical distinction made by Max Weber; cf. Giddens 
1971; Schluchter 1981). I understand formal rationality here as an approach to the 
construction of a political order in which the main purpose is to reconstruct that order 
on the basis o f rationally calculable principles. In this understanding of rationality, the 
driving logic is formed by the idea that the more society is based on rational principles, 
the more society is subject to rational control and hence to human autonomy. If
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substantive rationality is the predominant driving logic in the construction of a political 
order, rationality is based on the achievement of definite goals or values, and the 
furtherance of modernisation is therefore measured in terms of its rapprochement to 
these formulated, substantive goals. Modernisation is then guided by ‘ethical 
imperatives, utilitarian or other expediential rules, and political maxims’ (Schluchter 
1981: 89, 108). In spite o f the often presumed mutual exclusiveness of formal and 
substantive rationality, in the reality o f modernisation these logics are often invoked in 
parallel, although one of the two tends to be dominant. The assumed tendency (for 
instance, in modernisation theory) in which the ever increasing diffusion of formal 
rationality is understood as an indication of increasing modernisation as such is not 
followed here. Instead, I see both rationalities as the most important ordering logics 
informing projects of modernisation, especially the political order, i.e., the state. The 
latter is a primary object of any project of modernisation, but is perceived by 
modernising actors in diverging ways. In this sense, I will distinguish between two -  
ideal-typical -  extremes. On the one hand, a state can be perceived predominantly as an 
embodiment of formal-rational principles, i.e., as a ‘rational state’. On the other hand, a 
state can be seen as the expression of specific absolute, substantive values, as a 
‘substantive-ideological state’. In historical reality, the democratic state would come 
closest to the former, and the totalitarian state closest to the latter. However, we should 
bear in mind that both conceptions o f the state are in reality always an embodiment of 
both rationalities. It is thus the degree rather than the absolute difference that matters.
Two further understandings of the political order, particularly regarding state-society 
relations and the basis of membership of society, are the ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ 
understandings o f social bonds. In the first, the relationship between the state and its 
citizens as well as between citizens themselves is based on social contracts. The 
relationship is perceived as one based on a political understanding between the parties 
involved, in which citizens give up some rights in the exchange of security provided by 
the state, which further governs the common order. Similarly, the relationship between 
citizens is based on a ‘civic’ bond, i.e., the common membership of a society. A ‘thick’ 
understanding of social bonds regards such a civic understanding as too shallow, and 
therefore departs from a more substantive understanding. In this perception, members of 
a society must have more in common than a social contract, and individuals are seen as
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linked by ‘deeper* ties. The most diffused version of such a conception is that where 
social bonds are seen to be based on cultural, linguistic and ethnic ties. In the first, 
‘civic’, understanding a strict separation between state and society is supposed, whereas 
in the second, collectivist understanding, this distinction is much less significant (see 
Wagner 2001a: 40,44-5).
M odes o f  legitim ation
In order to provide a plausible and realistic image of a new political order, for the new 
order to consolidate and gain persistence, and to mobilise (parts of) the population for a 
project of modernisation, the latter needs justification or legitimation, i.e., 'normative 
validity'. Legitimation involves the modernising élites themselves, their staff or 
bureaucracy, but also other contending élites and the population at large. Legitimation 
underpins thè modernising discourse by sustaining the ’rightfulness' or 'validity' of a 
modem project as opposed to other models. In other terms, a dominant élite's 
'systematic' right to rule or its rightful claim to political power needs to be accepted, and 
its m ie needs to be morally approved of, or, put in a different way, its dominance has to 
be 'embedded' in its cultural context and to refer in some way to societal 'needs' (order, 
wealth) (see Holmes 1993; Oberschall 1996: 97-8; Tarifa 1997: 439). Furthermore, the 
legitimation claims of a political project not only provide persistence to the project (in 
terms of confirmation of its leaders and their objectives) but also ’helps to determine the 
choice of means of its exercise’ (Weber, cited in: Rigby 1982: 5). In other words, there 
is a congruence between the modes of legitimation invoked by the political élites and 
the shape the political project takes (Rigby 1982: 5). A further important distinction can 
be made between regime legitimacy and systemic legitimacy. It is only when the latter 
is called effectively into question, i.e. through a discursive representation of a new order 
which is perceived as a realistic alternative (what I have called earlier a crisis narration, 
see also Holmes 1993: 36), that a modem project gets into a systemic legitimation 
crisis. An important element in the persistence of modem projects is the prevention of 
emerging representations o f alternative orders (cf. Oberschall 1996). Less profound 
legitimation crises, those that do not directly engage in attacking the system as such but 
only question its leaders or particular elements, emerge rather frequently in modem 
societies and can lead to a shift in modes of legitimation. Such crises typically occur
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when regimes do not live up to their proclaimed self-identification (in terms of 
economic performance, human emancipation, providing order).
I identify various modes of legitimation that can underpin political projects, starting 
with Weber's classical distinction, but adding other modes that emerge as important in 
the various modernising projects I distinguish. The three modes of legitimation that 
Weber points out are traditional legitimacy, i.e. based on traditions and customs or the 
'sanctity of age-old rules and powers'; legal-rational legitimacy, a belief in the validity 
of patterns of impersonal, normative rules; and charismatic legitimacy, i.e. 'a certain 
quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary 
and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically 
exceptional powers or qualities', a legitimation that can also become 'routinised', but 
then tends to relapse into either traditional or legal-rational legitimation (see Giddens 
1971: 156-63; Rigby 1982: 5). A further mode of legitimation is based on absolute 
values or final goals invoked by political élites, a mode that has been called elsewhere 
'goal-rationality' (Rigby 1980,1982). Indeed, some political projects, such as the fascist 
and communist ones, attempt to mobilise the whole of society around one single goal or 
absolute value from which everything else derives. Complementary or auxiliary modes 
of legitimation are those modes of legitimation that contribute to the overall 
legitimation of a modernising project, but could in themselves not sustain a persistent 
social order. The most important of these modes is substantive or instrumental 
legitimation which is based on the (economic) performance and effectiveness o f the 
political order and the satisfaction o f social needs (cf. Holmes 1993: 15).
A final distinction should be made between the domestic and external nature of 
legitimation. In countries such as Romania, in which external models and ideas play 
such an important role in shaping domestic political projects, the 'domesticisation' of 
extraneous political models and its modes of legitimation not only means that the main 
claim to legitimacy is based on a derived legitimation, but also that claims to legitimacy 
need to be re-legitimised in the domestic context as their derived nature makes them 
constantly open to critique. In addition, the distinction domestic-external legitimation 
refers to the need of political projects to legitimise themselves in the international order 
(in terms of national sovereignty) as well as the possibility of legitimising a local 
project by referring to foreign experiences.
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Strategic-institutional objectives
In later modernising societies, projects of modernisation have predominantly been 
initiated ‘from above’. In this sense we can speak of the primacy of the political and 
state-driven modernisation in those societies that commenced modernisation in response 
to the West. The institutionalisation o f projects of modernisation has in those societies 
principally been undertaken by ‘institutional entrepeneurs* organised on the political 
level. These political actors ultimately act on the basis o f their normative horizons, of 
which I have tried to capture conceptually above. In order to institutionalise their 
political programme of modernisation, modernisers need to transpose normative 
assumptions to the level of cognitive prescriptions. The normative premises on which 
any project o f modernisation is based need to be translated into principles of action, or 
into cognitive ideas, for institutionalisation and political practice. I will analytically 
divide principles of action or what I call here institutional-strategic objectives into the 
following categories: collective self-determination; political representation and control; 
and social and economic progress. These categories refer to the nation-state, political- 
legal institutions, and socio-economic structures, but rather than defining in detail the 
ideational dimensions of these institutions, I try instead to specify their core functions. 
This means that the categories in themselves are fairly open-ended, but this seems to me 
a necessary ‘sacrifice’ in order to ‘capture’ conceptions o f modernisation in radically 
different political discourses.
Societal progress. Rather than assuming a cross-culturally shared conception o f societal 
progress - as the ‘adaptive upgrading’ o f societies to ever higher levels of economic 
welfare, increased rationalisation and differentiation -  different modernising projects 
have promulgated contrasting perceptions. To analyse these perceptions, it seems 
important to start from the hierarchy o f values or set of premises that every 
modernisation project incorporates. Western modernity, for instance, can be said to be 
constituted by the primacy o f the economic. Societal progress is to an important extent 
measured in terms of ‘objective’ economic growth, development, the diffusion o f and 
innovation in technology, and increasing specialisation. Such a vision implies an 
instrumental-rational understanding of progress, in that the increased mastery o f nature
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by rational means is its key objective. Societal progress is understood as possible 
through the increased rationalisation and differentiation of society. Despite the 
predominance o f such an understanding of societal progress, alternative visions are part 
and parcel of modernity as such. Thus formal-rational perceptions of progress can be 
countered by visions that emphasise the need for societal integration and 
homogenisation, rather than increased differentiation and specialisation. In both the 
fascist and communist projects, the visions of material progress and rationalisation were 
subsumed under the absolute values of the ‘nation* and ‘socialism’, whose progress was 
not predominantly assessed in material terms. Ideas on the institutionalisation of 
societal progress can thus endorse dedifferentiation and centralisation rather than 
differentiation and specialisation (for instance, when a rigid division between state and 
society is denied in favour of far-reaching state interference).
Collective self-determination. As projects of modernisation in later modernising 
societies are in the first instance a direct response to the emergence of Western 
modernity and the potential threat it is deemed to embody, the necessary precondition 
for any project to succeed is the achievement of collective self-determination. Only 
when the effective enclosure of a political space has taken place is it possible for local 
political actors to set up a political order based on their own laws and exigencies. In 
modernity, the predominant vehicle for collective self-determination has been the 
nation-state. Political conflict in modernisation is in fact for the most part aimed at the 
definition and control of the modem state. Collective self-determination is indeed not a 
structurally secured condition, but is jeopardised both from the outside (for instance, by 
imperialist tendencies of other states or by territorial claims) and from the inside (by 
actors that question its effective realisation). One of the key issues in controlling the 
state is the question of how collective self-determination is institutionalised. Collective 
self-determination as such can be understood in various ways and can refer both to the 
external, international sphere and to the internal, domestic domain. Various 
understandings and prioritisations can be identified.
When a state enjoys effective formal sovereignty or ‘constitutional independence’ 
(cf. Beitz 1991) (and is thus recognised by other states) it can be said to be autonomous 
in its internal sphere. Such a formal, political and liberal definition of collective self- 
determination constitutes however just one understanding. Radically different, ‘closed’
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interpretations o f collective autonomy argue for a widened scope of autonomy, which 
includes the economic and/or cultural sphere, and the protection of particular values and 
traditions. It is possible here to identify the relation between collective self- 
determination and the definition o f the collectivity; political-civic or more substantive 
definitions o f  the nation have an important bearing on the institutionalisation o f 
collective self-determination.
Political representation and control. The nature of political authority, the nature and 
scope of state functions, and the nature of political participation are essential 
components o f a political order. The conception of political power as embodied in the 
state is crucial in any programme o f political modernisation. Although in modernity 
political authority is always exercised in the name of the people, the mode in which 
popular sovereignty is to be achieved has been imagined by political élites in a wide 
variety of ways. In this sense, the democratic vision of the necessity o f representing a 
plurality o f  societal interests on the political level can be countered by political visions 
which stress the need to represent the people as a unity, thereby claiming the possibility 
of a political representation of the ‘general will’. Obviously, these understandings have 
far-reaching repercussions for the actual imagination of the institutionalisation of the 
political order as such. The understanding o f the right scope of politics can range from a 
minimalist conception (the most famous examples are the liberal nightwatchman state 
and the contemporary neoliberal contextual state), a more comprehensive conception (in 
the form of the interventionist state), to a totalitarian conception, in which no 
boundaries between state and society are acknowledged and thus the scope of politics is 
virtually unlimited. The conception of representation is similarly subject to different 
interpretations, ranging from the emphasis on a full exercise of political rights by 
citizenship to  passive representation by means of individual participation in the 
execution o f pre-defmed actions stipulated ‘from above’ (as for instance in communist 
conceptions).
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4. Modernisation in nineteenth-century Romania
4.1 Modernity and the Romanian Principalities
The emergence o f modernity in Western Europe (and the United States) had a profound 
yet differentiated impact on the Eastern part of the European continent. In the case of 
the Romanian Principalities that would come to constitute the modem Romanian nation­
state at the end of the nineteenth century -  i.e., Wallachia and Moldavia50 - the earliest 
impact was through the diffusion of the ideas of humanism and the Enlightenment. 
Since the sixteenth century, the Principalities had been semi-autonomous under the 
suzerainty of the Ottoman empire. However, this situation turned into one of complete 
subordination from 1711 onwards, when the so-called Phanariot regime was installed. 
The Romanian principalities were now ruled by intermediary Greek princes, who, in 
representing the Ottoman empire, deprived the Principalities of their local autonomy. It 
is in this historical and political context that the Romanian experience with modernity 
should be considered. The earlier diffusion of modem Western ideas formed the basis of 
the ideas of cultural unity and national consciousness. Notions of cultural belonging and 
common origins were transformed -  influenced to an important extent by the 
revolutionary vocabulary developed in France - into political ideas of independence and 
self-rule that formed the main objectives of the nineteenth-century modernising 
movement. Here the term modernisation can be rightfully introduced. As elaborated in 
the theoretical part, I understand modernisation as a political project in which the main 
objective is the reconstruction of the political and social order on the basis of the ideas 
of human autonomy and the human capacity to transform existing structures on the 
basis of an 'imagined' ideal model o f the polity. From the early nineteenth century
50 Transylvania, which contained a sizeable Romanian population, was part of the Habsburg Empire. 
Although a significant part of the struggle for modernisation and national unification was instigated 
here (most importantly in the development of a national consciousness, through the idea of a Latin 
national identity, of the Transylvanian School), Transylvania only became part of Romania after the 
First World War. Here, I will focus on the modernisation project as it was initiated and partly 
realised in the two Principalities that were to constitute the first independent Romanian state.
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onwards, such a project can indeed be detected in the Danubian Principalities. In 
particular in the 1820s, geo-political circumstances increasingly allowed for a local 
political project to emerge, as the Romanian Principalities gained some autonomy vis-à- 
vis the Ottoman empire and were opened up towards the Western world, especially in 
economic terms.
In this chapter, I will delineate the main contours of what may be called the liberal- 
national project o f modernisation that emerged in the nineteenth century in Romania. I 
will identify the particular constellation of actors behind this political project, and their 
relation to adversarial social forces. Furthermore, I will analyse the specific pattern of 
Romanian modernisation by looking at three principal elements in the 
institutionalisation of the political project of the Liberal nationalists: the state, the 
constitution, and the economy. The main purpose of the historical chapters is not to 
challenge existing Romanian (and foreign) historiography by giving an alternative 
account of major historical events. I rather want to give a partial reinterpretation of the 
dominant traits of modernisation in Romania in order to place in relief a particular 
Romanian pattern, by emphasising déviances from as well as commonalities with 
modernity as it developed in the West. In this, I want to emphasise the 'essentially 
contestable' nature of modernisation as such, and to challenge the idea of ultimate 
institutional and ideational convergence present in main-stream theorising of 
modernisation and social change.
4.2 Modernising agency: a coalition of national consensus
The nineteenth century witnessed a gradual but significant change in the social structure 
of the Romanian principalities. The most influential native social class, the upper 
landowning nobility, gradually lost its traditional dominance over (native) political 
power to an emerging liberal state class and a commercial-financial bourgeoisie. The 
increasing importance of social groups associated with modernising efforts does not, 
however, signify the complete irrelevance of the traditional classes, nor does it exclude 
any modernising role that they played. The conservative parts of the upper nobility 
’corrected' modernising tendencies not only by constituting a brake on radical change. It 
was also within them that significant alternative visions of modernisation developed. It
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is important then, if one wants to understand the dynamics of modernisation in 
nineteenth-century Romania, not only to identify the 'progressive' political actors (in 
modernist terms, the 'functional élites'), their position within the political field, and then- 
self-understandings. Equally, one needs to consider and evaluate the positions and 
alternative self-understandings of adversaries in the context of the construction of 
modem society. I propose that it is in the reciprocal relations and mutual understandings 
of the modernising protagonists and contesting actors that we can try to understand the 
agency behind modernisation.
Although proposals promulgating unification of the Romanians in a single state and 
independence from foreign interference were already circulating in the eighteenth 
century, the crystallisation of these ideas into a veritable political project only found 
expression in the first half of the following century. During the intensified subjugation 
of the Romanian principalities under Ottoman rule, ideas inspired by humanism, the 
Enlightenment, and liberalism were promoted by political writers, who predominantly 
defended a vision of autonomy and unification of the Romanian lands, against the 
foreign domination of the Ottoman empire. The political writers were mostly of a gentry 
background, more specifically from the higher strata of the native gentry. By the 1830s, 
however, the most radical political ideas did no longer originate from the higher strata, 
but from the middle and lower ranks of the native nobility (the so-called 'lesser' or 
'middling boyars’). The younger generation of these lower ranks, for the most part bom 
in the second decade of the nineteenth century, often studied abroad and had in this way 
been in direct contact with Western ideas (Janos 1978: 80-1; Siupiur 1998). An 
overwhelming majority of those whom in the 1830s would become the liberal, 
revolutionary élite had studied in France, especially in Paris.51 Here, they came into 
contact with the revolutionary ideas (especially relevant were those regarding national 
emancipation) of, amongst others, Michelet, Guizot, and Quinet (see Bodea 1970). The 
young generation did not only refer to the external political situation (as the higher 
ranks had done) but also to the internal socio-political situation of the Romanian lands. 
Around the 1830s, the formation of a radical intellectual stratum became visible, which
51 The studies taken were mostly in law (RSdulescu 1998: 113-4).
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would form the main political force in the revolutions of 1848. These revolutionaries or 
'48-ers' {pa$opti$ti) went beyond the mere expression of economic class interests in their 
promotion o f  national consciousness, and a common history and culture (cf. Georgescu 
1971: 51-3).
The most outspoken protagonists of a liberal and nationalist project for an 
independent Romanian nation-state thus stemmed mostly from a social background of 
native landowning classes, be it the middling or lower parts o f those classes. In general, 
the higher layers of these native landowning classes shared with the lower an aspiration 
for native self-rule in the Romanian lands, but were less inclined towards revolutionary 
ideas of a complete reconstruction o f  the social order inspired by the French Revolution 
and liberalism. At the same time, and here comes to the fore a significant difference 
with the social forces that shouldered modernising projects in Western Europe, the 
(economic) bourgeoisie played hardly any role in the project of reconstructing the 
polity. This was so primarily because o f the numeric insignificance of this social group 
in the Romanian lands at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and furthermore as a 
result of the mostly foreign nature o f  the merchant and capitalist classes. Those middle 
classes of native background (and therefore perhaps potentially receptive to liberal- 
nationalist ideas) seemed mostly suspicious towards modem ideas. Therefore, in the 
early part o f the nineteenth century only a minor and rather insignificant part of the 
liberal movement could be associated with upcoming commercial interests.52 The 
Romanian historian Boia (2001a: 32; cf. also Prodan 1971: 348) underlines the rather 
limited and even reactionary role played by a middle class in social change in nineteenth 
century Romania:
In the first half of the nineteenth century the bearers of the notions of progress were neither the 
lower classes nor a practically non-existent bourgeoisie. The opposition between “old” and 
“new” did not separate antagonistic classes, but was, in fact, a division within the Romanian 
élite of the time. The wearers of the new clothes, with ideas to match, were, for the most part, 
young boyars. The same group could also be found at the head of the revolution of 1848...
[T]he social category that we might describe as a somewhat insubstantial middle class, rather
52 A gradually developing autochthonous middle class represented upcoming trade and commerce, 
but, by 1849, still only constituted about 8 percent of the population of Wallachia and Moldavia, 
Janos 1978: 75).
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than a bourgeoisie in the strict sense, was far from being highly receptive to what was 
happening in the west of the continent.
In the first half o f the nineteenth century, then, we can identify three groups of actors 
relevant for our discussion of the origins of and emerging pattern of modernity in 
Romania: the liberal nationalists, comprising mostly the middle and lower layers of the 
landowning classes, and striving not only for national unification and independence, but 
also for the extension of privileges and access to public functions from the higher to the 
lower landowning classes; the 'liberal conservatives', i.e„ those parts of the higher 
landowning classes that equally aspired to native self-rule, but not to large-scale social 
reforms; and the conservative or reactionary parts of the landowning classes, that did 
not support any project of change and sought to maintain the status quo. All in all, the 
main protagonists and their adversaries in introducing a project of modernisation in 
Romania were part of an extremely narrow upper social layer, representing only a very 
small segment o f the Romanian population (the majority of which consisted of 
peasants).53
Liberalism in Romania was thus carried by the indigenous gentry that strove for 
autonomy from the political authority of the Ottoman Empire. The native landowning 
classes had been rebelling against these foreign rulers since the eighteenth century, and 
managed to free themselves from direct foreign rule in 1821, in the wake of a large- 
scale social upheaval led by Tudor Vladimirescu.54 The partial achievement of local 
autonomy brought to the fore internal divisions existing within the native landowning 
classes itself. In both Wallachia and Moldavia, the social groups that strove for unity 
and national independence organised in the respective Wallachian and Moldavian 
National Parties (partida nationala), which represented both the upper and middle 
layers o f the native nobility. The National Parties represented a political coalition on the
53 Prod an (1971: 349) mentions some 20 families constituting the upper layers of the native gentry, 
without specifying the dimension of the lower layers.
54 In 1821, Tudor Vladimirescu, a popular leader of peasant origin, started a popular uprising against 
the feudal yoke and in favour of emancipation from the Ottoman empire. The revolt failed, 
however, and Vladimirescu was put to death (Giurescu 1974: 163-4). In the revolt’s wake, the 
Ottoman empire granted the principal demands of the Romanian nobility, i.e., political rule by 
native princes and the exclusion of Greeks from public office, so as to prevent further revolutionary 
unrest in South-Eastern Europe (Giurescu 1974: 165; Seton-Watson 1934: 198-9).
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basis of consensus on national self-rule. Nevertheless, within the National Parties, 
factions existed (the above-mentioned liberal nationalists and the liberal conservatives) 
that were divided over 'the profundity, the rhythm and the nature of the transformations, 
and the particular position in relation to socio-political structures' (Platon 1985: 72). 
Whereas the dispute over reforms points to conflicting positions vis-à-vis the nature and 
scope of modernisation, the argument over socio-political position involved the access 
to political government, and thus political power itself. The middle and lower ranks 
argued for extended access to public office. Partly rebelling against the upper strata o f 
the landowning classes and partly seeking alternative social positions, these lower ranks 
strove for the institutionalisation o f native political power in state structures, and the 
formation of a nation-state to create an enduring foundation for collective autonomy, led 
by an ‘enlightened* and liberal political class.
Thus, despite the coalition of consent, the liberal and conservative factions parted 
ways on the mode of realisation of national self-rule. The radical elements amongst the 
liberal nationalists believed in direct action and organised their activities in 
conspirational associations, such as Frâtia (Brotherhood, founded in 1843 in Wallachia) 
and Asociatia patrioticâ (the Patriotic Association, founded in 1846 in Moldavia) 
(Bodea 1970; Giurescu 1974: 175-6). Eventually, these secret organisations defined the 
revolutionary ideology and prepared the political actions that led to the revolutions of 
1848. The latter nevertheless failed as a result of interference from Russia and the 
Ottoman empire.
Attitudes towards revolution and radical change in general, and towards the 
reconstruction of Romanian society in particular, defined the constellation of 
modernising actors after the unification of the Romanian Principalities in 1859 (see 
section 4.3). In particular in the decade that followed 1866, the year in which the first 
national constitution was adopted, the liberal-nationalist and the conservative factions of 
the national parties organised themselves into the two main political parties that would 
dominate the Romanian political arena until 1914. The National Liberal Party (Partidul 
National Liberal), though internally divided, represented the upcoming state 
bureaucracy as well as the burgeoning urban and commercial middle class, whereas the 
Conservative Party {Partidul Conservator) comprised 'liberal conservatives', reactionary
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large landowners, as well as more progressive elements (Hitchins 1994: 22, 92; Iacob 
1995: 228-39). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the political class of liberal 
nationalists included not only the state bureaucracy but also an up and coming middle 
class with stakes in industry and finance rather than land.55 In general, the rise and 
political empowerment of these new social groups formed a significant challenge to the 
position of the large landowners. However, the latter continued to play a crucial role in 
the Romanian political arena, as the Conservative party remained the immediate 
opponent of the Liberals until the 1920s.
The Conservative and Liberal parties were, however, not the simple embodiments 
and reflections of a declining traditional class pitted against an emerging modem, 
dominant class.56 Both parties represented their constituencies not only in terms of 
economic class interests, but also promoted ideas and programmes of much wider and 
universal significance. Thus, where for the Liberal party the protection of native 
interests was of primary importance, its reference to the idea of national autonomy and 
its inclination towards universalist, Western-type of institutions had significant, long­
term implications that went beyond narrow economic interests. The political 
imaginaries thus created (in particular those of popular sovereignty and social equality) 
informed the social struggle that eventually resulted in political 'voice' for the peasantry 
(cf. Platon 1985: 65). Similarly, the Conservative party, though ultimately defending 
and protecting the interests of the traditional upper nobility and therefore traditional, 
rurally-based societal arrangements, did so by invoking national traditions and pointing 
to the necessity of preserving a (rather recently 'invented') national identity. As such, 
they thus engaged in institutionalising a particularist tradition of thought that showed 
considerable affinity with other political discourses (especially peasant ism and 
populism). This was the case of so-called 'progressive conservatism’ that found its 
origins in the cultural association Junimea (youth), founded in Ia$i in 1863. This was a 
group of young Conservatives (mostly stemming from the upper layers of society and 
having studied in Germany) who introduced a 'critical culture' which promulgated an 
evolutionist view against the uncritical imitation and adoption of Western structures 
(see chapter 11). Rather than being an uncompromising and negative critique of
55 For a detailed genealogy of the Liberal classes, see Ràdulescu 1998 and 1999.
56 A vision articulated in a particularly fortright way by ZeJetin (1925).
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modernisation, this culturalist doctrine formulated an alternative to Western 
universalism, admitting the necessity o f change, but at the same time seeking to 
preserve national particularity based on authentic local experience (Càlinescu 1988: 
352-3). Key figures associated with Junimea (Petre Carp, Titu Maiorescu) formed a 
progressive faction within the Conservative party, aiming at the renovation of 
conservative principles in an attempt to adjust a conservative outlook to a changing 
society (cf. Iacob 1995: 238).
4.3 The emerging pattern of modernisation
The modernising actors in nineteenth century Romania were preoccupied with the 
translation o f their political and cultural programme into durable political, economic, 
and cultural structures. In this sense, we can speak of an emerging institutional pattern 
of modernisation, in which the priorities of the modernising programme find 
'solidification' in more durable institutions. These institutions, emerging from political 
action, can therefore be regarded to an important extent as the expression of the 
particular interpretations of modernisation that dominated the political arena. The most 
important object of political action was the establishment and consolidation of an 
independent and autonomous nation-state. This priority brought with it a whole range o f 
reforms as well as conflicts over the substance of these reforms. It was simultaneously 
the outcome of consensus among the political élites on the importance for the 
modernisation project of national independence and collective autonomy. The absolute 
priority of independence - shared by the dominant élites - existed at the expense of other 
objectives of modernisation, although these were equally present in the modernising 
programme. The most significant was the social question or social equality, which in the 
Romanian context concerned above all the situation of the peasantry, and the political 
question o f popular representation. Both objectives had been part of the revolutionary 
programmes of the Liberals, but became secondary in the actual institutionalisation of 
the modernising project.
The modem institutions - mostly o f a political and economic nature - not only 
reflected the capacities of the actors involved and the restrained possibilities in which 
these structures were created. The general design of these institutions also directly
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reflected the images and models that were derived from the Western experiences with 
reconstructing modem society (most importantly those of France), The ’forms' of the 
institutions were in a superficial sense rather indistinguishable from Western ones. 
Nevertheless, a rather different modernising pattern emerged from significant 
differences in emphasis, which were the outcome of the distinct interpretation of 
modernity by the modernising élites, and the encounter of foreign models with local 
traditions.
In the following I will avoid a detailed chronological history of institution building in 
nineteenth century Romania57, analysing instead how the main objectives of the 
modernisers' political and cultural programme were 'solidified' in institutions. More 
specifically, I will look into how specific interpretations of the local signification of 
modernity (in confrontation but also in concomitance with existing traditions) were 
reflected in these institutions. Institutional change in nineteenth-century Romania began 
with the transfer of political rule from the foreign rulers to the local upper nobility. 
Subsequently, further advances towards the realisation of local autonomy were made 
through the Romanianisation of the economy, the embedment and expansion of native 
rule in the semi-constitutional Organic Regulations, the de facto and then de jure  
realisation of the unification of the Romanian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, 
and the wide-ranging internal political and economic reforms that were implemented in 
its wake.
Political institutions
A first advance towards the realisation of the main objective of native Romanian élites - 
greater local autonomy - was the result of the settlement of the political and social revolt 
of 1821, led by Tudor Vladimirescu. Paradoxically, the putting down of the revolt 
resulted in the concession of native rule to the local gentry by the Ottoman empire, 
instigated by the Turkish fear of widespread social disorder in the region (Seton-Watson 
1934: 199). The change in political regime led to the election of native princes in the 
two Principalities (for a period of seven years). Furthermore, in the 1820s, the influence 
of the Ottoman empire on the Romanian lands diminished in favour of Russia, turning
57 Historical narratives - including the establishment of modern institutions - can be found in:
Georgescu 1991; Hitchins 1994; Seton-Watson 1934; Treptow 1997; Zeletin 1925.
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the Romanian lands de facto  into a Russian protectorate under Ottoman suzerainty. The 
most significant rupture with the old political system of foreign domination was 
constituted by the Treaty o f Adrianople (1829), which underlined the administrative 
autonomy of the Principalities, installed the nomination o f native princes for life, and 
stipulated the liberalisation o f trade and industry in the Principalities (detaching them 
ever more from the Ottoman empire as the latter’s monopoly over trade was abolished) 
(Giurescu 1974: 168). In the wake o f the Treaty o f Adrianople, local autonomy was not 
only more extensively guaranteed in a political sense, but also required a legal status in 
the form of the so-called Règlements Organiques’ or 'Organic Regulations’, introduced 
by Russia but elaborated by the Divans (constituted by members of the upper nobility) 
of the Principalities. The demand for the 'rule of law' instead of the arbitrary nature of 
Ottoman rule formed an important element in the native Liberal élites' interpretation of 
local autonomy (see Stanomir 2002).
The Regulations of 1831 established a quasi-constitution in that they legally 
stipulated native rule and a form o f separation o f powers between the rulers and a 
National Assembly, the latter made up o f representatives o f the upper native nobility. 
Nevertheless, these early constitutional forms not simply reflected an important step 
towards the creation of a modem society in the Romanian lands by founding a native 
political regime on modem legal-rational fundaments. The Regulations at the same time 
reproduced a tradition of princely rule, in which the ruling prince obtained prerogatives 
vis-à-vis the upper native nobility (though now put in modem, constitutional terms), 
while the lower ranks were excluded from political rule.
The knowledge of radical (French) revolutionary ideas held by the intellectual stratum 
that had formed out of the liberal-minded middle and lower nobility, informed a radical 
critique against these arrangements, also because the Regulations had been set up under 
a strong Russian influence and consecrated a continued foreign domination o f the 
principalities. This political critique would eventually culminate in the 1848 revolutions 
(Seton-Watson 1934: 213). The revolutions o f 1848 embodied in particular the critique 
of the upper nobility's domination o f political rule and strove for the alternative of a 
constitutional state. Furthermore, the revolutionaries struggled for unification between 
the principalities, a more extensive form of independence, and socio-political reforms.
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Only in Wallachia, however, did the 1848 revolution lead to temporary success in the 
form of a revolutionary government. The attempt to establish a fully constitutional state, 
which was to include a much larger part of the population in the political nation, was 
rather quickly aborted, and the political situation returned grosso modo to that of the 
Organic Regulations. Nevertheless, by 1859, in the wake of the Crimean war and the 
Treaty of Paris of 1856 (by which Russian tutelage was terminated and the Romanian 
principalities came under the protection of the Concert of Europe), a further 
advancement o f the cause of the Romanian nationalists was achieved in the de facto  
unification of the two principalities through the election of the same person, Alexandru 
Cuza, as ruler for Wallachia and Moldavia. As Platon (1985: 76-80) observes, the union 
of the Romanian principalities should ultimately be considered as the outcome of the 
political action and collaboration of both factions of the partida nationalà in the form of 
promoting national unity.
The rather surprising outcome of the elections followed negotiations between the 
European, Russian, and Ottoman powers on the fate of the principalities, which had 
already resulted in far-reaching administrative unification (through, for instance, a 
Central Commission with legislative powers for both principalities), the establishment 
of constitutional government, and the abolishment of the privileges and monopolies of 
the native nobility (Seton-Watson 1934: 262-3). The resulting political unification 
created the preconditions for the ultimate objectives of the Liberal nationalist forces: the 
creation of a fully autonomous and independent modem state, whose sovereignty was 
acknowledged by the major European powers, and, concomitant with this desideratum, 
a modem, representative and constitutional government. These objectives formed the 
main component of political debate and action in the years to follow, eventually finding 
institutional expression in the constitution of 1866, and full independence in 1878.
The realisation o f native rule and political unification had not been merely the outcome 
of political action by the Liberals but, as mentioned above, was the result of 
collaboration between the native political élites. Although one can speak of the 
predominant initiative of the Romanian Liberals in creating and consolidating a modem 
Romanian state, the Conservatives too left their mark on the actual pattern of 
institutionalisation. The relation between the two political forces evolved around their
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interpretations of modernisation. The relationship ultimately consisted of a shared 
affirmation of modernity in the form of a modem constitutional state, but parted where 
the Liberal nationalists embraced the wide-scale social change that Western modernity 
implied. On the one hand, the Liberals and Conservatives were in consensus about the 
main goals of modernisation, i.e., national independence and the consolidation of a 
Romanian nation-state. This consensus consisted o f the idea that national autonomy was 
only possible through the institutionalisation of a whole range of political and economic 
structures, as derived from Western examples, and codified in a Constitution. Further 
political consensus existed over the collective identity that the new order embodied. 
Both the Liberals and the Conservatives held an ethnic, cultural vision of collective 
identity, based on the historical origins of the Romanian nation, and specific 
characteristics such as religion and a rurally based culture. On the other hand, both 
factions represented mutually exclusive visions of the actual substance of the new order, 
and the balance between the new institutions and remnants of the old order. Where the 
Liberals were eager to found a new political system on the basis of legal-rational 
proceduralism and the creation of a sizeable middle class, the Conservatives were more 
concerned with maintaining a stable order by recreating the rule and privileges of the 
upper classes in the new state.
Both the consensus and conflicts between the two major political actors were 
reflected in the institutions created. The main, and shared, aspiration for collective 
autonomy was embodied in the Constitution of 1866, its establishment of a 
constitutional monarchy, headed by a foreign prince, and the internal sovereignty of the 
Romanian state. The predominant concern for national independence - rather than other 
concerns, such as the extension of socio-political rights - was further reflected in the 
narrow franchise on which the electoral system was based as well as in the strongly 
centralised form of the new state. Furthermore, the predominant understanding of 
independence as the independence o f the Romanian nation, defined in ethno-cultural 
terms, was visible in the debate on Article 7 of the Constitution, which excluded non- 
Romanians from civil rights on the basis of religion. At the same time, the Constitution 
and the political institutions reflected the Conservatives’ goal of maintaining traditional 
structures.
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The Constitution of 1866 was formulated on the basis of two main sources, i.e., the 
Belgian Constitutions of 1831 and the French one of 1814, and the tradition of local 
constitutional projects, mostly formulated in the period 1822-1859 (Stanomir 2002: 87). 
The Constitution contained all the 'necessary* elements of a modem European 
constitution: national sovereignty, hereditary monarchy, representative government, the 
separation of state powers, the political responsibility of ministers, as well as civil 
rights, property rights, freedom of conscience, press, and education (see lacob 1995: 
225). It strongly underlined national independence by establishing national sovereignty 
as it identified the Romanian state as the executor of internal sovereignty and as an 
independent national actor on the international level. No reference was made in the 
Constitution to the suzerainty of the Ottoman empire or the status of protectorate under 
the Concert of Europe, thereby in effect proclaiming Romania as independent from 
external constraints (lacob 1995: 227). Apart from embodying political consensus on 
collective autonomy, the Constitution was also an outcome of intense debate and 
political conflict between the two main political forces in Romania. This meant that the 
Constitution was in many respects the reflection of a compromise between the Liberals 
and the Conservatives. The Conservative influence was particularly visible in those 
elements of the constitutional regime where the traditional dominance of the upper 
layers of society was maintained (cf. lacob 1995: 226). Thus in parliament, only a minor 
percentage of the representatives was (indirectly) voted by the peasantry and the less 
educated and propertied layers of the population. The Liberal plea for a unicameral 
system was rejected by the Conservatives and eventually turned into a bicameral system 
and the creation of a Senate, which almost exclusively represented the landowning 
classes (Platon 1985; Stanomir 2002: 89-90). Furthermore, in the installation of a 
constitutional monarchy and a foreign ruler, one could read both the demand of the 
Conservatives for a stable order and the preservation of a hierarchical society, and the 
Liberal stance as one of pragmatism58 (cf. Docea 1997: 207).
58 The Liberals perceived a foreign ruler as ‘the best way to maintain a balance between “despotism” 
and “anarchy’” , whereas the Conservatives rather hoped that it would keep liberal radicalism in check 
(Hitchins 1994: 12-3). Ion C. Br&ianti, the leader of the Liberals, expressed the Liberals' viewpoint as 
follows: 'Gentlemen, you cannot want anything else than a constitutional monarchy; as long as Europe
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The bicameral system outlined in the Constitution ‘tended to reflect the prevailing 
forces in the country’ (Janos 1978: 85). Participation in parliamentary institutions was 
based on property and educational qualifications. This meant that in reality the 
traditional upper classes continued to dominate the political arena. The electoral system 
of four colleges highly favoured the traditional nobility and to a lesser extent the new 
propertied and professional classes: the first college was made up out o f the largest 
landowners; the second of owners of medium-sized estates; the third o f industrial and 
commercial entrepeneurs, urban property-owners and professionals; and the fourth of 
the rest o f the (mostly rural) population, which could only vote indirectly (Iacob 1995: 
226; Janos 1978: 85). The propertied (and educated) classes constituted the 
overwhelming majority, whereas the minority position of the fourth college was even 
further undermined by electoral manipulation at the local level. In 1884, the electoral 
system was reformed, in a merger of the first and second colleges, entailing an effective 
preponderance of the ‘urban, professional and official class’, and placing the ‘main 
weight o f an extremely narrow franchise in an overwhelmingly agricultural country’ on 
those classes (Seton-Watson 1934: 357). This reform shifted the balance from the 
traditional to the new professional and middle classes. Moreover, as referred to earlier, 
the prevalence of the dominant, but extremely narrow group of social forces in the 
Romanian political arena was further underlined in the two-party system, in which only 
the Liberal and the Conservative Party could participate.
Although in reality political rule was in the hands o f a narrow group o f élites, 
formally the government and political institutions represented the Romanian nation at 
large. The nation was defined by both the Liberals and the Conservatives in ethno­
cultural terms, which meant that citizenship was only to be provided to those who 
belonged to the historically formed Romanian nation, thereby excluding foreigners, 
most importantly the Jews. The latter had by the second half of the nineteenth century 
constituted a significant part of the urban population, especially in Moldavia, and 
represented an economic threat to the interests (defined as national interests) o f the 
Romanians by dominating commercial professions. The objective of creating a state 
purely representative of the Romanian nation and the national interest was articulated in
remains monarchist, we will do the same; when Europe will declare itself a Republic, we will also declare
ourselves a Republic' (cited in: Docea 1997: 207).
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the Constitution of 1866, in which Article 7 stipulated that ’only foreigners with the 
Christian religion can obtain naturalisation’ (Iacob 1995: 227). The intention behind this 
article was to prevent the Jews (and other commercially active foreigners) from 
obtaining political and civil rights. The contents of this article were in keeping with the 
two principle objectives - defence o f the national interest and national integration - of 
the Romanian political élites. The national interest, defined as the (economic) interest of 
ethnic Romanians, was furthered by emphasising both an image of the Other, the non- 
Romanian, and the myth of unity o f the nation and therefore of a singular, collective 
identity protected by the state. International pressure, in particular in the form of the 
Congress of Berlin, eventually forced the Romanian political élites to change the article 
in favour of the emancipation of Jews and other foreigners by the omission o f any 
religiously based citizenship. As the exclusivist reading of membership of the nation 
had been carried unanimously by the political forces in the country, the forced 
modification was experienced not only as an unjustified foreign intervention in local 
affairs, but also as an act detrimental to the national interest (cf. Barkey 2000; Seton- 
Watson 1934: 349; Volovici 1991). Paradoxically though, the modification meant full 
international recognition for Romanian independence, and therefore also strengthened 
collective autonomy (cf. Platon 1985: 81).
The predominance of collective autonomy as the main objective o f modernisation 
was not only expressed in the great political weight given to the realisation of 
independence from external constraints, international recognition, and the protection of 
the national interest. Collective autonomy was also given priority in the internal 
relations between the state and civil society. In other words, individual liberty and 
representation, one of the key principles in West-European liberalism, was subordinated 
to collective self-determination exercised by the political élites. Although legal civic 
rights were guaranteed in the Constitution, in the actual institutionalisation of the state 
they only played a secondary role. As referred to above, the electoral system only 
allowed an indirect and insignificant vote for the majority of the population, i.e., the 
peasantry. At the same time, the state was organised on the basis of the centralised 
French political system, which in the Romanian context resulted in disproportionate 
political power of the centre (in Bucharest), with regional and local authorities strongly 
subordinated to the central bureaucracy, not only in budgetary matters but also in terms
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of decision-making. Public participation in political affairs was in this way effectively 
discouraged (Hitchins 1994: 95-6). The tendency towards bureaucratic centralisation 
increased during the decade of almost authoritarian rule by Ion C. Bratianu, in the 
period 1878-88, in which the leader of the Liberal party increasingly concentrated 
political power in his own hands, alienating radical Liberals in the party (Hitchins 1994: 
96; Seton-Watson 1934: 354-5).
Socio-economic structures
In the project o f modernisation advocated by the Romanian Liberals, political autonomy 
could not be separated from autonomy in the economy, i.e., the creation of a local space 
of autonomy in which the Romanian state would independently make decisions, and the 
creation of a viable national economy. Before 1859, one could speak of a combined 
effort of the Liberal and Conservative forces to enhance local autonomy in economic 
matters, in particular in the sphere o f tariff policies, which were of primary importance 
for the revenues of the ruling élites and the emerging state. After the unification o f the 
Romanian principalities, the consolidation of the state and formal independence in 
economic policy-making (1878), the primary objective became the construction of the 
national economy. This was the object o f intense disputes between the Liberals and 
Conservatives, especially in terms of what the nature o f state involvement and 
intervention in the economy should be and what relation the Romanian economy should 
have to the international economy. In both periods - before and after formal 
independence - the priority in efforts o f economic modernisation was the realisation of 
autonomy and independence from foreign interference. The Liberal Party dominated 
politics from the mid-1870s onwards and introduced a Listian protectionist policy, 
primarily aimed at creating and supporting national industry. This policy can be read as 
the expression o f  a 'nationalising state'59 (Brubaker 1996) or 'reconquista' (Platon 1985; 
see also Stokes 1997) which was to last until the 1930s. In the Liberal interpretation, 
political autonomy also took the form of the creation and defence of a native middle
59 Brubakers understands ‘nationalising nationalism’ as involving ‘the claims made in the name of a 
“core nation” or nationality, defined in ethnocultural terms, and sharply distinguished from the 
citizenry as a whole. The core nation is understood as the legitimate "owner” of the state, which is 
conceived as the state o f and fo r  the core nation’ (Brubaker 1996: 5).
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class, to the detriment of foreign influence in the national economy. The middle class 
was indeed the main object of the constitutional change in 1884, in which the four 
colleges of the parliament were reduced to three. This reform led to an increase in the 
franchise, but only a modest one. In this way, the political influence of industrial and 
banking classes would be increased without diluting its influence by giving 'voice' to a 
larger part of the population (Hitchins 1994: 101-2).
In the formative years of the Romanian nation-state (1821-1859), various efforts 
were undertaken to liberate the local economies from, first of all, the influence of the 
Ottoman empire, which had traditionally dominated the external economic affairs of the 
Principalities, and later Russia and the 'protecting' powers of Western Europe. By laying 
down the acquired freedoms in treaties and legal documents, the political élites sought 
to institutionalise an increasing independence from foreign interference. As referred to 
above, the Treaty of Adrianople and the Organic Regulations formed a significant step 
forward in this sense.60 The first allowed for a limited freedom of commerce in the 
Romanian Principalities, whereas the latter provided for a limited right of decision in 
external tariff adjustments as well as the abolishment of privileges for the Ottoman 
empire (Antonescu 1915: 2-3; Zeletin 1925: 37)61. A further advancement towards 
national economic autonomy came in the shape of the Convention of Paris (1858), in 
which freedom of commerce, legislation and navigation o f the Danube were once again 
underlined. Yet the Romanian principalities remained dependent on the Ottoman empire 
in external tariff policies (Antonescu 1915: 5). Only in the 1870s did the Romanian 
government managed to conclude its first direct trade treaty with Austria-Hungary, 
thereby instituting its formal capacity to conclude autonomous treaties vis-à-vis other 
states.
60 The Organic Regulations also formed the beginning of increased administrative unification of the 
principalities. In its wake, further measures towards the abolishment of local barriers were taken, 
such as the cancellation of local tolls and tariffs between Moldavia and Muntenia, effected in 1849 
and 1856, and the first modem commercial codes, adopted in 1840 and 1864, in Moldavia and 
Muntenia respectively. These codes were set up after the French example of 1807, only to be 
replaced by the national code in 1887 (Postolache 1991: 45).
61 Zeletin regards the economic opening up of the Romanian principalities as the moment in which 
the Romanian principalities were subordinated to Western capitalism, destroying the old feudal 
regime and resulting in the domination of the bourgoisie (1925: 37-8).
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The combined efforts of the Romanian political élites to create a national space of 
autonomy opened the way to an intimately linked, but much more contentious question, 
i.e., the creation o f a viable national economy. A local space for autonomy could in 
reality only hold a substantial meaning if the élites could exert this independence on a 
substantive basis. In other words, Romanian emancipation from external interference 
and liberty of political action would only really be meaningful if Romania held the 
actual means to bring to bear its voice. On the question of how to achieve such 
substantive emancipation the political forces were bitterly divided. The Liberals 
strongly advocated the creation of a national capitalist economy on the basis of Western 
industrialised societies, whereas the Conservatives were more concerned with 
preserving as much as possible o f the old social structures and therefore promulgated a 
capitalist economy based on the rural traditions of the country. As the Liberals 
dominated the political arena, most visibly in the decade 1878*88, but in reality until far 
into the 1930s, their conception of modernisation in the form of a 'nationalising state' 
(Brubaker 1996) crucially shaped the emerging national economy. At the same time 
though, Conservative efforts did inform (and alter) this main trend.
Liberal efforts to achieve a substantive form of emancipation revealed themselves 
most conspicuously in their continuous struggle to indigenise the economy. As 
mentioned above, Article 7 of the Constitution, which formally prohibited the extension 
of civil rights on the basis of religion, was in reality an attempt to reclaim commercial 
enterprise for native Romanians and prevent the exploitation of Romanians by 
foreigners (cf. Seton-Watson 1934: 349). The Liberals sought to nationalise the 
economy and subsequently to protect native economic activity in many ways. In 
particular under the quasi-authoritarian rule of Ion C. Bratianu (1878-88), the protection 
and promotion o f native industry became a crucial element of economic policy-making, 
which in itself had a lasting impact on the relation o f the state to the economy.
After the negative experiences of the various commercial treaties that Romania had 
concluded with foreign states (beginning with the treaty with Austria-Hungary in 1876, 
see Antonescu 1915), the Liberals introduced a protectionist, import-substitution policy 
in the mid-1880s. In the international context of increasing competition from the United 
States (in the export of wheat, at the time Romania's major export item) and a strong 
tendency towards protectionism in Western Europe, the Liberals could pursue their
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project of modernisation on the basis of partial isolation from the world market while at 
the same time emulating the Western industrial model. In this they followed the model 
offered by the economist A.D. Xenopol who advocated the creation of a Romanian 
heavy industry, whereas his main adversary, the Liberal economist Petre Aurelian, 
thought it best to promote smaller cottage industries and trades (Welzk 1982a: 48).
The Liberal policies during the 1880s were based on two instruments of state 
intervention: the promotion of native industry and the implementation of protectionist 
tariffs on a range of native products. In this way, the state became increasingly 
intertwined with the economy, as its revenues depended on the economic performance 
of national industry, whilst industry depended on advantages secured by the state. State 
interventionism would last until the 1930s, even if the Conservatives, and later, in the 
1920s, the National Peasant Party would slacken this trend. Intervention explicitly 
aimed at the promotion of native industry, in that enterprises eligible for tax reductions, 
tariff exemptions, and fruther advantages were required to be manned in significant 
measure by native Romanians, and later also to be headed by a Romanian.62 The Liberal 
policy o f Romanianisation' or indigenisation in the 1920s and 1930s continued the 
project of creating a native industry, to the detriment of foreign enterprise.63 
Additionally, the 'nostrification' of industry led to a further entanglement of state and 
economy. In the 1920s, the general advantages offered to native industry - tax 
exemptions, discounts in transportation, direct subsidies - were complemented by the 
provision of long-term credits under favourable conditions (Hitchins 1994: 367; Welzk 
1982a: 98-9). In the wake of the Great Depression, which had far-reaching implications
62 The first requirement was part of the law for the promotion of industry issued in 1886, which 
stipulated that, after five years, eligible companies needed to have a labour force consisting of two- 
thirds of Romanian citizens (Amonescu 1915: 107). The second requirement came to the fore in the 
1920s in the policies of 'Romani sation’, in which the Liberals not only sought to acquire a majority 
of the shares in enterprises controlled by foreigners, but also stipulated that the director should be 
Romanian, or, in case of a larger management, at least one third should consist of Romanian citizens 
(Welzk 1982a: 85).
63 A particular case regarded the extraction of the country's mineral resources. In the Constitution of 
1923, all mineral sources were declared state property, although existing concessions were 
maintained. The stipulation eventually had to be repealed in 1928, under strong foreign pressure 
(Welzk 1982a: 88-9).
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for of production and price levels, the economic policies of the Liberals took a 
qualitative turn. Before, the state had had a mainly supporting role vis-à-vis industry, 
and a contextual one in creating favourable conditions. From the early 1930s onwards, a 
veritable ’etatisation' o f the economy took place, which meant that the state participated 
directly in the economy and was given a strongly regulative and dominating role. By 
means o f an active cartellisation (and therefore an ever-increasing direct role o f the state 
in investment decisions and regulation of the economy), the Liberals attempted to 
maintain control of the pattern of industrialisation as well as of existing native industry.
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5. The crisis of liberalism and the fascist alternative
5.1 Liberalism and its discontents
In the context of a profoundly changed geo-political, territorial and socio-economic 
landscape, the interwar years saw the continuation of the Liberal nationalist project of 
modernisation. Immediately after the First World War, the political situation was 
confused and governments of different outlook alternated with high frequency. From 
1922 onwards, however, the Liberal party managed to regain a firm hold of political 
power, which it maintained until 1937. Despite major continuations in the Liberal 
nationalist project, significant modifications and adaptations were made by the Liberals 
in tune with the radically changed circumstances. Structural changes in the wake of the 
war had a profound impact on the Liberal project and on Romanian politics in general. 
These included the enlargement of the Romanian nation-state in 1918 into the ’Greater 
Romania' state (which comprised the new territories of Bessarabia, Bukovina, and 
Transylvania), the extensive land reforms of 1917-19, and the extension of voting rights 
to the male population. The immediate result of this was a bundle of political tensions 
that may be summarised in the following four tendencies: firstly, inter-ethnic problems 
became a heated issue of debate as the three newly incorporated territories contained 
much larger minorities than the Old Kingdom (Wallachia and Moldavia) and thus 
paradoxically the realisation of Greater Romania brought with it the relative reduction 
of the Romanian ‘element’ within the larger territory (cf. Livezeanu 1995). Secondly, 
inter-regional tensions arose between the central Bucharest-based government and 
administration, and local ruling élites of the new territories. Thirdly, an inter- 
generational struggle between the older Liberal élites and a ‘new generation’ of 
politically conscious students, an unintended consequence of the massive extension of 
the education system in the 1920s and 1930s. The youth movement, heavily opposed to 
the older generation’s vision of society, empowered itself by drawing on both 
domestically developed critiques of the Liberal project and by leaning on the interwar 
cultural currents of ‘cultural pessimism’ and revolutionary fascism in Europe. Fourthly, 
the urban-rural divide continued to provide one of the key points of contention as the
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disproportionate emphasis of the Liberal economic programme on industrialisation and 
the necessity of creating an urban middle class did not remain without reaction in the 
largely rural economy. The urban-rural divide was abated somewhat by the large-scale 
land reforms in the early 1920s, but simultaneously exacerbated by the inclusion of the 
overwhelmingly rural male population in the government o f the polity via the extension 
of male suffrage. The political inclusion of the latter meant that discursive 
representations of rural marginalisation stood a much larger chance in the political arena 
than in the pre-war era.
The whole gamut of political, ethnic and socio-economic tensions influenced the 
Liberal project decisively. Throughout the 1920s, the Liberals still represented the most 
powerful political élite, especially since the Conservative landed élites lost most o f their 
economic and political influence after the great land reforms following the First World 
War (Welzk 1982a: 69-70). The relatively large-scale agrarian reforms -  although 
hardly serving the needs of the peasantry as a whole (Tumock 1970: 542) -  undermined 
the socio-economic basis o f the land-owning class, and simultaneously any legitimate 
basis for its political status. Indeed, the issue of land reforms had been a major factor in 
dividing the party since the 1880s, and the land reform of the 1920s - complemented by 
the divided nature of the party (in a Conservative democratic and a progressive faction, 
Roberts 1951: 91) and ’Germanophile’ leanings during the war - meant the end of the 
major political role of the Conservatives in Romanian politics (Brown 1979: 457; 
Livezeanu 1990: 219).
From their rise to political power in the second half o f the nineteenth century 
onwards, but most clearly in the interwar period, the Liberals increasingly performed 
the conservative role of maintaining the status quo and defending the establishment 
(Brown 1982: 291; Platon 1985). The Liberal current showed clear tendencies towards 
authoritarian solutions for realising their project (see Preda 1998) and in this sense it 
changed -  contextually as well as substantively speaking -  into a conservative project, 
seeking to continue the original project of modernisation by accentuating (temporary) 
authoritarian solutions for its realisation. Both the defence of the status quo and the 
'neoliberal' outlook fed into the growing importance of the state.
It was this image of the Liberal project of modernisation, a subversive and innovative 
project increasingly turned étatist and conservative, that was the focus of critical and
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radically different interpretations - in particular revolutionary fascist ones - of 
modernisation. Changed circumstances allowed these critiques to arise, resonate and 
mobilise considerable parts of the population. The right-wing, fascist critique took the 
form of a cultural critique, which took issue both with the institutionalised form of 
liberalism (in democratic and statist structures) and its political doctrine as such. One of 
the peculiarities o f interwar Romania is that revolutionary leftism constituted a minor 
and even negligible factor in the political landscape. Conflicts over modernisation were 
therefore dominated by liberal, conservative and radical fascist interpretations (cf. 
Banac and Verdery 1995).
In this chapter, I will first identify the formation and consolidation of alternative 
political movements. Subsequently, I will analyse the continued institutionalisation of 
liberalism in the interwar period. This account of the institutional underpinnings o f the 
Liberal project performs a different role than in the previous chapter, where the 
institutional picture mainly served to indicate the general, structural changes that the 
Liberal project brought about. In this chapter, as well as serving this purpose, such a 
picture will reveal continuity and rupture with the pre-war period and show which 
institutions were the immediate reference points for a culturalist-spiritualist critique.
5.2 M odernising agency: political Voice* and modernisation *from below*64
After the First World War, the Liberals largely represented by the ethnic Romanian 
financial and industrial classes from Vechiul Regat or the Old Kingdom. In addition, the 
Liberals provided most of the members of the state-bureaucracy and the governments in 
the 1920 and 1930s. The Liberals' position as the ruling political and economic élite of
641 will focus on those political actors that had a structural influence on the direction and substance 
of Romanian modernisation. I will not discuss political forces that played only a transitory role, 
such as General Averescu's Popular Party (Partidul Poporului) in the early and middle 1920s. In the 
interwar period, three main political forces can be identified: the National Liberal Party, the 
National Peasant Party, and the fascist Iron Guard. The National Liberal Party dominated the 
political scene when in office from 1922 to 1928, and from 1933 to 1937, Their periods of 
government were interrupted by a period of rule of the National Peasant Party (1928-1931), the 
technocratic government headed by the historian Nicolae Iorga (1931-32), and once again the 
National Peasant Party (1932-33).
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an enlarged Romania increasingly came under pressure despite their attempts to 
integrate Greater Romania through centralisation and 'Romanianisation'. After the 
interruption of the First World War, the Liberals resumed the modernising project they 
had initiated in the nineteenth century. This 'original' modernising project was, however, 
increasingly subject to severe criticism and opposition stemming from political actors 
that interpreted the Romanian project in a radically different way.
The political field changed rather drastically in the interwar period, as the position o f 
the Liberal Party shifted from the role of emancipator and unifier of the Romanian 
nation to that of conservative guardian o f the status quo. Newly emerged political actors 
- representing the recently politically emancipated peasant majority - now took up the 
role of opposition to the Liberal Party. Despite the prominence of the Liberal Party in 
governance, its political legitimacy eroded steadily as a result of internal political 
problems65 and a growing critique on the Liberals' allegedly corrupt nature and 
inadequate representation o f the whole nation.66 The governing party was perceived as 
following narrowly defined class interests and therefore its predominantly economic 
nationalism as a betrayal of the interests of the ethnic majority. In addition, despite 
large-scale agrarian reforms in 1921, the Liberals proved incapable of structurally 
improving the socio-economic position o f the majority of the population, the peasantry. 
Although the extensive land reforms of the early twenties did meet part of the social or 
‘peasant question’ - the demand for ownership of land - it left unresolved the economic 
problems o f production and efficiency67, and therefore failed to confront the precarious 
socio-economic position of the peasantry. The Liberal élite could indeed legitimately be
65 In particular the death of leader Ion I. C. Brätianu in 1927 created a crisis of leadership and 
direction (Roberts 1951: 106-7).
66 As Roberts remarks: 'Although the National Liberal Party was pleased to trace its origins to the 
group of young Rumanian intellectuals who had been inspired by the ideals of the French 
Revolution of 1848, the temper of the Brätianu party in the 1920's bore a far greater resemblance to 
the rigid and narrowly conceived liberalism of Guizot in the latter years of the July monarchy. In 
both cases there was the same curious combination of a not unimpressive austerity with the crassest 
manifestations of the spirit of "enrichissez-vous" (Roberts 1951:108).
67 Janos claims that the reforms even had ‘disastrous long-run implications for the entire national 
economy’, because of severe decreases in crop yields, decreasing exports and increasing domestic 
consumption (Janos 1978: 103).
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subjected to the critique of systematic political negligence of a major part of the 
population. The continuing socio-economic problems of the enlarged Romanian state, in 
combined with the alleged self-interest of its political class and the wild growth o f the 
bureaucratic state system made the political élites and the political system extremely 
vulnerable to this critique, all the more so when the effects of Great Depression in 1929 
were felt in the Romanian lands (see Heinen 1986:48,52-3).
The main alternative political forces of the period can be distinguished on the basis of 
their positions vis-à-vis the political system. The democratic political forces, most 
importantly the regional and peasantist parties, both criticised the 'original’ modernising 
project for its negligence of the peasantry and its inadequacy in representing the 
authentic nation, but generally endorsed the legal and constitutional nature of the 
existing political system (cf. Perie 1998: 86-7). These counter-currents represented the 
political force of the peasantry unleashed in the 1920s and 1930s and formulated a 
relatively moderate critique o f the Liberals’ Western model, based on pre-war 
peasantist/populist strands of thought, strands which had in themselves grown out of 
organicist, evolutionary critiques on Liberalism. The common denominator among the 
peasantist parties was the representation o f the peasantry and the rejection of the 
Liberals’ protectionist and industrialist model. In general, however, their critique 
remained within the parameters of the political system. The nationalist parties that had 
emerged in the early twentieth century, who continued to political manifest themselves 
in the 1920s, similarly criticised the Liberals for their inadequate defence of the nation 
and identified the nation with the peasant masses and rural traditions. Their conception 
of national regeneration was predominantly expressed through anti-Semitism, i.e., the 
protection of 'the economic, political, and cultural interests of the Rumanians against the 
Jews by all legal means' (Hitchins 1994: 403). In this, they remained largely within the 
existing political framework, in contrast to the radical, fascist groups which emerged 
among the university youth in the early 1920s and which strongly rejected liberal 
democracy as a political system. The fascist movement mostly operated outside or on 
the margins of the formal political arena, was organised in a hierarchical and 
paramilitary movement rather than in a democratic political party, and promulgated as 
its main objective the overthrow of the existing system. Anti-systemic thought was not
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only professed by politically organised social groups that resorted to (often violent) 
political action but was also endorsed on a purely discursive, intellectual level by a 
group of young intellectuals. The initially distinct movements - political and intellectual 
-  collaborated openly from the early 1930s onwards.
1. Populism68. The political significance of the most immediate alternative to the 
Liberal project of modernisation - a  form of populism - was based on two factors: the 
political mobilisation of the peasantry and the formulation of an economic critique. The 
National Peasant Party (Partidul National Jârànesc) which came into being in 1926 
comprised both these elements. Its attention to the peasant question and its direct 
representation of the peasant class made it a significant force after the two-fold change 
of the extension of voting rights and the wide-scale land reforms. The implementation 
of universal male suffrage, meant to extend the political nation to the peasantry69 and 
resulting from the desire o f the incumbent political élites to prevent any ‘Bolshevik’ 
contagion among the masses (Heinen 1986: 102; Seton-Watson 1934: 552), resulted in 
two structural changes. First of all, it gave political 'voice' to the peasantry, turning 
political mobilisation of the masses into a significant element of politics. Secondly, the 
political representation o f the peasantry empowered those political forces that 
promulgated an alternative to the Liberal vision of modernisation.
The National Peasant Party emerged from the fusion of two regional political parties. 
The Peasant Party (Partidul Jârànesc) had been established in the Old Kingdom in 
1918 and originally promulgated a rather radical ideology of populism70 and 
revolutionary class struggle. In 1926 the Peasant Party united with the National Party of 
Transylvania (Partidul National), which was organised around the ethnic Romanian 
minority of Transylvania under the Austro-Hungarian empire (the party was established 
in 1888). The latter’s original doctrine was based on emancipation of the Romanians and
68 Populism refers here to those political movements that emerged around the turn of the twentieth 
century in Russia and Eastern Europe and sought to directly represent the popular (peasant) masses 
by striving for reforms to better the masses’ situation.
69 In 1930, the Romanian population was 80 percent rural, whereas only 20.2 percent lived in urban 
areas (Livezeanu 1995: 8-10).
70 The original peasantist doctrine was strongly based on Constantin Stere's populist ideas (Perie 
1998: 113; see chapter 7),
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unification with the Old Kingdom The fusion resulted in the National Peasant Party 
(Partidul National Tarane sc), which created a political party operating on the national 
level, and promulgated a discourse of social harmony and a rurally based economy, 
while remaining within the horizon of the democratic system The National Peasant 
Party assumed government in the period of 1928-30, underlining the rapidly changed 
power differential in Romanian politics after the extension of the franchise. 
Notwithstanding its electoral base (the main support came from peasants from the Old 
Kingdom), the party élite itself was mainly constituted by members of social groups 
other than the peasantry, such as urban intellectuals, the local bourgeoisie, and ‘heads of 
popular banks and village cooperatives’ (Hitchins 1994: 391-2; see also Heinen 1986: 
104). Despite the party’s formal representation of the major part of the population, the 
peasantry, its more emancipatory outlook and thus its more inclusive character, it still 
failed to effectively solve structural economic and politics problems (Livezeanu 1995: 
24). In the context of the world economic crisis and the declining status of democracy 
and its political programme, liberalism, the failure of the National Peasant Party in 
finding an enduring solution or third way' to the country’s problems contributed to 
clearing the way for authoritarian and fascist solutions.
2. The nationalist movements. The most important exponents of what might be called 
nineteenth-century nationalism or ‘traditional’ nationalism (see below), which formed a 
critique on the power of the Liberals in the interwar period, were A.C. Cuza and Nicolae 
Iorga. Both had studied at the university of Ia$i, had been influenced by the organicist 
critique o f the Junimists and represented the traditional nationalism of the ideologues of 
the last quarter o f the nineteenth century (another important figure was the national poet 
Mihail Eminescu) (see chapter 11). Cuza, in his position as professor of economics in 
Ia§i, and Iorga, as a prominent historian at the university of Bucharest, ‘provided the 
synthesis of Eminescu’s xenophobia and the nativism of Junimea’ (Niessen 1995: 281). 
Both Cuza and Iorga were involved in the foundation of the Universal Antisemitic 
League and, in 1910, founded the Democratic Nationalist Party, which had an explicitly 
nationalist and anti-semitic programme. According to Volo vici, these organisations had 
relatively little influence on interwar political life. Nevertheless, ‘[t]he spread of 
antisemitism was visible in intellectual and cultural circles, but more pronounced 
among the middle classes and “intellectual proletariat” [i.e., a university educated youth
The fascist alternative
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that could not find a place in the state bureaucracy, PB]; these sectors lacked “cultural 
capital” and were eager to acquire prestige and social position* (Volovici 1991: 18- 
19)71.
Cuza, along with Iorga, formed part of a group of Veterans* for whom antisemitism 
formed an integral part of their nationalist political programmes. Cuza, in his capacity 
as university professor and as politician, played a crucial role in the articulation and 
diffusion of an exclusionary and ethnicity-based nationalism. In addition to the 
Democratic National Party, Cuza later established the Guard of National Awareness 
(1919), the League of National Christian Defence (LANC, in 1923), and the National 
Christian Party (together with the nationalist and anti-semitic poet Octavian Goga, in 
1935). Iorga, one of the most important Romanian historians, contributed to nationalist 
ideology mostly through his understanding of the nation as the embodiment of the 
Romanian soul72, comparable to the romanticist tendencies in German nationalism. 
Iorga’s myth of ‘national regeneration’ was based on ‘the cultural and political 
promotion of the traditional values o f  Romanian rural life, opposition to modernization 
and, in different periods, varying degrees of xenophobia’73 (Volovici 1991: 31). The 
role of Cuza, Iorga and other intellectuals in the spread o f a nationalism that was 
demarcated by strong antisemitic overtones and a mythical perception of the nation 
underlines the significant and autonomous role of intellectuals in formulating political 
discourses in Romanian interwar society (cf. Volovici 1991: 31). Nevertheless, the 
traditional nationalist movement remained largely an intellectual phenomenon confined 
to the élite level and with little political influence, in contrast to the radical fascist 
movements which actively mobilised the masses (cf. Heinen 1986: 94).
3. Fascism. The radical, ‘new* nationalism that emerged in the interwar period and 
formed an important part o f the ideology of the fascist movement elaborated on the
71VoIovici depicts Cuza as ‘the perfect illustration of the mediocre intellectual who made a 
remarkable scientific and political career based exclusively on the promotion of a program to 
combat the “Jewish threat” (1991: 23).
72 Iorga equation of the authentic nation with the peasantry came clearly through in his historical 
work (see, for instance, Iorga 1971).
73 Iorga eventually renounced his anti-Semitic sentiments, which contributed to a break with Cuza, 
who persisted in his radically anti-Jewish outlook (Heinen 1986: 107-8).
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same themes as its nationalist predecessors, A collectivist and ethnic-cultural 
conception of the nation and a virulent anti-Semitism formed the main part of the fascist 
programme. The crucial distinction between ‘new* nationalism and its traditionalist 
predecessor was its anti-systemic character, which comprised a comprehensive critique 
of democracy, individualism, and rationalism. In practice, this meant that it rejected 
democracy as a political system, liberalism as a political doctrine, and the West as a 
model to follow.
The radical repudiation of the Western model found its most immediate supporters 
amongst university students in the rapidly expanding university system of the early 
1920s74, an educational system that was unable to cater for its immensely growing 
clientele.75 This situation was at its most evident in the new regions of Greater Romania 
(in particular in Bessarabia and Bukovina), but also in Moldavia, where minority, 
especially Jewish students formed a significant portion of the student population. The 
right-wing student movement could partially be understood as a struggle for social 
positions in that it emerged in the early 1920s as an agitation against minority students, 
who were depicted as competing for scarce resources in an overcrowded university.76 At 
the same time, and intimately related to their anti-minority and anti-Semitic attitude but 
beyond the direct social struggle, the right-wing student movements strongly opposed
74 For an extensive treatment of the cultural policies in interwar Romania, see Uvezeanu 1995. As 
she observes: ‘The dramatic growth in the university body, the conditions of overcrowding due to 
scarce resources and to inadequate growth in faculty and facilities of all kinds, and the persistence 
of ethnic minorities in the universities informed the protracted debate in interwar Romania over the 
purported excess of university graduates, the ethnic make-up of Romania's intellectual élite, and the 
unfair competition Romanian students and graduates might face from “foreigners’” (Livezeanu 
1995:240).
75 The number of university students grew from 0.1 percent in 1914 to 0.2 percent of the general 
population in 1930, representing an increase of 200 percent (Livezeanu 1995: 240; Janos 1978: 
108), although compared to Western Europe numbers these figures were relatively insignificant 
(Janos 1989: 354).
76 This was expressed in the demand for a numerus clausus for the admission of Jewish students. 
For accounts of these political struggles within the universities by the main leaders of the Fascist 
movement, see Codreanu 1974 and Mofa 1978. The demand for a numerus clausus for Jewish 
students could also be found elsewhere in Europe (for instance in neighbouring Hungary, see Ambii 
1980: 72).
107
The fascist alternative
emerging communist sentiments and the existing political establishment. In addition, 
the ’generation of 1922’ criticised the older generation for not dealing effectively with 
the social problems it perceived. The fascist movement was headed by the charismatic 
Comeliu Zelea Codreanu77 and organised in a strictly hierarchical and almost 
paramilitary manner, and in 1927 formed the ‘Legion of the Archangel Michael’, which 
from the 1930 onwards was also referred to as the ‘Iron Guard’ {Garda de Fier).7* From 
the early 1930s onwards the fascist movement increasingly participated in political life 
through its legal, political wing, which entered the elections in 1932 as the 'C.Z. 
Codreanu Group' and was renamed in 1935 as the All for the Fatherland Party (Partidul 
Totul pentru Tara).
The fascist movement in its manifestation as a political movement converged during 
the 1930s with an intellectual movement, the 'young generation* or 'generation o f 1927', 
which had similarly emerged in the university environment in the 1920s, but had 
confined itself to intellectual manifestations. The spiritual mentor of this so-called 
'young generation' was Nae Ionescu, a philosophy professor educated in Germany, who 
had an enormous influence on the young generation of intellectuals79 (among which the 
young Mircea Eliade, Eugen Ionescu, Emil Cioran, and Constantin Noica). Nae 
Ionescu’s main influence was to be found in his ideas about the reassertion of the 
prominence o f religion -  Romanian Orthodox Christianity -  and the primacy of the 
spiritual in society. Ionescu aired his opinions mainly through his university lectures, 
where he had considerable influence over many young students and gained the status of
77 Codreanu (bom in Ia$i in 1899) was the undisputed leader of the interwar student and Fascist 
movement. He was a follower of A.C. Cuza in the 1920s and founded with him the League of 
National Christian Defence, a nationalist and anti-semitic movement In 1927, however, he found 
his own Legion of the Archangel Michael after disagreement with Cuza, which became the prime 
political force against the democratic political system.
78 The organisational aspects of the Legion are elaborated in Codreanu's 'handbook' for the 
movement, Carticicade Cuib (Codreanu 1973).
79 This generation’s creed was based on ‘the primacy of youth over old age -  youth being equated 
with spiritual fervor, authenticity, creativity, idealism, while old age symbolized routine, inertia, 
political corruption, and petty materialism’ (Calinescu 1993: 133). See for Nae Ionescu, Càlinescu 
1988; Ricketts 1988: 91-126; Mircea Eliade's entry in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (1967, 
London: MacMillan); Voicu 1998a and 1998k
108
The fascist alternative
a sort of ‘Romanian Socrates* (Calinescu 1993: 143). After 1933, Nae Ionescu and 
some of the members of the young generation began to openly support the Iron Guard 
(most prominently Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran and later Constantin Noica. Other 
members of the young generation joined the extreme left, or oscillated between an 
apolitical and a democratic stance, Petreu 2003a; TismSneanu and Pavel 1994:433).
The young generation of intellectuals was formed in the late 1920s and became 
known through Mircea Eliade's Itinerariu Spiritual, published in Ionescu*s newspaper 
Cuvintul, and dealt with the upcoming spiritually-oriented generation of intellectuals 
(see Antonesei 1985: 190). In the period 1932-33, the generation u'as organised in the 
cultural association Criterion, which dealt with a vast range of cultural issues. In the 
early 1930s, one could still speak of a versatile group in which a wide range of opinions 
co-existed. From 1933, part of the young generation increasingly became politicised and 
moved towards the extreme right (Petreu 2003a). Nevertheless, even between those that 
supported the extreme right (Eliade, Noica, Cioran, Vulcinescu) a wide range of 
ideational differences existed, although the generation was defined by a consensus on 
the primacy of the spirit and contempt for liberal, bourgeois politics (Antonesei 1985; 
Simion 2000: 7-8).
The fascist movement’s leader- and membership was thus composed of the youth 
and young intellectuals (cf. Barbu 1968,1980; Heinen speaks of a ‘Bildungsmittelstand*, 
1986: 389). The leaders of the movement came from lower-middle class backgrounds 
(sons of wealthier peasants, and of priests and teachers) (Barbu 1980; Ioanid 1990: 65- 
73; Weber 1966: 569). An important part of its success must be explained by its efforts 
to mobilise the peasantry (from the early 1930s onwards) and the ‘victims* of the 
Liberal programme of modernisation in general (Livezeanu 1995: 287). The social basis 
of the fascist movement has been identified by most researchers with the lower middle 
classes or 'petty bourgeoisie', despite the lack of extensive evidence on membership.80 
As its members stemmed predominantly from those classes that did not share in
80 According to the estimates of Barbu (1980: 390), Ioanid (1990: 65-72), Heinen (19S6: 3SO-396). 
and Weber (1966), the cadres of the Fascist movement belonged mostly to an urban petty 
bourgeoisie and to the university student population.
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political rule and were often made up of people who had only recently joined the middle 
classes, the fascist movement can be characterised as a movement from below,81
5.3 Continuation and disruption of the original pattern of m odernisation
Institutional continuity and discontinuity in interwar Romania can be understood as the 
outcome of the interaction o f and tension between two attitudes towards the political 
and economic institutional situation: a defensive and largely approving attitude towards 
the existing institutions by key political actors on the one hand, and a highly sceptical 
and sometimes revolutionary anti-systemic attitude of contending actors on the other. 
This interaction and tension influenced the institutional pattern by constraining the 
political behaviour of the continuously dominant Liberal Party, and eventually resulted 
in the undoing o f its project of modernisation. I will look briefly into institutional 
continuity and change during the interwar period by analysing political institutions, i.e., 
elements of the new constitution, the enduring behaviour o f the political élites, and 
economic institutions, primarily in terms of state-economy relations and economic 
governance. Political and economic institutions constituted both the core defence of the 
establishment parties and the focal point o f the critique of emerging political actors.
81 An interesting parallel can be drawn between the position of the Liberal revolutionaries in the first 
half of the nineteenth century and the ‘young generation’ of the interbellum period. The Liberal 
revolutionaries opposed foreign interference and struggled for national autonomy. The intellectual 
elements in the revolutionary 1848-movement appropriated liberal and romanticist ideas with a 
view to bringing about collective autonomy. Their efforts of state and nation-building were indeed 
aimed at realising exactly that. Simultaneously, the development of state structures offered the 
intellectuals or the ‘proletariat of the pen’ as $tefan Zeletin has called them, the opportunity of 
employment in the state and a considerable increase in status by governing the newly formed polity. 
The intellectuals of the ‘young generation’ that came to the fore in the interwar years as the 
discursively most important opponent of the Liberal modernising project displayed the same kind of 
anxiousness to bring about collective autonomy while simultaneously seeking to enhance their own 
status and social position, as their vertical mobility in state structures was increasingly blocked by 
an overcrowded state bureaucracy, designated in the label ‘intellectual proletariat’. Where 
nineteenth century Liberal intellectuals drew their inspiration from revolutionary liberal ideas, the 
interwar intellectuals referred to contemporary cultural pessimism and neo-romanticism.
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The institutional pattern underpinning the Liberal project of modernisation had in the 
nineteenth century been based on the conception of the state as the embodiment of 
national autonomy and the national interest (see chapter 4). In the wake of the First 
World War, the Liberal Party attempted to continue its original project, but also had to 
adapt to radically changed circumstances. The Liberal strategy in the interwar period 
can be characterised by two trends, articulated in both institutional continuity and 
change. On the one hand, the Liberals continued the original project of modernisation, 
including its idiosyncracies, discernible in the centralised and unitary conception of the 
state, and a rather élitist conception of politics and political representation (pursued in 
the novel circumstances of an enlarged state). The Liberal project showed increasingly 
authoritarian tendencies during the 1930s as a reaction to perceived political instability 
and contestation. On the other hand, and in tension with their desire to remain in power, 
the Liberals realised one of the classical tenets o f liberalism - universal suffrage -  
immediately following the war. The latter can be understood as a result of immediate 
pressure - the revolutionary tensions created by the Russian Revolution and its influence 
on the Romanian masses - and of a change in the overall attitude of the Liberal élite vis- 
à-vis the political question of representation since 1914. In an immediate sense, the 
extension of the franchise signified the at least formal inclusion of the masses in 
politics. In a structural sense, it opened a political space for the contestation of existing 
arrangements, in the sense that the élitist discursive monopoly on the conception o f the 
'nation' and the common good, as had been exercised before the war by the Liberals and 
the Conservatives, could now be legitimately challenged by a whole range of different 
interpretations and representations of the same people or of hitherto excluded groups. 
The proliferation of new ideas and actors constituted an unintended consequence o f the 
extension of suffrage and went beyond the original intentions of the Liberals.
Political institutions
The new constitution of 1923 comprised elements of both continuity and change. 
Emphases on national autonomy and a centralist attitude towards politics could be read 
in the first three articles of the new constitution, in which it was stated that the 82
82 That this was the case was visible in the veritable ’explosion' in the number of political parties
during the interwar period (see Iacob 1995: 265-7).
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Romanian kingdom was 'a unitary and indivisible state', that its territory was 
inalienable, and that it was not to be colonised by any foreign people (Iacob 1995: 268; 
Roberts 1951: 98). In terms of the state’s relations with society, it was stated that all 
powers derived from the people, which could only exercise its rights by means of 
delegation. Regarding local autonomy, the constitution contained provisions that 
ensured central state control over local councils (Roberts 1951: 99; Helin 1967: 488). At 
the same time, the constitution embodied a 'civic' notion o f citizenship, in which the 
concept of the Romanian citizen was defined explicitly without recourse to ethnicity, 
language, or religion, elements which were in turn explicitly denied as impediments for 
the acquisition and exercise of political and civil rights (Article 7, Iacob 1995: 269). 
The constitution hinged on a dual, and therefore potentially tense, logic, i.e., the 
continued centralised political rule of the élites in concomitance with the formal, legal 
representation of the larger population (cf. Stanomir 2002: 94).
The élitist element was indeed visible in the continuation of institutionalised political 
practices that worked to the detriment of the full exercise of political rights. In 
particular, the electoral law of 1926 was an expression of the continuing élitist nature of 
Romanian government, in that it established that a political party which managed to 
obtain 40 percent or more of the votes would be awarded with the so-called 'electoral 
premium' (primâ electoralâ), which in practice guaranteed 70 percent or more of the 
total votes (Iacob 1995: 265). The intention behind the law was to create stability in 
Romanian political life, but it clearly also favoured larger parties with an established 
constituency (read: the Liberal Party). In effect, the law permitted the survival o f the 
informal rotational system of majority governments of pre-war politics, in that it created 
a stimulus for the merger of smaller, regional parties (as happened with the Peasant 
Party and the National Party o f Transylvania), which in turn led to the recreation of a 
political system dominated by two large parties83 (the Liberal Party and the National 
Peasant Party) (cf. Perie 1998: 77; see also Iacob 1995: 265, 267).
Liberal political practices aimed at top-down leverage by means of the centralisation of 
the administration, the nationalisation and homogenisation of society, the reduction of
83 On this process of polarisation, see Shapiro 1981.
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minorities’ and regional actors* political influence, and the manipulation of democratic 
processes. Initially, the institutional changes that led to the decline of the political power 
of the conservative class, the ‘ ’’rise” of the masses’ and their ‘ ’’entry” into the political 
mainstream’ (Janos 1989: 351) seemed to strengthen the position of the Liberals as their 
traditional rivals no longer presented a political threat. The dominant position of the 
Liberal Party was strengthened by the political system, which in general favoured the 
incumbent party and gave the executive a preponderant position (Maner 2001). 
Moreover, in the early 1920s, the newcomers - the regional and peasant parties - were 
not yet sufficiently organised to pose any effective challenge, especially since their 
original programmatic points - land reforms and inclusion of the peasantry in politics -  
had been formally granted. However, in the longer term, the inclusion of large parts o f 
the population in politics made the Liberals much more vulnerable to popular demands 
and gave a structural ’voice' to the hitherto excluded and the victims of earlier 
modernising policies. The Liberals, in some way incongruous with classical liberal 
tenets, reacted to assaults on their political dominance by fortifying their institutional 
strongholds. The clearest example of this is probably the Liberals' policy of 
centralisation, that was aimed simultaneously at subjecting the ethnically Romanian 
élites in the new territories to Bucharest authority while at the same time politically 
silencing the non-Romanian minorities in those new regions. Almost all the regions 
encompassed large ethnically Romanian élites, but at the same time a substantial 
number of non-Romanians, i.e., Magyars, Germans, Ukrainians, Ruthenians and others. 
The new territories had been belonged to different empires and therefore their local
A  J
governments had been shaped by different administrative experiences. The Liberals 
responded to this diversity by introducing strongly centralising administrative reforms, 
extending the highly centralised administration of the Old Kingdom and eliminating 
local autonomy by delegating authority in the regions to centrally nominated 
administrators (Hitchins 1994: 381). The ministeries performed their functions centrally 
without ceding autonomy to local administrative organs (Fischer-Galati 2000: 289).
Despite an interlude of government by the National Peasant Party (1928-1933), in 
which centralising measures were temporarily countered by démocratisation and 84
84 Bukovina was structured along Austrian patterns of administration, Bessarabia along Russian, and
Transylvania along Hungarian (Helin 1967:484).
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decentralisation (not, however, in favour of the non-Romanian minorities), the trend of 
centralised government ’from above' set in by the Liberals in the 1920s did not halt. 
When the Liberals returned to power in 1933, authoritarian policies were drastically 
expanded and popular freedom curbed.85 Indeed, in 1934 censorship measures were 
introduced and the administration governed by decree. Paradoxically, the Liberals 
themselves grew increasingly dependent on the monarch Carol II in the period 1933-37 
(Georgescu 1991:196; Hitchins 1994: 377-8).
While the authoritarian brand o f liberalism in the 1930s could still be explained as a 
necessary defence of the original modernisation project, political developments in the 
last years of the 1930s actually meant the undoing o f the Liberal project. The elections 
of December 1937 failed to produce the expected majority for the Liberal Party86, and in 
its wake the monarch Carol II installed a royal dictatorship. The ultimate consequence 
of the political 'voice' of the people, who had by now indicated a considerable 
preference for the radical right (the right-wing parties together officially obtained 
onefourth of the votes), was not accepted. Instead of a regime based on popular 
sovereignty, a regime was installed to guarantee order and prevent the loss of any 
national sovereignty. The main institutional elements of the democratic system were 
dissolved, i.e., the 1923 constitution, the party system, the autonomy of the parliament, 
and the division o f powers, whereas ample royal prerogatives were put in place 
(Giurescu 1974: 334-5; Nagy-Talavera 1970: 296). The Constitution o f 1923 was
85 As the historian Vlad Georgescu writes: ‘A long period of classic liberalism and civility in 
Romanian politics ended with the assassination of Prime Minister Ion G. Duca by members of the 
Iron Guard (Sinaia, December 1933)’ (Georgescu 1991: 196). This is not to say that the reality of 
the democratic system had reflected the formal requirements in the 1920s. In those days too, 
political participation by the major part of the population was minimal, the parliament was primarily 
made up of urban middle classes and landowners, and was dominated by the government, elections 
were manipulated by the leading party (Heinen 1986: 52; Roberts 1951:91,96).
86 Totul Pentru Jarâ, the political extension of the Iron Guard, won 15.58 percent of the votes, the 
National Christian Party (a right-wing party led by Alexandra Cuza, the anti-semitic nationalist, and 
the poet Octavian Goga) 9.15 percent, and the National Peasant Party 20.40 percent, whereas the 
Liberal Party obtained only 35.92 percent, and thus fell short of reaching the 40 percent necessary 
for the ’electoral premium' (Giurescu 1974: 331-2; Nagy-Talavera 1970: 293-4).
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substituted by the monarch with a corporatist constitution, in which citizenship rights 
were tied to labour activity rather than individual rights (Roberts 1951; 207). Later, in 
1938, the Front of National Revival {Frontul Rena^terii Nationale) was established as a 
'single political organization in the state’, headed by the monarch (Giurescu 1974: 336). 
The administrative structure of the country was altered significantly, the number of 
districts greatly reduced and put under the direct control of royal administrators, as a 
result of which local governing capacities were reduced to the minimum (Helin 1967: 
492). Not only were the traditional parties deprived of effective political influence, but 
the Iron Guard violently suppressed and 13 of its leading members (including its leader 
Codreanu) assassinated. The corporatist state was later replaced by a self-proclaimed 
totalitarian regime, which needed to 'defend the political and totalitarian order of the 
Romanian State' (Giurescu 1974: 340). Ultimately, the dissolution of the Liberal project 
was completed by the substitution o f the so-called National-Iron-Guardist State’ for the 
Nation’s Party' which had constituted the royalist regime.87 In this way, the Fascist 
alternative to Liberal modernisation, however short-lived, found its institutional 
expression.
Economic structures
The pre-war Liberal project was equally continued in the domain of political economy. 
At the same time, the consequences of the First World War, the world economic crisis 
and the enlargement of the Romanian polity created significant pressures for the 
political élites.88 In other words, the political élites were obliged to adapt their pre-war 
economic strategies to the new setting, although they proved to be highly consistent in 
continuing certain key policies. Continuity was particularly prominent in the Liberals'
87 The monarch had to flee the country, as his position became untenable after a series of geo­
political adversities that led to the annexations of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet 
Union, Southern Dobrogea to Bulgaria and Transylvania to Hungary. The successor, the 'National- 
Iron-Guardist State', was led by the authoritarian general Antonescu and the fascist Iron Guard.
88 The Greater Romanian state had to deal with high inflation rates and a continuous depreciation of 
the leu (the national currency), a war debt of 6 billion francs, a potentially explosive situation as a 
result of social contradictions and revolutionary contagion (Berend and Ranky 1974: 182-8; Welzk 
1982: 65-68). In addition, the Liberals deemed a major priority the homogenisation of the new 
regions and the Old Kingdom, and the promotion and rationalisation of industry (Tumock 1970).
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attitude towards the economy. The role of the state was deemed all-important in the 
support and development of the enlarged national economy, especially in terms of 
national industry. With respect to the latter, the autochthonous bourgeoisie was the 
evident object o f state economic policy. The Liberals continued the trend initiated in the 
1880s, when they had shown their first inclinations towards Listian policies of 
protectionism (see chapter 4). Similarly, active policies of support for native industry to 
the detriment o f  foreign industry were sustained. In some ways, this policy was 
radicalised in the frame of the 'for ourselves’ policy (prin noi inline). This entailed the 
insistent promotion of Romanian interests within the national economy.89 The 
indigenisation and centralisation policies of the Liberals were aimed foremost at 
sustaining the political power o f the Liberals and the continuation of their modernising 
project; the first policy sought to drastically reduce the influence of foreigners in the 
Romanian economy (and thereby to increase the ethnic Romanian element and more 
particularly the ruling oligarchy) whereas the latter was directed both against minorities 
and local Romanian elites in the new regions (cf. Roberts 1951: 118). In addition, the 
policies were an attempt to respond to direct economic problems: the mono-cultural and 
unproductive nature of agriculture, an export-oriented industry owned mainly by 
foreigners, the extreme fall in prices for the main Romanian export goods of oil and 
wheat after 1929, and as such a deterioration of the terms of trade, the high foreign debt, 
the protectionist policies of West European states, and the lack o f a national 
administrative structure (Welzk 1982a: 67, 120-1). In practice, Liberal policy entailed 
the structural discouragement o f importing manufactured goods and the promotion of 
national industrial production, in particular in metallurgy and textiles. In this, the 
Liberals tended increasingly towards a policy of national autarchy. In particular after 
193390, governments supported heavy industry, whereas in the 1920s the main
89 In the 1920s, the Liberal policy was defined by the slogan 'prin noi înçine' (for ourselves), that 
was explained as: 'the development of the country’s wealth primarily by Romanian labour and 
initiative, and by Romanian capital' (as mentioned in the Liberals’ economic program of 1921, in: 
Welzk 1982a: 63).
90 As observed above, in the years 1928-1933 the Liberals lost political ground to the National 
Peasant Party. The peasantist government intended to abandon the nationalist economic policy by 
steering away from ‘economic self-sufficiency’ and was in favour of ‘international economic co­
operation’, and of switching domestic economic policy from ‘industrialism to agrarianism’ (for a
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objectives had been light industry and the commercial-banking sector (Postolache 1991: 
101). A further instance of the Liberals’ emphasis on the national interest had come to 
the fore in the constitution of 1923, in which it was stated that the country's natural 
resources constituted state property. Clearly against foreign interests, this stipulation, in 
concomitance with the nationalisation of foreign companies, produced strong foreign 
reactions91 (Iacob 1995: 270). Ultimately, these ‘autocentric’ policies led to a greatly 
expanded state role in the economy and a high concentration of capital, structurally 
articulated in the intertwining of privileges, monopoly rights, cartel formations and all 
kinds of relations of interest between politics and the economy (Welzk 1982a: 133; 
Hitchins 1994: 360-1).92 The state was the dominant actor in providing credits and 
investments, export and import licenses, and the protection of industry, leading to a 
formidable bureaucratic stake in the economy (Welzk 1982a: 130,133).
As regarding the unification of the different territories within the Greater Romanian 
state, the Liberals confronted this political question by means of centralisation, 
homogenisation and diffusing the policies of the Old Kingdom to the new regions.93
programmatic statement of the most important peasantist economist, see Madgearu 1929; also 
Hitchins 1994: 368-73). The National Peasant Party opened the doors for foreign capital ( ‘por(i 
deschise capitalului strain’), and tried to counter the financial and economic oligarchy of the 
Liberals (Hitchins 1994; 369). Nevertheless, the world economic crisis had a significant impact on 
agricultural countries such as Romania, and the peasantist government was not in a position to 
reverse the trend of étatism.
91 The nationalisation policies as such had their legal underpinning in the postwar peace treaties and 
as early as 1919 Romania (Yugoslavia reacted in a similar way) had begun to prepare for the 
nationalisation of firms which were owned by Austrian, Hungarian, and German capitalists (Berend 
and Ranky 1974: 193). Although foreign firms tried to rescue their capital by transferring shares to 
French and Czechoslovakian banks, a considerable amount ended up in the hands of the 
nationalising élites (Berend and Ranky 1974:196).
92 The state held monopolies in salt and tobacco and owned metallurgical, munitions, textile, 
distilling and printing works (Tumock 1970:544, fnlO).
93 The Liberals took as an explicit model for the 'unitary national state' an industrial state, with 
production, circulation and exchange as its central elements and with its economy synchronised 
with the Western European one (Saizu 1985: 165). In this sense, a strong and nationalised economy 
was deemed an essential underpinning for national sovereignty (as opposed to quasi-colonisation 
and monopolisation by foreign powers and capital).
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Through these measures, the new territories were subjugated to the overall logic and 
objectives of the Liberal programme and were incorporated into the efforts towards 
creating a nationally controlled economy, emancipation from foreign interference, and 
the linking of national interest with interests of the bourgeoisie and large industrial 
enterprises.94 The first step in unification was to renounce all legislation and to abolish 
all those political-administrative institutions in which foreign dependence was 
institutionalised. Subsequently, the constitution of 1923 (which included approximately 
60 percent of the old constitution of 1866) was applied to the whole national territory 
(Postolache 1991: 97). The Liberal unification policies were not merely confined to the 
restructuring, reorientation and extension o f transport, communications, the banking 
system and the like, but systematically favoured particular industries above others, most 
of all to the detriment of agriculture.
The Romanian Liberals reacted to the world economic crisis by following a policy of 
national autarchy, in particular through large-scale industrialisation, which should 
increase national independence from foreign influence as well as protect the Romanian 
economy from the vagaries of the world market. Political authority was increasingly 
concentrated and state control over the economy steadily increased. The one-sided 
Liberal policies, however, failed to lead to structural improvements, in particular with 
regard to the still overwhelmingly rurally based population. Socio-economic issues 
played indeed an important part in the electoral landslide in December 1937 (Hitchins 
1994: 419), and indicated the failure of the Liberals in implementing their project. The 
royal dictatorship set up by Carol II in 1938 was a further signal of the profound crisis 
of liberalism. The monarch considered the options of liberal democracy as exhausted, in 
particular since the dominance of the Liberals seemed undermined by the increased 
significance of the political forces on the extreme right and the major democratic 
alternative, the National Peasant Party, had proved unable to resolve the political and 
economic problems (Heinen 1986: 358-9). The monarch’s installation of an 
authoritarian regime constituted an answer to both the hollowing out of democracy and
94 The redistribution of revenues created from agriculture, small production and consumption in 
favour of investment in industry was one of the outcomes o f this priority, and sparked critiques of 
the Liberal industrialisation policies for being ’parasitic* (Postolache 1991:101).
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the imminent threat of a Fascist take-over. The royal dictatorship that was installed in 
1938 and lasted until 1940 practically continued the economic policies pursued by the 
Liberals throughout the 1930s, i.e., a heavy emphasis on state intervention in support for 
industry. The royal dictatorship only superficially resembled a fascist or totalitarian 
regime, and in reality entailed a ‘bureaucratic-corporatist’ alternative to both liberal 
democracy and fascism (Heinen 1986: 365; Welzk 1982a: 137). The bureaucratic- 
corporatist state constituted a reaction to both the crisis of liberalism and to the 
revolutionary tendencies of the extreme right, and promulgated an anti-revolutionary 
conservative nationalism in its stead. At the same time, it underlined key elements of 
the systemic critique of the Fascists and contributed both in ideational and historical 
terms to the undoing of the Liberal project of modernisation. In the end, the royalist 
dictatorship itself gave way to an ‘authentic’ (but short-lived) Fascist regime.
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6. The national Communist project
6.1 Communism in Romania
A century or so of attempts by native élites to banish foreign influence from Romania 
came to a temporary halt with the incorporation of Romania in the imperial project of 
the Soviet Union. The exhaustion o f both the Liberal and the authoritarian/Fascist 
projects (the latter had been seriously compromised by its collaboration with and 
subordination to Nazi Germany) and the atrocities of the Second World War had left 
Romania disorganised and extremely vulnerable to outside interference (Jowitt 1971). 
The course of the Romanian experience with modernity was radically altered by the 
imposition of the Soviet model, but at the same time the emergence of significant 
continuities with the inter- and pre-war situations should be acknowledged.
It seems hard to deny that, firstly, Communism in Romania at first lacked a domestic 
social base, that is to say the Romanian Communist Party had not attracted a substantial 
following since its foundation in the early 1920s, and, secondly, as a movement it had 
been dominated by foreigners (Deletant 1999; Zamfir 1992: 121). The regime change in 
1944 can then only be seen as an imposition or ‘revolution from above’ or ‘from 
without’, directly instigated by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, ‘[e]ven if precisely the 
common structure was externally imposed in most of the relevant countries, ... it ha[d] 
become indigenous even in the historically modem settings' (Arato 1993: 134). As 
Feher et al. remarked in the early 1980s, it was 'not only that in these dependent 
countries there exist significant strata whose interests are now directly bound up with 
the continuous existence of the whole established institutional structure, but above all 
that this structure has become the framework within which the whole population 
articulates its plans, expectations and even its desires' (Feher et a l  1983: 41-2). Indeed, 
despite the initial over-arching role o f the Soviet Union and its domination of domestic 
politics, over time a particular Romanian experience with communism emerged. On an 
ideational level, the Romanian pattern was characterised by a fusion of the specific 
Romanian understanding of the nation with Marxism-Leninism, resulting in a syncretic
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national Communism. However, on the socio-economic level the party-state zealously 
upheld a Stalinist understanding of modernisation as the unlimited expansion of 
production, a pathological interpretation of the Soviet model, which was continued until 
the very end (unlike countries such as Hungary and Poland, and the Soviet Union
itself).95
Concisely put, communist regimes were based on the Soviet model of a highly 
centralised Communist party, a coalescence of party and state, a nationalised economy 
organised -  formally - on the principle of instrumental rationality and supervised by a 
rationalised bureaucracy, and an ideology based on Marxism-Leninism (cf. Crowther 
1988: 2). Economic, political and ideological power were dominated by a ruling class 
(the uppermost echelons of the Communist Party), although the state bureaucracy 
played a considerable executive role and therefore represented a power base in its own 
right. Other than portraying the communist regimes or state-socialist countries as 
ultimately based on the hegemony of the ruling class and state bureaucracy, it seems 
important to underline that the ruling class itself was subject to continuous internal 
power struggles and therefore liable to change. These struggles mostly involved (apart 
from power struggles among individuals), the particular pathway societal change should 
follow and how specific pathways were to be linked to the past. In addition, the 
emphasis on rational-technical solutions to societal problems entailed the expansion o f a 
relatively all-encompassing state bureaucracy and created a partial shift in power from 
upper to lower levels. Thirdly, the ideological dominance o f  the ruling class was 
continuously questioned by members of society other than members o f the ruling élite, 
especially intellectuals, constraining the ruling class to continuously re-emphasise and 
reformulate its legitimacy. i'
95 In the 1980s, this commitment - after many setbacks and economic crises - was still very much 
alive. For instance, Ceau$escu declared at the thirteenth party congress in 1984,- that *[wje have to 
bear in mind that we cannot weaken... the centralized management of the social economic activity 
based on the central plan’ (cited in: Orescu 1985:27).
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6.2 Political agency in totalitarian Romania
Once a communist society is established, the societal logic of conflict and therefore of 
modernising agency changes. The state in totalitarian societies does not merely 
constitute the political sphere, but performs the role of an autonomous actor in its 
attempt to remove the distinction between the political and society. It can therefore be 
seen as ’invading' society. Paradoxically, this means that the possibility for societal 
actors to access politics becomes radically restricted, as the claim to absolute power and 
knowledge by the vanguard party denies the need for alternative visions and plural 
interests. If in democratic and constitutional systems the need for the representation of 
different interests is (at least formally) admitted (as the foundation of the political 
system on any substantive value is denied and only a temporal domination of particular 
interests on the political level is allowed), in totalitarian systems only one collective 
interest is allowed, of either class or racial/ethnic nature.
In the era in which the national Liberal project was dominant in Romania, political 
conflict evolved around the domination of the political arena, as well as around access 
to the state for the masses. Only those that could not perceive the democratic system as 
being capable of representing the masses in any meaningful way criticised the 
democratic state on the systemic level. In this way, Fascism effectively criticised the 
Liberal-nationalist project, but in its specific historical context was not able to 
institutionalise its counter-project to any great degree. The communist alternative in this 
sense followed the systemic critique of the Fascist project in that it denied any place for 
pluralism, as its political project evolved around the totalistic notions of unity, 
homogeneity and absolute knowledge.
After the exhaustion of the authoritarian and fascist projects of the interwar period, 
the externally imposed communist ‘revolution from above* in Romania completed the 
discontinuation of the democratic system by imposing a ’total state', which held as a 
main objective the complete permeation of society; the subordination o f society and its 
assimilation to the state logic was its ‘systemic goal’ (Amason 1993: 108). The 
reconstruction of society involved the centralisation of political, economic, and 
ideological power in the Communist Party, which increasingly engulfed both state and 
societal spheres as it infiltrated society at large, undermining autonomous, alternative 
centres of power outside of the state. In order to complete its project, the Communist
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party-state required an extensive bureaucratic organisation as well as the co-operation of 
intellectuals, therefore creating space for contention. In analysing communist society 
one needs to differentiate between the ruling élite (the upper level of the Party 
hierarchy, embodying the official vanguard), the state bureaucracy (which constituted 
an important node of control in economic planning and political domination of society), 
and intellectuals.96 In Romania, it was above all the relationship between the first and 
the third of these that eventually defined the structure and contents of the modernising 
project.97
In sum, in modem societies contestation and conflict around worldviews and visions 
on societal progress play a central role, and contestation is ultimately deemed legitimate 
and even essential.98 In this sense, any version of modernity is continuously susceptible 
to conflict and tension, and various patterns and pathways should be understood as 
(temporary) outcomes or stabilisations of conflict. But whereas in democratic, 
pluralistic societies contestation evolves around a formalised system of access to the
96 Although sometimes officially affiliated with the Party, intellectuals were the only force in 
society that could ‘compete’ with the Party on the basis of knowledge; they had some kind of power 
base of their own. On the one hand, since the communist project was unevenly based on a 
technocratic and rational vision of societal progress and was thus reliant on 'technocratic' specialists, 
and on the other because of the perceived need for a cultural revolution and complete mobilisation 
of society, for which the party-state needed humanist intellectuals. In this way, potential autonomy 
(and thus conflict) derived from the functional need for intellectuals in the communist project. In 
addition, the ideological nature of the project induced factionalism and varying interpretations of the 
'correct line’. In other words, the insistence on the necessity to follow the 'correct line' in 
constructing a socialist society in itself created the ideational space for different interpretations of 
this line (see for this point, Jowitt 1992: 8-9).
97 It is important here to point to the altered framework for intellectual activity in the communist 
period. As Verdery (1991: 73) suggests, the position of the intellectuals in society was made much 
more dependent on the state bureaucracy. During the interwar years, intellectuals grew more 
autonomous as a social group by carving out institutional positions and claims to superior 
knowledge. At the same time, they were dependent on both the state and the market for the 
continuation of their cultural production. The communist regime changed all of this in that it made 
intellectuals much more effectively and comprehensively dependent on the state.
98 In totalitarian regimes the role of the communist party as a vanguard is fundamental in bringing 
about a new society, institutionalising the critique of the old regime and basing its legitimacy on the 
‘constitutive myth’ of the role of contestation.
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political, in communist societies conflict follows a different logic, strongly conditioned 
by the ubiquitous position of the party-state.
The history of the implementation, consolidation, and adaptation of communism in 
Romania can to a great measure be understood by looking at two kinds of collective 
actors, the party élite and the intellectuals. The a-typical nature of Romanian 
Communism consists of two elements: the unusual endurance of Stalinism and the 
emergence of a radical nationalism fused with communism. As I will show below, the 
Romanian distinctness was the outcome of the autonomy, creativity and intransigence 
of local political actors.
Below I will outline the emergence of a core ruling élite from intra-party struggles 
and the increasing significance of the technocratic and humanist intelligentsia from the 
1960s onwards. The structure of the section is based on a distinction between two 
temporal phases, which overlap with two (extended) moments of conflict between 
social actors. The two phases are: the phase of Stalinist emulation characterised by 
intra-party struggles over political domination and the correct interpretation of 
communism (1947-1961), and the subsequent period (1961-1989), in which the conflict 
between the party and intellectuals over the precise interpretation of national 
Communism was dominant. In the latter period, the intellectuals gained some 
(politically relevant) autonomy, which was, however, partially undone in the period of 
re-Stalinisation (1971-1989), as the party-state re-asserted its prominence. Nevertheless, 
intellectual impact was made on the official party line as a specific group of intellectuals 
formed a discursive coalition with the Ceau$escu regime in the 1970s, institutionalising 
a specific interpretation of national Communism.
Stalinist emulation (1947-1961)
Although a Romanian socialist current could be identified from the end of the 
nineteenth century onwards, it was not until 1944 that it gained a wide social basis. The 
most important Romanian socialist thinker, Dobrogeanu-Gherea, was a social-democrat 
in favour of a form of legalist evolutionism (Shafir 1985: 14), and hardly approved of 
revolutionary solutions to the Romanian situation. In the interwar period the Romanian 
socialist movement was effectively subordinated to the universalist Comintern (Denize
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2002; Tismaneanu 2003), while its membership was dominated by Hungarians, Jews, 
Russians and Bulgarians, rather than Romanians. These factors strongly contributed to 
its 'foreign image' in a period in which nationalism was the dominant ideology in 
Romania (see Verdery 1995). This image was reinforced by the fact that national 
minorities in the newly acquired territories opted for supporting an internationalist 
doctrine against the centralising Romanian state. For ethnic Romanians it was hardly 
plausible to support a political movement that was easily identified with its 'historical 
enemy’, Russia, and which promulgated the undoing of the recently established Greater 
Romanian state (Shafir 1985: 21-9).
As in most countries in Eastern Europe, the Romanian Communists came to political 
power thanks to the backing of Soviet political, economic, and military might. The 
Romanian Communists first joined a coalition government in 1944, after a coup d'etat in 
August that brought down wartime military dictator Antonescu, ended Romania's 
alliance with the Axis powers, and formally restored democracy. The restoration of 
democratic structures was short-lived however, as the Communists gradually expanded 
their influence in politics through the formation of the National Democratic Front, a 
coalition of left-wing movements. Within a few years, the Communists controlled 
virtually the whole government and proceeded to eliminate the pre-war political parties 
as well as perceived 'class enemies’, and eventually establishing a People's Democracy 
(30 December, 1947)."
Once the Communist regime was established, its consolidation had the nature of a 
revolution 'from above', that is to say, its relation with society was one of coercion, 
violence, and mobilisation controlled by the party. During the first fifteen years of 
communist rule, critique and conflict over the nature of the communist reconstruction of 
society could only take place within the party itself. The early years of communist 9
99 The imposition of communism in the immediate postwar period followed a similar, stage-like 
pattern in many countries. First the communists entered a coalition government, increasing their 
influence in a formally democratic system, and eventually 'crowded out’ all other political forces to 
install a People's Democracy, directly subordinated to the Soviet Union (see King 1980: 47-51). 
People's Democracy was a conceptual expression of the subordinate relation with the Soviet center 
and constituted a specific phase in the development of socialism, in which the lowest stage was 
made up by the bourgeois democracies and the highest by the socialist societies (at the time, the 
Soviet Union) (Janos 2000: 236; see also Roberts 1951: 312-3).
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experience in Romania (1947-1961) were dominated by a virtually absolute obedience 
and subordination to the Soviet Union. In the Romanian case, subordination was 
enhanced by the fact that a communist tradition had been largely absent and 
membership of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP)10 01 was conspicuously low in 
respect to other countries in the interwar period. Additionally, the leadership of the 
Communist regime that was literally installed in 1945 was overwhelmingly dominated 
by Soviet forces and their sympathisers (Chirot 1978£: 460). Nevertheless, despite 
strong subordination to the Soviet model and its rigid emulation by Romanian 
Communists, a more autonomous and nationally-oriented Romanian project did emerge 
after the most immediate forms o f subordination subsided.102 Paradoxically, the 
increased space for local autonomy expressed itself in a persevering, dogmatic pursuit 
of the Stalinist model. This dogmatism formed the outlook of the dominant ruling élite 
around the General Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej103, who emerged as undisputed leader.
In the early years of Romanian Stalinism (1948-52), two major factional struggles 
within the newly established ruling élite took place.104 The ultimate outcome of these 
struggles was the obstruction o f the emergence of any alternative vision of the 
Romanian pathway to socialism, as practically all potential carriers of deviant ideas had 
been removed from the political arena. From these conflicts, the Gheorghiu-Dej group
100 In effect, deviation from the Stalinist macro-political model was immediately branded as a 
'separate road to socialism', a transgression that led to the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Soviet 
Bloc in 1948 (Janos 2000: 244; on the Romanian subordination, see in particular Denize 2002 and 
Tismâneanu 2003).
101 Although the Romanian Workers Party only changed its name to that of the Romanian 
Communist Party (RCP) in 1965,1 will refer throughout the text to RCP.
102 Instances of this were the ending of direct Soviet exploitation through the so-called Sovrom 
companies and the retreat of Soviet troops from Romanian territory in the latter half of the 1950s.
103 Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej had played a prominent role in the underground Romanian Communist 
Party (RCP) in the interwar period. He had been a member of the central committee of the RCP 
since 1935 and had been imprisoned for ten years for his participation in a railway strike in 1933. 
During his imprisonment, he emerged as the leader of the 'prison nucleus*. In 1944, he became one 
of the leaders of the RCP, together with members returning from the Soviet Union (among whom 
was Ana Pauker).
104 By 1946, Çtefan Foriç, the Moscow-appointed general secretary of the RCP, had already been 
assassinated, apparently on the orders of Moscow.
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(a group of Communists that had been imprisoned with Gheorghiu-Dej in the 1930s and 
had remained in Romania illegally during the war) emerged victorious. The first victim 
of the post-war factional conflicts was Lucretiu Pâtràçcanu, a communist intellectual. 
He was considered the most prominent national communist and therefore a potential 
alternative for the Party leadership. Pâtràçcanu was contested as he might have 
formulated a viable version of Romanian national Communism and therefore 
constituted a threat to the Stalinists (cf. Tismàneanu 2003: 104-5). Pâtràçcanu was 
eventually executed in 1954. Within the ruling élite, the remaining contending faction 
of Gheorghiu-Dej was the so-called Moscovites’ group of Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and 
Teohari Georgescu, of whom the first two had been in exile in Moscow and returned to 
Romania only in 1944 (Gabanyi 1975: 15). The Moscovite* group was portrayed as 
representing foreigners (the 'internationalist faction') and the intelligentsia (Crowther 
1988: 49).105 After the expulsion of the Moscovite faction in 1952 (on the accusation of 
'rightist deviationism’), Gheorghiu-Dej emerged as the main leader. His victory signified 
the surfacing of a relatively autonomous 'native* faction (autonomous both in an internal 
and external sense), a development which was highlighted by the Romanianisation of 
the Communist party and even more so by Gheorghiu-Dej’s resistance to processes of 
de-Stalinisation and liberalisation instigated by Khruschev. Gheorghiu-Dej resisted 
Khruschev’s line by claiming that de-Stalinisation had already taken place in Romania 
(in the form of the purging o f the Moscovites), although in reality Gheorghiu-Dej 
represented a policy line that remained strongly Stalinist.
Further conflict emerged over the Stalinist line in the late 1950s, as Gheorghiu-Dej 
was not only challenged by Moscow but also from within the RCP itself, and on similar 
grounds: once again the question o f de-Stalinisation. An important power struggle 
within the Party came to light in 1956 as the orthodox line of Gheorghiu-Dej was 
questioned by two members o f the politburo. Miron Constantinescu, a sociologist, 
leading intellectual and one of the architects of economic policy, argued in 1956 for 
economic reforms and a démocratisation of the party and intellectual life, arguing for an 
upgrading of the position of technocrats in the RCP (Chirot 1978a: 470). In a similar
105 The division often made between native Communists and Moscovites was never absolute, as the
two factions were rather incohesive (Shafir 1985: 35), and both fractions followed Stalinist lines
(Tismàneanu 1984:180, fa 5; 2003; see also Deletant 1999: 83-8).
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vein, Iosif Chi$inevski, original member of the party and leading ideologue, argued for 
Krushchevite reforms. Both were accused of 'liberalism' and 'revisionism* and expelled 
by Gheorghiu-Dej in 1957. Constantinescu was regarded as the only legitimate 
alternative to the Gheorghiu-Dej faction at the time (Tismaneanu 1984: 182), after 
Patra$canu and the Moscovite group had been purged, and with his silencing 
Gheorghiu-Dej could emerge as the undisputed leader. The successive political 
eliminations of Patra$canu, the Pauker-Luca-Georgescu group, and Constantinescu and 
Chi§inevski did not merely concern the consolidation o f power within the party. They 
were also significant in terms of the orientation and direction of change. The final 
settlement of political conflict within the 'professional vanguard* effectively prevented 
the emergence of any alternative discourse.
National Communism (1961-1989)
The emergence of Gheorghiu-Dej's faction as cohesive and dominant was intimately 
related to its 'antifactionalism’ and its claim to represent the genuine communist model 
or ‘correct line*. All possible rivals to Gheorghiu-Dej were silenced with reference to 
their status as 'class enemies'. Gheorghiu-Dej argued that Patra$canu was 'an agent of 
the Fascist-bourgeois police and the British Secret Service* (Deletant 1999: 88), accused 
the Moscovite group of obstructing the processes o f industrialisation and 
collectivisation and thus sabotaging the construction of socialism106 (Deletant 1999: 86) 
Finally, he criticised Constantinescu for 'anarcho-liberal* deviationism (Tismaneanu 
1984). After 1953, Gheorghiu-Dej equally invoked the authenticity of his model on the 
international plane against both revisionist tendencies of de-Stalinisation in the Soviet 
Union and the attempt to create a supra-national division of labour among the satellite 
states (see section 6.3). In this way, Gheorghiu-Dej turned from an internationalist into 
the defender o f the national interest, without diverging from the essentially Stalinist 
path of modernisation (based on the imperatives o f single-party rule and 
industrialisation). The resistance of the RCP to bloc-wide trends of de-Stalinisation 
resulted in a nationalist tum, which was defended by a legitimising discourse invoking
106 A further argument in the case against the Moscovite group was its non-native origin, Pauker 
being Jewish and Luca Hungarian. Anti-semitism and romanianisation thus further underpinned 
Gheorghiu-Dej's image of authentic native proletarianism (see Ionescu 1964: 209-11).
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1fi7the right to national industrialisation, national sovereignty, and autonomy. A 
concomitant internal liberalisation created a limited space for political expression and 
contention.
Nicolae Ceauçescu, the new leader following the death of Gheorghiu-Dej in 1965, 
continued the nationalist line initiated by Gheorghiu-Dej, and his early years of rule 
(1965-1971) are generally regarded as years of relative liberalisation and relaxation.107 08 
This political opening is significant for the discussion of political agency and 
modernisation as it allowed intellectuals to articulate alternative visions whereas thus 
far any emergence of counter-visions had been effectively impeded. The nationalist turn 
in the 1960s produced exactly such a space for contestation, as it was accompanied by a 
'guided* liberalisation, i.e., liberalisation within strict limits set by the party. Within this 
context, both the humanist intelligentsia and members of the technocracy could move to 
the foreground. The former could articulate visions of decentralised and relatively 
autonomous intellectual activities whereas the latter could further visions of economic 
reforms based on specialised knowledge. Partial emancipation led to increasing 
demands for additional freedoms, thereby potentially undermining the imperatives of 
centralised industrialisation and single-party rule.
Ideological mobility was, however, decisively abandoned in July 1971, the direct 
trigger being two speeches by Ceauçescu, referred to later as the 'July Theses'. A decade 
of liberalisation, increased contact with the West, and increased intellectual freedom 
had led - in the perception of Ceauçescu (and influential, dogmatic party leaders around 
him) - to the thriving of potentially threatening forces (see Negrici 1999: 64). Alongside 
these domestic considerations, it seems that this ’mini-cultural revolution' imposed by
107 In this period of burgeoning nationalism, the myth was created that the Pauker-Luca-Georgescu 
group had been responsible for excessive Stalinism, in contrast to the alleged nationalism of the 
Dej-group (Tismàneanu 2003: 174).
108 The relatively liberal course aided Ceauçescu not only in gaining public support for the regime, it 
served him equally well in his personal struggle for the succession of Gheorghiu-Dej. By 
constructing a reformist and liberal image while invoking external threats (the Soviet Union), 
Ceauçescu was able to ward off rivals from the ’old guard' of the Gheorghiu-Dej era (Laux 1979: 61; 
Shafir 1983: 411). Furthermore, by pointing to Gheorghiu-Dej’s terror and dogmatism and 
stimulating a process of ’de-Dejification', Ceauçescu could claim to be the originator of the 
nationalist line (Shafir 1983: 412-3).
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Ceau§escu was inspired equally by external factors, most directly by a visit to China and 
North Korea.
The new course initiated by the July Theses entailed the restoration of party 
imperatives in two important areas: relations between the party and society, especially 
intellectuals, and the economic orientation of communism. The relation between the 
party and society changed as a result of the re-imposition of party hegemony and direct 
control, and by the anti-intellectualism and promotion of mass culture and populist 
nationalism. The regime undertook an offensive against those forces in society that had 
sought to use the limited freedom granted to them in the 1960s to move beyond its 
boundaries and reform socialism. Both the young generation of intellectuals and writers, 
and an increasingly numerous stratum of technocratic or reformist elites (who posed the 
threat of 'narrow professionalism') constituted a menace for the party (Gabanyi 1975: 
141-61; Shafir 1985: 91-2). The former had clearly shown their inclination towards 
liberalisation during the 1968 Writers' Conference in the form of demands for leading 
positions in cultural institutions and the abolition of censorship (Culic 1999: 52; Martin 
2002c). The latter was perceived as a threat by the orthodox group within the upper 
echelons of the party, as in the sixties a considerable number of technocrats had entered 
the party (Shafir 1985: 91-2).
The mini-cultural revolution served the purpose of re-subordinating both groups 
through the reassertion of a Stalinist vision of socialist construction, in the field of 
culture by re-imposing socialist realism, and in the economy by reiterating central 
planning and party control. The emphasis on centralised planning (as opposed to the 
decentralising reforms taking hold elsewhere in Eastern Europe, notably in Hungary) 
undermined the position that experts or technocrats had gained in the 1960s, tipping the 
balance in favour of humanist intellectuals, as the regime regarded intellectuals as 
political instruments in the socialisation of the population (Fischer 1989: 109-119; 
Jowitt 1971:185-9).
The strong emphasis on national culture and its affiliation with popular socialisation 
and mobilisation found its most important expression in a strand of thought that had 
emerged in the 1960s but gained full importance only at the end of the 1970s, the so-
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called thesis o f  'protochronism'109 (see chapter 9). The imposed dogmatism of the July 
Theses resulted in the polarisation of the field of cultural production. Whereas 
Ceauçescu's intentions was to bind the intellectuals to the regime and its new course 
(Martin 2002c), what actually happened was a negative reaction from large parts of 
those intellectuals that 'favored a Western definition o f culture and insisted upon 
academic competence as the principal criterion of authority' (Culic 1999: 53). At the 
same time, a positive reaction came from a much smaller group of 'protochronists' that 
provided an important cultural alibi for the autarkic and isolationist policy as well as 
sustaining a cult o f personality for Ceauçescu (Martin 2002c). The first faction, the 
major part of the intellectuals with a more reformist, universalist orientation, dominated 
the officially created cultural institutions o f the communist system, such as the Writers' 
Union and the Romanian Academy. The other faction, the so-called 'protochronists', 
remained outside these institutions, carefully protected by the former group, but they 
did have access to important cultural journals (such as The Flame’ (Flacâra) and The 
Week* 0Sâptâmâna)). At the end of the 1970s, the latter faction managed to  obtain 
official support, whereas the first, entrenched in the official cultural institutions, was 
besieged by the party. The discursive outcome of the restructuration of political forces 
was a syncretism between 'protochronism' and Ceauçescu’s interpretation of 
modernisation as economic autarchy and isolationism. It was this syncretic discourse 
that informed the Romanian pathway to national Communism during the 1970s and 80s.
6.3 The national Communist pattern of modernisation
The institutionalisation of the communist programme in Eastern Europe followed a 
similar pattern throughout the region. In economic terms, the absolute goal of 
industrialisation on the basis of central planning was its main feature, whereas in 
political terms the subjugation of cultural production to the exigencies of 'building 
socialism' and comprehensive mass mobilisation for the benefit of the socialist ideal 
were arguably the most conspicuous aspects. At the same time, after a rather 
homogenous Stalinist phase of consolidation, national approaches in dealing with the
109 The label stems from the Greek proto-chronos, which means 'first in time' (Culic 1999: 69, fn
20).
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post-Stalinist 'thaw', stagnation in the socio-economic sphere, and intellectual critique 
diverged widely. The specificity o f the Romanian case lay in its unrenounced fervor in 
pursuing Stalinist industrial policies, the announcement of an independent course within 
the internationalist communist bloc in the 1960s, and the prevention of the emergence 
of both a reformist/managerialist project and a humanist/intellectualist critique.
Socio-economic transformation
Accelerated industrialisation was arguably the main social goal that communist regimes 
set themselves. A rapid transformation of the economy served a number of purposes. Its 
political goal was primarily to strengthen the role of the party in controlling and 
programming social development, which was further expressed (as shown below) in the 
centralisation and nationalisation of the economy, and central planning. Furthermore, 
the intensive transformation of society that was perceived to be the result of 
industrialisation was aimed at undermining the social position of the bourgeoisie (and 
other class enemies) and creating a sizeable working class, which, at least in theory, 
would guide further transformation into a socialist society. Economic goals were 
directly aiming at socio-economic modernisation, i.e., the transformation o f an 
agricultural society into a society based on a rationalised economy oriented towards 
progressive growth. Industrialisation was perceived in a distinct way: the imported 
model was a fusion of 'techniques o f government and a social pattern peculiar to Russia’ 
(Dumitriu 1961: 3) and 'an ideological projection of past developmental patterns’ 
(Amason 2000a: 67). In other words, the imported Stalinist model reflected the needs of 
Soviet society (the creation of large-scale heavy industry, the transformation of the rural 
economy) which were reflected in a mode of development which could be called 
'Fordism in one country' (Ray 1996: 110). This mode of development rested on a model 
of extensive growth, which 'is amenable to central direction and implies relatively low 
levels o f social differentiation* (Ray 1996:108). It can be said that '[t]he goal of Stalinist 
economic development recapitulated the central dilemma o f industrialization, namely to 
convert peasant labour into an industrial proletariat while increasing food production 
and preventing traditional rural habits (e.g. fragmented cultivation) from dissipating 
productive gains' (Ray 1996: 108-9).
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The particular emphasis on investment in the means of production and the 
mobilisation o f (unskilled) labour not only reveals the economic goals o f the 
Communist project, but at the same time points to ideological and moral priorities, i.e. 
’[the] commitment to one line of development entails a corresponding disengagement 
from other, alternative commitments, such, for example, as reducing inequalities of 
income among social strata o f geographic regions' (Gouldner 1980: 213), priorities that 
in themselves point to the imperative of collective autonomy or national self- 
determination. The 'economising behaviour' o f socialist regimes demonstrated an 
(irrational) obsession with rationalisation of the economy, economic development, 
control through central planning, and an increasing division of labour. This obsession 
pointed - more than anything else - to the substitution o f industrialisation for human 
emancipation. Instead of being perceived as a mode of development, industrialisation 
became an absolute priority, or, in other words, 'industrialisation, which had first been a 
means to the end of human emancipation, ha[d] become an end in itself (Gouldner 
1980: 217).
Collectivisation as a social goal was closely related to the above-mentioned 
underlying reasons for industrialisation. As Jowitt (1992: 29) argues, collectivisation 
had much to do with an 'attack on the social institutions and cultural orientations of 
peasant society', and was 'integrally related to a comprehensive policy of 
industrialization and education' (Jowitt 1992: 32). The main political objectives were 
party control over the economy, centralisation and rationalisation of the economy, and 
the relegation o f agriculture to industrial development. In economic terms, the 
modernisation o f the agricultural economy was to lead to an increasing mechanisation 
of agriculture, and the stimulation of large-scale, extensive production. Collectivisation 
did not constitute a goal in itself, however, as it was always tied to the absolute priority 
of industrialisation, and in general to what Jowitt calls 'revolutionary breakthrough’.
The distinctiveness of the institutionalised pattern of Romanian Communism therefore 
did not so much lie in its absolute commitment to industrialisation as such. It was rather 
the unshaking belief in the 'mythology o f industrialisation' until the very end of the 
project, and a continued centralised and collectivist approach towards industrialisation, 
linked with an interpretation of industrialisation as the exclusive means towards national
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sovereignty and collective autonomy. In the emulation phase, one of the main 
imperatives for the construction of the socialist nation was wide-scale, comprehensive 
industrialisation (the other being cultural revolution, see below).
In the initial years of Communism these objectives were derived directly from the 
Soviet experience, and its emulation was deemed functional for the construction of 
socialist society. From the mid-1950s onwards, more emphasis was placed on specific 
Romanian circumstances, as the RCP now explicitly regarded national autonomy as 
deriving primarily from a strategy of emulation. The adaptation of the emulationist 
strategy to local realities merely required 'operational autonomy' within the wider 
framework of Stalinism/communism (Jowitt 1971: 152-5). From the mid-1950s 
onwards, the tenacity of the RCP to a programme of modernisation fundamentally based 
on industrialisation revealed its primary and substantive commitment to the 
achievement of national, collective autonomy, in the face o f both internal and external 
resistance (cf. Jowitt 1971: 181-2). A reconsideration of the hierarchy of priorities and 
primary values occurred, in which national self-determination was regarded an integral 
part of the project of socialism. However, whereas under Gheorghiu-Dej self- 
determination was understood as the precondition for the continuation of a Stalinist 
project in Romania, under Ceau$escu national self-determination became the primary 
substantive value o f the Communist project as such.110
In the period 1948-50, the Romanian economy was nationalised and private assets 
transformed into state property (Denize 2002; Georgescu 1991: 233). A crucial part of 
the economy was subordinated to the Soviet Union, by means of the Sovrom 
companies, which were excluded from the nationalising process and enjoyed 
considerable privileges (such as extra-territorial rights and exemption from taxes). This
110 Ceaugescu re-evaluated the concept of the nation within the Communist project, turning the RCP 
into the direct successor of all historical attempts to realise national unity and independence. The 
1974 Party Program referred explicitly to the origination of the Romanian state in the alleged 
Thracian-Dacian 'state', thereby constructing a direct link between Romanian origins and the 
Communist party (RCP 1975: 93). The Communist project constituted the continuation of the 
struggle for national freedom, but was also considered as realising a higher stage of national 
emancipation.
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situation changed only in 1956, when the last Sovrom company was returned to 
Romanian hands.111
During the Stalinist period, the process of the East European countries’ integration 
into the Soviet economic sphere was based on a degree of national autarchy, or, in other 
words, the development o f a multi-faceted national industrialisation process. In this 
sense, Romania’s emulation of the Stalinist model was part of a pan-East-European 
phenomenon, a recreation o f the Soviet model in various national contexts (Tumock 
1970: 546-7). The priority of extensive industrialisation was expressed in high 
investment rates in the heavy industry and energy sectors (strongly favouring producer- 
goods over consumer-goods), the creation o f large-scale industrial complexes 
(following the logic of extensive growth), and the subordination of collectivised 
agriculture to the needs o f industry (cf. Montias 1967). The pattern and level o f  state 
investments in industry, expressed in the various five- and six-year plans, showed an 
absolute priority for investment in heavy industry. The first five-year plan for the period 
1951-55 allocated 51 percent of investments to go into industry whereas another 
considerable amount was given for energy sources (Ionescu 1964: 191). At the same 
time, local consumption was held in check (Montias 1967: 29). The post-1953 'New 
Course' introduced some relaxation -  following the pattern of developments throughout 
the bloc - in the form of lower investment rates for industry and concessions to the 
population.112 The second five-year plan for the period 1956-60 indicated, however, a 
renewed drive for industrialisation, with 56 percent of planned investments dedicated to 
industry (Crowther 1988: 58).
Following Stalin's death in 1953, the centralised and over-organised understanding of 
economic transformation was increasingly challenged by alternative visions, both inside 
Romania and within the Soviet bloc. Romanian deviation from the general pattern of 
reformism was revealed when the Romanian élite refused to adapt its domestic economy
111 The Sovrom companies were situated in key sectors of the economy (such as oil, mining, wood, 
and gas), and although the companies were formally mutual efforts, Soviet participation was mostly 
limited to seized Goman capital (Montias 1967: 19; Welzk 19826: 20-1). The Sovrom companies 
were in reality largely relegated to the direct economic needs of the Soviet Union at the time.
112 Montias (1967: 38) claims that some relaxation was probably inescapable in the early 1950s, as a 
result of the socio-economic effects of expansionist industrialisation.
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to the exigencies of the Soviet bloc at large and continued with the model of extensive 
industrialisation and rigid central planning (Montias 1967: 16). Whilst other countries in 
Eastern Europe opted for a more decentralised, reformist, and 'consumerist' pathway, 
influenced by developments in the USSR, the Romanian regime relaunched initiatives 
for national development on the basis of heavy industrialisation.113 The third five-year 
plan o f 1961 again revealed the continued commitment to the development o f an 
autonomous industrial base, with its emphasis on investment in energy, machine 
building, and the chemical industry (Chirot 1978a: 472; Crowther 1988: 58-9), at a time 
when within the CMEA plans for a region-wide socialist division of labour were 
launched. Individual countries (East Germany114, Czechoslovakia) criticised Romania's 
perseverance in national autarchy (Tumock 1970: 547). Faced with Khrushchev’s 
redefinition of the communist developmental model as based on reformism and co­
ordination within the Soviet bloc, the Romanian leadership emphasised its commitment 
to an enduring strategy of national development (Chirot 1978a: 471). The nationalist 
turn signified the partial detachment of Romania from the socialist world and a 
reorientation of trade patterns towards the West.
Nevertheless, in the early years of Ceau$escu's leadership (1965-1969), Romania's 
immunity from reformist tendencies appeared to be unsustainable, as more reformist 
elements were introduced within an overall programme of comprehensive 
industrialisation. Reformism was exemplified by an emphasis on mass participation, 
increased local autonomy, and collective decision-making in enterprises in the reform 
programme of 1967, the outcome of two years of debate between the political leadership 
and more reform-minded elements (Crowther 1988: 82-3; Shafir 1985: 120), The
1,3 The trend in many other socialist countries was to answer the crisis of the communist model by 
an attempt to shift from an exhausted extensive growth model, based on large-scale industrialisation 
and mass production, to a more diversified intensive growth model, which would favour the 
increased production and distribution of consumer goods, and which would mobilise workers to 
increase labour productivity (Ray 1996: 112-3). In Romania, in contrast, the attempt was ’to 
overcome the stultifying effects of centralization on production not through reforms, but through 
forcing up the level of investment’ (Verdery 1991:100).
114 The East Germans, being strong supporters of a socialist division of labour, called for 'passive 
industrialisation' in the Balkan countries (see Tumock 1970: 547).
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programme apparently indicated an attempt by the party leadership to deal with the 
structural dilemmas of the communist developmental model.
This reformist tendency was, however, nipped in the bud, as reformist initiatives 
were criticised and opposed by two groups in Romanian society, i.e. the bureaucrats in 
charge of economic ministries and hard-liners within the party (Crowther 1988: 83). In 
the end, Ceau$escu sustained these criticisms, and their eventual impact on overall 
economic orientation was minimal. Economic policy-making was increasingly 
centralised and the general tenets of the Stalinist model re-articulated, as was clear from 
the five-year plans adopted in the 1970s and 1980s. Rates of investment destined for 
industry amounted to around 50 percent o f total investments, the lion’s share going to 
the so-called Group A industries (producer-goods), and remaining significantly higher 
than the rates destined for agriculture or the production of consumer-goods (Shafir 
1985: 108-9)!
The nationalist turn at the beginning of the 1960s had redirected Romanian economic 
trade patterns and credit relations towards the West. In the 1970s, however, increasing 
awareness in the West of Romania's rather weak credit-worthiness and its poor 
performance in agriculture made the RCP divert Romanian trade increasingly to the so- 
called Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs), as these seemed to be both less rigid than 
Western countries and to provide a way to Western technology in any case (Lawson 
1983; Linden 1986; Shafir 1985: 111). In this way, the RCP could continue its project 
of political autonomy by diverting trade to non-CMEA countries, whereas its self- 
proclaimed status as a ’socialist developing country' would bring the economic benefits 
necessary for the further construction of its domestic economy. Relations with 
developing countries became highly significant, as these countries could provide 
necessary raw materials and at the same time constituted export markets for Romanian 
industrial products. In line with its aims o f national independence and economic 
autarchy, Romania joined the GATT and the IMF in the early 1970s, as well as the 
'Group o f 77' o f  non-aligned states, which ensured access to the European market and 
preferential treatment (Lawson 1983; Shafir 1985: 112). In the 1980s, however, the 
RCP limited its foreign trade to minimal requirements as it deemed its most important 
priority the paying-off of its foreign debt, leading to extreme austerity measures in the
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domestic sphere, while blaming the West for exploitation and imperialism (Shafir 1985: 
117,119).
During the entire communist period, agriculture was subordinated to the imperatives of 
industrialisation. Agricultural policy was essentially aimed at achieving two objectives: 
the mobilisation and socialisation of the peasantry through collectivisation, and the 
technical and organisational upgrading -  through mechanisation and rational 
organisation -  of agricultural production. The first, revolutionary, purpose regarded the 
profound restructuring of agriculture by disintegrating the (remnants of) feudal and 
capitalist ownership structures and the creation of collective organisations ultimately 
controlled by the Communist state. The first drives for collectivisation in the 
countryside had a highly purifying character, in that they were aimed at eliminating 
enduring class structures and peasant exploitation (especially directed against relatively 
large landowners, the 'kulaks'), and should result in more egalitarian and homogeneous 
agricultural structures (cf. Berend 1996: 213-4). In addition, through collective 
organisation the peasantry was much more effectively amenable to resocialisation and 
mobilisation for the construction of socialism. By means of collectivisation the peasant 
mentality (in essence adverse to the socialist cause115) could be profoundly changed, the 
peasant integrated into the communist system, and its productive efforts made to serve 
the purpose of the construction of socialist society116 (Jowitt 1971:121-3).
The second, equally important, purpose of agriculture policy was the reorganisation 
and mechanisation of agriculture and its relegation to the needs of industry. In theory, 
the rationalised and technologised organisation of agriculture should lead to much 
higher rates of productivity and output. Increased production could then be used for 
export, which would generate the financial means for the importation of the necessary
115 The distrust of the Communist regime towards the peasantry was exemplified by accusations of 
sabotage of production plans, refusal to fulfil the set quota, collusion against collectivisation and 
trade on the black market (Welzk 1982è: 105).
116 ‘The development of a cooperative spirit, comunal labour, the reinforcement of discipline and 
order in the cooperatives, the elevation of the socialist conscience of every collective peasant and 
his responsibility towards the common patrimony, towards the general interest of our society’ were 
considered of primary importance (Ceauçescu 1969: 36).
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components for industrialisation. Agriculture served primarily as a source of income for 
industrialisation (Welzk 1982b: 112).
During the 1950s, large-scale collectivisation was hardly coming off the ground 
whereas the technical upgrading of the agricultural sector was impeded by the lowest 
investment rates in agriculture in Eastern Europe (Welzk 1982b: 98). Only from 1958 
onwards the party substituted a veritable collectivisation drive for earlier relatively mild 
policies, and it could announce the complete collectivisation of agriculture in 1962. 
Whereas in 1958 only 18 percent of the farms had been collectivised, in 1962 
collectivisation of the whole sector was near complete as 96 percent were now 
collective farms (Georgescu 1991: 235; Montias 1967: 53). In that same period, the 
share of collectives or cooperatives in overall agricultural land rose from 17.4 to 77.4 
percent, whereas the share of private farmers decreased from 44.7 to 3.5 percent (Welzk 
1982b: 225). Agriculture's main goals were identified as producing (low quality) food 
for the urban population, and (high quality) agricultural products for export purposes, in 
order to finance growing imports, such as raw materials and machinery (Montias 1967: 
30-2; see also Gilberg 1990: 127). The five- and six-year plans were in this respect as 
self-evident in defining the role of agriculture as they were in their approach towards 
industry.117 The absolute priority of industrialisation meant the diversion of investments 
to the modernisation and expansion of industry, and seemed to entail a voluntarist 
approach towards agriculture, in which little effort and investment were expected to 
lead to highly positive results. In this sense, the self-proclaimed completion of 
collectivisation by the regime in 1962 did not entail a change in policy or a shift in 
priority of agricultural policy. In fact, from 1947 onwards, the RCP's policy was 
continuously characterised by a lack o f investment in the agricultural sector, low 
priority of mechanisation and education, and an enduring emphasis on the subordinate 
role of agriculture in the overall project of modernisation, further exemplified by the 
utilisation of rural manpower for industrialisation purposes (Gilberg 1990: 123). The 
consolidation o f  collective farms in the 1960s did not lead to a more balanced 
investment policy while from the late 1970s onwards the role of agriculture was to 
generate income from exportation for the payment of the foreign debt.
117 From the first five-year plan (1951-55) until the sixth (1976-80), planned investment in
agriculture and forestry never exceeded 20 percent of total investment (Montias 1967; Shafir 1985).
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The negligence of agriculture and its relegation to a secondary status in the economic 
policies of the RCP seem to be the result of its one-dimensional attitude towards 
economic policy. The imaginary o f rational control over nature through industrialism 
clearly formed an essential part of the Communist project of modernisation and in this 
vision agriculture could only perform a marginal and additive role. The apparent 
disregard for even a transformational role of agriculture in the structural change from a 
pre-dominantly rural economy to an industrialised society further underlines the highly 
one-sided attention for the ‘myth* of industrialisation. In addition, the Romanian path to 
communism has been characterised by a strong opposition to any structural relegation 
of its economy to the international division of labour as envisaged by more 
industrialised countries within the socialist world.
Political-cultural transformation
In a similar vein to the socio-economic transformation, which was aimed at both 
continuing and superseding the capitalist project of an industrialised market economy, 
the communist political-cultural revolution aspired to both neutralise the social 
divisions of class society and to perfect the democratic ideal in the form of 'democratic 
centralism'.118 The institutional aspects of the political and cultural programme of 
Communism aimed at the concentration of all political power in the party-state, which 
was both the ultimate expression o f complete societal unity and the singular guiding 
force for the realisation of the Communist project. In the last analysis, the national 
Communist project was about the promulgation and institutionalisation of a form of 
collective autonomy. The subjugation and mobilisation of all societal forces under the 
banner of this social imaginary was one instance o f its all-pervading significance; the 
erasure of the distinction between the political and the cultural another.
118 In Communist discourse, socialist democracy was defined as the transcendence of social 
antagonism: '[T]he essence of socialist democracy [consists of] the ensurance of all conditions, in 
which the people can observe its sovereign right to participate in the settlement of the affairs of the 
country both through its representatives and in a direct way, in the mobilisation of the wide masses 
of the people for the development and the advancement of socialist society. Socialist democracy 
ensures the harmonic relation between the general interests of society and the interests of the 
individual citizens and allows for the full development of the capacities and talents of any worker, 
[and] the many-sided manifestation of human personality' (Ceauçescu 1971:40).
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Political and cultural transformation can be characterised by means o f three 
relationships o f the state and its surroundings: the state and the party; the state and 
society; the state and the intellectuals. In practical terms, the political objectives of the 
establishment and consolidation o f a socialist society had direct implications for the 
form o f the state, society and its representation, and the role of intellectuals.
The state and the party. The communist transformation aimed at the concentration of 
all political (and social) power in the Communist party, and its domination of the state. 
From the moment the RCP emerged from its state of illegality in 1944, its main 
objective was to disempower and eliminate rival centres of power and construct a 
political system in which it constituted the only source o f political power (in strict 
terms, the Party-as-One' was not a party, that is to say, it did not form one part amongst 
others, but embodied the only representation o f the single societal will, see Lefort 1986: 
283-4). In spite of formal representation and a division o f political power119, the only 
effective body was the Communist party itself. This was indeed acknowledged in the 
Constitution of 1952, in which the RCP was designated as the ’"leading political force" 
in state and social organizations', a statement reiterated in the 1965 version (Shafir 
1985:42 ,95).120
In the mid-1950s, Gheorghiu-Dej and his political faction emerged as the singular 
ruling élite in which virtually all political power was concentrated. The RCP moved 
towards a form of autocracy in which political behaviour and decision-making were not 
the result of established rules and procedures, but stemmed directly from the upper 
echelons of the party. Jowitt has called this, using Weberian terms, a form of
1,9 The political system that was established followed directly the Soviet system as established by 
the 1936 Soviet constitution; it comprised several formal institutions: the Grand National Assembly 
(the parliament, carrying the same name as the interwar democratic parliament), a government 
headed by the prime-minister, the State Council responsible for parliamentary functions when the 
parliament was not in session, and the People's Councils which allegedly provided for local 
representation, although in reality they represented central authority (King 1980: 52-3).
120Under the pretext of the so-called New Course, the RCP moved towards collective leadership in 
1955. This change from single leadership to a form of oligarchy was induced by the trend of dé­
stalinisation in the Soviet Union, but never went beyond a superficial, symbolic redistribution of 
political power (cf. Shafir 1985:68-9).
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'patrimonialism', in which Gheorghiu-Dej attempted to 'establish himself as the primary 
element in the definition of the Party's character and power'. The emergence o f an 
autocratic form of political system included party dominance over the institutional 
apparatus of the bureaucracy and security forces (Jowitt 1971: 147-8). Thus, the party 
represented institutionalised political power (and its organisational role) whilst 
simultaneously it could performing revolutionary functions (guiding the direction of 
change). Jowitt confronts the endurance of this 'patrimonial' form of political power and 
its relation to the entrenched position of the Gheorghiu-Dej faction with the possible 
alternative of a legal-rational system in which a technocracy would play a significant 
role (Jowitt 1971: 196).
In the early 1960s, the political system seemed indeed to move in a more pluri- 
central direction, in which technocratic specialists would play a partially autonomous 
role in managing the economy. The increasing emphasis on an independent Romanian 
path to socialism, in which national industrialisation played a key role, seemed to point 
towards a form of reformist national Communism. However, as Gheorghiu-Dej was 
directly dependent on the communist tradition of Stalinism, reforms could only be 
limited. His project had been exclusively based on the emulation of the Soviet Union, 
and was virtually without local ideological and political origins. Any form of prolonged 
de-Stalinisation would therefore have meant the undermining of Dej’s own position, as 
it would have discontinued the communist tradition (cf. Feher et al. 1983: 152). 
Nevertheless, the relaxation and 'guided liberalisation' that accompanied the turn away 
from the Soviet Union from 1962 onwards apparently entailed a more lasting form of 
de-Stalinisation. The 'dictatorship of the proletariat* seemed less important now that a 
certain consolidation of the socialist system had taken place.
As Verdery (1991) has pointed out, it was the invocation o f the symbol of the nation 
that led to the loss of control of the Communist party over absolute knowledge. From 
1971 onwards, Ceau$escu therefore re-installed central control through the 'mini- 
cultural revolution’. Any lasting form of de-Stalinisation, reformism, or national 
Communism (as reformism) was thus prevented and autocratic rule was re-asserted. 
Various modalities were installed to ensure the hegemony of the party-state, in 
particular Ceau§escu's personal control. Both technocratic and humanist intellectuals 
were denied any autonomous social position and were re-arranged in the strict paity-
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state hierarchy (see below). Furthermore, in 1974 the requirements for holding leading 
positions in the RCP were made much more stringent. Access to high positions in the 
party-state hierarchy were made more strictly dependent on the duration of party 
membership and party activity (King 1980: 87), increasing control over the political and 
ideological character of the party leadership.121 Another instance of increased control 
over party members and state personnel was Ceau$escu's policy of 'rotation of cadres'. 
Through the alternation of cadre positions between party and state party officials 
apparently not only gained 'many-sided experience* in fields other than their own, but 
were also prevented the creation of autonomous political bases outside of the party top 
(King 1980: 95). An ultimate feature o f increased boundary-setting towards society and 
the concentration of political power in the hands o f the few is attested by the tendency 
towards a dynastic form of communism. From the early 1970s onwards, high leadership 
positions were given to Elena Ceau$escu, Ceau§escu's wife, and at the end of the decade 
also to  his son, Nicu. In addition, various family members of both Ceau§escu and his 
wife were promoted into prominent party positions.
The state and society. The relationship between the Communist state and society was 
one o f bureaucratic domination, albeit via various modes o f control. Following Verdery 
(1991: 85-7), three modes o f control may be distinguished: remunerative or material 
control, in which material incentives constitute the key instrument in obtaining 
compliance from the population; coercive control, in which compliance is ensured by 
direct coercion; and, normative, or what Verdery calls 'symbolic-ideological' control, in 
which compliance is induced by reference to ideology, substantive values, or 
substantive rationality. Whereas the first played an insignificant role in Romanian 
Communism, the latter two were crucial for the emergence of the national Communist 
project. The periodisation introduced earlier (the period o f emulation and that of 
national Communism) can be further substantiated through distinguishing between 
dominant modes of control: the period o f emulation was predominantly characterised by 
coercive control, whereas in the period of national Communism symbolic-ideological 
control became increasingly important, although coercive control always remained
121 As King observes: '... individuals with longer party membership and greater leadership 
experience at lower levels are much less likely to become dissidents within the organization or lead 
break-away factions’ (King 1980: 97).
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significant (in particular during the 1980s). in the period of emulation, the dominant 
relationship between the party-state and society was coercive. The party-state sought to 
represent and control society in all its facets, hence the creation of an extensive 
bureaucracy, whose primary task was the complete organisation of society. As the 
RCP's priority was rapid and comprehensive industrialisation and it enjoyed Soviet 
support, it relied on coercion and violence to achieve its objectives122 (King 1980: 100). 
The setting up of all kinds o f ’participatory' institutions, the 'front organisations', do not 
contradict such a conclusion, as these organisations mainly functioned as 'transmission 
belts’ for party guidelines, and further constituted the monitoring institutions of society.
With the introduction of nationalism and the proclamation of national independence 
and sovereignty, the Communist leadership introduced the possibility for symbolic- 
ideological control, which could also be used to counter forms of remunerative control 
(as common in the reformist projects in other Eastern European states), which would 
have implied the decentralisation of the political system. Gheorghiu-Dej’s move towards 
independence did not entail a qualitative change in state-society relations, as 
nationalism was mainly invoked to ensure the continuation of policies of 
industrialisation. Another development did, however, push the party towards other 
modes of control. The industrialisation and educational policies of the 1950s had 
created a technocratic layer or 'new middle class', which was on the rise in the 1960s. 
Its upward social mobility seemed to indicate two things: the increasing demand for a 
reform of the communist system and a stronger emphasis on material incentives, and a 
menace to the position of the traditional ruling élite (Jowitt 1971: 186-9; Verdery 1991: 
106-7). The tendency towards liberalisation and openness that characterised the 1960s 
apparently indicated a shift towards what Verdery calls a remunerative mode of control. 
Yet this trend was abruptly discontinued with Ceauçescu's re-assertion of central 
control, the renunciation of the 'bourgeois ideology and a retrograde mentality’, and the
122 Not only the 'continuously exacerbated "class conflict" i.e., the elimination of 'class enemies' 
attest to this (Jowitt 1971: 136), but also the forced project of collectivisation. The most clear-cut 
instance of the combination of violence and control was the construction of the Black Sea Canal in 
the early 1950s. This project not only exemplifies the priority of large-scale economic 
transformation, but also involved large-scale repression and violence towards the 'enemies of the 
people' who were forced to work on the project.
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restitution of the coercive mode of control. Ceauçescu's 'repossession' of society did not 
simply signify a return to Stalinism, however. In the 1970s, the earlier tendency towards 
nationalism and independence, which in the 1960s seemed to point to reformism, was 
adjusted to the central coordination o f the Stalinist project of industrialisation. As 
observed by Verdery (1991: 107), Ceauçescu could now use a symbolic-ideological 
mode o f control (primarily based on the symbol of the nation) to counter tendencies 
towards reformism. By creating a syncretism between particularist nationalism and 
Stalinism, Ceauçescu found a way to continue the original project without giving in to 
decentralising tendencies or external interference.
The state and the intellectuals. The cultural revolution demanded the mobilisation 
and occasionally the co-optation of the intellectuals as transmitters of the right socialist 
culture. The cultural revolution thus aimed at redefining the relationship between state 
and society, and more specifically, between the state and (contentious) intellectuals. The 
concomitant political (and economic) goals of cultural revolution were the integration 
and mobilisation of society and the silencing of dissenting social forces. The ultimate 
aim was to enhance party control, which was understood as increased collective 
autonomy. In the redefinition of the relationship between the state and the worker or the 
peasant, and the state and the intellectual, all members of society were formally 
presumed as equal, whilst at the same time subordinated to the Communist project. As 
the state was the embodiment of the workers’ sovereignty, workers were dispossessed of 
a means of protest (through strikes and collective demands). The same held true for 
intellectuals: as they were obliged to dedicate their work to the necessities of the 
construction of a socialist society (in the form of social realism), they were dispossessed 
of their means to protest and critical reflection.
As intellectuals had the capacity to formulate different world-views and were 
therefore capable of undermining the vision held by the ruling élite, their compliance 
and active participation in the Communist project was perceived as a prerequisite.123 
The relationship between the party and the intellectuals was one of mutual necessity. On 
the one hand, the Communist party needed intellectuals for reasons of legitimation as
123 In 1946 Gheorghiu-Dej called for the co-operation of the intellectuals in the rebuilding of the 
country, stating that not only reactionary action but also self-chosen isolation were detrimental to 
the intellectual mission (cited in: Gabanyi 1975:19).
1 4 6
T he national Communist alternative
well as technical and bureaucratic control, and at the same time was well aware that 
intellectuals might form a threat to the regime’s coherence if they managed to construct 
and diffuse an alternative world-view. On the other hand, the intellectuals needed the 
party for reasons of employment and income, as well as for reasons of enhancing 
status.124
Throughout the communist period, one could observe a wavering of the RCP 
between attempts at co-optation and/or liberalisation, and endeavours to absolute 
control over the intellectuals (through cultural policies that reiterated the absolute truth 
of the dogmas and through socio-economic policies). Immediately after the communist 
taking-over in 1944, the necessity for cadres and intellectuals was felt as of ’great 
tactical significance’, since the party itself was extremely small (Gabanyi 1975: 19). In 
the period from 1945 to 1948, a rapid expansion of membership took place, an 
'uncritical’ move that was later strongly criticised by Gheorghiu-Dej, and educational 
institutions were set up to train newly recruited cadres.125 These institutions strongly 
followed the Soviet-model, both in structure (they included cultural institutions, a cadre 
school, and a Writer's Union, and in outlook (they were designed to actively promote 
the Stalinist model). A process of 'russification' took place, as any form of nationalism 
was strongly condemned and adherence to Slavic elements in the Romanian culture and 
language encouraged. After 1949, the attempted 'embedding' of the party in society was 
furthered by accepting 'bourgeois' intellectuals and scientists, as the party was in dire 
need of cadres (Jowitt 1971: 103). By the time of Stalin’s death in 1953, some elements 
of de-Stalinisation were felt in Romania. The dogmatism of the early period was slowly 
replaced by concessions and liberalisation in cultural policy. In reality, this was a 
process steered from above, as the party leadership only provided such concessions with
124 As Verdery (1991: 73) observes: 'Romania’s metamorphosis from capitalist colony into socialist 
satellite altered the framework for intellectual activity. It greatly reduced (he role of the market and 
curtailed western influence, while making the state bureaucracy virtually the sole employer and
sustainer of culture.'
125 The Writers' Union and other ’creative unions’ were set up to ensure party control over cultural 
creation. Furthermore, the 'Andrei Zhdanov School for the Social Sciences' was established to train 
future party cadres (TismSneanu 2003:110).
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the mutual understanding that the struggle against revisionism and bourgeois ideologies 
was not to be debilitated under any circumstances (Gabanyi 1975:43-4).
The period o f controlled liberalisation lasted until 1957, when the party re-articulated 
its earlier dogmatic views and renewed its campaign against revisionists, lack of 
orthodoxy, and 'a-politicism' (Gabanyi 1975: 68). In the early 1960s, cultural policy 
closely followed foreign policy, as the RCP sought to defend the continued pursuit of its 
policy of ’socialism in one country' against CMEA-pIans for increased co-operation and 
division of labour within Eastern Europe. The formulation of a policy of national 
autonomy meant the redirection o f Romania's economic and political focus on the 
Soviet Union to the West, stimulating such contacts between Romania and Western 
countries, along with cultural ties (Gabanyi 1975: 78-9). The emphasis on national 
autonomy was a direct result o f the RCP's persistence in following a Stalinist model of 
social transformation, but could not be reduced to it. The RCP's ’declaration of 
independence' in 1964 ushered in a new era of overt nationalism, on which Ceau$escu 
picked up when he came to power in 1965.
From the third Party Congress o f 1960 onwards, Gheorghiu-Dej engaged in a policy 
of 'guided liberalisation' ('guided' because it was immediately made clear that 
liberalisation could only take place within a strictly defined framework). While 
Gheorghiu-Dej argued against the 'influence of foreign ideology', he simultaneously 
limited internal reformist tendencies by renouncing any attempt at 'reconciliation of the 
ideology of the revolutionary proletariat with bourgeois ideology' (cited in Gabanyi 
1975: 80). In itself, 'guided liberalisation' was part of the regime's reformulation of its 
political image, externally in terms of its emphasis on independence, and internally in 
search of a 'new political formula' that could provide legitimacy (Shafir 1983: 409). 
Despite its controlled nature, liberalisation did decrease control over intellectual 
production, stimulate the political involvement o f intellectuals, and create a limited 
discursive space for alternative visions.126 The aim was to create 'greater ideological
126 Membership was opened to those that formerly had been defined as politically dangerous, 
obtainment of party membership for intellectuals was simplified, political prisoners were released 
(in the period 1962-64), and important cultural figures rehabilitated. In cultural policy, the pressure 
on intellectuals to act as ‘activists on the ideological front* decreased, as socialist realism made 
apparently place for ’socialist humanism* (Barbulescu 1970). Instead of repression and strict
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mobility as well as moving away from primitive-dogmatic theses, without really 
criticising the principles of Marxist-Leninist cultural policy'. The principles of the 
educational value o f art and culture were not abandoned and the ’cultural revolution', i.e. 
the creation of a New Man, remained a mainstay of the socialist project: *[t]he only new 
element was the search for more effective methods to reach this goal' (Gabanyi 1975: 
79).
The liberal tendencies, aimed at the co-optation o f intellectuals for the purposes of 
creating a national mass basis for Romanian Communism, evoked a highly positive 
response from the intellectuals, whose activities had until then been strictly 
subordinated to the political objectives o f the Communist project. In particular humanist 
intellectuals were highly attracted by the new course taken by the leadership, especially 
as this course seemed to involve an intimate relationship between national 
independence, de-Stalinisation, increasing national consciousness and the allowance for 
some autonomy in the field of cultural production (Gabanyi 1975: 81). The positive 
response came especially from a young generation of writers and intellectuals, which 
pressed for more intellectual freedom, the decentralisation of cultural institutions, and 
access to higher positions within these institutions. The 'guided liberalisation* continued 
by the Ceau§escu-regime entailed consequences beyond its original intentions as 
intellectuals instigated a movement 'from below* calling for increasing transformation of 
the dogmatic Marxist-Leninist superstructure of society and the control of state 
institutions over intellectual production. The partial restitution of autonomy to the 
cultural field, as cultural production was tied less rigidly to political objectives, led to 
the strong assertion for more rights, freedom and influence on the side of the 
intellectuals. The demands for increased cultural freedom, the influence of intellectuals, 
and the abolition of censorship reached its pinnacle at the Writers' Conference of 1968, 
where young writers sought to find an entrance into the cultural establishment (see 
Culic 1999; Gabanyi 1975; Verdery 1991). As the relaxation commenced by the RCP 
led to fierce competition between intellectuals (in particular over the concept of the 
nation, and the relation between culture and politics, see Verdery 1991), it surpassed the
supervision of the producers of culture by the Communist party, as in the 1950s, the new 
relationship between party-ideologues and intellectuals was one of co-optation of intellectuals and 
technocrats into the party (Gabanyi 1975: 79-81).
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RCP's goal o f mobilisation and the creation of legitimacy through the substantive value 
of the nation. In reaction to a perceived loss of control over the cultural field, Ceau$escu 
reasserted the prominence o f the party and himself at the 1969 Party Congress, and in 
particular in 1971 in the so-called 'July Theses'. The relative autonomy of cultural 
production from politics was renounced, and the essential role of culture as the 
promoter of socialist realism was re-established.
Even if the reclamation of party control over cultural production was accompanied 
by a renewed subjugation of nationalism to revolutionary objectives (see Martin 2000a), 
the concept of the nation remained a principal element in the national Communist 
discourse of the RCP. The reactivation o f nationalism in the 1960s resulted in two main 
interpretations among intellectuals: Western-oriented, universalist nationalism and 
particularist nationalism (Martin 2002b). Proto-chronism, which emerged most visibly 
in the 1970s, could be understood as belonging to the latter. Essentially proto-chronism 
formed a cultural theory, in which autochthonous culture was revaluated and defended 
against foreign imports. In its most radical version, it led to the 'intensified resuscitation 
of interwar indigenist arguments about the national essence*, a reiteration o f an 
essentially isolationist, closed vision o f Romanian culture and society but in a rather 
different societal context (Verdery 1991: 168). Not only were certain concepts from the 
interwar debate re-introduced in the context of a society embedded in the Soviet sphere 
of influence and therefore gained different meanings (to begin with, isolationist 
nationalism was now not only directed against the West but also against Soviet 
imperialism and reformism), but indigenist discourse now also had to be reconciled with 
the main tenets of the Communist project.
In this sense, Ceau$escu's resumption of strong central control over the debate on 
nationalism was meant to co-opt the concept of the nation for the purposes of a 
developmentalist project based on Stalinism. The proto-chronist doctrine offered a 
cultural alibi for an isolationist and autarkic course, and contributed to the centralisation 
of Romanian society and the silencing of oppositional voices (cf. Martin 2002c; 
Verdery 1991: 169). By the mid-1970s, Ceau§escu had become enthusiastic about 
proto-chronism but did not yet support it explicitly. However, when the proto-chronist 
writer Eugen Barbu was accused o f plagiarism at the end of the 1970s, Ceau$escu
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backed him up, thereby tying himself openly to proto-chronism (Verdery 1991: 205, fn 
40).
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Part 3 Transnational discursive paradigms and Romanian 
discourses of modernisation
The preceding chapters consisted o f a historical-empirical analysis of modernising 
agency, institutional patterns of modernisation, but have not systematically referred to 
the normative premises and cognitive prescriptions o f the programmes of 
modernisation, as promulgated from the early 19th century onwards. Likewise, the 
external dimension of modernisation has not yet systematically been introduced. The 
purpose o f this chapter is the elaboration of the normative premises and cognitive 
prescriptions that have formed the 'horizons of meaning' of Romanian modernisation. I 
will examine the competing modernising discourses in relation to what I call 
transnational discursive paradigms of modernity. In other words, I will compare 
dominant discourses in the Romanian context with those that have been the 'reference 
societies' or dominant extraneous interpretations of modernity that have profoundly 
shaped Romanian projects of modernisation.
This synchronic discursive perspective allows me to consider two aspects. First of 
all, a synchronic comparison enables me to identify the nature and logic inherent in 
projects of modernisation in Romania (thus going beyond the mere self-labelling of the 
actors involved). Secondly, such an approach sheds light on the extent to which the 
advancement of a modernising project in the local context is congruent with or derived 
from a dominant discourse in the transnational context, and to what extent it can be 
considered a re-interpretation/adaptation or a purely local creation. The conceptual 
reconstructions o f transnational discursive paradigms serve the purpose of identifying 
the main understandings of modernisation in these discourses. These reconstructions are 
not exhaustive treatments of a certain political strand of thought but will be relatively 
cursory and schematic, focusing on modernising functions and the directions for 
modernisation that can be derived from them. Although a 'minimal' conceptual approach 
tends to lead to an exaggeration of differences between transnational discourses and 
local ones, it will allow me to identify perceptions and the extent to which these are 
creatively re-interpreted or adapted in the local environment more clearly (cf. Szacki 
1995: 24-5). In addition, I will be able to compare competing modernising projects in
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Romanian society diachronically, and to  identify continuities and discontinuities. In this 
way, I place myself in a position where I am able to tease out similarities and 
dissimilarities in approaches in order to confront the primary questions raised by 
modernity.
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7. Liberalism, romanticism and Romanian national Liberalism
7.1 Discursive paradigm s in the nineteenth century: liberalism and romantic 
nationalism
In its place of origin, Western Europe (in particular England and France), liberalism 
constituted a critical and subversive political discourse against what were portrayed as 
illegitimate practices of political rule: the despotism of the absolutist state and the 
interference of religion in politics (cf. Manent 1995: 80). Notions of individual liberty, 
the rationality o f human beings, and self-government were contrasted with the 'divine 
right' to political rule claimed by absolutist monarchies (cf. Held 1987:41). Instead of a 
society ruled by preconceived traditions and hereditary rights and privileges, in which 
the larger part o f human beings were socially immobile, dependent, and subject to a 
strict hierarchical order, liberalism proposed a society based on the autonomy o f the 
individual and the protection of individual liberty (Russell 1946: 578). Concisely put, 
the liberal crisis narrative deemed unjustified two elements of the traditional order: the 
complete dominance of political authority by the absolute ruler (who impeded self-rule 
by the ruled) and the arbitrary nature o f the traditional political regime (no guarantee of 
natural, individual rights).
As the liberal doctrine could in practical terms not provide for the direct, individual 
exercise of autonomy on the level of the state, the notions of representation and popular 
sovereignty were introduced (Wagner 2001a: 46). In historical terms, the notion of 
popular sovereignty was most forcefully articulated in the French Revolution, which 
proposed a political order based on the representation of the will of each individual, in 
contrast to the notions of absolute sovereignty and divine right that had existed until 
then. In this way, the political order was to found its legitimacy on the volition o f each 
of its subjects, instead of on absolute sovereignty or a transcendental order (the latter 
was exclusively the domain o f the church, and its interference in the polity was seen as 
impeding the full realisation o f individual liberty). The modem subject became 'citizen', 
a position in society based on a social contract between the individual and the state. 
This social contract not only guaranteed social order in that it placed authority on the
1 5 5
L ib e r a l is m  a n d  r o m a n t ic is m
level of the state, but at the same time protected individual liberty by limiting the right 
of the state to interfere in society. Moreover, state power was to be divided in such a 
way as to prevent it from becoming dominant vis-à-vis society.
The liberal, emancipatory discourse translated into political practice signified the 
dissolution of older, traditional social bonds. It was profoundly modem as it prioritised 
human self-rule. In this sense, the liberal notion of human autonomy became the central 
point o f reference for all other modem discourses. The novel idea of individual self-rule 
and the professed dissolution o f the unequal and ascriptive social positions of traditional 
society meant that any modem discourse needed to reconceptualise understandings of 
social order and belonging. The liberal, political, civic understanding of the polity with 
its ‘thin* conception of the relation between the individual and the state did not remain 
unchallenged and found in particular in political romanticism a forceful alternative for 
the construction of a modem order.
In political romanticism, it was assumed that the individual, rather than an atomic, 
self-sufficient unit, was always already involved in pre-political relations with others, 
mostly conceptualised as linguistic, cultural and ethnic bonds.127 It was these two 
transnational discursive paradigms that had an extended influence on conceptions of 
modernity all over Europe. For my purposes, I will deconstruct these two discourses 
into the three categories I proposed in chapter 3: cultural inspiration; Political 
foundations; and socio-political practices.
Normative premises
1. Cultural inspiration. In principle, classical liberalism had implications far beyond the 
historical situation in which it arose. The assumption of equality and the endowment of 
natural rights by all human beings were first promulgated against the arbitrary rule of 
absolutism and subjugation to the spiritual influence of the church. But the same time 
these principles held potential relevance far beyond the immediate circumstances. The 
universal validity of liberal tenets was not a matter o f contingent political relevance for
127 In practice, however, the difference was less clear-cut as the liberal notion of a entirely formal- 
rational order could not be sustained and had to incorporate substantive elements, as was for 
instance achieved by drawing on cultural-linguistic elements in the definition of the political 
community (see Wagner 1994),
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other societies, but was explicitly asserted as universal by liberal thinkers. In their view, 
the liberal world view could be applied to all humanity. As long as its main tenets 
(rationalism, individualism, legalism) were systematically institutionalised, ever-larger 
parts of humanity would be able to enjoy ever-greater happiness (Wallerstein 1995: 76). 
Such postulates of universal applicability contained strong notions of rupture with 
traditional society and thus with history as such. This moment of complete 
reconstruction of society implied, in turn, a strong assumption of historical determinism 
(progress), and the convergence and homogenisation of diverse societies.
The notion of universal validity and the concomitant assumption of the essential 
similarity between human societies stood in strong tension with romanticist notions of 
the specificity o f cultures, the immanent diversity of human experience, and the need 
for individuals and cultures to realise their own specific 'form' (Taylor 1979: 3; Taylor 
1992: 28-9). The particularism or essentialism inherent in such notions parted from an 
understanding of the world as ultimately made up of diverse experiences and the 
essence of humanity in the expression of this diversity. Romanticist thought directly 
challenged the implications of liberal individualism, in that the liberal understanding of 
human beings as essentially equal and interchangeable conflicted with the singularity 
and peculiarity which, according to Romantic thinkers, could be the only basis of 
individuality as well as the collective being (cf. Schenk 1966: 15).
2. Liberty, autonomy. Essentially, the liberal project of modernisation entertained 
two, complementary, notions of liberty or autonomy. The first concept around which 
liberal thought evolved was the notion of individual liberty. The cornerstone o f a 
modem society was deemed the individual, who was to be independent from external 
interference (by authority or by fellow citizens) in his/her private space or 'realm of 
freedom'. Such a conception of the free individual was based on the idea of the natural 
rights of essentially equal human beings, rights that every human being possessed 
irrespective of social location and origin. This conception of liberty entailed in essence a 
negative form of liberty, in that it understood liberty as a space of non-interference, in 
which the individual's actions were not restrained by other individuals or by a higher 
authority (Berlin 1969). The second important notion in liberalism that directly related 
to autonomy was the idea of popular sovereignty, which was to replace the absolute 
sovereignty of the absolutist monarchy. Popular sovereignty entailed the democratic
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idea that sovereignty should be based in society itself, i.e., on each subject's consent in 
the rule of the polity (Manent 1995: 32). Both notions o f liberty/autonomy hinged on 
the individual.
The liberal project provoked strong criticism, not only from a 
conservative/reactionary side, but also in the form of alternative visions of modem 
society. The idea that the modem polity should part from a purely individualist 
understanding of liberty was criticised by those alternative conceptions (manifest in 
particular at the end of the 18th century) that understood the individual not as a 
completely solitary unit but as already rooted in pre-political relationships with others 
(Berlin 1997: 567-9; Wagner 2001a: 44-5). In these conceptions (as found in (political) 
romanticism and later romantic nationalism), the autonomy of the individual was only 
deemed realisable through his belonging to a larger, cultural-linguistic sphere of like- 
minded individuals. This theory of autonomy and emancipation rejected the idea that 
liberty implied the complete detachment of the individual from external interference and 
his (partial) retreat in a private sphere. Instead, it parted from the whole or unity of 
social life, in which the parts (individuals) could find their true meaning and 
emancipation only in relation to the other parts (Taylor 1979: 1-2). The a-historical and 
non-social conception of the individual as stripped from its environment and as 
constituting a closed, autonomous unit (the rational individual) was rejected in favour of 
a conception o f the individual as embedded in a specific human community. The 
essence of human nature was not deemed to lie in its rationality, basically similar 
everywhere, but in its uniqueness which could only be expressed in a specific 'cultural 
individuality' o r supra-individual cultural entity (Dumont 1986: 116).128
3. Political and social order. Liberty, the key feature of liberalism, provided the main 
orientation for the reconstruction of the political and social order. For its realisation,
128 This social vision of the individual is aptly expressed by Dumont (1983) when he discusses the 
notion of Volk as promulgated by one of the main protagonists of the romantic movement, Herder: 
'We may say that, in anticipation, the basis is laid here for a right of cultures or "peoples" in contrast 
to the future Rights of Man. This implies a deep transformation in the definition of man: as opposed 
to the abstract individual, endowed with reason but stripped of all particularity, man for Herder is 
what he is, in all modes of thinking, feeling, and acting, by virtue of his belonging to a given 
cultural community' (1983:117).
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liberals envisaged a formal system o f law as the main device of organising a modem 
society. By means of a legal system the rights of the individual could be guaranteed, as 
by obeying the law the citizens realised both their own freedom and that of others. A 
system of formal rules not only regulated the behaviour of the citizen but also codified 
the limits of state authority in the form of institutional rules, thereby reducing the sphere 
of action of the state and effectively relegating the state to the role of guardian o f the 
political and social order. It is significant to note here, that the state did not represent 
any particular substantive purpose or end, so as to prevent any particular social force or 
individual from dominating the rest of society (cf. Manent 1995). The liberal order thus 
hinged on a strict separation of the state from civil society. The former was to be 
sovereign in its role as protector of individual rights, whereas the latter was autonomous 
in that the state was only to interfere with it as far as the upholding of the political order 
required. The relationship between civil society and the state (which ultimately 
represented society) was perceived as a 'social contract*, which gave the state the 
authority to act in the interest of the individual. At the same time, the sovereignty of the 
state was to be limited by means of a division of powers into executive, legislative, and 
judiciary powers, which ensured both the responsiveness of the state to individual 
interests (through the legislative) and limited its authority.
What the liberal vision boiled down to was the construction of societal arrangements 
on the basis of a formal-legal rationality, which, as it was grounded in an understanding 
of individual rights as natural and universally valid, was deemed impersonal and 
independent of particular interests and thus immune to serve as a vehicle of these 
interests. In other words, modem society as envisaged by the liberals could only be 
based on a 'thin' concept of membership of the polity, as the only link between state and 
society was the former's protection o f the latter's natural rights (cf. Wagner 2001a: 40). 
The organisation of society on the basis of formal procedures had two major 
advantages. The organisation of authority in such a way as to result in the 'neutralization 
of the political' enhanced individual negative liberty. It, however, would also lead to 
more positive freedom as it emancipated the domains of the economy and culture from 
political interference (Manent 1995: 60). Citizens would thus be free to pursue their 
own (economic) interests within the confines of the law, an activity that was believed to 
further the common good as it would make available a larger quantity o f wealth in
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society (a vision perhaps most famously promulgated by Locke, see Manent 1995: 69- 
70).
The romanticist critique to liberal understandings of modem society took issue with 
the 'thin* liberal concept of membership of the polity. As we saw above, the radical 
liberal understanding of the individual as a completely autonomous and rational subject, 
without social ties and incapable o f  constructing such ties anew, was questioned by 
visions in which the individual was seen as always already embedded in ’pre-political' 
social relations, such as those of culture, common history, language and ethnicity. A 
case was made not only for the importance of preserving such pre-political elements as 
significant in the constitution of individual identities and the understanding of his/her 
social surroundings, but even more so as essential factors - in the form of collective 
ends - in the construction of any political and social order. Thus, a socio-political order 
could not be based on legal procedures and economic exchange alone (or, even, not at 
all), but required substantive elements to provide for the unity and integration of the 
polity. Political romanticism questioned the impartiality and impersonality of legal 
formalism in defence of individuality. In particular, it criticised the primacy o f rights in 
the foundation o f modem society over that of the collective ends of the community 
(Rosenblum 1987: 35). The point of departure for romanticist interpretations was not 
the individual in the liberal understanding of an isolated human being, but the individual 
as embedded in its social surroundings. Therefore, the romantic vision o f modem 
society gave primacy to substantive, common ends - inscribed in the foundation of the 
polity - in the form of 'thicker' social bonds than those foreseen by liberalism.
M odes o f  legitim ation
In promulgating an absolute rupture with tradition, against the arbitrary rule and divine 
right o f absolutist systems, liberalism promoted a political order in which authority was 
grounded in impersonal rules and procedures. In other words, it hinged on a legal- 
rational mode o f legitimacy. Departing decisively from collectivist notions, the liberal 
order revolved around the individual, who, when free from the constraints imposed by 
the traditional order, would be able to fully emancipate himself and therefore be able to 
maximise individual freedom and development (see Bracher 1984: 17). Individual 
liberty was a conditio sine qua non for societal progress to take place, a linkage being
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supposed between individual freedom and the maximisation of the public good that has 
perhaps best been explained by Adam Smith (see Nisbet 1980: 187-92). Whereas 
traditional societies were characterised by slow or little change, an absence of social 
mobility and a sense of fixed destiny, the liberal order would favour those elements in 
society that signified dynamics, the accumulation of wealth, and human emancipation 
(liberalism was centred around the capitalist spirit and the bourgeoisie). In this sense, 
liberalism held a modem, Promethean conception of humanity*, it believed in the 
malleability o f nature and society. The progress embodied by liberalism was a result of 
the construction of a new order based on formal rationality, institutionalising a 
thoroughgoing rationalisation of society (starting with the differentiation between state 
and society), in particular through the division of labour, industrialism, and the 
organisation and bureaucratisation of the state, developments that were in themselves 
believed to contribute to the resolution of social problems (socio-economic inequality) 
and 'just* rule.
Political romanticism differed crucially from liberalism in that it did not propose an 
absolute rupture with the past, its conception of the political order being based on 
essential aspects of a pre-political community. It was the preservation of particular, 
essential features of a culture that normatively underpinned the nation-state, as its 
‘raison d ’etat’. Political romanticism or romantic nationalism posed the preservation of 
‘national individuality’ as an absolute goal. From this it followed that legitimate rule 
could only be exercised by those representative of the ‘national individuality’. In this, 
political romanticism was predominantly legitimised through both traditional and ‘goal- 
rational’ modes, in that its legitimacy was based on both the conservation of traditions 
and the foundation of a new political order on essentialised national characteristics.
7.3 Liberalism and romantic nationalism in Romania
The two major interpretations of modernity in nineteenth century Europe - liberalism 
and romanticism - provided political élites in Eastern Europe with conceptions of 
modem society. The historical and socio-cultural context in which ‘modem’ Western 
ideas were received and adapted in Eastern Europe partially recast the original meaning 
of both liberalism and romanticism, in that national liberation movements argued, on
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the one hand, for wide-scale reforms and revolution, but on the other developed a 
definite emphasis on national traditions and particularity.
Classical liberalism in Western Europe could be understood as primarily a subversive 
and revolutionary mode of thought, as it called for radical change of the foundations of 
society on the basis of individual liberty. As mentioned above, Western liberalism 
envisaged the separation of state and society, a division, which was expressed in social 
contracts, settled by law. The conclusion of a social contract between different social 
groups, and between the state and society, was regarded as an essential delimitation of 
state authority and of facilitating the emancipation of the individual from state tyranny 
(Held 1987: 41-2; Vajda 1988: 341).129 The national liberation movements in Eastern 
Europe equally aimed at emancipation, but as a result of historical circumstances (most 
importantly, the lack of clearly defined boundaries and a sovereign state) focused their 
emancipatory aspirations at the collective level. It is here that one sees the romanticist 
influence on East European modernising élites. They were not promulgating the 
rationalistic universalism of the Enlightenment, but rather a romantic universalism, 
which posed that nations were the primary individualities of mankind’ and that 
universality was defined by the variety and particular characteristics of different 
national individualities (Walicki 1981: 74-5). The primary rights defended consisted of 
the right of national self-determination and the historical right of preserving one’s 
nation and its traditions. One could make a further distinction between those 
‘progressivist’ romantic nationalisms which emphasised the realisation of the national 
mission through political action and militantism, and more conservative romanticist 
views that understood the preservation of national uniqueness and traditions as their 
highest goal (Walicki 1981: 75-6). On the one hand, the predominant understanding of 
liberty in Eastern Europe could be regarded as a negative liberty for the collective 
('national self-determination*), i.e., as the wish to emancipate the collective from
129 One should not overstate the homogenous experience of the West in this process; for instance, 
one could say that the development of the state and political institutions as opposed to society was 
less articulated -  or at least had a different character - in England and the United States than in 
continental Western Europe (Wagner 1990: 38; see also Wagner 1994,2001).
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external influence and constraints, and to create a collective ’private* realm.130 On the 
other, East European nationalisms contained a strong component of collective positive 
freedom in which the cultivation of national traditions and uniqueness were regarded as 
the precondition for any kind of individual freedom.131
Romania’s initial, predominantly cultural, experiences with modernity were politicised 
by means of a programme o f modernisation at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
(see Marino 1995: 157-90). The national movement manifested itself increasingly in 
opposition to the intensified oppression and exploitation of the Romanian lands by the 
Ottoman empire in the 18th century. The Romanian Liberal movement was a prime 
example of a movement for emancipation in which liberal ideals o f national self- 
determination and legalism were combined with the conservation of essential Romanian 
traditions and history. The advance guard of the Liberal movement was constituted by 
important Romanian historians who not only engaged in political action, but also sought 
to contribute to the national reawakening by the means of ethnogenesis, philology, and 
the gathering o f national culture and folklore. Within the Romanian national movement, 
both conservative romanticism (with its emphasis on evolutionism and national
130 This is not to say that discourses of individual rights were absent from the Liberal projects in the 
region. Rather, they had a lower ranking in the hierarchy of values in programs of modernisation. 
That conceptions of individual liberty and collective self-determination never left the stage was 
proved by the continuously expressed aspiration for the expansion of political rights to ever larger 
parts of the population. See Janos 2000 for an account of national independence struggles by Liberal 
élites in Eastern Europe.
131 One should add, that the historical differences of Western European 'civic* and Eastern European 
'ethnic' understandings of the nation cannot be interpreted as absolute (see, for instance, Kohn 1969; 
Greenfeld 1992; Sugar 1994; for a recent critical treatment, see Delanty 2003). Rather, one should 
say that in the cases of England and France a cultural and linguistic basis of the nation was 
presupposed and therefore unproblematised, whereas elsewhere it became an essential element of 
nation-building as such (cf. Wagner and Zimmerman, 2003: 247-8, fn 6). Recently, the civic-ethnic 
distinction has been criticised for its imprecise description of reality and its normative implications 
(see Yack 1999; Wodak 1999). Political communities are deemed to always incorporate both pre­
political understandings of the community as well as political ones. Moreover, in historical- 
empirical terms, 'civic* nations have had to seek recourse in cultural-linguistic boundaries in order to 
render feasible of an essentially universalisée liberal project (see Wagner 1994 and 2001).
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traditions) and romantic progressivism (with an emphasis on the national mission, 
revolutionism and militantism) can be detected Revolutionary Liberal forces 
increasingly dominated the national struggle, especially with the emergence of the 
'young generation' at the end of the 1830s, which culminated in the (failed) revolutions 
of 1848 (see Vitcu 1997: 167). From the 1850s onwards, a more cautious and 
evolutionist vision took the upperhand (cf. Zub 1981). After the realisation of 
independence and the establishment o f a sovereign state in 1859, the Liberal Party 
pursued its Liberal political program of modernisation as a ’doctrine of government' 
(Platon 1985), but never abandoned its primary preoccupation with national sovereignty 
and self-determination.
Crisis narrative o f  the Liberal project
The crisis narrative advanced by the national movement and in particular by the Liberal 
nationalists had its roots in Western understandings (mainly French and German) of 
modem society. From the liberal and romanticist currents o f thought, two main concepts 
were derived which constituted the main components of the programme of 
modernisation. First, from Western liberalism and the French revolutionary programme 
the principle of national self-determination was taken, i.e. the natural right of 
nationalities to rid themselves of oppression through revolutionary upheaval. The triple 
motto o f the French Revolution was adopted in 'accordance with its "horizon of 
expectations"’, which meant that liberty was predominantly interpreted as national 
liberty (Zub 2000: 52, 1979; cf. Platon 1985: 70). Secondly, the Liberal perception of 
national independence found inspiration in the romantic, Herderian conception of the 
nation, i.e., as ultimately unique, with its own distinct language, culture and history (cf. 
Brown 1982: 283; Zub 1981: 121-2). Here, the nationalists also built on the national 
humanist tradition in which a cultural-linguistic conception o f the nation had emerged.
In order to evaluate the reception and promotion of Western liberal, romanticist and 
revolutionary ideas in the early nineteenth century, one needs to refer to the impact of 
the Enlightenment and humanism firstly on cultural, and later on political writers in the 
Romanian Principalities in the preceding centuries. Many o f the priorities that emerged 
in the nineteenth century political project of modernisation found their origins in claims
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that had been made earlier by native political writers. In reaction to the Phanariot 
regime, political writers from the native Romanian nobility engaged in the 
denouncement of its imposed nature. In this, these political voices drew nearer to 
enlightened Europe, and introduced new ways of perceiving socio-political 
circumstances, history and historiography (Dutu 1981: 100). The arguments they 
developed contained important elements that were reproduced in the modernisation 
discourse of the nineteenth century.
In essence, two claims - one historical and one political - were raised by these 
political writers against the regime that was experienced as an illegitimate infringement 
of local autonomy. Firstly, the historical argument was made claiming historical rights 
on the basis of the continuity of the Romanian presence in the territory of Wallachia and 
Moldavia. New trends in Southern European historiography had resulted in the 
replacement of historical writing in the form of chronicles o f events with an ethno- 
genealogical analysis of the origins o f peoples. In the case of the Romanians, their 
origins were ’discovered’ in the Roman conquest of Dacia in the 2nd and 3rd centuries 
(Dupi 1981: 132; Kellog 1990; Stoicescu 1986). Based on this argument of common 
origins and historical continuity, two additional claims were made. First of all, the 
political writers claimed the cultural belonging of the Romanians to Western European 
civilisation, which was, in turn, counterposed with the oriental culture. The latter was 
portrayed as imposed by the Phanariot regime and the Ottoman empire and was 
therefore not indigenous, as Romanian culture was historically based on Latinity (cf. 
Georgescu 1971: 40). Political writers thus also constructed the cultural unity of the 
Romanian lands - as their cultures, ethnic origins, and history were the same - which, 
when politicised, could justify political unification. In other words, the political writers 
represented Romania' or Dacia’ as a national individuality in need of emancipation.
Secondly, the political claim was made for the independence of the Romanian 
Principalities on the basis of the political rights it had enjoyed before the Phanariot 
regime. Here, the restoration of limited local autonomy that allegedly had existed before 
1711 was referred to, the writers being in favour of political independence and local 
self-rule. Ideas of national emancipation and historical rights were initially carried by 
political writers from the Romanian upper nobility or the higher clergy. By the end of 
the eighteenth century, the self-assertion of lower ranks of the nobility as well as some
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bourgeois writers became more explicit (Georgescu 1971: 52-3). In contrast to the 
higher social classes, the lower added a social claim to the reformist ones, thereby 
introducing the social question, i.e. referring to the social predicament of the common 
people. The emancipation o f the people meant not only the emancipation of the nation, 
but also the emancipation of the peasantry from the exploitation in feudalism (Duju 
1981:103).
The nationalist movement pointed in its critique of the existing political and social 
order at two elements deemed illegitimate: the impediment of the natural course or 
progress of history by the oppression by the Ottoman empire, and the denial of natural 
and historical rights of self-rule of the Romanian principalities. The natural course of 
history implied the return of the Romanian nation to the European ’family of nations’ 
(with which it was connected through the Latin basis of Romanian culture), unaffected 
by the oriental, Byzantine sphere of influence. The idea o f  Europe as a more advanced, 
progressive civilisation and stable order was sharply confronted with the stagnation, 
primitiveness and disorder of the Ottoman empire (Georgescu 1971: 41-2, 88; Marino 
1995: 157-190). In addition, the natural place of the Romania Principalities in Western 
civilisation could be realised as soon as the original right to self-rule was regained, as it 
had existed prior to the Phanariot regime.
In sum, the nationalist movement pleaded for the restoration of an earlier existing 
situation. Only such a ‘restitutio’ would permit a cultural and political revival which 
was understood as a prerequisite for the full emancipation o f the Romanian nation (Zub 
2000: 55). Such 'discursive weapons' provided justifications for the project of 
modernisation and empowered the native élites in their struggle for national autonomy. 
The main contrast with Western liberalism that significantly influenced the overall 
pattern of modernisation was the fact that the Romanian national movement justified a 
new order predominantly on the basis of the natural and historical rights of the 
Romanian nation/collective to self-rule. The right to collective freedom took thus 
precedence over individual rights, such as socio-political equality (cf. George 1998: 47; 
Platon 1985: 72). In other words, the dominant issue in Romanian national Liberalism 
regarded the shift from Ottoman suzerainty to national sovereignty, rather than from 
absolutist rule to popular sovereignty.
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The Romanian interpretation o f  national Liberalism: commonality and difference 
Romanian Liberalism was in essence a synthesis of Western liberalism and romanticist 
nationalism, adapted to the circumstances of nation and state-building in the Romanian 
Principalities. In order to place in relief significant differences with Western liberalism- 
in the form of a different hierarchy o f values and priorities -  and underline romanticist 
tendencies I will again use the conceptual map as introduced in chapter 3. I will deal 
with cultural-political inspiration, political foundations, and those of the socio-political 
order in Romanian national Liberalism.
1. Cultural-political inspiration. The modernisation programme of the Romanian 
Liberals contained a dual logic in its cultural orientation as it comprised both a strong 
element of emulationism or mimetism (of socio-political institutions and ideas as 
developed in Western Europe), and therefore the partial acceptance of the universal 
validity of Western models, yet simultaneously embodied a form of particularism or 
essentialism. Modernity as introduced in the Romanian Principalities ultimately resulted 
in a persistent tension between the preservation of the particular and the traditional or 
historical on the one hand, and the universal and the desire for synchronism with other 
cultures on the other.132 The critique of the Liberal project that emerged in the second 
half of the nineteenth century stemmed predominantly from a more radical particularist 
interpretation of modernisation (see chapter 4). The Liberals themselves promoted a 
moderate view that combined a positive stance towards Western modernity and its 
institutions, and at the same incorporated the idea that the polity thus created needed to 
represent the 'national genius', the historically evolved particularity or individuality. In 
their main intellectual activity, the gathering and narration of national history, the 
Liberal revolutionaries attempted to firmly establish the Romanian nationality and to 
narrate the ethno-genesis of the Romanian people. In other words, they tried to create a 
strong foundation for collective autonomy. At the same time, this 'invented' national
132 Cf. Zub 1981: 91. It is worth repeating here Kaya’s observation in the context of Turkish 
modernity (see also chapter 3, fh 4 4 ) : .  the view of modernity as a universal civilization created a 
contradiction within Kemalism, that of autonomy versus universality; the latter would assimilate the 
former if it was achieved’ (2004: 46). The understanding of autonomy as the ability to set one’s own 
rules, based on one's own relation to the world, is always in potential tension with an understanding 
of society as based on universal values, valid in any temporal and spatial context.
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culture needed to be worthy of integration into the European or universal culture (see 
Corbea 1978: 184; Zub 1981: 91-98). Thus, the creation of an exclusive national culture 
was not interpreted as the need to detach Romania from Western or world culture, or the 
need of an isolationist position, but was deemed instead a process that was firmly tied 
the progress o f humanity. A clear example of this dual attitude towards modernisation 
was the work of one of the main Liberal protagonists, Mihail Kogalniceanu. Although 
he acknowledged emulation of the West as imperative if Romania was to become 
modem and civilised, the transformation of Romanian society should be coterminous 
with its own national traditions and culture.133 Kogalniceanu argued for evolutionary, 
organicist reforms which would lead to the adoption of essential elements of civilisation 
(equality, education, legal rules), whereas it simultaneously allowed the national culture 
(‘national specificity’) to improve and form the foundation of the modem national state. 
The essence was national history: ‘history is the measure or the meter by which you 
may find out if a nation makes progress or goes backwards” (cited in: Schifirnet 1991: 
108; cf. Zub 1981:251-2).
2. Political foundations. As most historiographic sources attest, the dominant locus of 
nineteenth century Romanian modernisation was national self-determination. In contrast 
to Western liberalism, where the primary objective was to liberate the individual from 
the constraints of despotism and the political interference o f religion, the Romanian 
Liberals adapted the narrative of liberation to their own historical conditions. Whereas 
in Western Europe one could speak o f  the pursuit o f negative liberty for the individual, 
in the Romanian case negative liberty became, mutatis mutandis, predominantly an
133 Kogalniceanu remarked: ‘Romanians by their geographic, political, moral, ethnographic position 
have a greater duty than any other nation not to remain estranged from everything that this century’s 
glory and power is creating. Slight and weak, they cannot be great and powerful but through 
civilization, that is through their country’s intellectual and moral improvement’ (cited in: SchifimeJ 
1991: 105). Simultaneously, he argued that ‘a fundamental law of the country must be an 
indigenous plant, an expression of the country’s customs and deeds, but because the nation’s laws 
have been severed from the past and are no longer based upon the old laws that guarded our 
nationality, we would want to go back to those institutions whose origin is in our land and whom, 
having had with us for five centuries, we do not wish to adapt to this epoch’s progress and efforts’ 
(idem., 107).
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aspiration for the liberation of the collective from external constraints.134 Self- 
determination for the collective logically had to precede the question of political rights 
for individual members of the polity, as one first needed to define the boundaries of the 
polity in order to claim the right to set one’s own rules.135
At the same time, the collective for which negative liberty was claimed was not 
understood as a purely political collective, but as a collectivity based on substantive 
elements: a common history, territory, and cultural and linguistic homogeneity. A 
romanticist notion of the collective, i.e., as a distinct historical and cultural entity, which 
needed to be preserved, was highly present in the programme for modernisation. The 
claim for independence was not merely made in the name of a political entity, 
consisting of an aggregation of individuals living on a specific territory (the people); the 
people here consisted of a specific social group, that shared particular cultural traits (the 
Daco-Romanian culture) and it was in the name o f  the preservation of this specificity 
that emancipation was claimed. Therefore, the modernising programme of the national 
movement not only contained strong claims for political liberation in the form of 
independence, but also for the unification of the Romanian people in one nation-state 
which could ensure the continuity of Romanian history and culture.136
134 Liberalism in Romania was less the outcome of an internal theoretical debate on the desirable 
form of a future society than the result of the adoption by political élites of a Western doctrine for 
the specific purpose of the realisation of national self-determination, thus for purposes of political 
action (George 1998:45).
135 That the leaders of the national, revolutionary movement saw this clearly is for instance attested 
by the observation of Nicolae Bâlcescu, one of the most important protagonists of the 1848 
revolutions: T o  my mind, the problem of nationality comes before that of liberty... Liberty can be 
easily obtained once lost, but not nationality1 (in: Prodan 1971: 375). '[Liberty within the country] 
cannot be achieved unless there is liberty from without, freedom from foreign rule’ (in: Paçcu 1977: 
44).
136 The preoccupation with the origins or ethno-genesis of the Romanian people and the 
establishment of a homogeneous culture is exemplified by the great activity in the fields of history 
and philology, carried out by prominent members of the national movement, such as Mihail 
Kogàlniceanu and Nicolae Bâlcescu (Zub 1981). The former expressed the primary importance of a 
national history in his inaugural speech at the Mihâileanâ Academy in Iaçi, 1843: '... The necessity 
for the history of our fatherland is undisputed for the protection of our rights against foreign nations. 
Not having a history, every hostile nation can say to us... "Your beginning is unknown, the name
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3. Socio-political practices. The primary foci of the Romanian political and cultural 
programme o f modernisation - independence and unification - determined the way in 
which the modernising élites confronted the question of the reconstruction of the socio­
political order. The programme hinged on a dual logic as it was based on a strong 
rupture with the past as embodied by the legal formalism and constitutionalism found in 
the West, but at the same time regarded continuity with the past as its main objective. 
The Romanian Liberals promulgated the idea, as it had emerged in the West, that the 
best way to found a stable and just political order was by means of its codification in 
law and its institutionalisation in formal, impersonal structures. A polity based on 
constitutional rule, the limitation o f political power, and a social contract was deemed to 
further the common good, whereas political rule based on tyranny and despotism would 
induce arbitrariness and corruption (Georgescu 1971: 104-5). The importation of these 
institutions was nevertheless primarily valued from the point of view o f self-rule rather 
than for internal reasons o f reform, i.e., the introduction of representative institutions 
and wide-scale socio-economic reforms.137 The thrust of the majority o f political 
arguments made in the early 19th century was the restoration of local princely rule, and 
the international acknowledgement o f the constitutional independence o f the Romanian 
state, freed from Ottoman suzerainty and Russian tutelage. The political representation 
of the population and the extension of political and social rights were much less 
prominent and often considered dangerous to the stability of the polity. Arguments for 
the establishment of political autonomy and the reform of political rule concentrated on 
autonomy for the local boyar classes. It was only in the early 20th century that the 
extension of political rights to the entire (male) population became part of the official 
Liberal programme.
One curtailment of Liberalism was therefore formed by the boundaries set on the full 
rights and participation of the major part of the Romanian population because o f fear of 
unrest and disorder (these boundaries were equally present in the ‘sectarian liberalisms’
which you bear is not yours, neither is the land which you live o n ..." ' (cited in: Treptow 1997: 
241).
137 Here, the fact that the Liberal movement was dominated by the nobility whereas the bourgeoisie 
constituted a negligible social force during most of the nineteenth century may well have played an 
important part
1 7 0
L ib e r a l is m  a n d  r o m a n t ic is m
of Western Europe, cf. Brown 1982). A further restriction in the potentially universal 
scope of liberalism was the essentially ethnic definition of citizenship. If classical 
liberalism promulgated a vision of the individual which was essentially stripped from 
all substantive characteristics other than natural rights, the Romanian Liberals 
understood citizenship in a predominantly ‘thick’, ethnic sense, tying the rights and 
obligations that resulted from citizenship to the status of nativeness (cf. Georgescu 
1971: 174-5). This meant that the Romanian Liberals explicitly understood substantive 
values to be the basis of the political order. The state needed to set clear boundaries 
between those that belonged to the polity (ethnic Romanians) and those that did not. It 
needed above all to protect the nation and stimulate political, economic and cultural 
development in its name. The main object of modernisation was ultimately the nation as 
a collective, instead of the individual o f classical Western liberalism. The state, in turn, 
was the expression of this collective in its role as defender o f the national interest and as 
the main instrument of socio-economic modernisation (see chapter 4). The latter was in 
strong contrast with the formal relegation of socio-economic functions to the sphere of 
civil society as found in classical liberalism (cf. Platon 1985: 78).
Legitimation o f  the Liberal project
The Liberal project was underpinned by various modes of legitimation, the principle 
mode being 'derived' legitimation, based on the embodiment of progress as 
conceptualised in the European civilisational model and socio-political institutions. 
Through reference to the modem nature of European societies, the Liberals exposed 
imperfect elements in Romanian society (the lack of an advanced, authentic Romanian 
culture, the absence of self-rule, Byzantine traditions) invoking an inferiority complex 
in respect to Western Europe. In this manner, everything non-European came to be 
associated with retrogradation, the impediment of progress, and as against the national 
interest (Marino 1995: 163). The West-European political form, the nation-state, was 
invoked as the only solution that could raise the Romanian people to a higher cultural 
plane. The derived nature of this mode of legitimation necessitated the relegitimation of 
the Western model in the Romanian context. This could, partially, be achieved by 
referring to formal rationality as a superior principle for arranging society. Only 
partially, however, because Western universalism itself posed a threat towards national
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peculiarities. Kogalniceanu, for instance, clearly understood that blind imitationism 
involved the steady erosion of national forms (cf. Schifimet 1991: 106). Relegitimation 
therefore required supplementary modes of legitimation, related to the local context. 
The most significant of these modes was provided by traditional legitimation. The 
Liberals historically justified their condemnation of foreign domination o f the 
Romanian lands by referring to the Romanian continuity in this geographical space. One 
source of common Romanian origins was found in Latin origins, both in terms of 
cultural and linguistic elements. In this way, one could defend both political unification 
as well as point to a common heritage with Western Europe, as Romania was an 'island 
of Latinity in a Slav sea' (an identity rediscovered by the Transylvanian Latinist School 
in the 18th century) (Boia 2001: 34-5; Georgescu 1971: 171-2). Furthermore, the 
common origins of the Romanian people could be traced back beyond Roman times by 
claiming descent from the native Dacians, by which the Romanians could claim an 
uninterrupted presence in the Romanian lands for about two millennia (Georgescu 1971: 
172). Traditional legitimacy was not only invoked by the claim to historical continuity, 
but also by the historical right to which the Romanians pretended in terms of 
independence, as the principalities had been relatively autonomous prior to the 
increasing subordination to the Ottoman empire in the 18th century (Pascu 1977: 30). 
The explicit nationalist foundation o f the political order comprised both a form of 
traditional legitimacy, i.e., the nation-state would be built on age-old traditions and their 
conservation, and a form of goal-rationality. The latter consisted of legitimation on the 
basis of the embodiment o f an absolute value, which in the case of nationalism is the 
principle of popular representation. Through the claim of exclusive representation of the 
Romanian people, national Liberalism justified its rule and project as representative of 
the general will o f the people and of the ethnic nation. Both aspects stood in strong 
contrast with previous forms o f rule, which had represented foreign powers and 
particular interests.
A supplementary mode of legitimation that fortified the indigenous relevance of the 
project as well as the role of the Liberals was what may be called charismatic 
legitimation. The Liberals claimed a messianic role in identifying the goals and 
strategies of the project o f modernisation, as they were knowledgeable about Western 
rationalism and the liberal philosophy of progress. Partly, this could be understood as a
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main element of Enlightenment thinking, that put such a strong emphasis on reason and 
education, creating a large gap between 'enlightened* intellectuals' and the masses of the 
population (Prodan 1971: 287). The intellectuals and other ’enlightened’ political actors 
were then the only ones that could lead the way to a modem society.
7.4 The strategic-institutional programme of Liberalism
The critique on the ancien regime, the normative premises of the new order and their 
justifications contain the ‘superstructure* of the Liberal nationalist programme, but in 
themselves are not unequivocally related to distinct institutional counterparts which 
would make up such a new order. In other words, the normative premises as found in 
the Liberal discourse do not translate directly into strategic components for political 
action, but could potentially be translated into different institutional constellations. It is 
therefore warranted to look closer at how the Romanian Liberal nationalists perceived 
of their programme of modernisation in terms of actual institutional constellations. I 
will try to capture the Liberal-nationalist perceptions by using the conceptual scheme 
introduced in chapter 3, in which institutional-strategic ideas are divided in ideas 
relating to societal progress; national self-determination; and political representation 
and control.
1. Societal progress. As long as the Liberal offensive retained a subversive character, 
the language of the various proclamations, memoranda, and draft constitutions 
predominantly dealt with the issues of unification, national independence and forms of 
native rule. The liberal-minded élites did include claims for social equality and the 
abolishment of privileges in their programmes from the beginnings of the nineteenth 
century onwards, but these remained secondary to the goal of national independence 
and unification. Social critique was mainly directed against the parasitical nature of the 
upper landowning classes. This critique referred not only to their exploitation of the 
landed masses, but also to their own unproductive nature and obstruction of the 
emancipation o f the trading and merchant classes (Georgescu 1971: 98-9, 102). The 
abolishment of the privileges of the nobility and the acknowledgement of the rights and
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social functions of the industrious classes constituted the initial components of a (still 
immature) programme for socio-economic change.
The political programmes for socio-economic change were articulated more 
explicitly after the unification of 1859, and in particular after 1866, when the two major 
political parties were formed (cf. Iacob 1995; Platon 1985). The nature, rhythm, and 
scope of socio-economic change became the object of debates between the newly 
formed Liberal and Conservative Parties. These debates were not merely important for 
eventual political action (in terms o f the reconstruction of domestic political and socio­
economic institutions) by one o f the various post-independence governments. The 
standpoints taken in these debates also evolved around understandings o f how to 
substantively realise the main political objective, national autonomy. After the 
realisation of formal independence, the preoccupations and aspirations of the political 
actors turned inwards. In this, the continuing hiérarchisation of political and social 
objectives in the modernising programmes of the Liberals as well as in those of then- 
adversaries became clear. The Liberal programme clearly advocated the emulation of 
Western liberal industrialism, but, at the same time, adapted the Western liberal 
programme to the Romanian context. The Liberal programme aimed above all for 
national economic independence, and therefore foresaw an active stimulation o f the 
national bourgeoisie, the protection and stimulation of national industry, and the 
minimalisation of foreign influence in domestic industry (Brown 1982: 282; Iacob 
1995: 231; see also Saizu 1985: 174-9). In this, the Liberal understanding of political 
economy clearly demonstrated a strong affinity with Listian arguments for 
protectionism and ’infant-industry' based state interference. Free-trade doctrines were 
not however rejected on a normative basis, but were deemed unsuitable for the 
contemporary situation in Romania (Antonescu 1915: 55-6).
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, protectionism as an ideology of 
modernisation was perhaps most convincingly articulated by two economists, who 
nevertheless diverged on its precise significance in the Romanian context: the liberal 
economist Petre Aurelian, who advocated a policy of protectionism towards home 
industry and handicrafts, and his most important intellectual adversary A.D. Xenopol 
(close to the conservative Junimea society, but a self-defined liberal economist), who 
favoured the protection and stimulation of larger industry (Hitchins 1994: 85-9; Montias
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1978: 59-60). Despite divergent opinions on whether to skip developmental stages or to 
start at the bottom, both agreed on an essentially determinist and singular reading of the 
history of modem society, i.e. socio-economic change and development required the 
emulation of the Western pattern. The most important synthesis of the Liberal 
perception was formulated in the 1920s, when the economist Çtefan Zeletin defended an 
interfering and dirigiste role for the state class ('the bourgeois oligarchy') (Zeletin 1925; 
see also Chirot 1978b). His 'neoliberalism* in reality signified the suspension of 
liberalism's emancipatory objectives (democracy, social equality) in order to arrive at its 
material, and especially its political aims.
2. Collective self-determination. The political struggle of the modernising élites 
centred around one dominant objective: the political independence of the Romanian 
Principalities or the realisation o f national self-determination. In anticipation (and 
preparation) of its realisation, the aspirations expressed in political discourse referred 
predominantly to collective autonomy (external sovereignty) and self-rule. The 
aspiration for negative liberty on the level of the collectivity was expressed in the wish 
to rid the Romanian Principalities of the Phanariot regime, and of other forms of 
interference in local affairs. In this, the nineteenth century modernisers built on ideas 
passed to them by earlier generations. Political independence was justified by means of 
the political rights the Romanian Principalities had enjoyed under Ottoman suzerainty 
before the Phanariot regime, in other words, for a restoration of an earlier existing 
international status. This prior existing autonomy was emphasised in the so-called 
'theory of capitulations', which stated that the Romanians had subjected themselves 
voluntarily to Ottoman suzerainty for reasons of military security (Georgescu 1971: 
153-4). The theory served the purpose of reclaiming older rights and as an accusation 
of the Greek Phanariot regime for violating the country’s historically formed political 
rights (Prodan 1971: 352). The call for independence implied the demand for local self- 
rule, which in the early nineteenth century was mostly understood as a restoration o f the 
rule of the native upper nobility. From the 1820s onwards, however, this 'traditionalist'
133 This 'theory of capitulations' was even taken up in the Convention of Paris 1858, in which the 
relation between the Principalities and the Ottoman empire was settled. The 'capitulations' referred 
back to treaties concluded between the Principalities and the Ottoman empire in the 14th, 15th, and 
16th centuries (Antonescu 1915: 35-6, fn 4).
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claim was increasingly challenged by the liberal-minded modernising élites. 
Nevertheless, the call for boundary-setting in the realisation of self-rule was shared by 
both factions. Thus, in this shared vision, native self-rule implied the management of 
one's own affairs, but also the impediment and exclusion of others - non-natives within 
the polity - from exercising these rights. Therefore, political programmes often included 
claims against rights and privileges for foreigners, in particular the Greeks.139
The national question was not understood as the simple right to self-rule o f the 
existing political units, it was also expressed in terms of national unification and the 
restoration of Daco-Romania. Therefore, the corollary of independence as negative 
collective freedom was recognised in the realisation of ’a free and independent 
fatherland for all the scattered members of their nation’ (as in the declaration of the 
national movement of 1838, Act de unire $i independents (Act of union and 
independence), in: Bodea 1970: 46). The revolutionary struggle took as its guiding 
principle the idea of Dacia' or Daco-Romania', to be realised in the future in the form 
of a nation-state comprising all those of the Romanian ethnicity. In this way, not only 
was a cultural programme of the nation promoted (as had been the case with earlier 
generations), but also a political programme of national unification, in which the nation 
begot a 'historic mission' and expressed the 'genius and spirit' o f the people (Dutu 1981: 
164; cf. Zub 1981). Unity thus signified political emancipation, and was seen as the 
only viable way in which the Romanians could achieve real political independence140
3. Political representation and control. The national question in itself largely 
consisted of external constraints towards national autonomy. It regarded the relationship 
of a self-defined nation (an ’imagined community') with the international environment. 
However, any (temporary) solution of the national question tends to bring into focus the 
internal sphere. When sovereignty is transferred from foreign hands to native ones, the 
question arises of how and by whom internal rule is to be executed. This political
139 See for example the title of one of the political programs of the 1820s: Indreptarea tarii (dupd 
cele) ce a pdtimit tar a a la 1821, de la strdini (Recovery of the country (after all) it endured in 1821 
on part of the foreigners) (Prodan 1971: 353).
140 The Act de unire §i independents of 1838 included the pragmatic argument that ’with a divided 
territory and scattered as they were it would be impossible for the Romanians to oppose single- 
handed the powerful empires which surrounded them’ (Bodea 1970: 46).
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question - of political form, control, and representation - therefore constitutes a vital 
element in any political project for the reconstruction of society on the basis of self-rule. 
At the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, native rule was mostly 
understood as entailing the rule of either a native prince or the native nobility. The first 
of these pointed to enlightened absolutism or constitutional monarchy (counter-posed to 
the 'social anarchy' of democracy and the oligarchic tendencies of aristocratic rule, 
Georgescu 1971: 104-7), whereas the second was the claim o f the upper nobility to 
political rule, and contained elements o f traditional rule (continuity in the privileges of 
the higher strata) as well as forms o f constitutionalism and the rule of law. The latter 
was, for example, articulated in the concept of the 'aristocratic republic', promulgated in 
the early nineteenth century (see Georgescu 1971: 112-3; Prodan 1971: 349), and 
repeated in other statements o f the upper nobility. Such limited conceptions of reform 
were however increasingly criticised, in particular in the period between the 
establishment of formal native rule in 1822 and the promulgation of the Organic 
Regulations. The more moderate forms o f critique argued against an overly restricted 
understanding of the upper classes eligible for political rule and therefore favoured an 
opening of public office to lower ranks. In this, they touched upon the question of 
political rule but avoided that o f (popular) representation. Claims for access to political 
power were mostly made in concomitance with arguments in favour restricting the 
legislative and executive rights of ruling princes, by means of legalism, constitutional 
rule and the division of power among various institutions. Political rule was however to 
be restricted to an eligible élite, as political rights were to be granted on the basis of 
social criteria, and in more radical cases on the basis o f economic criteria141 (Georgescu 
1971:117).
141 The ’free people', which the political institutions were to represent, were perceived as those with 
a certain amount of property. The extension of the political elites went only so far as to include the 
second and third ranks of the landowning nobility, and the political institutions only represented 
these social strata (as in the ’Constitution of the Càrvunari' (carbonari) of 1822, mentioned in: 
Prodan 1971: 354-6).
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The question of political representation was however placed on the agenda by some 
parts of the lower nobility, who, from the early 1820s142 onwards, began to introduce 
more radical concepts into their political programmes. They referred to popular 
sovereignty and enlarged political representation, arguing for the opening up of the 
political nation to the dependent, non-propertied strata (see Prodan 1971: 356-67). Such 
ideas of popular sovereignty emerged most visibly with the increased political assertion 
of the generation that would dominate the Liberal, revolutionary movement from the 
end o f the 1830s onwards (the period in which a division took place within the partida 
nationalà between reformist and revolutionary forces, cf. Bodea 1970: 40, 57, 96; 
Platon 1985: 72).143 Equality and extended political rights formed an integral part of the 
revolutionary programmes of 1848 (cf. Constantinescu and Pascu 1971; Seton-Watson 
1934: 229), although emancipatory ideas were always regarded as of secondary 
importance in relation to the main objective of national liberation.144 After the main goal 
of the modernising forces was fulfilled - the formation of an independent nation-state - 
the questions o f political representation and the extension o f political rights came to the 
fore in the political debates between the Liberals and the Conservatives. Whereas the 
Liberals in general promulgated the need for the stimulation o f participation in political 
life and extension of the franchise, the Conservatives adhered to an 'élite theory', i.e., the 
limitation of participation in public life to the upper classes (Iacob 1995: 233, 237). 
These conflicts continued within the overall framework o f the constitutional monarchy, 
which was in itself a compromise between the Liberals and the Conservatives.
142 It is indeed in the early 1820s that the significant popular uprising of Tudor Vladimirescu took 
place, under invocation of social and political rights for the people.
143 The older generation within the National Party was considered defeatist by the younger 
generation, as it was not ready to pursue revolutionary objectives, but adhered to reformist goals 
(Bodea 1970: 40).
144 As one of the most important revolutionary leaders, Nicolae BSIcescu, pronounced in 1848: 'To 
my mind, the problem of nationality becomes before that of liberty... Liberty can be easily obtained 
once it is lost, but not nationality'. And later, in 1850: ’It is only when the holy war rids the nation 
from the pressure of foreigners and returns to it its liberty and unity, that the people’s assembly, the 
Constituent Assembly will be able to carry out unhampered all the political and social reforms it 
requires and set up the domination of democracy, the domination of the people by the people* (cited 
in: Prodan 1971: 375, italics in original).
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Interlude: Romanian Liberalism and its discontents
The two major ideological strands that crystallised in the middle of the nineteenth 
century are often placed opposite one another. The liberal strand is identified with the 
revolutionary 1848 movement (pa$opti$ti) and progressive and Europeanist ideas, 
whereas the conservative strand (and its traditionalist offspring) is purported to embody 
the old feudal landowning nobility, and retrograde and traditionalist ideas (see, for 
instance, Bodea 1970; Deletant 1998; Georgescu 1971; Hitchins 1994; Zeletin 1925). 
Whereas particular elements o f the two political visions and actions justify such an 
identification, at the same time one can notice an ideological consensus on the main 
priority in the nineteenth modernisation project, political unity and independence. I 
want to suggest that the strands of 'modernism' and 'traditionalism' did not constitute an 
antinomy of modem and anti-modem or reactionary visions, but entailed different 
readings - and therefore ultimately different assimilations - o f the Western modem 
experience.
It was indeed the liberal interpretation that provided the central point of reference of 
Romania's experience with modernity in the nineteenth century. As such, liberalism set 
the tone of what modernity was about and which of its elements were relevant for the 
Romanian situation. The liberal interpretation could be understood as a form of 
'particularisation of the universal'145 in that it promoted the assimilation of universal 
patterns of modernisation, but adapted and subordinated them to the objective of 
collective self-determination and integration. The significance of this 'particularisation 
of the universal' in Romanian modernisation is notable for the fact that emerging 
critiques of the liberal interpretation did not criticise particularist aspects (self- 
determination), but rather emulationist ones (assimilation o f universal patterns). The 
liberal argument that to consolidate collective autonomy Western patterns of 
modernisation needed to be accommodated in the Romanian context were refuted by 
critical strands of thought that challenged the universal validity of Western patterns of 
modernisation as such and re-evaluated and recast endemic traditions into indigenous 
modes of modernisation. In this, the critical strands always referred to the liberal
145 On this concept, see Robertson 1992.
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understanding and more often than not produced a diametrically opposed vision of 
modernity, without however fundamentally criticising the need for collective autonomy.
The severe critique of the Liberal political and cultural programme of modernisation 
was initiated by the so-called Junimea society, a cultural society founded in Ia$i in 
1863. It was here that the most critical and influential objections to the Liberal project 
were formulated. Within the cultural framework constituted by the members of 
Junimea, which represented more o f a critical spirit than a well-defined programme 
(Zub 1985: 113-4), the Liberal project - and the Westernising current as a whole - was 
rejected for its 'emulationism'. Liberalism was reproached for its hasty and uncritical 
adoption of models, institutions and ideas that had been formulated elsewhere and in a 
radically different context (the Junimists especially criticised the adoption of the 
intellectual heritage of revolutionary France).146 The theoretical underpinning o f the 
critique was provided by Titu Maiorescu, the leading personality in Junimea, by means 
of the thesis of 'formele fSra fond', meaning forms without substance.147 This thesis 
highlighted the discrepancy between the extremely rapid adoption of a superstructure of 
Western, bourgeois 'forms' o f civilisation on the foundations of a late feudal society 
(Marino 1995: 191; Omea 1996: 54). Maiorescu reproached the 1848-generation for 
their uncritical, superficial and mechanical adoption of Western structures and ideas, 
which, according to him, formed an antinomy within the Romanian context. Whereas 
Western ideas and institutions had been formulated by an ascending bourgeoisie and 
reflected a situation of rising social forces in a changing society, in Romania such 
phenomena had been largely absent. The generation of 1848 had therefore imported 
'forms' from the West which it did not fully grasp, and which had no real significance 
within a society that was of a largely rural nature. In other words, the Liberals had only 
imported the superficial aspects they could perceive, without being aware of their deep
146 As Adrian Marino has pointed out, the Junimist critique consisted of a generalisation of critical 
ideas that already existed in Romanian society and which, moreover, had a strong affinity with 
European post-revolutionary thinking in general (Marino 1995: 191-8).
147 This idea was first articulated in Maiorescu’s article 'in contra direc(iei de ast3zi in cultura 
roman5' (Against today’s direction of Romanian culture), published in 1868 in Junimea's literary 
journal Convorbirii Literare,
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historical roots and without which they could not really exist (Stahl 2002). The 
implications of such a critique on the Liberal project of modernisation were far- 
reaching. Whereas the Liberal conception of modernisation only acknowledged a 
singular pathway for Romanian society to follow, i.e., the modem Western model, the 
Junimists re-evaluated local traditional culture. Here they pleaded for an evolutionary 
model of social change148 to replace the Liberal models’ revolutionary, voluntaristic 
tendencies (as demonstrated not only in the revolutions of 1848, but also in the Liberals' 
aspiration to drastically reconstruct Romanian society). In other words, the Junimist 
critique emphasised the priority of organic development, in which national institutions 
and culture could develop in a natural way. Revolutionary upheavals would only disrupt 
this natural course and introduce anomalies in the development of society. Instead of 
emulating foreign structures, one needed to build on natively accumulated experience. 
The Junimists thus underlined cultural specificity and originality, against the explicit 
imitational tendencies of the Liberals (Corbea 1985: 104).
It is not the purpose here to elaborate on the nuances and divergence in opinion and 
approach that could be found in the highly diverse Junimist circle. What is of 
importance in the discussion of Romanian patterns and interpretations of modernisation 
is the critique of Liberal modernisation that was provided by the Junimists and the 
continuing importance of a conception of constructing modem society on the basis of 
traditional and local experience and culture. The Junimists essentialised a discourse of 
particularism or cultural exclusivism, in which the uncritical following of a model 
deemed universally valid was renounced in favour of local experience and creativity. In 
other words, the Junimists exposed the tension in Romanian culture between Western 
’forms' and autochthonous 'substance' (cf. Marino 1995: 69). In this, the Junimists did 
not reject the primary objective of the Liberals - the creation and sustenance of an 
independent nation-state - they disagreed on the means and the way in which these 
means should be implemented. The Junimist critique provided the basis for 
formulations of alternative conceptions of modernisation in Romania, which revaluated
148 The Junimists' thesis of'forms without substance' further rested on German organicist historicism 
and more specifically the historical school of law, which had articulated the idea of national 
specificity in legal principles against the universalistic principle of natural law, dominant in 
Enlightenment thought (Qmea 1996: 54-5).
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- to varying degrees - national traditions and social structures. The tenor of the 
Junimists' thesis, the tension created by the introduction o f Western ideas and structures, 
formed the starting point for currents of thought that equally criticised the Liberal 
project for not being in harmony with traditional Romanian society (cf. Cálinescu 1988: 
511; Hitchins 1994: 60). I will merely provide a cursory account of those critical 
currents here. One strand o f thought that criticised the introduction of industrialisation 
into Romania and 'unmasked* the Liberal élite as exploiting the peasant population for 
its own purposes was the so-called cultural current o f Sámánátorism (derived from 
sámanator, sower), centred around the literary review Samanatorul (Treptow 1996: 
198). Its most significant proponent was the historian Nicolae Iorga149, who pleaded for 
originality and the articulation of the national spirit, and therefore criticised cultural 
imports (Cálinescu 1988: 511; Daskalov: 1997: 164-165). In essence, the sámanátorists 
argued for the priority of cultural unity over political unity (Cálinescu 1988: 511). In 
their view, the political structures established by the Liberals were artificial and abstract 
importations. A nation's emancipation could only take place through its cultural 
constitution and, as Romania's traditions were essentially based on social life in the 
agricultural village, values that reflected such a form of social life should form the basis 
of an original culture (see Hitchins 1994: 67-71). A contemporary critical current was 
so-called Poporanism or populism, of which the most important spokesman was 
Constantin Stere. Also populism regarded rural life as authentic whereas urban life was 
deemed an imported, unnatural phenomenon. Stere perceived the small-scale peasant as 
the pinnacle of Romanian society and economy, a society that could be an alternative to 
Western capitalism and industry (Hitchins 1994). While the sámánátorists argued 
predominantly for a cultural and moral revival, the populists formulated a more 
substantial alternative to Western modernisation in that they pleaded for a 'rural 
democracy'. The populists sought political representation o f the peasantry, land reforms
149 Iorga, a prominent historian, was one of the central figures in the emerging critique of the 
heritage of the French Revolution. In a similar way as Maiorescu and the poet Mihai Eminescu, 
Iorga pleaded for a re-evaluation of tradition, the restoration of indigenous values and criticised 
excessive rationalism (Zub 2000: 85). He advocated organic evolutionism, condemning the French 
Revolution as a 'revolution of rationalism' and as being 'too abstract to lead to something useful' 
(Zub 2000: 87, 83-106).
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in order to improve the peasantry's socio-economic situation, and access to education 
for the masses (Hitchins 1994: 72).
For my purposes, it is less important to deal at great length with the specific nature 
and variations within the critical strands that emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. In relation to the dominant project of modernisation, these critiques did not 
constitute a political alternative at that moment in time. Nevertheless, as we will see in 
the following chapter, these critiques did provide the basis for more radical strands of 
essentialism, which would ultimately replace the dominant Liberal discourse.
1 8 3
1 8 4
Lv t e r w a r  F a s c is m
8. Interwar Fascism and Romanian anti-liberal discourse
8.1 The emergence of anti-liberal thought
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century witnessed the emergence of various 
strands of thought in which liberal modernity was assessed in a highly negative way 
(among others, cultural critique, nationalism, social Darwinism, fascism, and 
revolutionary syndicalism, see Bracher 1984). Instead of sharing the liberal optimism of 
comprehensive human progress, many thinkers questioned key tenets of liberalism as 
well as of Enlightenment thought in general. The rationality of the individual, the 
individualist assumption of the human being as a pre-social entity, and the harmonious 
and progressive nature of industrialisation and démocratisation were increasingly 
submitted to critical assessment. Rationality was perceived as at best only one aspect of 
human nature, whereas irrationalism, emotions and passion were regarded as not only 
more meaningful, but also as increasingly endangered by the diffusion of rationalism. In 
this, the natural social bonds between members of a community were deemed in a 
process of dissolution as a result of the encroachment of ‘modem society’ on ‘authentic’ 
life (cf. Herf 1984: 13; see also Bracher 1984: 16-38). Rather than understanding 
industrial society as the harbinger o f  human harmony and social well-being, it was 
understood by anti-liberal thinkers as weakening the social tissue and serving only 
particular interests in society. Similarly, democratic politics was deemed as inherently 
deficient in providing political authority, in service of private interests rather than the 
general good, and structurally incapable of dealing with conflicts of an irrational nature 
(S. Holmes 1993: 40).
In the postwar political context of radicalised antagonisms, deep disillusionment in 
liberalism and progress, and heightened revolutionary tensions the anti-liberal critiques 
gained new import. In this context, the anti-liberal currents of thought, that before the 
First World War had been of a mostly theoretical, intellectual nature, were further 
substantiated and adapted to political practice (Bracher 1984: 85). The liberal 
democratic society was portrayed as in a civilizational crisis, a crisis which totalitarian 
movements attempted to exploit. They strove for the mobilisation and organisation of
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the prior unorganised and non-politicised masses, with which they shared a 'negative 
solidarity' against bourgeois society (see Arendt 1951). Liberalism was without doubt 
the prime target of fascist theorists
such as Giovanni Gentile and Carl Schmitt, [who] violently assailed the liberal tradition. They 
excoriated liberalism for its atomistic individualism, its myth o f the presocial individual, its 
scanting of the organic, its indifference to community, its denial that man belongs to a larger 
whole, its belief in the primacy of rights, its flight from “the political,” its uncritical embrace of 
economic categories, its moral skepticism (or even nihilism), its decision to give abstract 
procedures and rules priority over substantive values and commitments, and its hypocritical 
reliance on the sham of judicial neutrality (S. Holmes 1993: xii).
Fascism promulgated a radical, alternative and new pattern of civilisation, against the 
background of liberal bourgeois society, a society deemed profoundly in crisis. Against 
the ‘Gesellschaft’ of liberalism, a reintegrated and socially united ‘Gemeinschaft* was 
posed; against the formal freedom based on individual natural rights, collective 
emancipation in the nation; against the lack of decisive authority of the democratic state 
the authoritarian leader; against rational contemplation the force of direct, spontaneous 
action; and against one-sided materialism, spiritual. Fascist ideology thus offered new 
solutions to those aspects o f liberal society that were deemed in crisis. Rather than 
promulgating an irrevocable return to the past, fascism offered a new and fuller form of 
freedom and a more authentic democracy organised by the all-powerful state (cf. A.J. 
Gregor, introduction to Gentile 2002). The dissolution of social bonds, by now accepted 
as inherent and inevitable in the creation of a modem, liberal society, was countered by 
the abolishment of intra-societal polarisation and the reunification of individuals in the 
nation. Below, I will deconstruct the alternative promulgated by fascism in terms of its 
general position on cultural inspiration; political foundations; and socio-political 
practices.
1. Cultural and political inspiration. The universalist categories introduced by 
fascism and national socialism, nation and race, were posed directly against the 
domination o f liberal individualism, and formed the basic categories or units of 
humanity in their world views. In this sense, both fascism and national socialism 
promulgated conceptions of social life that had potential implications beyond the 
specific context in which they originated, as both race and nation form concepts 
sufficiently abstract to be prone to reinterpretation or to coincide with traditions of
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thought elsewhere. Furthermore, universal validity was an explicit component of fascist 
programmes.150 So, while the fascist and national socialist movements promulgated an 
'extreme negation of the universalistic components of the cultural programme of 
modernity, especially the Enlightenment version' (Eisenstadt 1999: 112), they also 
professed a counter-vision, an alternative programme with its own universalistic 
pretensions of itself. Fascist ideology did not only provide a new theory o f society, in 
which the prime, allegedly natural elements were continuous struggle and elitism in the 
internal sphere, and externally the struggle between nations, it also posited a vision of a 
counter-civilisation, a 'fascist century’, or a ’new civilisation’. Fascism professed a new 
kind of society and a new type of man, and promised that the ’century of the individual’ 
would be replaced by the ’century of the collective and the state’ (Stemhell 1976: 337).
The collectivistic nature of fascism's primary concepts -  nation and race -  
constituted an alternative to the previously predominant individualism, which was 
deemed to undermine the traditional community through its unnatural egalitarianism 
and diversifying pluralism. In combination with a vision o f social life and the world as 
such as being constituted of the struggle of all against all (the radical opposite o f the 
belief in harmony present in liberalism), and a doctrine based on radical and 
revolutionary voluntarism, these categories could provide for or strengthen collectivistic 
conceptions of the reconstruction o f society. At the same time, these concepts could 
induce or re-inforce forms of particularism, as both nation and race could be given 
particularistic substance in local contexts.151 Thus the idea of ‘authentic’ culture as 
opposed to ‘materialist’ civilisation could find widespread approval, but at the same 
time induced exclusivist forms of particularism, in which the essential and traditional 
features of a specific society were placed above everything else.
130 As Stemhell mentions, Fascist leaders argued that the 'basic doctrinal postulates of fascist 
regimes' had a universal character and were thus essentially valid for humanity as a whole (Stemhell 
1976: 318).
131 Although in the case of the racial ideology of the national socialists this seemed excluded by the 
idea of exclusivity and superiority of the Aryan race, the representation of the Jew as the eternal 
enemy and the embodiment of all malign elements of Western modernity could and were easily 
adopted or reinforced in other fascist programs.
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2. Political foundations. Anti-liberal and fascist thought departed from the negation 
of the key postulate of liberalism, i.e., the rational individual as the basis of political and 
social life. The liberal conception o f freedom as the rationally acting individual 
unrestricted by religious o r political oppression and free to develop its individual 
qualities, was confronted with a collectivist conception of freedom, in which the 
individual was always already a social being. The revolt against liberal individualism 
therefore promulgated the emancipation o f the collectivity as a path to individual 
freedom. The emphasis on the community or collectivity led to the relativisation of 
the individual (Bracher 1984: 83). Society as such was perceived not as a mechanistic 
aggregate o f independent, rationally calculating individuals, but as an organic collective 
of socially behaving human beings (Gregor 2000: 166-7). Fascist views of society 
’accorded moral privilege to the collectivity, its traditions, and in particular its juridical 
embodiment in the state’ (Stemhell 1976: 345).15 *53 One could therefore say that in the 
fascist and national socialist ideologies the collective was reified, in that it existed 
distinctly from the individuals or citizens, and constituted an entity in its own right and 
with its own will. The singularity o f  this collectivity reflected a total social unity, what 
Lefort calls the PeopIe-as-One (Lefort 1986).
Coinciding with the collectivist interpretation of freedom inherent in the fascist 
programme was a positive understanding of freedom. Freedom was equated with the 
membership o f the individual in a collectivity or community. According to this vision, 
human freedom could not exist outside o f society, as it was the rules, customs, traditions 
and history o f  society itself that allowed the individual to be free.154 Only through self-
151 Dumont can therefore remark that ‘the rights of man thus amount to the rights of the superior
race’ (Dumont 1986: 167).
153 For Giovanni Gentile, one of the most important thinkers behind Italian fascism, ‘a serious 
liberty with important content could not [be] obtainfed] other than within the sound organism of the 
state, whose sovereignty would be the indestructible foundation of all its activities’ (Gentile 2002: 
7).
154 Thus Mussolini remarked: 'In the fascist conception of history, man is only man by virtue of the 
spiritual process to which he contributes as a member of the family, the social group, the nation, and 
in function of history to which all nations bring their contributions. Hence, the great value of 
tradition in records, in language, in customs, in the rules of social life. Outside history, man is a
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denial, a sense o f duty, discipline and sacrifice in the name of the community, and thus 
the dissolution of the individual in the community could man be free. This was one of 
the principle aspects of the new man that was to be generated by the fascist revolutions 
(cf. Mosse 1999: 34). The fascist understanding of the new man posed a reconciliation 
of spirit and nature, which had been divided in Enlightenment thought (cf. Payne 1980: 
11). The highly participatory character and mass mobilisation of fascist regimes were 
the political expression of this.
3. Socio-political practices. Anti-individualism coincided with the general reproach 
of formal-legal pluralism and 'negotiationism' inherent in liberal party politics and 
democratic systems. The procedural nature of democratic politics could not lead to its 
desired end, a prospering community, as it impeded social unity and promoted division 
and egoism. It was ‘the ethic of ultimate ends rather than the ethic of responsibility’ that 
was espoused as fascists did not consider politics as a matter of ‘give-and-take of 
interest groups and parliamentary conflict’, engaging 'in the difficult and frustrating 
business of balancing means and ends’, but as a means ‘to save their souls, find a new 
identity, or establish the authenticity of their commitment, or to re-establish a lost 
Gemeinschaft' (Herf 1984: 14, 27). Democracy was immanently incapable of 
representing the whole community or people. Liberal politics were exposed by both left 
and right as merely a facade for particular interests (see Furet 1999: 170).135
Fascism espoused a clear hierarchy of values to be established by and in an 
authoritative state. In this, fascism reproached the complete absence of values on the 
political level in pluralist liberalism, which ultimately relegated specific visions of a 
common good to the private sphere. Authoritarian and totalitarian thinking could 
counter such an absence by their clear adherence to absolute values, i.e. the promotion 
of race or class, embodied in a hierarchical, top-down organisation (Bracher 1984: 98- 
9). The more radical reactions against liberal modernity ‘placed blood, race and soul 15
non-entity. Fascism is therefore opposed to all individualistic abstractions based on eighteenth 
century materialism' (cited in: Stemhell 1976: 3*45).
155 As Hannah Arendt remarks: the liberals’ political philosophy, according to which the mere
sum of individual interests adds up to the miracle of the common good, appeared to be only a 
rationalization of the recklessness with which private interests were pressed regardless of the 
common good' (Arendt 1951: 336).
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beyond rational justification* (Herf 1984:13). The absolute values could be found in the 
‘mechanic solidarity' of the Gemeinschaft, which was preferred over the ‘organic* one 
of the Gesellschaft (cf. Lowy 1981). In other words, new society should be grounded in 
‘inspired’ culture instead of ‘soulless’ civilisation (the latter term was interpreted as 
inextricably bound up with liberal and ‘progressive’ understandings of society156).
The construction of the new order was thus explicitly grounded in substantive values. 
The main object as well as agent of the desired transformation was the state, perceived 
as the stato totalitario or totale Staat. This total state was the fullest embodiment -  
historical-empirically speaking - of what I have called a 'substantive-ideological state’. 
On the one hand, the total state was the embodiment of the unity of the nation and as 
such had to consist of a single body itself; the party system of democracy represented 
different interests and institutionalised conflict, whereas the totalitarian state directly 
represented the people and its singular 'general will'. In the latter sense, the totalitarian 
state claimed to incorporate a form of popular sovereignty, superior to the mediated, 
differentiated and incomplete popular sovereignty o f democracies (cf. Mosse 1999: 2). 
The leadership principle and singular party demonstrated the same logic, as both were 
deemed as the direct representation of the people.
On the other hand, the state was the active protector o f the unity of the people and its 
'Selbsterhaltung', and as such authorised to intervene in any conceivable societal sphere. 
Mussolini contended that outside the state 'no human or spiritual values can exist, much 
less have value' (in: Stemhell 1976: 356). In the totalitarian project, the differentiation 
between state and society as well as within society was - at least theoretically - 
completely dissolved in order 'to restore the mysterious irrational wholeness of man' 
(Arendt 1951: 336). The leader could be seen as both the embodiment o f unity but also 
as a necessary function in the hierarchical organisational model o f totalitarianism 
(Arendt 1951: 383, 387; cf. Lefort 1986: 288). The leadership function was not only 
dissolved in the larger community but also stood above it, in the sense that it was the 
leader who decided and organised and who mobilised the masses. The one could not do
156 Instead of taking the classical modernist meaning of civilisation as a culturally superior and 
advanced state of society, critiques often turned around the argument and emphasised not so much 
the progress that civilisation entailed but the down-sides of processes such as industrialisation and 
démocratisation (Wagner 1990: 234).
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without the other. The total state, i.e. 'a power that drew from itself the principle of law 
and the principle of knowledge' and in which distinctions between societal dimensions 
disappeared and the political thus presided over everything (Lefort 1986: 280, 286) 
needed an individual that embodied the will of the people and from whom all directions 
and decisions ultimately derived.
The conceived form of citizenship or membership in fascist societies was a highly 
exclusivist one, based on narrowly ethnic, cultural-linguistic, and in the most extreme 
cases, racial terms. In particular in the latter case, membership of society was predefined 
by birth, and the exclusivity and the purity of the people could be defended by recourse 
to pseudo-scientific, biological means. The nature o f membership in the fascist 
community stood in contrast to the liberal conception of natural rights and negative 
freedom as it was primarily based on a strong sense of national solidarity and survival, 
which excluded individuals outside of their 'own' community.
M odes o f  legitimation
The collectivity formed the essence of fascist thought. In fierce critique of the liberal 
conception of the individual preceding the community and the artificiality of the 
Gesellschaft or civilisation that replaced the Gemeinschaft, fascist thinkers placed a re­
invented but authentic community - based on race, religion or ethnicity - at the 
forefront. The fascist order was therefore primarily legitimated through a form of goal- 
rational legitimation, i.e. by turning the community, its defence and prosperity into the 
absolute value around which all other thoughts and actions revolved. In this way, 
fascism proposed to retrieve the alienated individual and his lost original communal 
relations. By placing the community and its natural unity prior to or outside of actual 
history, fascism could claim its authenticity, its justification beyond rationalism, and 
could reveal the detrimental effects of artificial liberalism and capitalism for the 
authentic and still undivided community (cf. Herf 1984; Marcuse 1988: 6-8).
By returning to this putative authenticity of the past and by claiming to re-establish 
the age-old, undivided community, fascist thinking partially evoked traditional 
legitimation. This did not entail by any means that fascism could be considered merely a 
reactionary, traditionalist movement. It proposed a novel approach to popular 
sovereignty and the representation of human will and autonomy but in a unified,
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solidary society. In this way fascism could claim to have resolved the enduring tension 
in modernity between the individual and society.
A form of charismatic legitimation was evidently part of the fascist project, both in 
the role of the leader (most visible in Hitlerism) and in the total state. The charisma of 
the leader was a function of his ability to mobilise the masses and o f his direct 
identification with the salvation o f the nation and allegedly supreme knowledge of its 
needs. The charisma of the state emerged as a result of its reified form, i.e., as an 
autonomous entity which through its embodiment of the people and through acting as its 
last resort gained mystical connotations (the charismatic character of the state seems 
more a characteristic of Italian fascism, in which the state was glorified and attributed 
an autonomous and absolute role, than of national socialism in which the state was 
subordinate to race and Volk, Stemhell 1976: 356).157
8.2 A cultural, spiritual alternative to Rom anian Liberalism: Fascism
Whereas in other countries the widespread nature of anti-liberal critique stemmed from 
resentment of defeat (Germany) or inertia (Italy) - which caused the transformation and 
radicalisation of old nationalism into a violent and fanatic extremism - in Romania the 
driving force was, paradoxically, territorial expansion158 (Manea 1995: 104). 
Ultimately, fascism seemed to provide an answer to Greater Romania’s weak national 
identity, in a similar manner to national-socialism in interwar Germany: ‘In a period of 
economic, political, moral and intellectual crisis, it provided a simple solution, violent, 
“radical*” (Manea 1995:100).
The Liberal nationalist project met with critique and resistance from the 1860s 
onwards, as seen in chapter 7. Nevertheless, the indigenist critiques that could be found 
in strands of thought as diverse as peasantism/populism, nationalism, and 'progressive
157 Giovanni Gentile made a distinction between nationalism, in which ‘the State is conceived as 
prior to the individual’, and fascism, in which ‘the State and the individual are one’ (Gentile 2002: 
25).
158 In other East European countries, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, similar anti- 
liberal discontent emerged, despite their ’winner’ status in the First World War (Chirot 1989: 389- 
91).
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conservatism’ never posed a systemic alternative to the project of Liberal nationalism. A 
counter-project with systemic ambitions only emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, and was 
sustained by the Iron Guard and the intellectual movement centred around Nae Ionescu 
(see chapter 5). Although virtually all political movements referred to nationhood and 
the ’national essence' in the interwar period (see Verdery 1995), the Fascist movement 
represented the most radical interpretation (together with the communists who, rather 
than having a radical understanding of nationality, proposed to abolish Romania's 
nationhood altogether in the name of the international class struggle). The radicalisation 
professed by the Fascists entailed a rigorous transformation of the understanding of 
nationhood. The Fascists criticised the universalism o f the French Revolution; in line 
with the political romanticist critiques of Enlightenment rationalism they embraced a 
theory of national specificity. Whereas the Liberals promulgated an essentially 
'objective', institutionalist definition of nationhood, referring to the 'objective* criteria of 
history, language and culture, the radical intelligentsia as well as the Fascist movement 
at large employed a definition of nationhood in which 'subjective' criteria prevailed. The 
Fascists understood the 'national specificity' as a particular state of mind, a particular 
Romanian essence revealed in a spiritual outlook. They defined therefore the essence of 
Romanian identity not merely in terms of control of the national economy and the 
polity, but also in terms of the collective embodiment of specific cultural characteristics, 
narrowing the concept of ‘authentic’ Romanians and thus aiming criticism inwards.
The spiritualist and Fascist counter-movement that embodied the domestic critique of 
the Liberal project developed largely as a native movement, without relying explicitly 
on external sources of reference.159 Nevertheless, the external environment played a 
significant role in the critique in two ways. First of all, the emerging and increasingly 
successful fascist and national-socialist movements provided reference points for the
159 I refer here to the Fascist student movement of Codreanu. The cultural criticism of the 
intellectual movement (which only became explicitly fascist in the 1930s) was more versatile and 
constituted a synthesis between nineteenth century ‘organic* nationalism (Eminescu and Iorga), and 
interwar neo-romantic cultural pessimism (as espoused by, for instance, Oswald Spengler, Ernst 
Jiinger, and Martin Heidegger in Germany, Charles Maurras in France, and Nae Ionescu). As Voicu 
argues, Nae Ionescu's thought was based on the Junimists (Maiorescu and Eminescu), peasantism, 
and German ideas. Nae Ionescu studied in Germany in the period 1916-1919 (Ricketts 1988; Voicu 
1998a: 2).
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burgeoning Romanian movement, especially visible after the victory of Hitler in 1933, 
the latter having a discernible impact on the morale of the native movement. Secondly, 
the intellectual movement was a versatile one in which foreign currents of thought had 
been a significant ingredient in the debates all along, and which started to move towards 
a more narrow and outspokenly particularist vision only after 1933 (see Antonesei 
1985; Petreu 2003a, 2003b; Ricketts 1988).
The sui generis elements of Romanian Fascism lay in its unusual emphasis on 
religion in the form of Eastern Orthodoxy (Pavel 1998a: 222) and, to a lesser extent, in 
the mythicisation of the peasantry and the rural community. The crucial role played by 
religion in the Romanian Fascist discourse - discemable in its essentialised function in 
the overall discourse - and radical particularism with its excessive emphasis on the 
preservation o f  native traditions did not, however, prevent fascism from being an 
essentially modem project.160 In spite o f the Fascist claim of wanting to reconcile the 
Romanian nation with God, and therefore to explicitly reintroduce religion into the 
political sphere, the by far most important aim was to reconstruct society and man 
through political action and on the basis o f a political programme.161 The overall Fascist 
programme (understood here as comprising both the articulations of the Fascist 
movement as such and those of the intellectual movement) contained a strong notion of 
revolution or regeneration, o f the overthrow of the old order and of the creation of a 
new society. The old order was criticised for its unnatural and artificial nature, whereas 
a new society based on 'pure’, Romanian essentials was envisaged as the foundation of 
an 'authentic* emancipation o f the Romanians. The notion of revolution in the Fascist 
project contained both pre-modem and modem connotations of the term. On the one 
hand, revolution meant the construction of a fundamentally new order, whereas on the 
other, revolution should lead to the restoration of an earlier existing situation, which had 
been undermined by the Liberal modem project. A collateral element was the moral 
regeneration o f man, revealing a focus in the Fascist project on the individual and a 
profound belief in the perfectibility o f man, both essentially modem conceptions. In a
160 By starting from this assumption, I differ from analyses that understand fascism to be an anti­
modem movement (see e.g. Davidescu 2002; Ioanid 1990; Omea 1995).
161 Eisenstadt's analysis of the modem aspects of fundamentalist movements has provided me with 
useful reference points (see Eisenstadt 1999).
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similar vein, the emancipation o f the collective or nation formed a crucial element in the 
Fascist project for the reconstruction of society, revealing some form of reference to the 
notion of popular sovereignty.
At the same time, the Romanian Fascist movement forcefully promulgated anti- 
Enlightenment ideas in the form of anti-rational, anti-individualist, and anti-democratic 
conceptions, and against the differentiation and disruption of traditional society 
promoted the upholding o f (re-invented) traditional values and forms of belonging (as 
expressed in Eastern Orthodox religion and rural, village-based community values).
Crisis narrative o f  the Fascist project
The coalescence of the interwar tensions made critique on the Liberal project both 
widespread and effective. The traditional (peasantist, nationalist) and radical critiques 
focused on unresolved political problems stemming from the pre-war period, i.e. the 
national and social questions, problems which had become more acute and more 
complex as a result of the interwar transformation of Romania. In the early twenties, the 
gist of the peasantist and nationalist critiques of Liberalism were social integration 
(extending political membership to the rural population) and social equality (a more 
equal distribution of national wealth through land reforms). After the extension of male 
suffrage and far-reaching land reforms, the national question emerged as the dominant 
one. As Livezeanu argues: by partially satisfying the peasant demand for land, the
land reform made it possible for the national question to displace the social question -  
that o f the peasantry and its land hunger -  as the chief issue in Romanian society* 
(1995: 12).
The common denominator in the critiques raised by the Fascists was the demand for 
the primacy of the spiritual and the cultural. In this sense, one could speak of a 
culturalist critique of the existing societal order. Despite the acknowledgement o f the 
crucial political role of the Liberal revolutionaries in constructing a Romanian nation­
state, 1848 was often portrayed as the moment of rupture with the past and discontinuity 
with authentic national traditions (Omea 1995: 30; Voicu 1998a). From this realisation - 
that of a fundamental breaking point in history in which natural, organic history was 
interrupted by the introduction of foreign elements - stemmed a whole range of 
critiques. The call for the primacy of the spiritual was raised against the primacy o f the
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economic and the political found in the materialist and rationalist ideas introduced by 
the Liberals in the nineteenth century. In addition, the a-historical, general and abstract 
nature of Western structures and ideas (articulated in their juridical nature and universal 
validity) signified that these could never represent the particular, the essence of the 
Romanian nation. The Western forms 'imposed' by the Liberals represented a foreign 
element with no organic roots in Romanian reality. The liberal state was thus 
structurally incapable of representing the authentic traditions of Romanian life (Omea 
1995: 32-3). The remedy to this inauthenticity was local spiritual creation. Only through 
local creativity based on local traditions could the Romanian be authentic.
The imported structure most reproached by the Fascists was democracy. As Eliade 
has put it: ‘I f  a good idea ever had a deadly result for a nation, then, in the case of 
Romania, that good idea was democracy’ (Eliade, cited in: Ricketts 1988: 900). A 
political critique 'unmasked' the democratic system, exposing democracy as serving the 
interests of the small bourgeois, capitalist class instead of the common good. On the 
level of values and morality, various other arguments were posited (the following list is 
not exhaustive). First of all, the system of democracy was seen as a political system, 
which could not represent the national collectivity and its will. As Codreanu observed, 
instead of unifying the nation the democratic system led to its fragmentation into 
mutually opposing political forces, thus weakening it (Codreanu 1973: 328). 
Furthermore, the natural rights embodied in the democratic system referred only to the 
abstract individual. Democracy took neither the actually existing national community 
nor the spiritual or 'transhistorical' nation, which included ancestors and future 
generations, into account (Codreanu 1973: 336). Secondly, democracy was reproached 
for being a purely intellectual construct, with no roots in reality. Democracy, based on 
the ’inventions' o f natural rights (equality162 63) and the social contract, were said to lead
162 As Hirschman has pointed out, the argument that the ‘deep structures’ of society ultimately 
remain untouched by ‘cosmetic’ changes has been often used in reaction to major changes and 
reforms in Western Europe, and ‘is one of the principal weapons in the reactionary arsenal’ (1991: 
79). In the Romanian context, this discursive 'weapon* could however also be utilised for the 
formulation of alternative projects of modernisation.
163 Ionescu considered the notion of equality one of the worst elements of democracy as it went 
against the natural human order, i.e., the fact that human beings are in reality inequal. This 
observation led him to promulgate a strong form of political élitism (Voicu 1998a).
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away from organic social harmony (Codreanu 1973: 328-30; Voicu 1998a). This ]
critique has affinities with the notion of 'forms without substance' in that democracy !
|
was perceived as merely a juridical form unrepresentative of any local Romanian )
substance, i.e. the Romanian rural traditions and Orthodox religion. A third argument
concerned the anachronistic and obsolete nature of democracy as a political system of
rule. This argument was sustained in both a historical and a theoretical mode. >
Historically, democracy was seen as giving way to other political forms, both o f the left '
and right, all over Europe. In the Romanian context, an anti-democratic discourse could \
easily be related to political realities as the imperfections and dysfunctional nature of
Romanian democracy were clear to all (Voicu 1998a). Alongside the historically
founded argument of obsolescence, theoretical arguments were made on the imminent
collapse of the democratic system. Ionescu maintained that political parties are naturally
inclined to oppose each other and therefore ultimately inclined to defeat their adversary.
In the last instance, therefore, this meant that an absolute victory of one political party I
would lead to the elimination of the party system as such (Ionescu 1937: 178-9).
Finally, the democratic system was attributed a structural incompetence to govern, as it 
opened political rule to non-specialists (Ionescu in: Voicu 1998a), whereas democratic 
parties lacked continuity, and democracy was deemed incapable o f the necessary i
authority (Codreanu 1973: 329).
Interpretations and legitimations o f  the Fascist counterproject
Romanian Fascism, despite being a primarily native movement, comprised most of the 
elements I have identified as part of the fascist paradigm: the primacy of the collectivity 
over the individual, the radical negation of democracy, rationalism, and liberalism, a 
preoccupation with the preservation of traditional values, and the call for a spiritual 
revolution. The distinct elements of Romanian Fascism were (as mentioned earlier) the 
central place of religion in its self-identification, a relatively minor attention to political 
institutions, a non-developmentalist attitude, and a radical particularism and almost 
exclusive attention to Romanian regeneration. Below, I will outline the Romanian 
Fascist discourse by means of three categories: cultural inspiration; political 
foundations; and socio-political practices.
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1. Cultural inspiration. If  national Liberalism was typified as a synthesis of liberalism 
and political romanticism, in which values, ideas and orientations were defined by both 
a paiticularist and universalist relation to the world (what I have labelled particularist 
universalism), the entire project o f Fascism was designed to redefine Romanian culture 
and the socio-political order on the singular basis of indigenous, traditional values. Thus 
it incorporated and continued the romantic nationalist trend of both Liberal-nationalism 
and its 'traditionalist' critiques (for a commentary of the latter, see chapter 7), while 
strongly rejecting its universalist component. In the Fascist project, however, the 
romanticist notions of cultural essence and national individuality were radicalised not 
only by their promotion to the top o f the hierarchy of values, but also by the fact that the 
notions themselves were essentialised in a limited number of indigenous values which 
totalised the overall discourse. The Fascist view of Romanian society could be labelled 
radicalist particularism, as it parted exclusively from local, indigenous traditions and 
rejected anything exogenous as artificial.164 The essential values posited by Fascism, 
often defined as Eastern Orthodox religion and ruralism, constituted the only legitimate 
basis on which Romanian culture or the national essence could be founded. In this way 
not only foreign, universalist ideas and values were rejected, but also other, local 
definitions o f Romanian nationhood.165 Whereas the Liberal-nationalist project had 
been based on ‘mimetic competition’, the alternative project endorsed in the interwar 
years replaced the contemporary understanding of nationhood with one o f ‘quasi- 
mystical self-imitation’ (Antohi 2000: xvi, introduction to Liiceanu; cf. Irimia- 
Tüchtenhagen 1997: 321, fn 8). In other words, a different way of realising the 
unrealised dream of Liberal-nationalism was ‘to drop out of “competition” with the 
West and choose the alternative of a Balkan, patriarchal model in the autochthonous 
tradition’ (Volovici 1991: 81).
The universal nature of liberalism was strongly rejected by the Fascists, in particular 
in its manifestations of rationalism and individualism. These tenets of Western
164 As remarked by Codreanu: 'This culture can therefore never be international, because it 
expresses the genius of the nation, its blood. The culture becomes international in as far it is an 
emanation o f the nation, but it remains always national in its origins' (Codreanu 1973: 339).
165 See Verdery (1995) for an analysis of the different understandings of the 'national essence’ in the 
interwar period.
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universalism were not only rejected in their political manifestations o f democracy and 
contractual relations, but also on a philosophical level. The domination of reason in 
Western culture, the assumed self-sufficiency of reason, and its supposed autonomy (the 
idea that the individual by means of reason could master the world) were regarded as 
the antithesis o f Romanian culture (Hitchins 1995: 148). The 'naked' individualism of 
the West was incompatible with the Romanian understanding of man as an ultimately 
social being. Ionescu counterposed God-oriented Eastern metaphysics, related to 
Eastern Orthodoxy in which the individual was dissolved into the collective, to the ego­
centric, individualistic Western metaphysics. According to Ionescu, meaning in history 
could not be found through reason, but only through 'lived-experience' (traire), thereby 
proposing a fundamentally different manner of relating to the world (Ricketts 1988: 
104-5). The essence and particularity of Romanians was to be found in their belonging 
to a higher, collective sphere constituted by the traditions of Orthodoxy, a mysticist way 
of relating to the world, and ruralism.166 Indeed, the Legionary movement promoted a 
'new man' who was to be the opposite of the 'bourgeois man'. His behaviour was not to 
be based on cold calculation, material interests, and socially detached individualism, but 
on moral purity, sacrifice, discipline, and subjugation to the collective interest (Ricketts 
1988: 656). Western individualism was rejected in favour of this indigenous tendency 
towards collectivism, the desire to be part of the whole.
2. Political foundations. Fascism was continuous with liberalism in that its 
overarching objective was the liberation of the Romanian nation. However, where in 
liberalism national freedom and self-determination had been conceived mainly in terms 
of negative or formal collective liberty, i.e., the creation of a politically controlled 
national 'private sphere' within which national continuity would be ensured, the Fascists 
radically redefined the notion of liberty. According to fascist thinkers, political unity
166 Nae Ionescu saw strong correlations between Western religious, political and socio-economic 
culture, which as a whole was incompatible with the Romanian one - with its emphasis on 
Orthodoxy, contemplation, and the spiritual: 'Everything in this world is linked together and forms a 
system. And politics cannot deviate from this rule. Thus... the constitutional parliamentary regime 
is a correlate of the Protestant mentality, of the individualistic-democratic, rationalistic and 
scientific mind-set, and of the capitalist-bourgeois economic formula erected on a preponderately 
commercial and industrial base' (Ionescu, cited in: Ricketts 1988: 102-3).
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could only be meaningful if it would lead to the preservation and expression o f 
particular Romanian values. The Fascists portrayed the Liberal project as one that 
introduced entirely new and foreign forms into Romanian reality, thereby constituting a 
complete break with the past (cf. Omea 1995: 29-33). It was for this reason that the 
Liberal project was structurally incapable of representing Romanian reality and the 
Romanian ’essence'.167 The Liberal Romanian state was reproached for only 
representing 'empty', 'hollow* concepts and forms, a critique that had been raised earlier 
by the Junimists in their notion of ’forms without substance'. In this, fascism entailed the 
réintroduction of substantive values into the political sphere. According to fascist 
conceptions man or the individual was an exclusively social being, and thus Romanian 
man could only realise himself within the collective sphere. The collectivity or national 
community itself could not be based on universal, imported, and imitated values, as 
these could never represent the Romanian essence.
Emancipation of the nation by means of the re-assertion of authentic national values 
and their shifting into the centre o f the political project of modernisation formed the 
main task o f  the Fascist counter-project. In particular, the intellectual movement 
represented by Eliade, Cioran, and Noica, amongst others, underlined the need for 
spiritual, cultural creativity in order to express and produce a real, authentic Romanian 
cultural being (this intellectual project was initially only expressed in a-political terms, 
but gained an increasingly political dimension in the 1930s). The intellectuals pleaded 
for the re-evaluation and primacy o f the spiritual in the hierarchy of general human 
values (Antonesei 1985: 204). The fascist intellectuals echoed the romanticist emphasis 
on creativity as a means to the salvation and emancipation of the human being. Only 
within a culture that was locally produced and therefore authentic could the Romanian 
individual be truly Romanian, realise its essence and become a complete, integral 
human being.168 It was, naturally, the young generation of intellectuals itself that was
167 According to Vasile Marin, member of the Iron Guard, the Liberal project had never led to the 
creation of a national Romanian state as it represented only a juridical expression in the 
international order, without having resulted in the integration of the Romanian nation and without 
representing Romanian culture (in: Omea 1995: 29).
,6S Cf. Antonesei 1985: 202. Mircea Eliade identified two paths towards salvation and 
emancipation: the first, a religious path, led to emancipation by unifying oneself with God (which
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deemed to be especially 'fit* to create this national culture. Within the political 
movement of Fascism the emphasis was less on cultural creation as on realising the 
preconditions for an authentic and unitary Romanian state ('a great spiritual revolution 
of the entire people’, Codreanu 1974: 67) by removing foreign elements. In other words, 
the political implications of the idea of an authentic Romanian state were found in the 
purification of Romanian society, through the expulsion or elimination o f the 
stereotypical Other, the Jew.169
3. Socio-political order. The main object of the Fascist project was the national 
collective.170 In this sense, one could say that Fascism formed a continuity with the 
Liberal-nationalist project. However, whereas in the Liberal project the creation and 
preservation of the sovereignty o f the national and territorial state had been a major 
preoccupation, the main focus o f the Fascist project was on the moral and spiritual 
generation of the Romanian state. The Fascists sought a spiritual and cultural revolution 
that the Liberals had failed to carry out, the realisation of which was conceived as the 
only way in which the Romanian nation could be truly liberated and meaningful. In 
concomitance with the objective o f national regeneration, both the Fascist political 
movement and the intellectual generation strongly rejected democracy as a political 
system and promoted a totalitarian state. The state was conceptualised as organic, the 
embodiment of the national soul rather than a rational structure based on the protection 
of individual rights. The state was not so much a political instrument as a cultural one, 
as Eliade and Ionescu believed (Ricketts 1988: 897; see also Codreanu 1973). The 
totalitarian or fascist state represented the higher collective interest and was a vehicle to
he called 'soteria'), the other, a secular path, by immersion into the history of the nation ('sympathia') 
(Ricketts 1988: 889).
169 According to Codreanu a new Romania implied giving to 'the nation its real meaning of a natural 
society of individuals of the same race, and not the abstract meaning of the juridical nationality of 
the citizen’ (Codreanu 1974: 101). Both the Jew and the 'politicianist' were reproached for their role 
in having 'deformed, having disfigured the structure of the Daco-Roman race’ (Codreanu 1973: 
244).
170 Both the intellectual generation and the Legionary movement displayed an elementary 
preoccupation with the grandeur of the nation. Codreanu’s main concern was to create a powerful, 
homogeneous, and undivided nation (Codreanu 1974), whereas the intellectual generation was 
preoccupied with inserting Romanian culture into world culture (see Petrea 2003a).
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further Romanian culture, ultimately based on Romanian ethnicity and the Christian 
Orthodox religion. In this, the neo-nationalist, Fascist perception went beyond the 
xenophobic element that pre-war nationalism and conservatism had contained, giving 
anti-semitism a primary place in its ideology (Ioanid 1990: 29). Nae Ionescu, Nichifor 
Crainic, a theologian and fascist theoretician, and others formulated the concept of a 
'corporate ethnocratic state', ’a state with a peasant character’ in which Jews were 
excluded from political participation (Volovici 1991: 118, 129).m  The electoral system 
was essentially flawed; it could never represent the national will as the masses were not 
capable of identifying their own will (Codreanu 1973: 330-2; cf., for Ionescu, Voicu 
1998a).
The totalitarian vision o f  the state was complemented by the cult o f the 'capitan', i.e. 
the Iron Guard leader Codreanu, who was to be accompanied by an ‘ascetic élite* 
(Ionescu) or a ‘new aristocracy* (Eliade). The movement would function as a role model 
for the population, turning Romanians into 'new men'. By their ascetic and submissive 
behaviour the élite would avoid the particularism of the Liberal political class (see 
Ioanid 1990: 136). Codreanu and Nae Ionescu therefore pointed to the necessity of an 
'exceptional personality' or a 'new aristocracy' who would have an intimate knowledge 
of the 'eternal laws' which the masses did not have. Here we find a strong element of 
messianism. The leaders had access to privileged knowledge, for them 'the nation is 
something concrete' (Ionescu in: Voicu 1998a), and therefore they were capable of its 
guidance. The new political form or totalitarian state that results from this would not be 
a dictatorial rule, as a dictatorship implied the subjugation of the masses to the will of 
one man, but would constitute a complete, total agreement between the masses and the 
leader(-s) so as to encompass one single will (Codreanu 1973: 266-7). The élite was 
considered the 'emanation o f the people, [they are] as the nation. Their decision is 
presented to be the decision of the entire people. That is why one says totalitarian, 
because the individual is completely melted into the collectivity' (Ionescu: in Voicu 17
171 The Jew was identified as the main obstacle on the road to national regeneration: The Jew was 
unacceptable not only because he was a "foreigner" with a different religion; he was identified with 
all the "vices": political (democracy, liberalism), social (corruption, social inequality, poverty), 
moral and cultural (cosmopolitism, poisonous foreign influences) and spiritual (rationalism, 
individualism, Marxism)’ (Volovici 1991: 139).
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1998b). The political form promulgated by the Fascists was highly distinct from the 
democratic system as the Fascists rejected the implications of a formal-legal system,
i.e., the differentiation between state and society, the creation of an autonomous societal 
sphere, and the relegation of substantive values to the private sphere. The totalitarian 
system can from this perspective be seen as an attempt to resolve the continuous tension 
between the ruler and the ruled (representation) in any political system.
Furthermore, it was held that only in this way could the essential, particular values of 
the Romanian nation find political expression. Membership of the polity was therefore 
exclusively for those that belonged to the ’transhistorical nation', i.e., by birth and thus 
defined in ethnic terms. Ethnicity, in the programme of Codreanu even understood as 
raciality, defined as the Daco-Roman race. Those from Daco-Roman descent were 
threatened by the Jews as well as by the 'politicianist' (the Romanian politicians), a 'sub­
human type', who 'does not possess anything of the nobility of our race anymore, who 
dishonours our race, who defiles it, kills it’ (Codreanu 1973: 244). Despite reference to 
the term race, the Romanian Fascist ideology seems to lack an elaborated pseudo­
scientific theory of racism, as found in national socialism.
M odes o f  legitimation
The radical particularist project rested upon various modes of legitimation. The derived 
mode of legitimation in the Liberal project - which was in the final instance a 
legitimation based on the experiences of other societies - was rejected in favour of a 
legitimation based on Romanian national traditions, or ‘quasi-mystical self-imitation’. 
As Romanian society was in substance different from the Western ones, it was 
incompatible with Western forms. Fascism invoked historical continuity as it claimed to 
restore traditional Romanian society. Traditional legitimation was based on an 
autochthonist rereading of history, i.e. instead of finding the ethnogenesis o f the 
Romanian people in both Roman and Dacian origins, Romanian roots were found 
exclusively in the people o f Dacia, a native people, thereby excluding linkages with 
Western Europe. The enduring cultural inferiority complex towards the advanced West 
felt by many Romanians, despite the generous territorial provisions of the Treaty of 
Versailles, was convincingly dealt with by the call for a 'national regeneration'. Intense
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consciousness of the country’s backwardness172 could only be countered through a 
radical move, i.e., radical particularism. Such an alternative route to modernisation 
could hardly be imagined without a strong, charismatic leader capable of mobilising the 
Romanian people around the absolute goal of national regeneration, as a counterpart to  
Western pluralism and democracy. National regeneration was to be based on orthodox 
religion and an ‘orthodox ethnic state’, elements that provided for a unique Romanian 
experience.173 Here one can identify various modes of legitimation that run directly 
counter to the legitimacy of the Liberal project. The principal mode of legitimation o f 
the Fascist project was charismatic: charismatic legitimation was to replace the Western 
legal-rational legitimacy as the figure of the leader became the ultimate expression of a 
strong state, the ’eternal' national spirit and community (see Codreanu 1973: 268). 
Furthermore, as the individualism and the rational-procedural spirit of the Western 
model were detested, its overall legitimacy was denied (one can speak here of negative 
legitimation). Western rationalism and pluralism and their ruinous consequences for 
national unity were to be countered by the absolute goals of national community and 
social harmony, supreme values that required faith rather than rational calculation.174
8.3 The strategic-institutional programme of Romanian Fascism
The main politico-institutional elements of the Fascist discourse can be reconstructed on 
the basis o f  fascist perceptions of societal progress, collective self-rule, political 
representation and control (see chapter 3). One should bear in mind that two factors 
worked against a fully cognitive, institutional crystallisation of the Fascist discourse. 
First of all, the Fascist programme was primarily concerned with preventing the 
corrosion of traditional and essential values and their return to the political centre, and 
therefore promulgated its revolution mainly on a spiritual, ethical level. Secondly, the
172 Emil Cioran, member of the New Generation, expressed this backwardness as the ‘vanity of a 
man bom within a small culture is forever wounded’ (Cioran, mentioned in Tism&neanu 1996: 390).
173 As Totok remarks: ‘[o]nly through the creation of unique cultural values would a small people be 
able to assert itself, to succeed in the world, and to find recognition’ (Totok 1995: 925).
174 A famous part of Codreanu's 'program' was its four rules of conduct: faith in god, faith in the 
mission, reciprocal love, and group chanting (Codreanu 1973: 240-1).
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institutional moment of the Fascist project was very short: effectively four and a half 
months (September 1940-January 1941, see Pavel 1998a; Petreu 2003a), and therefore 
the translation of the discourse into a political doctrine of governance did not take place.
1. Societal progress. Fascism broke decisively with the positive reading of Western 
modernity by the Romanian Liberals. Whereas the latter promoted a project of 
modernisation that was firmly grounded in materialist and progressivist notions, the 
former emphasised the artificial and foreign nature of capitalist and democratic society, 
and the erosion of essential Romanian values that its introduction had brought with it. 
The Fascists' fundamentally different conception of society revealed itself in the 
continuous emphasis on a 'moral' and 'ethical' regeneration of Romanian society. This 
regeneration was linked to the idea of the purification of Romanian society from 
exogenous and internal, in particular Jewish, elements, and therefore the reclamation of 
Romania for the ethnic Romanians. In this respect, the Fascist project was similar to the 
Liberal one. Nevertheless, the Fascist conception of Romanian society radically differed 
in other aspects, namely in giving primacy to spiritual and moral values over materialist 
ones. Here, the Fascist project broke with the materialist progressivism of both 
liberalism and communism, promulgating a radical, alternative vision o f  the 
reconstruction of society on the basis of substantive, traditional values. The primary 
objective was to instigate a moral revolution, which would transform the Romanians 
into new men. This new man embodied two components that had been lost in the 
Western materialist and individualist man (in Romania personified by the greedy 
'politicianist' and the Jew): spiritualism and a *thick' sense o f social belonging. Codreanu 
criticised the dominant materialist mentality in the Western world and proposed the 
restitution of the primacy of the spirit over the material (Codreanu 1974: 238). In the 
Fascist programme, then, the social question was redefined or, perhaps more accurately, 
relegated to a lower status. The Fascists often disregarded developmental aspects and 
when they did take such considerations into account, they did so mostly by defending 
rural traditions (Gregor 2000: 176-7).175 Capitalism, industrialism, concomitant 
urbanisation and economic liberalism were rejected for much the same reasons as a
175 The non-materialist, ascetic attitude of the Romanian Fascists could be seen as rather distinct. In 
their early years, Hungarian Fascists had a similar non-developmental attitude, but turned to the 
promotion of industrialisation in the mid-1930s (Gregor 2000: 176).
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democratic political system. They were foreign, artificial inventions that did not 
resonate in the ‘authentic' Romanian rural life. Ionescu regarded the city as ‘too 
abstract’ and modem industry as ‘too rational’ (Hitchins 1994: 317). As mentioned 
earlier, Codreanu agitated against the domination of the material over the spiritual, 
which was threatening the ‘original harmony o f life' (Codreanu 1973: 237-8). Mircea 
Vulcanescu (a member of the young generation) saw Romania as divided into an urban 
and a rural society, the first serving the interests of foreigners, whereas the latter 
represented the unchanged, traditional, true Romanian character (Ioanid 1990: 149-50). 
In contrast to the tendency of capitalism to create differentiation and tensions between 
social classes, Fascist neo-nationalism aimed beyond class differences by promoting 
national unity and harmony.
2. Collective self-determination. The Fascist conception o f self-rule stemmed directly 
from the collective level of the nation. In this, Fascism did not criticise the notion of 
national emancipation as such, but defied the liberal conception of a legal-formally 
based political understanding of sovereignty and redefined the concept of a negative 
space of freedom in cultural, spiritual terms. Whereas the Liberals had continuously 
sought to realise national independence by adopting internationally endorsed standards 
(a constitutional-democratic and industrialised nation-state), the Fascists deemed this 
conception a contradiction in terms. In their view, the Romanian nation could only be 
truly independent when its political structures reflected its inner nature, its ‘national 
essence* (specificul national). Fascism therefore rejected the thesis of the universal 
validity of the Liberal project and promulgated an essentialist, radical particularist 
vision of Romanian modem society in which the Romanian nation would be completely 
- including culturally - detached from the West.176
In a similar vein, the Fascists regarded the political unification of all Romanians in a 
single nation-state as insufficient in terms of emancipation of the Romanian people and 
the realisation of collective autonomy. To fully realise national independence and 
collective autonomy, a deeper ‘moral’ or 'spiritual revolution' was necessary177 (cf.
176 Nae Ionescu, for instance, argued for a complete witdrawal of Romania from Western 
civilisation, and thus 'to renounce the civilised superstructure’ of Romanian society (Voicu 1998b).
177 As Codreanu indicated: The state cannot be based merely on the theoretical conceptions of 
constitutional law. The new state presupposes, in the first place and as an indispensable element, a
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Omea 1995: 31). Only a society reconstructed on the basis of authentic Romanian 
values and traditions could lead to the full emancipation of the Romanian people. The 
unique and essential values of Romanian society were identified as Eastern Christian 
Orthodoxy and a religious mystique (Volovici 1991: 80), promulgated against the 
universal Western values of formal-legalism, democracy, and rationalism. Democracy, 
according to the Fascists, was a foreign import and merely a 'juridical expression of the 
international order', which represented a break with traditional, essential values and 
impeded the realisation o f an authentic Romanian national state (Omea 1995: 27-30). 
The institutional implications of such a view were that political and public life were to 
be purified from the influence of extraneous elements that undermined the Romanian 
nation from without, but also from within. This was most clearly expressed in the 
notions of 'numerus clausus' or even 'numerus nullus', not only within the confines of 
academic life, but also in the societal sphere as a whole.178
3. Political representation and control. The political and institutional implications of 
the radical particularist philosophy of Romanian society were expressed in an 
exclusivist and totalitarian vision of the state. The totalistic vision of the fascist political 
and cultural programme of modernity meant that: a. The state was to represent the 
ethnic nation only; b. The state was to represent the essential values of Romanian 
ethnicity; c. Political rule by a single party was to be substituted for pluripartidism 
(Codreanu 1973: 268); d. The organisation of the state and state-society relations should 
take the form of corporatist structures, which consisted of professional organisations 
rather than parliamentary institutions.
In order to institutionalise a state that embodied the Romanian essence and protected 
its distinctiveness against foreign influence, strong boundaries between ethnic 
Romanians and non-Romanians were essential. At the centre of the Fascist project for a 
'new Romania' stood the idea of ethnic rule, to be realised in an 'ethnocratic' state. This 
political form was not conceived as a body ultimately legitimised by its representation
new type of man. A new state with men having old shortcomings cannot be imagined' (Codreanu 
1974: 67).
178 Here, the Fascists’ propositions for purification seemed essentially similar to the Liberal- 
nationalist attempts at wide-scale Romanianisation, apart from the ethical, moral groundings of 
these proposals.
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of the people (as in liberalism), understood instead from a ho list conception, i.e., as 
representing the nation as such. The nation, in this vision, did not entail an aggregation 
of individuals with similar cultural and ethnic linguistic characteristics, as the Liberal 
nationalists believed, but rather represented a transhistorical entity, including previous 
and future generations, the ’eternal nation' (Codreanu 1974: 59). A spiritual and 
transhistorical conception was explicitly counterposed to the ‘limited* and abstract 
juridical conception of the nation contained in liberalism (Codreanu 1974: 101). The 
‘ethnocratic state* (Nichifor Crainic), ‘totalitarian state’ (Emil Cioran), or ‘new state* 
(Comeliu Codreanu) was the political expression of the transhistorical nation o f ethnic 
Romanians and was to substitute an ‘organic’ state, developed from and in touch with 
local realities, for the juridical, abstract, and imported form of state179 (Gmea 1995: 33). 
The political mission of the new state was primary the purification of Romania from 
foreign elements, mostly understood as the Jews (Volovici 1991: 128). The 
emancipation of the Romanian people was only considered possible through such a 
move. This meant the abolition o f the democratic political system, seen as an instrument 
of foreigners (again, especially the Jews), and the establishment of a regime that 
uniquely represented the Romanian nation (Omea 1995: 29). In more practical terms, 
this meant the cancellation o f political and property rights for Jews (Petreu 2003a).
The state should not only represent the ethnic nation but also its essential values, 
which made up the Romanian particularity or essence. The essential element of 
Romanian culture most frequently cited was that of Orthodox Christianity. The 
importance o f religion in the definition of Romanian ethnicity was acknowledged by 
Nae Ionescu, the philosophy professor and the spiritual mentor of the young intellectual 
generation and later of the Iron Guard180, by Nichifor Crainic, a theologian, poet and 
important theoretician and politician o f fascism, who promoted an 'ethnocracy' based on 
Orthodox religion (cf. Verdery 1995: 123), and by the leader of the Iron Guard,
179 The Liberal democratic state could never represent the Romanian people and their culture as 
such, because it was based on a constitution that was based on a concept of citizenship that did not 
recognise ethnic, linguistic, or religious distinctions (Omea 1995: 29). Here, the tension between 
universalism and particularism becomes visible.
180 Ionescu defined the essence of being Romanian as being Orthodox (Ionescu 1937).
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Codreanu, who sought to reunite the nation with God through the ’legionary' revolution 
and the construction of a 'new Romania'.
A totalitarian vision o f the political order was further expressed in the abolition of 
the pluralist party system and the promulgation o f the doctrine of the single ruling party. 
The party system was deemed incapable of representing the national interest as it only 
represented the particular interests of the corrupt and egoistic 'politicianists', the 
professional politicians. Political rule could only be a singular form of rule, without 
giving expression to plural interests within society, as the state should represent the 
unanimity o f the nation. In contrast to the inefficacy, indecisiveness, and artificial 
nature of democratic pluralism, a new political form, which embodied the essential 
Romanian value of Eastern Orthodoxy, would be able to unite the political leaders and 
the people (Volovici 1991: 62). According to Codreanu, in a new political form the 
distinction between ruler and ruled dissolved, as based on 'total agreement', the leader 
embodying the expression of the will of the people (see Codreanu 1974: 266-7).181 The 
Fascist discourse further underlined the importance o f a messianic ruling class that 
would be able to set the example and teach the Romanian nation to renovate itself and 
become new. A 'new aristocracy' based on virtù and spiritual quality was needed 
(Codreanu 1973:78).
Finally, fascist thinkers promulgated various forms o f corporatism as alternatives to 
the liberal-democratic state.182 The organisation o f the state and state-society relations
181 The leader of the Legion of the Archangel Michael or Iron Guard, Codreanu, expressed the 
messianic character of the ruler in his Pentru legionari (For the Legionaries): ’... the leader is not 
anymore a 'master', a 'dictator1 that does what he wants and rules according to his own will: he 
becomes the expression, the incarnation of this invisible spiritual state, the symbol of this 
enlightened condition that underpins the entire national community. And thus the leader does not do 
what he wants, but what he needs to do. His action is not based on individual interests or on those of 
the present national community, but on the interests of the eternal Ancestry, of the eternal nation, 
from which the conscience of the peoples stems. In the sense of those latter interests - and only in 
the sense of these - individual interests as well as collective ones will reach their maximum level of 
satisfaction and conciliation* (Codreanu 1973: 268). A similar vision was promoted by Nae Ionescu, 
see Voicu 1998b.
182 Amongst these thinkers we might count Mihail Manoilescu, who was not a fascist in any strict 
sense, but who in his political opinions moved close to the extreme right-wing and formulated the 
most elaborate account of corporatism in his Century o f  corporatism (Secolul corporatismului) of
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should take the form o f professional, corporatist structures. Through corporatist 
structures, the state could give expression to the direct public interest (whereas the 
democratic state and the system of universal suffrage could only represent particular 
interests). Instead of being neutral, as the liberal state was, the corporatist state would be 
the 'bearer o f values' and would therefore directly serve the national interest and 
national solidarity (Love 1996: 96; Omea 1995: 46-50).
1934 (see Love 1996: 95-8). Manoilescu was criticised, however, by one of the leaders of the Iron 
Guard, Ion Moja, for promulgating merely a rational theory of corporatism, explaining the 
'mechanism', without taking into account the real problems of contemporary society. The real 
problem which needed solving, according to Moja, was the Jewish problem, the solution of which 
would lead to a spiritual regeneration rather than a mere technical transformation of the state (Mofa 
1978: 207-20).
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9. Communism and modernity
9.1 Communism as a project of modernisation
The changes in 1989 resulted in the widespread perception of ‘really existing socialism’ 
as a ‘failed revolt against modernity’ (Amason 2000b: 61). However, to understand the 
communist societies as essentially anti-modem projects, undermining the original 
modem version, hides a number of important insights from view. Firstly, as in any 
society in which the idea of human autonomy gains a foothold, i.e. the idea that people 
can shape their own social context, various perceptions on how to change and mould 
society emerge. Conflict and strife over specific reform pathways are therefore inherent 
in any modem or modernising society. It is in this sense that the communist societies 
were modem Ultimately, conflict occurred over the interpretation of autonomy, or in 
other words over collectivist or individualist interpretations of society. The party-state 
strove for the realisation of collective autonomy through a ‘revolution from above’, 
basing its superior claim to knowledge on the Leninist myth of the vanguard and its 
access to ‘objective truth’. This dominant ideology had to compete with forms of 
Westernism in which the individualist values of pluralism and liberalisation were 
evoked, and rival collectivist understandings of society, mostly in the form of 
nationalism (cf. Amason 1993: 145). In some Eastern European countries a more 
individualist understanding eventually gained ground (Hungary, Czechoslovakia), 
whereas in others communist collectivism was reinforced through absorbing 
nationalism (Romania, Albania).
Secondly, the ‘derived’ communist projects in Eastern Europe consisted of a 
complex and sometimes ambivalent coalescence of distinct dimensions of Western 
modernity, in which certain aspects were exaggerated or radicalised whereas others 
were subordinated: a) ‘really existing socialism’ constituted a continuation and 
radicalisation o f the Enlightenment project in its instrumental rationality and ‘quantity 
drive’ (in this sense the concept was completely opposite to the romantic anti-capitalist 
dimension of the other ‘totalitarian’ type of society, fascism); b) Marxist thought and to 
a certain extent ‘really existing socialism’ absorbed romanticist critiques of Western
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modernity by condemning particular negative effects of capitalist society (alienation, 
commodification, etc.), articulated in a  nostalgia for a post-capitalist future (see Löwy 
1981: 85); and, c) the East European varieties all eventually had to come to terms with 
pre-communist traditions, so that the communist ideology in one way or the other had to 
absorb or coexist with traditions o f nationalism and Westernism. This complex and 
multiple understanding of modernity could be found in Romanian Communism as it 
comprised a continued but radicalised understanding of modernity in its project of 
‘Promethean modernity’ (Ray 1996: 46), consisting of increased rationalisation and 
bureaucratisation, while at the same time incorporating its own tradition of nationalism 
and romanticism by re-introducing organicist understandings of the community.
The continuation of the Enlightenment project was highly visible in the manner by 
which the communist regimes attempted to realise their objectives, which may be 
understood as either a pathology o f the ‘original’ modem project in its extreme pursuit 
of rational mastery or as a particularly technocratic understanding of modernity 
(Amason 1993: 7; Bauman 2001a: 63; von Beyme 1994: 45). Societal goals such as 
increased levels of urbanisation and industrialisation were pursued through a relatively 
extreme form of instrumental rationality and belief in technical progress. The absolute 
priority of these goals crowded out considerations of general welfare and individual 
autonomy (for instance, in Romania, as in many other countries in the region, rates of 
investment in industry were continuously adjusted upwards to the detriment of social 
spending on housing, food, etc.). Such an approach to socio-economic transformation 
resulted in a one-sided perception o f collective mobilisation through education and 
labour for the development of the national economy. Both education and the labour 
process were therefore disproportionately aimed at the absorption of technical 
knowledge and the construction and expansion of specific sectors of the economy, while 
neglecting other spheres of society and science. This also meant that ‘non-productive’ 
spheres of society, such as the arts and literature, were co-opted to the ideological 
purposes of the Party. This unevenness of (early) communist societies can be called 
‘Promethean modernity’, in which means became ends, and society was 
overwhelmingly geared at ‘gigantism, Fordist mass production and consumption; an 
extensive, corporatist and rationalized state; a secular (and often etatist) ideology; 
cultural homogeneity governed by the ethos of technology and the culture industry’
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(Ray 1996: 46). Instead o f aiming for the maximisation of profits, as in capitalist 
societies, communist societies maximised accumulation, production for its own sake 
(Crowther 1988: 9; Ray 1996: 83), although the latter formulation seems to obscure the 
underlying social objective o f the socialist regimes (Fehér et al. 1983: 33).m
To grasp the continuity o f romanticist critiques in Marxism and in the ideology of 
‘really existing socialist* societies we should make a short excursion into the romantic 
impact on Marxist thought in general and its implications for ‘later modernising 
societies*. The idea of ‘universal human emancipation’ informed romanticist thought 
strongly, just as it shaped crucial aspects of the communist projects. In the former it 
might be referred to as the need for emotional liberation, self-development or 
creativeness whereas in the latter it may be found -  for example - in the concept of 
alienation (see Gouldner 1980: 200). In societies that distinguished themselves from 
Western Europe by their levels of socio-economic development critiques of Western 
modernity had a particularly ‘urgent’ impact, as emancipation was deemed necessary on 
both individual and collective/societal levels. Romanticism and the perception of 
underdevelopment by local intellectuals were strongly linked as in romanticism 
backwardness was articulated either in a sense of shame and therefore the sense of need 
for action or, alternatively, it led to an enhanced self-understanding, that is, a source of 
pride (as in German romantic conservatism), in reality often taking the form of a 
‘volatile mixture of both’ (Berman 1982: 43). This tense mixture consists of the dual 
search for ‘progress’ or ‘individual and collective self-development’ on the one hand, 
and ‘authenticity’ on the other. As an analysis of society and as a guiding ideology for 
societal change, Marxism picked up on this tension in its idea of ‘development as the 
form o f the good life’ (Berman 1982: 98), that is to say, in how it perceived personal 
liberation and authenticity as achievable through continuous development. The 
revolutionary dimension of romanticism as human liberation through action was 
combined with a nostalgic dimension of romanticism that longs for an earlier social 
state, nostalgia for the past thus being projected into the future (Lowy 1981: 85). The 
capitalist present was rejected in favour of a future society that recovers elements of the 
dissolved past (e.g., a sense of community). Here we can also discern a continuity 83
I83Verdery suggests that these systems were mainly enhancing the capacity of the apparatus to
allocate resources, not so much resources per se (Verdery 1991: 75; see also Ray 1996: 70).
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between elements of fascism, interwar cultural pessimism and the projects of ‘really 
existing socialism’ in that all o f them  criticised capitalism for destroying original human 
relations and creating disenchantment throughout modem society (cf. Heller 1986: 254).
The re-emergence of traditions in the East European communist societies was related 
to the mode of imposition and absorption o f communism in these societies. The 
imposed and alien character of the Soviet model and the often fragile social position of 
local communists resulted in a continuous legitimation crisis in the East European 
satellites. Particular national experiences that re-emerged as national traditions were 
revived and reinterpreted to counter this lack of legitimation. In the early years, the 
establishment of communist societies had to allow for existing social structures and 
constructed national traditions, ideas and identities, as their claim to legitimacy was 
never very strong in Eastern Europe, and when the Soviet Union relaxed its external 
grip on the satellite states the explicit utilisation of national traditions, was, if not 
inevitable, a likely step to be taken by local élites. In Romania, the re-emergence of pre­
war features became visible after a period of imposed communism by Moscow, 
although these features did not retain their original form and were almost continuously 
challenged, both from within the Communist Party and from the side of the 
intellectuals. It would be misleading to portray the re-emergence of pre-communist 
structures and ideas as a predetermined process, an evolution that sooner or later had to 
occur. In some societies assimilation of the Soviet model was effectuated with more 
zeal and depth than in others, although no society displayed a complete absorption or 
subordination to the model. In the Romanian context, as in other parts of Eastern 
Europe, struggle over the definition of Communism partly led to the rediscovery of 
older values and ideas, and a reconfirmation of a dimension of romanticist critique that 
had been present to varying extents in both the liberal and fascist worldviews. In some 
countries, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, struggles between 
doctrinarians and dissident voices led to the re-appropriation of bourgeois liberalism, 
which in the latter years of the communist regimes resulted in a coalition between party 
technocrats and dissident forces and their mutual commitment to transform communist 
society (Eyal et al. 1998: 11). Indeed, such a route, based on reforming the communist 
system by introducing some market elements, was a possibility opened up by the 
(temporary) experimentation with the New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union of the
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1920s (Ray 1996: 121). In contrast, in Romania, a short period of economic and 
political liberalisation did occur in the early post-Stalinist years, but was quickly 
subsumed under a form of national Communism, which did not so much aim at the 
rationalisation of the economic system as the increased mobilisation of society in the 
name of the original communist project. One could in this sense speak of a process of 
re-Stalinisation rather than liberalisation.
Normative prem ises
The general features of the communist model -  as a ‘reference model’ for emulation -  
can be deconstructed with the help o f the conceptual map introduced in chapter 3.
1. Cultural inspiration. The communist model of modernisation was presented 
through ’a claim to universal validity and world-historical legitimacy' (Amason 2000a: 
79). Communism was formulated as an explicit alternative to liberal modernity and 
claimed to transcend its major complications. The alternative modernity promulgated by 
communists entailed a universal model which would eradicate the alienating and 
exploitational features of the Western, liberal model of the market economy and formal 
democracy (the latter was considered the mere extension of the dominant forces present 
in the former) and claimed a more complete fulfilment of the Enlightenment 
programme. The Soviet Union could therefore espouse the aim of a world revolution 
that held the possibility of the liberation of the working class (and, in turn, humanity as 
such) from oppression and alienation everywhere. Marx's original project ultimately had 
been about the universal emancipation of humanity (Walicki 1995) and the project of 
'actually existing socialism' with its world-wide thrust cannot be fully understood 
without exploring this fundamental element. The Marxist/communist project not only 
promised to eradicate material poverty in modem society but also to re-unite mankind 
and to reconcile humanity with its essence. Communism's revolutionary programme did 
not merely promulgate an alternative vision of modem society, but was based on a 
utopian conception of future society that was not only to be realised by voluntaristic 
means but whose realisation was based on an understanding of the meaning of history 
and the laws of its progression. In this sense, the communist programme held 
transcultural meaning as it could be applied in different circumstances (in particular by
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means of the theory of the vanguard) and provided pseudo-scientific means to identify 
its end-goal.
As the communist programme claimed to bring about an absolute rupture with the 
past and a total transformation o f society, the new order could said to be ’in principle 
transcending any primordial, national, or ethnic units' (Eisenstadt 1999: 107). The 
universalistic foundations of communism did not however prevent partial reconciliation 
with more particularistic understandings of the social order. Stalin’s 'socialism in one 
country', which was proclaimed against the tenet of the world revolution and at least 
temporarily sought the consolidation of the revolution in a single country, could be 
understood as one such compromise of the universalistic and revolutionary premises of 
communism in favour of its local embedment. It was also Stalin who wedded the 
communist ideal with that of the construction of a national communist state, whose 
economic development was explicitly tied to its independence and whose existence was 
legitimised through reference to national symbols (cf. Walicki 1995: 415-6).
2. Political foundations. The communist project criticised the view of freedom 
contained in individualist liberalism on the grounds of its mere formal and illusionary 
status. The purely negative and individualist form of freedom promulgated in liberalism 
added up to nothing more than a legally guaranteed set of rights, leading to political 
equality, without resolving social and economic inequality between individuals. The 
inequalities in the socio-economic sphere and their recreation on the level of the state 
structurally impeded the non-owning classes to politically voice their interests (cf. Held 
1987: 120-1). According to the Marxist view, such a situation of structural inequality 
and unfreedom for the larger part of the population could only be overcome by the 
collective emancipation of the subordinated class, the working class. Only through the 
emancipation of the proletariat as a collectivity, by transcending the class antagonisms 
and structural conditions that prevented the subordinated classes from being free 
(private ownership and the market) could freedom be realised. Freedom was not just the 
result of the emancipation of the collective (the working class) from the oppressive 
bonds of class society, but was a 'communal' form of freedom in the sense that it could 
only be achieved in a collective way, through the control of society by the collectivity 
itself (cf. Walicki 1995:13-4).
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The negative freedom of liberalism could be seen as incommensurable with the 
conception of positive freedom of communism (Walicki 1995: 24). In the Marxist 
vision, freedom was linked to the cancellation of the modem individual’s alienation -  
‘the dependence or loss of potent subjecthood’ (Gouldner 1980: 200). Emancipation, or 
the retrieval of ‘potent subjecthood’, was perceived as freeing the worker from 
exploitation by the capital owning classes, from 'objective dependence' on the market 
economy, and from dependence o f the individual on material needs. To emancipate the 
individual, a form of positive freedom was promulgated which would retrieve the 
original unity of the community through the elimination of class conflict, the abolition 
of private ownership, and the release of the human being from dependence on extra- 
human elements (material scarcity, market relations).
3. Social and political practices. The communist project of modernisation was based 
on the substantive notions of distributive justice, the emancipation of the subordinated 
classes and the retrieval o f communal unity, along with the eradication of material 
scarcity. These substantive values informed its vision of the role of the state, society and 
economy, while subordinating the formal rationality of the capitalist economy to the 
premises of communism. Politically, the totalitarian form of the party-state embodied 
retrieved unity and expressed the general will of the people. The collapse of the state 
into society meant that formally class antagonisms were abolished and political strife 
abandoned, and collective energy thus released for the project of economic prosperity. 
Where fascism explicitly denounced capitalism, at least on the ideological level, in 
communism part of its logic was incorporated in the project of modernisation, as the 
economic organisation of communist society was deemed superior to the capitalist one 
and capable of transcending its problematic features. In communism, ‘capitalist culture’ 
(Gouldner 1980: 213; see also Ray 1996), at least in terms of the primacy o f the 
economy and industrial modernisation, was reproduced.184 The values of efficiency,
184 Thus Walicki on Marx: '[H]e [Marx] was inevitably more hostile to the market than to capitalism 
as a system o f large-scale factory production: the factory was for him a great step forward to 
rational planning and organization, while the market was synonymous with anarchy and blind 
necessity* (Walicki 1995: 6). In a similar vein, Lenin was hostile to the market economy but less so 
to 'capitalism as a mode of production because the latter could assume the form of rationally 
controlled state capitalism' (Walicki 1995: 5).
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bureaucratisation, and calculability were in this sense inherent in any communist 
discourse, although the subordination of this form of formal-instrumental rationality to 
substantive goals and political domination thoroughly changed its overall logic.
The conception of the state in communism and fascism has rightfully been subsumed 
under the definition of a totalitarian state. Neither fascist nor communist states 
recognised the formal division between state and society in liberalism. In communism, 
the state was ultimately expected to wither away, but was revived through its equation 
with Lenin’s vanguard party and Stalin’s re-acknowledgement of the role of the state in 
building socialism. As society re-absorbed the economy, in other words, as it was 
subjected to the control o f the collectivity at large, the state was the instrument through 
which this control was exercised. As the state represented the people in its entirety, state 
intervention knew no limits. The unlimited sphere state action was wedded with an 
understanding of the vanguard party or ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ as constituted by 
professional revolutionaries who had exclusive access to the ultimate and absolute 
knowledge o f history and society (Lefort 1986: 283): ‘The Party embodied the centre of 
knowledge and action; it attracted to itself those who could only theorize, because it was 
theory, and those who could only practise, because it was practice’.
The merger o f state and society, and the formal abandonment of any recognition of 
an autonomous civil society signified the complete identification of the state with 
society. The idea of a social contract as inherent in the civic-political idea of a ‘thin* 
membership of society was explicitly condemned for its resulting ‘egoism’ and its 
inherent incapacity to represent the community as a whole. In this sense, the conception 
of membership in communist discourse could be seen as a ‘thick’ understanding of 
membership, i.e. as a political community whose members shared social solidarity. 
Social solidarity as the primary form of social bond was almost exclusively identified 
with the working class, and only with difficulty applied to the peasantry and 
intellectuals. The elevation o f the working class to the status of the people as such 
provided the means for the creation of boundaries. In other words, the party-state was 
able to identify as ‘class enemy’ or ‘enemy of the people’ those that were deemed a 
direct threat to the unity o f the working class. By the same token, those classes or social 
groups that were deemed socially neutral or potentially co-operative could be identified.
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Modes o f  legitimation
The dominant mode of legitimation or claim to legitimacy made in communist 
programmes was a form of goal-rational legitimation. The claim to transcend the prior 
existing order (either oppressive non-democratic regimes or formal democracies) by 
establishing a more exemplary order based on the 'validity of principal social goals’ 
(egalitarianism, human autonomy, economic prosperity, and in some cases, the 
prosperity of the nation) formed a central and essential element of communist 
discourses (Pakulski 1986: 44). Therefore, the immanent normative nature of the 
promulgated model (communism), as opposed to other societal models, in itself 
conveyed a highly significant form of legitimation. This also meant that formal 
rationality, as the key form of rationality in the bureaucratisation and rationalisation of 
society, was always subsumed to the substantive goals of the project.
These normative values were embodied by the core institution of communist 
systems, the vanguard party or ’dictatorship of the proletariat', which, both as the self- 
defined professional revolutionary movement and as the enlightened élite with 
exclusive access to superior knowledge of the workings of socialist society, claimed 
significant forms of legitimation. As Heller remarks: The Bolshevik Party conceived of 
itself as a revolutionary power, as the embodiment of a complete break with Russian 
tradition* (Feher et al. 1983: 140). The vanguard's role was that of the 'executor of a 
world-historical necessity, of the vanguard of world-revolution, of the repository of the 
future, of the embodiment of the real interests of the proletariat inside and outside 
Russia’ (Feher et al. 1983: 140-1). The imaginary of the vanguard party conveyed the 
absolute values of the communist project, including the image of unity between party 
and society, popular sovereignty, and the promise of a utopian future order (the latter 
was especially true since the vanguard’s role was formally understood as temporary). 
Apart from embodying the absolute normative orientations of the project, by referring to 
a self-created revolutionary tradition the vanguard party could - to a limited extent - 
claim a form of traditional legitimacy (cf. Feher et a l 1983: 140). The party-state, in 
concomitance with the absolute ruler, also claimed a form of charismatic legitimation in 
its allusion to omnipotence, i.e. the absolute, scientifically based knowledge of history 
and the future, and the capacity to bring about a complete transformation of the social 
order (cf. Amason 1993: 105-6; Jowitt 1992; Tarifa 1997: 449-50). Auxiliary modes of
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legitimation - of particular importance in moments of legitimation crisis - were to be 
found in a negative reference either to prior existing regimes or to contemporary 
societies. More important as legitimating 'solutions' was the recourse to substantive 
rationality, i.e. material redistribution (although strictly speaking this is a form of 
political action rather than discursive legitimation), the gradual introduction o f forms of 
formal-legal rationality (as happened intermittently in Eastern Europe from the 1950s 
onwards), and the utilisation of nationalist symbols.
9.2 The Rom anian national Communist project
In the early years of communism (from 1944 onwards), the strategy of 'emulation' 
pursued by the Communist party indicated a strong subordination to the Soviet Union, a 
weak domestic status of the party, and the absence o f a clear ideology and political 
programme (Denize 2002; Jowitt 1971: 102). Although a Romanian Communist 
movement had existed in the interwar period, its party line was the complete 
subordination to the demands of the Communist International (King 1980; Tismàneanu 
2003). Local traditions of Marxist thought were ignored, so that the Communist party 
found itself without any Marxist tradition to drawn on after the Second World War. 
Initially, the legitimation of the Communist project was sought through explicit 
reference to the external Soviet model, based on proletarian internationalism and the 
construction of a classless society. Marxism-Leninism promulgated the emancipation of 
one single class, the working class, while - at least in the early stages of the project - 
national identities were renounced and any validity of national traditions was denied.185 
One might say that in the Communist project, as in the Liberal project, the Romanian 
pathway was heavily informed by a model constituted by 'successful' external 
experience, introduced against dominant local models. As communism was imposed
185 In contrast, as elaborated on above, interwar fascism had above all been legitimated by explicit 
reference to a 'national specificity’, which drew on an ’authentic' national past, denying the 
legitimacy of foreign elements. Although Nazi Germany and fascist Italy provided auxiliary 
underpinnings for the Fascist counterproject, external models never constituted an exclusive 
legitimation for a totalitarian Romanian project, as the Fascist movement had strong national, social 
and ideational roots.
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'from without1 local autonomy remained restricted in its early phase. What is important 
here is that although some national communist parties started out without any strong 
national basis (the Romanian party was the smallest of the region, see Boia 2002), 
through subordination to the Soviet Union they could fortify their national position 
considerably, through local ’ideological unity' and 'bureaucratic cohesion' (see Lefort 
1986: 56). The Soviet model and subordination to it were then not only crucial factors 
in organising local revolutionary élites, but also in providing them with the ideological 
means to oppose either the bourgeoisie or fascist groups in society. The eventually 
recovered autonomy of the Romanian Communist party did, however, not lead to a 
reformist, national pathway of de-Stalinisation, as in Hungary and Poland, but permitted 
the re-activation of interwar autochthonous traditions. A fusion of Stalinism with radical 
nationalism allowed the Ceau§escu-regime to diverge from reformist trends and pursue 
an isolationist and hypercentralised project until 1989.
Crisis narrative
Despite the imposed nature of communism on Romanian society, we can speak of 
(conceptual) continuity and compatibility with the interwar debate on modernity. As 
seen in chapter 5 and 8, anti-liberalism and anti-democratic sentiments were widespread 
in interwar Romania, and not only confined to the political extremes of the extreme left 
and right (cf. Preda 1998). In terms of traditions o f ideas, communism fitted in with a 
general climate of 'cultural pessimism' and not only overlapped with radical viewpoints 
in terms of the critique on Western ideas and institutions (the malfunctioning and 
hypocrisy of democracy), but also offered a radically new solution to the problem of 
modernisation. On the question o f the political order, communism reproached 
democracy for its partial and merely formal representation o f society.186 Democracy was 
perceived as ultimately being an expression of the interests of the bourgeoisie, and 
thereby as continuing in the political sphere the economic exploitation o f the working
186 Communist democratic centralism thus entailed an upgrading of democracy, as, for instance, 
attested to in the Party Program of the Romanian Communist Party of 1974: The incontestable 
superiority of socialist democracy is evermore confirmed in respect to the bourgeois one, which 
limits itself to formally proclaiming certain democratic rights, but which does not assure the 
material conditions and the adequate social framework for their exercise’ (RCP 1975: 165).
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class. Communism further invoked a critique of modem civilisation, which it blamed 
for the destruction of traditional social relations, for contributing to the alienation of 
individuals from society, and for the creation o f continuous disharmony as a result of 
class struggle. The reintegration of the individual into a new community was deemed 
necessary as any human being was essentially a social being. This meant the 'priority of 
society or community over the individual’, conceived within the form of a modem 
socialist nation and state (Bracher 1984: 52, 98). The necessity of creating a new 
community not only revealed communism's departure from liberal society but also its 
continuous reference to liberalism’s main tenets: the unity of the people and government 
by the people formed part of communism's main understanding of society, although the 
liberal understanding of freedom as a form of negative freedom of the individual was 
rejected.187
Regarding problématiques of an economic nature, the communist ideal stressed the 
disharmonious (class antagonism) and exploitative effects of capitalism on society and 
argued for a re-embedding of the economy in society. As opposed to the limited 
adherence to social equality in liberalism, communism made social equality its primary 
objective. Real democracy could only be achieved through the elimination o f inequality, 
which, in turn, could only be realised through the emancipation of the exploited classes,
187 Ceau;escu aptly articulated this conception in 1968, when addressing a general meeting of 
Romanian writers: 'In socialism man becomes free not because he is exempted from the influence of 
social laws, but rather because, understanding their imperative necessity, he acts, in their spirit, for 
the conscious building of society. Therefore, individual liberty does not contradict society's general 
interests, but, on the contrary, serves these interests. Therefore, whenever activities disregarding the 
general interest are registered... society is entitled to take the necessary measures... to prevent 
harming the collective's interests' (cited in: Shafir 1983: 417). Or as stated in the Party Program of 
1974: 'Petty bourgeois liberalism, [with its] concepts of so-called absolute, unlimited freedom, the 
individualist attitudes, which do not take into account the general interests of society, have nothing 
in common with real socialist democracy. The wide development of rights and freedom of citizens 
in the context of our order, [and] the deepening and perfection of socialist democracy cannot be 
perceived outside of the context of the social responsibility of every single person with regard to the 
general interests of society, outside the context of the conscious obligation of everyone to do the 
utmost for the wellbeing and happiness of the entire people, for the cause of socialism and 
communism’ (RCP 1975: 166)
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i.e. the proletariat.188 The liberation of the working class would not only emancipate the 
population in an economic sense, but also in a political one, as economic emancipation 
would end all societal conflicts. The Communists thus argued against liberal-capitalist 
claims for the necessity o f the autonomy of the economy and the functioning o f the 
'blind laws' o f capitalism as the best guarantor of social harmony; their critique was then 
aimed against the institutions in which this autonomy was based (private property, the 
bourgeois state). At the same time, however, in Stalinism the Communists preserved 
and radicalised the capitalist developmental model - based on industrialisation and 
extensive growth - as well as a 'capitalist culture'189. A similar view was held on 
questions of culture. Western rationalism was not countered by a mystical or spiritual 
world-view, as in fascism, but was instead integrated into the communist world-view, 
where the claim was made that communism's deeper understanding of rationalism (in its 
pseudo-scientific knowledge of historical laws through historical materialism and the 
superior rationality of planning) would lead to the transcendence of Western modernity 
and the creation of a superior society, in which the individual would enjoy a fuller kind 
of emancipation. Communism's critique of Western individualism was intimately 
related to a 'new man', who would not be imbued with materialist and egocentric- 
individualist behaviour, but would act from a sense of community and moderation.
The Romanian interpretation o f  communism: national Communism
The singularity of the Romanian pattern of communism consisted of its demand for 
national sovereignty, its perseverance on the Stalinist path, and the re-activation of a 
radically particularist nationalism. A short elaboration on the implications for local 
autonomy of the adoption of the Soviet experience as a local model o f development is 
therefore warranted. Specific elements in Stalinism could function as pretexts for local 
autonomy in the emulating countries. In Romania, the insistence on the right to national
188 In the fascist critique, the problématique was equally perceived as the destructive effects of 
modem society, but the solution (re-embedding) was to be achieved through the national 
community, i.e. by creating 'organic' harmony between classes, whereas communism promoted 
class struggle.
189 That is to say, in Stalinism labour discipline, the intensification of production and increased 
capital investment persisted, as economic activity was deemed the height of modern society (and 
socialist construction) (Gouldner 1980: 212-3).
223
C o m m u n is m  a n d  m o d e r n it y
sovereignty eventually provided the context in which radical nationalism could re- 
emerge.
In its interpretation o f modem society, the Communist project was initially less 
concerned with the integration o f the polity and state-society relations than with the 
construction of a socialist system as such (see Jowitt 1971). The adoption of the Soviet 
model predominantly signified system-building, i.e. its main concern lay in establishing 
the absolute authority of a party leadership that would subsequently control the project 
of constructing socialism 'from above', through innovations such as the 'dictatorship of 
the proletariat' and 'democratic centralism’. Of overriding importance was the creation 
and consolidation of an independent ruling élite/party that would be in a position to 
implement and control the Communist project of modernisation. The project o f 
constructing 'socialism in one country' in itself was strongly identified with 'rapid 
economic development' and 'the sustained mobilization of resources’ (Jowitt 1992: 59- 
61), which pointed to the overriding priority of state-building and the relative 
negligence o f other elements, such as national integration and distributive justice.
In spite o f the uncritical emulation o f the Stalinist model in the local contexts of the 
Eastern European countries, the People's Democracies' established immediately after 
World War II were not and could not be completely subordinated to and absorbed into 
the Soviet Union (Shoup 1962: 889-90). In the first instance, from 1944 until 1947, the 
People's Democracies' were created through the taking over of state power by the 
Communists, but still within the context of a formal democracy. In Romania, the so- 
called National Democratic Front performed this role, a coalition that comprised the 
Romanian Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party and some Communist front 
organisations (King 1980: 49). Once state power was captured, a point of no return was 
reached almost everywhere in Eastern Europe by 1947 (Brus 1977: 242), the process of 
building a socialist society in national contexts was initiated. In addition, after the break 
of the Soviet Union with Yugoslavia in 1948, the Soviet Union policy changed from a 
careful approach to the downright imposition of the Stalinist model. In this, any 
reference to 'national roads to communism* was condemned, leaving little room for 
independent development (Shoup 1962: 890). From that moment on, Stalinism as a 
model became of uttermost importance, in particular in a country such as Romania in 
which a communist tradition was largely absent and the local élite lacked in 'practical
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ideology*. This absence initially led to a highly uncritical emulation of the Stalinist 
model (Jowitt 1971: 102). Nevertheless, in a paradoxical manner, the direct adoption of 
Stalinism and the creation of 'socialism in one country’ laid the foundations for local 
autonomy. As Paul Shoup argues:
In one sense, at least, [the adoption of Stalinism] suggested more, not less power for the new 
Communist states: if the East European nations could duplicate the Soviet performance, they 
might one day become her equals. Imitation of the Soviet Union, after all, did not necessarily 
imply subordination and dependence. It could also mean power and independence for each 
Communist nation separately.
This ambiguity immanent in the Stalinist model of modernisation was exactly the fact 
that eventually allowed a 'national road* to emerge in Romania.190 Indeed, one may go 
as far as to say that in 1948 Stalinisation already corresponded to the aspirations of both 
local and Soviet élites. The fact that the Romanian Communist Party engaged in the 
emulation of the Stalinist experience later enabled it to expand its own local power and 
to hold on to its own - Stalinist - vision of socialist construction. Over time, the 
Communist party was increasingly able to control all forms of power in the domestic 
sphere, as provided by the Leninist concept of the vanguard party. The credo of the 
vanguard party - assigning it a superior knowledge of objective conditions and therefore 
of historical necessities - remained a crucial concept throughout the whole communist 
period. In this way, any opposition outside of the party could be silenced (both 
Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceau§escu made use of this mechanism), and any attempt at crisis 
narration produced by opponents could be repressed. The Communist party, which 
through its absorption of the state and subsequent policies to mobilise and invade 
society in almost all of its facets, established an absolute monopoly on all forms of
190 This immanent quality of the Stalinist model has been aptly described by Arnason (1993: 133): 
‘. ..th e  Soviet centre insisted on the reproduction of basic structures of the model within each unit 
of the bloc. The emphasis was, in other words, on conformity and homogeneity rather than 
integration. But when the balance of power between the centre and the periphery was upset by crises 
or conflicts within the imperial apparatus, small-scale versions of the Soviet model could serve as a 
basis for separate strategies. An institutional complex that had originally taken shape in an imperial 
context and continued to embody an imperial logic was, in such cases, adapted to the more limited 
purposes of states in quest of autonomy from the imperial centre and trying to maximize both their 
power over their own societies and their position in the international arena'.
2 2 5
C o m m u n is m  a n d  m o d e r n it y
power and ideological truth. Although changes in the form of leadership could be 
discerned in almost all Soviet societies from Stalin's death in 1953 onwards (from 
autocratic to oligarchic rule), the basic prerogative and initiative always remained in the 
hands of the party.
Apart from the fact that 'socialism in one country' provided local élites with an 
organisational model and legitimacy, it also gave them the opportunity to protect and 
further national (economic and political) interests.191 As such, the Stalinist 
developmental model could be regarded as a model o f national autarchy. In this sense, 
'socialism in one country’ identified itself with the vision of the 'nation-state as a vehicle 
of progress', i.e. 'as the most effective socio-political mechanism by which change can 
be stimulated or channelled by a ruling élite or dominant class' (Shoup 1962: 887). The 
vision of the nation-state as the vehicle of progress was from the early 1960s onwards 
defended as the national Romanian model against interference from other communist 
countries and especially from the Soviet centre. The Stalinist model changed not so 
much in its social goals, but in the way it was defended: it could no longer be 
implemented by way of emulation, as the Soviets had changed course. It was instead 
defended by reference to the right of national self-determination and by the explicit 
interpretation of 'socialism in one country’ for the common good. National Communism 
in the Romanian context implied the furthering of the nation-state through socialist 
construction, and in the process it opened up as well as necessitated new modes of 
legitimation. As Jowitt (1971: 220) has argued: Prom  one point o f view the 
commitment to industrialization mediated Gheorghiu-Dej's increasing appreciation of 
the nation-state. In turn, the "conditioned" value placed on the nation-state (by reason of 
its relation to  continued industrialization) provided both an increasing legitimacy for the 
nation-state and a core around which other socio-political forces, having a more
191 In the communist project, a logic in which industrialisation became an end in itself (Gouldner 
1980: 217) seemed to have been set free, especially in the period of subordination to and emulation 
o f the Soviet centre. However, in reality this logic could co-exist with the idea of national 
sovereignty, thus serving the goal of collective autonomy. This ambiguity remained present in 
Stalinism as its dynamics could serve both socialism and the concentration of local power: 
'Stalinism is a social system in which industrialization becomes the key criterion of socialism's 
achievement and its legitimacy, and whose aim is the power of the new state rather than the 
contentment and welfare of its citizenry1 (Gouldner 1980: 217-8).
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complete appreciation of the role and value of the nation-state, could gather.' Nationalist 
symbols became increasingly important in defending the pursuit of a Stalinist 
developmental model and the conservative stance taken against revisionist projects 
emerging elsewhere in Eastern Europe, to 'preserve precisely those values, symbols and 
institutions questioned by the proponents of "socialism with a human face'” 
(Tismaneanu 1999: 167). The internal corollary of this highly defensive stance was the 
prevention of the emergence o f  rival élites or the loss o f power of the centre, while 
painting a utopian image of a 'multilaterally developed socialist society' (see Palade 
2000:107-8).
I will analyse the shift from emulation to national autonomy to national isolationism 
by means of my conceptual model, consisting of the three concepts of cultural 
inspiration, political foundations, and socio-political practices.
1. Cultural inspiration. Whereas the interwar Fascist project had promulgated a radical 
particularist alternative to the Liberal project of modernisation, thereby eschewing any 
kind of universalistic logic, since society could only be founded on local values, the 
Communist project substituted the universalistic pretensions of liberalism for the 
equally universalistic claims of Marxism-Leninism. It was because of its universalistic 
pretensions that Stalinism could relatively easily supplant local discourses and offer a 
'practical ideology' to social forces that opposed the status quo. The nationalist turn in 
Romanian Communism was then not so much a questioning of the universal validity of 
the main tenets of Stalinism, but a critique of the proposed subordination of the national 
interest to the supranational common good, i.e., of the Soviet Union and the more 
advanced satellite states. Initially, the nationalist turn was about the right to persevere in 
following the original Stalinist model. The insistence on the right to national 
sovereignty and independence in deciding the national course opened, however, the 
possibility not so much for a critique of the universalism inherent in Stalinism, but for a 
fusion of its universalistic tenets with a purely national and ultimately particularistic 
model.
On the one hand, Ceau$escuism contained claims that went beyond the national 
context, i.e., it promoted a world order in which it was the strength o f the individual 
nation-states that guaranteed universal harmony. On the other hand, there were strong
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tendencies towards isolationism, the rejection of any extraneous influence (both in the 
form of capitalist and Soviet imperialism), and an absolute commitment to distinct 
national values. In other words, a discourse o f world unity through the unity of nation­
states was paralleled by a radical particularist model in which anything beyond the 
national context lost all value (cf. Jowitt 1971: 233-292). The latter tendency moved the 
Romanian Communist project towards isolationism and autarchy, through the refusal to 
interact or ’compete’ with other societies (Martin 2002b, c). The inward turn signified 
the re-activation of popular and rural traditions, and an essentialisation of national 
culture through the promulgation o f  distinct national origins (the Dacian independent 
central state') and a continuous and unified national history (Deletant 1998; Verdery 
1991).
2. Political foundations. The early phase of Stalinism in Romania contained an idea 
of individual emancipation that went beyond the national context and underlined 
international class cohesion. Individual liberation was directly linked up with the 
liberation o f the working class. The ultimate legitimation of the construction o f socialist 
society was its potential for a more complete form of individual emancipation. The 
Romanian project - as in the other Eastern European countries - linked this 
emancipation directly to the abolition of private property and a collective drive towards 
industrialisation.192 The national context in which the industrialisation process was 
initiated provided an ’objective', almost instrumentally perceived framework for the 
construction of communism. This universalist idea of individual emancipation through 
the establishment of communism remained a key factor in Communist discourse, both 
after the nationalist tum in the early 1960s and during Ceau§escuism.193
192 Gheorghiu-Dej, the first General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, formulated the 
emancipatory aspect as follows: T o  the existence of a developed industry is connected the existence 
o f the working class which represents a guarantee of the democratization of public life, a guarantee 
of the liquidation of feudalism and landlords' (cited in: Jowitt 1971:110).
193 The Party Program of 1974 affirmed this in the following way: ’Communism does not lead, 
cannot lead to petty bourgeois levelling; to the contrary, it guarantees the best conditions for the 
affirmation of the human personality, for the affirmation of the creative force of any single 
individual. Freed from exploitation, working for himself and for society, being guaranteed all the 
conditions of affirmation, in an equal way, in every sector, man becomes really free and master of
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With the nationalist turn of the early 1960s, the emphasis in Communist discourse 
was placed on the idea o f collective negative liberty, i.e., the idea of the right to national 
sovereignty of every socialist state, equal rights between states, and the principle of 
non-interference. The argument for collective negative liberty - the removal of 
constraints on socialist nations preventing them from deciding their own course - 
consisted of the novel idea that the best way to realise communism in single countries 
was not to emulate as far as possible the Soviet model, but to pursue national paths in 
which internal possibilities could be used to their fullest. As stated in the Party 
Programme of 1974, 'the program of the Romanian Communist party indicates the ways 
for the application of [the universal laws of the theory of the proletarian revolution] in a 
creative way, [according to] the concrete historical, social, and national conditions of 
Romania' (RCP 1975: 92). This argument in itself had implications for the international 
movement of communism. The unity and solidarity among socialist nations was no 
longer perceived as the basis for national sovereignty, it was instead the independent 
development o f singular states that was said to lead to a strong international movement. 
In other words, whereas before the parts were only expressions of the larger whole, they 
were now deemed to constitute that whole (cf. Jowitt 1971:236).
The claim for independence and emphasis on non-interference pointed to possible 
diversity in the development of socialism in singular countries. In principle, this 
argument does not determine an approach in which national diversity becomes the 
absolute priority in the political project. To argue for relative variety in ’roads to 
socialism’ does not necessarily imply the assertion of national diversity over 
internationalist values. The latter was however the case in Romanian national 
Communism, as the nationalist turn led to the re-emergence of nationalist values which 
were firmly embedded in local culture. The re-assertion of national values and thus the 
re-activation of national traditions ultimately resulted in the domination of nationalism 
over communism. Ceau§escuism entailed a sui generis ideological fusion of the main 
tenets of Stalinism and nationalism.
On the one hand, it was claimed that 'the interest for the flourishing of the socialist 
nation and of the national independent state cannot be contrary in any way to the
his own destiny. This coincides with the freedom of the whole nation and of all mankind’ (RCP 
1975: 191).
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development of collaboration, solidarity and reciprocal aid between the socialist 
countries, that the preoccupation for the reinforcement of the national state cannot be 
contrary to proletarian internationalism' (RCP 1975: 175). In this line of thought one 
can also read the concept of the 'socialist nation'.194 On the other hand, however, 
Ceau$escuism entailed a strong emphasis on the particularism of national values, 
national diversity, and the national essence. In the more radical understanding o f 
nationalism, national values served as the basis of national unity and integration, and 
were defined in contrast to the imposition o f exogenous values. The conservation and 
development o f these essential values tended to become more important than the project 
of socialism. The Romanian Communist Party criticised any infringement of national 
rights and rights to nationalism: 'Experience shows that the nation [and] the national 
state have not yet concluded their role in the scene of history, in the developed capitalist 
nations. The attempts to limit or negate the role of the nation, to ignore historical reality 
cannot lead to anything else than the stimulation of social and political contradictions. 
The tendency to enforce the dissolution of national states to subsequently pass to a 
formation o f supranational organisms is in substance a new form of aspiration to 
dominate other peoples, an attempt to mask class oppression, to derail the popular 
masses from the struggle for the revolutionary transformation of society’ (RCP 1975:
194 The Mie Dictionar Enciclopedie (Small Encyclopaedic Dictionary) of 1972 defined the nation as 
follows: ’Nation. Historical form of human community, characterised by a community of language, 
territory, economic life, and physical style, which manifests itself, in essence, in a national cultural 
community and in the consciousnes of common origins and destiny. Bourgeois Nation -  first type 
of historical nation, appeared in the enduring conditions of the capitalist relations of production; 
divided in antagonistic classes, in which the bourgeoisie has a dominant role. With the scope of 
consolidating and defending its class position, this [class] instigates and maintains national discord 
by propagating nationalism and chauvinism. Socialist Nation = new, superior type of nation, 
constituted on a qualitatively different economic, political, and ideological base, bom in the process 
of the socialist revolution, in which the leading force is represented by the working class [which is] 
led by the marxist-leninist party. It is characterised by social homogeneity, a community of 
interests, and the fundamental aspirations of one class and friendly social strata. The victory of 
socialism has created the full conditions for its affirmation and multilateral development. The 
flourishing of every socialist nation represents an essential demand on which the strengthening of 
unity and cohesion of the socialist countries depends, increasing their influence over the advance of 
the whole mankind towards socialism' (1972: 618).
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174; cf. Ceau§escu 1973a, b). The primary object of the Romanian Communist project 
was the collective rather than the individual. In the phase of emulation the collective 
was constituted by the 'most progressive force': the working class (always perceived as 
in alliance with the peasantry, and often as supported by intellectuals). In the national 
Communist phase, the working class was increasingly understood as the 'exponent of 
the entire nation’ (Ceau§escu 1973a: 74), whereas later the nation came to substitute the 
proletariat entirely (cf. Gabanyi 2000).
3. Socio-political practices. Three key 'logics' underpinned the Communist project of 
the reconstruction of society: the construction of communist society (in itself 
predominantly based on the one-sided 'myth' o f industrialisation); the totalistic vision of 
the party-state; and the ’myth' of national continuity.
The core feature of any Communist project was its adherence to the 'industrial 
mythology' (Boia 2002). The nineteenth-century model of industrial society constituted 
the basis of a new and allegedly qualitatively superior societal form. The transformation 
of the economy was envisaged in terms o f accelerated industrialisation and the 
collectivisation of agriculture, and both as (inter-related) expressions of communism's 
'revolt against backwardness', and its promise to surpass capitalist systems in terms of 
productivity. In fact, as in the previous projects of modernisation, a major element of 
the Communist project was competition with societies that were deemed more 
advanced. The Communist project tried to formulate an answer to the negative aspects 
of capitalist society - in this sense adhering to particular crisis narrations of liberal 
capitalist society - and therefore to transcend it. The Soviet model did not only provide 
local élites with a mixture of criticism/crisis narration on capitalism and its liberal 
ideology, but also built on a revived sentiment of'backwardness'.195 Crisis narration and 
competition with the West were thus major drives behind communism’s extreme 
emphasis on economic progress and concomitant industrialisation.196 A further
195 This was best expressed in Ceau§escu's adoption of the label 'developing country1 for Romania.
196 As noted by Ray: 'the spatial organization of the world into more and less developed regions 
coincided with a temporal sequence, through which different societies were situated along a 
developmental continuum. As a consequence, according to Marx, the more developed country 
industrially shows the less developed the image of its own future (Marx 1978: 416). This 
assumption is relevant to the Soviet experience (and to developing countries for which the Soviet
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consideration behind the absolute, and thus substantive, commitment to the 
rationalisation o f the economy -  along with the critical and developmental ones - was 
the consideration of its emancipatory potential, i.e. its promise to rid society o f 
traditional constellations (what Jowitt calls 'breaking through', 1971). Economic 
considerations were complemented by aspirations to destroy prior existing social 
relations and to construct a new society in the name of the collective, and based on the 
equal distribution of material benefits and employment. In this, the Communist project 
of modernisation involved a firm commitment to the substantive goals of emancipation 
and progress through the profound transformation (in terms of value commitments) and 
industrialisation of society.
The transplantation o f the Stalinist model to the national context further signified the 
recreation o f a revolutionary élite, whose messianic mission was based on an alleged 
insight into the ’objective' needs o f the working class, a superior knowledge of the laws 
of history, and a self-identification as a revolutionary élite.197 But perhaps more 
important was the pretence o f the revolutionary élite, carried on later in the 
institutionalised form o f the party-state, to be the emanation of the collectivity, 
understood either as class or as nation. The Communist project can be read as a political 
project to further unity, harmony, and integration, against the differentiating and 
disintegrating forces of modem capitalist society (cf. Amason 1998). Whereas in the 
early years of Romanian Communism the defence of the collective interest was tied to 
the universalist objectives of the international communist movement, in the later phase 
of national Communism the collective interest was increasingly defined in narrow,
system was regarded as exemplary) where the goal was to compress this time difference through 
accelerated industrialization. In the process, moreover, Soviet communism would not only 
overcome its temporal distance from the West, but would surpass it, to create a new civilization that 
prefigured the future of Western societies themselves’ (Ray 1996:16).
197 One of the many relevant statements here is: T he tasks related to the realisation of the historical 
mission of the proletariat in the new society necessitate the organisational and political association 
of the working class, the establishment of a unitary marxist-leninist vanguard party of the working 
class. The creation of a unitary party of the working class - the Romanian Workers Party - was a 
significant victory of the revolutionary forces of our country and fulfilled an urgent historical 
necessity, required by the struggle for the conquest of power and socialist conversion of the 
Romanian society' (Ceau$escu 1971 [1967]: 62).
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particularist terms. By insisting on its role in defending and enhancing the unity of the 
Romanian people through the continuous oppression and elimination of disharmonious 
elements in society the Romanian Communist party was able to continue in its position 
as the leading force as well as to indigenise the Communist project. The party became 
the leading force in the realisation of both social and national emancipation. 
Paradoxically, the responsibility and the leading role of the party increased as ideal of 
the socialist society was approached, whilst at the same time it proclaimed an evermore 
organic unity with the people.
The indigenisation o f communism was achieved by a revision of history in national 
Communism. The establishment o f socialism was no longer to be conceived as an 
absolute break with the old, with the preceding order, but was now seen as the outcome 
of a logical, historical continuation of the struggle for national liberation. The struggle 
for liberation was traced back to the Daco-Roman origins o f the Romanian nation and 
Romanian history reread as the 'history of continuous class struggle, o f the struggle led 
by the popular masses for freedom and social justice, for the defence of the national 
entity and independence for progress and civility' (RCP 1975: 94-5). The emulation of 
the Stalinist model was encapsulated into the nationalist project for autonomy. The main 
logic of the former, industrialisation, was now understood as not only a way to 
overcome economic backwardness and to achieve social justice, but equally as a means 
towards the realisation of national independence and sovereignty (RCP 1975: 118). The 
Communist project became increasingly a project of ‘nationalising nationalism' as 
national interest was equated with the interest of the ethnic majority. The archetypal 
member o f the national Communist society was a combination of the New Man 
(scientific knowledge, dedicated to the construction of Communism), ethnic Romanian 
( ‘autochthonous-patriotic feelings’), and proletarian (or peasant, rather than intellectual) 
(cf. Gabanyi 2000).
Changing m odes o f  legitimation
Apart from domestic legitimation, i.e. Communism's explicit confrontation with the 
prior modem projects (liberalism and fascism) in Romanian society and its mission to 
undo and transform their most distinctive elements, communism was, simultaneously, 
an attempt to compete with other contemporary societies in terms of human
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emancipation and socio-economic progress, as well as an attempt to enhance the 
collective autonomy of its ’own' society in the international system. In this sense, we can 
roughly distinguish between a need for legitimation in the domestic sphere (in order to 
justify the Communist project over other 'available1 projects) and a roughly comparable 
need in the international sphere, both to define its position towards the Soviet Union 
and, in more systemic terms, to enhance its status in terms of political and socio­
economic development (cf. Holmes 1993: 24-25).
Within the need for domestic legitimation one can distinguish various modes of 
legitimation that define the relationship between the ruling élite and the bureaucracy as 
well as between the ruling élite and society at large. It was the external nature of their 
ideology that caused a major problem for the East European élites in terms o f domestic 
legitimation, in other words, the Soviet model was in dire need of rejustification within 
the domestic context.198 Relative and temporary rejustification in the Romanian context 
were achieved in a number of ways. First o f all, the absolute values pursued in the 
Soviet project were presented as of direct relevance in the Romanian context. Initially, 
local relevance was not expressed in terms of enhanced local autonomy or the 
consolidation of the Romanian nation. But the transposition of the theory of class 
struggle as the motor of history could be effectively used against claim to legitimacy by 
the interwar political parties. The absolute values of Soviet communism (the building of 
socialism; the transcendence of capitalism; the transcendence of class antagonism) 
clearly had their historical-situational relevance in post-war Romania. In the Romanian 
case, particular components of Marxism-Leninism (the universal role o f the working 
class, a supersession of 'anachronistic' nationalism by universalism) were at a later stage 
displaced by nationalist symbols, significantly changing the absolute values of the 
project. The socialist nation in Romanian Communism metamorphosed into a historical
198 Féher et a l (1983: 137-8) claim that the communist regimes in Eastern Europe faced a 
’permanent legitimation crisis', because the system was only endorsed by a very small number of 
people (in essence the ruling élite) and the population had an exemplary alternative image of society 
in the form of Western society. One might question the permanent nature of legitimation crises (see 
Holmes 1993), as the East European communist societies continued to persist also after direct 
Soviet influence decreased. One could say that East European societies were more exposed to 
nationalism and Westernism, and therefore more susceptible to crises of legitimation (see Amason 
1993: 145).
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stage in the rapprochement of the socialist ideal. Secondly, the self-identification of the 
local Communist party with the Soviet model enabled a reproduction of the legitimating 
elements of the Stalinist experience. Thus, reference to the revolutionary credentials of 
the ruling élite served to reproduce the logic of the vanguard party within the national 
context. This also meant that within the ruling party itself, one could distinguish an 
’aristocracy’ which had been intimately involved in bringing about the revolution. In 
Trotsky's words, theirs was the 'primogeniture in the Revolution* (Fehér et al. 1983: 
169). In the Romanian context this primogeniture enhanced the position of the 'native 
group' of Gheorghiu-Dej as they had lived in illegality in Romania during the war, 
whereas others, such as Ana Pauker, had been in Moscow.199 The vanguard party can be 
seen as taking up a domestic project of modernisation by claiming its superior role in 
identifying such a project.200 Related to the 'vanguard' position of the ruling élite was its 
superior knowledge of social-historical laws and interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. 
By claiming its absolute superiority in these fields, it could legitimate the totalitarian 
control of society.
199 The myth of a ’patriotic group' in the history of the Romanian Communist Party and its role in 
the coup d'état that overthrew Antonescu's military dictatorship formed an important part of the 
constitutive myth, and gave Gheorghiu-Dej a powerful argument in his struggle with contending 
élites (King 1980: 39-46).
200 In the Marxist-Leninist ideology one finds a notion of urgency, as it perceived the class struggle 
as being in an acute phase and thus the necessity for immediate action was warranted (by a 
vanguard party/élite that understood this acuteness). The understanding of history in Marxism- 
Leninism - in the form of 'historical materialism* - emphasised the historical role of one class, the 
proletariat, in realising socialist society. As the proletariat was deemed not yet capable of 
representing its own interests (as it was indeed often almost non-existent in the East European 
societies), the party would (temporarily) replace it in the pursuit of the overall socialist project 
(which was ultimately considered a 'natural' end to history anyway). The tenet of the vanguard party 
in the Marxist-Leninist vision of the creation of a modem society had far-reaching consequences for 
the interpretation as a whole, as it perceived party sovereignty as a goal in itself (Fehér et a l 1983: 
187), and as necessary the complete subordination of society to its will. This meant that party 
interference in any aspect of society - economic, political, social or cultural - was warranted from 
the point of view of the 'superior knowledge' the party possessed. This kind of 'social holism* 
provided legitimation for the reproduction of the ruling élite's power in communist societies, in 
certain contexts leading to autocracy as all visionary power was possessed by one person (in the 
case of Stalin or Ceau$escu), in others to more collective forms of rule.
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A third mode of legitimation in the Communist project was negative legitimation,201
i.e. highlighting the lack of legitimacy of prior existing regimes as well as current 
contenders. All communist parties were in this sense referring explicitly to their own 
anti-fascist credentials and their superior performance in terms of social equality and 
human emancipation, and ultimately the alleged transcendence of capitalism by the 
Communist project. A fourth mode of rejustifying the Soviet model in the domestic 
context was the invocation of traditional legitimation, i.e. showing the continuity of the 
Communist project with local ideas and practices. In Romania, this was particularly 
visible in the national Communist phase, when Ceau$escu likened his own person to 
other great persons from the past (for instance, $tefan cel Mare (a unifier avant-la-lettre 
of the Romanian lands), or even 19th century Liberals such as Balcescu), and also in the 
tendency for Romanian producers of culture to be reassessed by the Communists as 
socialist thinkers avant-la-lettre\ Mihail Eminescu's allegedly socialist writings are a 
case in point. These various elements of domestic legitimation obviously had different 
meanings and weight through time and could be evoked simultaneously. For instance, 
whereas the notion of vanguard party was probably more important in the initial stages 
of communism (as a constitutive myth, see Amason 1993), elements of traditional 
legitimacy and goal-rationality (both articulated by means of national symbols) came to 
the surface in later moments of crisis.
i  -
2011 use the concept of negative legitimation in a sense similar to that of Feher et al. (1983: 182), i.e. 
pointing out an alleged superiority of the socialist model. Ray's minimal concept of legitimacy 
(1996: 86) - which he in fact borrows from Feher et al. - also refers to a negative conception of 
legitimacy, but in the sense of a passive acceptance of the regime by the population, which does not 
have recourse to any image of an alternative political order.
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9.3 The strategic-institutional programme of national C om m unism
If the communist programme of modernisation was essentially an universalist and 
internationalist one, pre-empting specific local or national concerns, its main premises 
were eventually embedded in the local contexts in which its promissory creed was 
executed. The role national traditions played in indigenising communism should not be 
underestimated. The Romanian transition from Stalinism to national Communism is a 
case in point. The Romanian reaction to de-Stalinisation and reformist discourses reveal 
how in particular interwar definitions of the 'national specificity* and understandings of 
modernisation could re-emerge and be reactivated against what were perceived as 
tendencies of erosion of national autonomy. By means of the construction of a syncretic 
discourse consisting of communist ideology and radical particularist and nationalist 
traditions (I differ here from Verdery's view that communism was completely subsumed 
under a nationalist course, Verdery 1991), the Romanian Communists created a highly 
specific national project, in which the continuation of a programme based on a 
'quantity-driven* economic project and the centralisation and dedifferentiation of 
political authority was pursued in name of the particular good of the nation and its 
essential values.202
Cognitive prescriptions
1. Societal progress. In the phase o f emulation, Romanian Communism was fully 
committed to rapid and comprehensive industrialisation. The priority of its model of 
modernisation was the complete transformation of the dominantly rural economy into 
an industrialised, urbanised economy. Its particular (Stalinist) model of modernisation 
prescribed that small producers were to be replaced by large-scale agricultural 
collectives and state farms and industrial production was to be organised in extensive 
industrial complexes (cf. RCP 1975: 118; 120-24). This was not merely a strategy of 
'catching-up* with the West by means of an organised offensive of centrally led 
economic modernisation, but entailed a reading of societal progress as an ever closer 
rapprochement to the ideal of a communist society. The latter was not merely
202 Rather than being the ‘vanguard of the proletariat’ the party embodied the ‘vital center of the
nation’.
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understood as a society in which economic scarcity (and thus the social question) was 
abolished; its concomitant effects were at least as significant. The complete harmony o f 
society was counterposed to the class conflict and exploitation of the subordinated 
classes in capitalist societies. Perhaps more importantly, the revolution was deemed to  
result in the creation of a ’new man', which was qualitatively different from the egoistic, 
bourgeois man of capitalist society. In most aspects, the communist revolution 
constituted a discontinuation o f capitalist society and an alleged transcendence of its 
major complications. This utopian vision of future society was based on a ‘social 
scientific’ reading of history, which made it possible to identify the general laws o f 
societal change and therefore the ‘conscious regulation ex ante of all economic 
processes’ (Walicki 1995: 452). In this way, the anarchy of the capitalist market 
economy could be overcome by the full rational control of society and the possibility o f 
carefully planning a perfect society came within grasp o f humanity.
In the subsequent phase of national Communism, societal progress was not merely 
read as the abolishment of material scarcity, the elimination of social antagonism, and 
the eradication of bourgeois values; these priorities were now understood within the 
context o f national independence and self-rule. Societal progress was not only read as 
the ever increasing rational control over the forces of nature and society, but also as the 
increasing autonomy and self-rule of the (Romanian) nation: ‘Life demonstrates that 
socialism is the most advanced social order known to mankind, capable of assuring to 
any people full social and national liberation, the edification of a free future, according 
to a people’s own aspirations’ (RCP 1975: 90). The nation was now equated with 'a 
strong factor of progress and civilization in the world’ (Ceau$escu 1973a: 73).
2. Collective self-determination. The most decisive rupture resulting from the 
communist 'revolution from without' was the apparent abandonment of any project of 
national autonomy. As the reconstruction of society was exclusively based on a 
conception o f 'proletarian internationalism' and subordination to the demands and needs 
of the Soviet Union, one could not speak of any modernisation in the sense it is used in 
this study, i.e., as a project to reconstruct society in such a way as to achieve local self- 
rule in one form or the other. Not only was the societal transformation based on a fully 
extraneous model, the Stalinist one, the political project was also instigated on the 
explicit premises of allegiance to a project with supranational aspirations. Nevertheless,
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one needs to go beyond these explicit features of the Communist project in Romania to 
reveal a different, latent manifestation of autonomy. Some drive for autonomy was 
immanent in the project of ’socialism in one country' and the absolute priority for 
national industrialisation.203 By emphasising the necessity of building communism first 
in the national context, the interpretive space was created for a later re-assertion of 
local, collective self-rule. Gheorghiu-Dej's drive for industrialisation could be seen as a 
composite of two aspirations: on the one hand, to strictly implement the Stalinist line 
dictated by Moscow, and on the other, to achieve what Jowitt calls a 'break-through', 
i.e., the 'decisive alteration or destruction of values, structures and behaviors which are 
perceived by a revolutionary élite as comprising or contributing to the actual or 
potential existence of alternative centers of political power' (Jowitt 1971: 7). The latter 
clearly has primarily domestic implications.
The eventual transformation o f  Romanian Communism into an explicitly national­
ist) project was, however, by no means completely pre-determined. Only through the 
coming together of relatively contingent events and enduring tendencies (such as the 
demands for supranational division of labour, the Sino-Soviet split, and the 
perseverance of the Romanian élite) could the explicit commitment to a national project 
emerge. The national line initiated by Gheorghiu-Dej entailed the explicit demand for 
local self-rule, expressed in the call for 'non-interference' and the right to national self- 
determination. In essence, the independent line of Gheorghiu-Dej consisted of the 
aspiration to persist in a national Stalinist line, without giving in to either trends of dé­
stalinisation or supranational division of labour. To defend this policy, Gheorghiu-Dej 
invoked the right to national self-determination of the socialist states, the complete 
sovereignty of national communist parties, and condemned the right of interference in 
national matters of any supranational entity (Schöpflin 1974: 80). Collective self-rule 
was thus interpreted as the local authority to set one's own rules, independent of the 
course of other states. Self-rule was to be guaranteed by a form of 'constitutional
203 This is not to say that one should read history in a teleological way (as is strongly denounced by 
Shafir, 1985), and conclude that the early Communist project necessarily had to evolve into a 
distinct nationalist project. My argument here is that despite of the internationalist character of early 
communism in Romania, an implicit assumption of local autonomy was contained in 'socialism in 
one country* and could therefore emerge in particular circumstances.
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independence’, i.e., the strict compliance of the socialist states to international norms o f  
national sovereignty.
Gheorghiu-Dej interpreted the nation primarily as a context for industrialisation and 
the realisation of a communist society (the nation as a 'vehicle of progress'). Ceau$escu’s 
national Communism (or Ceau$ism) comprised more than only a claim for national 
independence, in the sense that nationalism became an integral part o f the socialist 
project. Thus the nation was not only the pre-text for the 'communisation' o f society, but 
was converted into an explicit objective of the project of modernisation. Whereas under 
Gheorghiu-Dej the official line was 'national in form, socialist in content', under 
Ceau$escu it became 'socialist in form, nationalist in content' (SchOpflin 1974: 93). The 
defence and the thriving of particular national values became the primary objective o f 
the search for national self-determination. Although society was mobilised around the 
objective o f industrialisation, the ultimate end was the emancipation of the nation. Not 
only the independence of the nation was claimed, but the nation was also fully 
reconciled with the socialist project, which was deemed a superior way of emancipating 
the nation:
... the party considers it necessary that new relations between nations and states will be 
established, relations based on the full equality of rights, on full reciprocal respect for 
independence, on the right of every people to develop according to its own will (RCP 1975:
172).
... the role of the nation in history is not yet finished. Rather, practical reality shows clearly that 
the nation and the national state are destined to have, still for a long period of time, a role of 
primary importance in society... communists, revolutionaries and progressive forces have die 
obligation to combat adequately for the consolidation of the nation, of the national states that 
declare themselves in favour of a free and independent development (RCP 1975: 173).
Socialism continues the development of the nation started in the bourgeois epoch and creates 
the conditions for the full realisation of the people's national life. The socialist revolution and 
the construction of a new societal order free the creativity o f the people from its chains and 
open up an epoch of national awaking in the life of every country, [as well as] the powerful 
manifestation of patriotic sentiments among the masses (Ceau§escu 1971 [1966]: 27).
The syncretism of Marxism-Leninism and nationalism found its clearest expression 
when the Ceau§escu-regime formed a discursive coalition with a group of radical 
nationalist intellectuals. This group of so-called 'proto-chronists* or 'nationalist
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dogmatists' had accepted Ceau§escu's guided liberalisation of 1971 mostly because of 
its 'nationalistic overtones' (Shafir 1983: 418), and promoted a vision of Romanian 
culture that was to have significant implications outside of the field o f culture. The 
proto-chronist vision basically postulated the anticipation in Romanian culture of major 
developments in the more recognised Western European cultures, claiming a variety of 
innovations and discoveries in the cultural field.204 Although proto-chronism started out 
as a literary doctrine, its main tenets had strong political implications, not only because 
of the closeness to political power of some of its protagonists, but more importantly 
because of the affinity of its arguments with Ceau§escu's course of isolationist 
nationalism. The proto-chronist doctrine included a renewed attention for ’national 
specificity' and the 'national essence', and the organic development of Romanian culture 
which was to be protected from harmful external influences. The domination of Western 
culture was rejected in favour of the local creation of culture; Romanian culture was 
perceived as self-sufficient, having the potential of being created on the basis o f self­
generated values (Martin 2002b). The proto-chronist model for cultural autarchy had a 
strong affinity with Ceau§escu's search for economic and political autarchy. At the same 
time, important tenets of the interwar radical nationalist and fascist discourse were re- 
articulated, be it in a different context and without necessarily re-activating all o f its 
elements (cf. Verdery 1991: 168). Proto-chronism stressed, as interwar fascism, the 
necessity of preserving essential values of the Romanian nation, although mysticism 
and religion were largely absent. Essential values were often identified with popular and 
rural culture. Additionally, the autonomous development of Romanian culture, 
safeguarded against the nefarious influences from both the Western and Soviet sides, 
was a principal argument. Proto-chronism further implied some sort of cultural 
revolution, in which cultural, ideological purity and authenticity were asserted against 
importation, but which in itself also 'upgraded' the importance of culture in wider 
society.205 Finally, proto-chronism shared with fascism its preoccupation with the 
'organic' continuity of Romanian culture and the concern with prior achievements of 
'heroic' Romanians.
204 See for the emergence and spread of the theory: Gabanyi 2000; Martin 2002a-c; Verdery 1991.
205 As one of the major participants in protochronism stated: 'Can one speak of real independence if 
a nation is prevented... from exercising its right to culture? (cited in: Verdery 1991:178).
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3. Political representation and control. The Communist project in Romania aimed at 
the realisation of two primary objectives: first of all (and from the very beginning of its 
implementation), the construction of a socialist society; and, secondly, the realisation o f  
national independence and autonomy. The transformation of rural, bourgeois society 
into an independent socialist nation was held possible through the institutionalisation o f  
mainly three organisational innovations: a: the creation of a vanguard party; b. the 
ensurance of the participation o f the people; and, c. the vertical hiérarchisation o f  
society.
The creation of ‘a party of a new type’ or vanguard party was the most significant 
practical innovation in Marxism-Leninism. Formally, the vanguard party constituted the 
expression of the rule of the working class (the ’dictatorship of the proletariat'), and its 
institution was seen as a historical necessity in the transitory phase of the construction 
of socialist society. At the same time, it embodied a radical organisational innovation as 
it concentrated all political authority in a small political unit, and it congregated all 
knowledge in this unit, making the vanguard the only possible source of knowledge o f 
society and thus the only issuer of directives for social change. The totalistic 
interpretation of the working class as the ’most revolutionary force in society' and of the 
party-state as its direct representation meant that the representation of any other political 
force206, and any form o f contestation was denied.207 In addition, as the party was both 
one with the people (and could thus express the people's unified will)208 and at the same 
time was its guiding force, its penetration of societal spheres knew no limits.
The Communist party's guiding role comprised therefore not only the 'normal' sphere 
of politics, regarding the co-ordination and direction o f  society, but also the unlimited 
mobilisation of society for the objective o f economic development as well as the 
subordination of all cultural production to its political objectives; the party was ‘the co­
206 The working class was often depicted as in alliance with the peasantry and the intellectuals (see, 
for instance, RCP 1975: 112), which meant that their interests were seen as completely coinciding 
with those of the working class.
207 In ideological terms, this was stated by the RCP in 1969 as follows: 'There can be no field in 
theoretical thought or in the activity of the propagation of ideas, in which the presence of the party 
does not appear explicitly' (RCP 1971 [1969]: 83).
208 As Amason remarks: 'the definition of the party as the only authentic representative of the people 
relativizes the principle of popular sovereignty without openly rejecting it' (1993: 106).
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ordinating centre o f all the sectors of economic and social life’ (RCP 1975: 156). The 
primary task o f the party vis-à-vis society was the augmentation of the socialist 
consciousness o f the masses and the complete mobilisation of the latter for the 
construction o f socialist society. In the transitory phase, the directing role of the party 
necessarily had to increase to ultimately bring about the complete fusion of the 
members of the party with the masses, by bringing the masses up to the level of 
consciousness and social responsibility of the party (RCP 1975:153). In this, the role of 
the party could be expanded indefinitely, as the phase of the 'edification of socialist 
society' never found a definite end-state (as affirmed by the launch of a new and 
allegedly superior phase of socialist development in the early 1970s, the construction of 
a 'multilaterally developed socialist society'). Participation of party members in the 
political project of Communism was therefore confined to 'acting tirelessly for the 
application of party policy in all sectors of activity', so as to guarantee 'a unitary 
direction and a full political-organisational unity in the ranks of the party' (RCP 1975: 
156, 155).
The receiving end of the party guidelines -  society -  was perceived as the subject of 
societal transformation, rather than as an active participant. The relation between the 
party and society was based on the socialisation, re-education, and mobilisation of the 
population, justified by the party’s superior knowledge of the ‘objective necessities’ of 
the population. Traditional values in the form of rural and bourgeois mind-sets were to 
be replaced by socialist values. The unlearning of old behavioral patterns and the 
acquisition o f new mind-sets signified the internalisation of the socialist culture as 
promulgated by the party and transmitted by ‘organic intellectuals’ and party members 
on various levels. The internalisation of socialist culture should result in the creation of 
new men, who had a higher level of consciousness and who were dedicated completely 
to the cause, hard work, and had a collectivist and patriotic outlook209 (Gilberg 1981:
209 The socialist ethical principles included: ’a) All the workers will have to be convinced that their 
strict obligation is to dedicate all their energy, capacity and ability to the great work of edification 
of multilaterally developed socialist society and communism in Romania... [some lines below, pb] 
c) The supreme obligation of any member of society is to defend at any cost and with whatever 
sacrifice the integrity of the fatherland, the revolutionary conquests of the people, [and] the 
independence and sovereignty of Romania*... [some lines below, pb] h) The party continuously
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150). Political participation has been defined as the ‘greatest possible degree o f  
mobilization of all human and material resources for the quickest and most thorough 
way of implementing historical necessity’ (Gilberg 1981: 149). Political representation 
and participation were interpreted as only possible through the complete subordination 
to and confirmation o f the centrally identified ‘objective necessities’ by the citizen. 
Thus, the active participation of the population in self-rule and the sensation of every 
citizen that he is ‘master of his own destiny, able to think and act freely for the benefit 
of the progress of society’ (Ceauçescu 1969: 83) necessarily took the form of the 
confirmation of the party’s programme.210
In organisational terms, the party-state as the singular guiding force o f the objective, 
rational necessity o f industrialisation, collectivisation, and cultural transformation found 
its institutional expression in what has been called a  ’mono-organisational’ structure. 
The continuous affirmation of the party as the ‘only political force capable of guiding 
the people on the road to socialism and communism’ and the subordination of ‘all 
organisms and political and social institutions* (Ceauçescu 1969: 89) was translated into 
an institutional structure in which the party formed the centre and the top of the 
organisational system. The strictly hierarchical and pyramid-type of organisation of the 
Romanian Communist state has been likened to a form of corporatism, i.e., in the 
interwar, fascist understanding of the concept (Chirot 1978a: 492). This comparison 
seems to hold true when read in a particular way, i.e., as an expression of the vertical 
organisation of Romanian communist society, in which the party-state apparatus 
centrally directed and co-ordinated society, whereas horizontal links between societal 
actors were - at least formally - eliminated (cf. Chirot 1978a: 493-4).211 Institutional 
innovations, such as the ‘multilaterally developed socialist society’, the blending o f
promotes the struggle against individualism and petite bourgeois egoism, against the tendencies of 
the subordination of the general interest of society to narrow private interests... (RCP 1975:183-4). 
2,0 As Shafir (1985) argues, the ‘political innovation’ that took place during the early years of 
Ceauçescu’s rule, i.e., the increased references to the possibility of political expression through 
debate over party policy and participation through political institutions, largely entailed a form of 
‘simulated change’. Rather than stimulating the production of pluralist views of social change, the 
confirmation of consensus over the party line was sought (Shafir 1985: 53-4).
211 Chirot further argues that the various organisations that made up the whole of the communist 
state had specific functional qualities in an organically conceived national structure.
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party and state functions, and the increased emphasis on participatory democracy 
reconfirmed rather than undermined the central position of the Communist party (King 
1980, chapter 5).
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10. Romania after communism: which new project of 
modernisation?
10.1 Post-communism in Romania
The end of the 1980s saw widespread political upheavals in the communist world, 
which eventually led to the disintegration of the Soviet empire. Although Romania 
participated only towards the end of the wave of revolutions, its own violent revolution 
- with its call for autonomy and freedom - appeared to be grounded in the revolutionary 
vocabulary as much as anywhere else in the region. Simultaneously, the post- 
revolutionary developments indicated a perseverance of distinct historical legacies. 
These legacies (of a communist as well as pre-communist kind) conditioned the present 
to a significant extent. Continuity was discernible in political terms (the continuation in 
power of those belonging to the higher echelons of the Communist Party), in 
institutional terms (centralised and unitary state structures), in economic terms (the 
legacy and preservation of nationalised, large state enterprises), and in particular in 
terms of the interpretive horizons of the leading élites (who re-activated discourses of 
paternalism, particularism, and 'nationalising nationalism*). This last point is important, 
as the various interpretive horizons or perceptive frameworks that inform significant 
political élites in their actions ultimately constitute the overall structure within which 
potential directions of social change are defined.
The conceptions of modernisation of the most significant actors of the post­
communist transformation were conditioned by locally produced discursive legacies 
and, ultimately, by the specific genesis of modernity in Romania. As I have shown in 
the historical-empirical analysis o f Romanian projects of modernisation, the ‘original* 
project of modernisation in Romania -  national Liberalism -  not only institutionalised a 
discourse of emulationism and Westernism, but also evoked a strong counter-reaction in 21
212 Understanding the past as conditioning the present does not signify a deterministic reading of the 
impact of historical legacies on the present, though. Rather, for the past to become an effective 
legacy, it needs to be actively recreated or ’transmitted’ in the present by political and cultural 
agents (Kubik 2003).
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the form of traditionalism or particularism. In this sense, we can speak of a legacy o f 
two dominant discursive traditions of understanding modernity in Romania. This dual 
legacy is situated on the structural level in that both discursive traditions have remained 
the primary local sources for modernising discourses.
Legacies on a historical-institutional level are the ones produced in the different 
projects of modernisation undertaken in the last two centuries. The political élites that 
instigated these projects all referred to the dominant discursive traditions, reproducing 
some of their main tenets, but also combined these discourses with transnational^ 
discursive paradigms, the outcome of which informed their behaviour in specific 
historical circumstances. The national Liberal project institutionalised a form of 
particularist universalism, which comprised both the emulation of the West and a 
collectivist, ethno-cultural understanding o f  the nation. Further, the national Liberal 
élites designated the state as the main protagonist of the project o f modernisation. The 
Fascist counter-project introduced a form o f radical particularism as it strongly 
criticised the Liberal project for its emulationism, while promulgating a strongly 
particularist understanding of Romanian uniqueness. At the same time, though, it re­
produced the national Liberal emphasis on the emancipation of the ethno-cultural 
nation, be it on a cultural level. In addition, the Fascists reiterated the statist tendency 
introduced by the national Liberals, although the Fascist conception entailed a 
qualitative turn in its promotion o f a ‘total state’. The national Communist project of 
Ceau§escu reproduced part o f the fascist tradition, as it promulgated a form of 
particularist universalism, in which the main tenets of Marxism-Leninism formed a 
syncretic discourse with a radically particularist nationalism. This discourse not only 
reproduced the collectivist, ethno-cultural understanding of the nation, but also 
introduced a ‘social rationality’ (Bauman 2001b: 263), which was based on social 
solidarity and equality. The national Communist ‘patronage’ state re-emphasised the 
statist tendency in Romanian modernity, in which the party-state was perceived as the 
principle agent of modernisation as well as the identifier of the ‘objective necessities’ of 
society.
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The political projects in the post-communist period have been significantly conditioned 
by both the structural and historical-institutional legacies.213 At the same time, post- 
1989 discourses of modernisation have been susceptible to external discourses. As the 
break-down of the communist regimes also signified the breakdown of an artificial 
societal disconnection from the West, the post-communist countries are nowadays again 
exposed to transnational^ dominant discourses which can potentially be adopted and 
integrated into local discourses. This in turn means that the potential o f recreation of 
particularist discourses is threatened by exogenous universalist discourses. However, 
the exact meaning of the external discourses in local contexts can only be fully 
understood by looking at the intercourse of these two types of discourses in the local 
political field.
The transformation process in Eastern Europe has been dominated by two 
transnational^ dominant discourses, on the one hand, the neoliberal paradigm in 
politics, economics, and the social sciences (see Bônker et al. 2002), and, on the other, 
the discourse of a ’return to Europe* or European integration, which comprises an 
economic element (which overlaps with elements of neoliberalism, but also containing a 
higher awareness of social solidarity), and a political element, consisting of a strong 
commitment to civil and political rights. Perhaps most importantly, European 
integration touches upon the complex but elementary questions of national identity, 
national culture and collective self-determination, so crucial for the ‘liberated’ post­
communist societies. For Romania, as for the other countries in the region, the collapse 
of the communist project meant that political élites and other social actors had to 
confront anew the questions of the construction of the polity, of socio-political 
practices, and o f national and cultural identity (cf. Jowitt 1992: 285).
10.2 Political conflict over transformation
The Ceau$escu regime indirectly collapsed as a result of the diminishing grip of the 
Soviet Union on its East European empire. As the threat of Soviet intervention faded
213 As, for instance, noted by Shafir, an exclusionary, ethnic logic has been prominent during the 
Romanian modem experience and continued to be so during the post-communist period (Shafir 
2001: 91; see also Gallagher 2001).
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away, domestic reformist élites as well as dissidents could voice their opinions with 
fewer restraint. In contrast, in Romania Ceau§escu maintained his firm grip on society 
until the end but could not prevent local anti-regime movements (that already existed in 
an unorganised form) from rising to the surface. The revolution that was fully unleashed 
between 16 and 22 December 1989 combined spontaneous social movements from 
below214, and political action from particular factions in the Communist Party, thus 
from above. In the disorder and confusion of the revolution, in which significant roles 
were played by the army and the Securitate, which emerged in support of the 
population, the so-called National Salvation Front (NSF)215 was eventually able to seize 
power.216 The Front comprised a wide range of social actors, most importantly members 
of the Communist nomenklatura, but also a number o f anti-regime dissidents.
The initial mobilisation o f reform-minded and revolutionary forces in the Front 
fragmented rapidly as the latter was criticised both for the manner in which it seized 
power and its general non-democratic behaviour. This led to a political polarisation of 
pro- and anti-Front forces and resulted in the domination o f immediate post­
revolutionary politics by conflicts over transformation. Although in very broad terms 
one could speak of a political consensus on the 'restoration of democracy, liberties, and 
dignity o f  the Romanian people' (as stated in the declaration issued by the NSF on 22 
December 1989, see Uiescu 1995a: 19), because of later deviations by actors from these 
objectives and different interpretations of what key concepts such as democracy and a 
market economy actually mean, the immediate post-revolutionary period was dominated 
by conflict over the definition and direction of reforms. Conflict occurred over the pace 
of reforms (should they be gradual or rapid?), their meaning and function (what was to 
be achieved and why?), their scope (which institutions and fields of social life were to
214 In particular the Hungarian minority was prominent in protesting against the Ceau$escu regime. 
The December revolution started in Timi$oara, a city in western Romania, and was triggered by the 
imminent expulsion of the Hungarian pastor Tökés from his parish. From Timisoara the revolution 
diffused to other cities, to reach eventually Bucharest, where it culminated in the flight of the 
Ceau§escus from the communist party building.
215 In the text and in figure 2 I refer to the political parties in their English names; note that 
references can contain Romanian names.
216 For a detailed account of the revolutionary events, as well as the various myths that surround it, 
see Gabanyi 1998, Neumann 2000:63-87.
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be included?), and which societal model, which national and cultural identities were 
desirable?
At least a part of the revolution had been about a critique of the communist system as 
such, i.e. a denial o f the party's self-proclaimed monopoly on the truth, a condemnation 
of the complete subordination of the individual to the system and its needs (which was 
especially true in Romania), and a renunciation of the ways in which material means 
and wealth were distributed. If events after the revolution indicated that the new ruling 
party showed an inclination towards redirecting systemic critique to a limited critique of 
the Ceau$escu regime, the fact that the revolutionary events had for to a crucial extent 
been the outcome of political action 'from below' meant that the new rulers were 
vulnerable to the criticism of betrayal of the ideals of the revolution. In addition, the 
politically hegemonic NSF itself articulated the need for 'a system of pluralist 
democratic government', 'the elimination of ideological dogma's', and 'respect for full 
human rights and liberty' (Declaration of the NSF, 22 December 1989, in: Iliescu 1995a: 
19-22)217. Critique of the communist system re-opened the questions of national identity 
and belonging, and territorial issues as well as social questions. In other words, it re­
opened the questions of what would hold the community together (if not class unity or 
national homogeneity), and how social solidarity should be perceived and realised. Here 
the international context becomes significant, as the fall o f the communist regimes was 
generally interpreted as a failure of communism as such, and solutions to the above- 
mentioned problématiques were articulated in a liberal form: a democratic state (based 
on a social contract between citizen and state), an individualist notion of freedom, and 
market-based solidarity (this is true for both neoliberalism and the overall direction of 
European integration at the beginning of the 1990s). This
217 In the same communication one could also detect articulations in the opposite direction. It 
stipulated that the NSF had entirely taken over the means of state authority and had subordinated its 
institutions to the NSF. These statements could be read as a negation of other sources of political 
power in society (see also Iliescu 1995b).
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interpretation was by and large adopted by pro-Western social organisations and 
political parties in Romania, and as such became part of the conflict over 
transformation.
By and large, the political scene in post-communist Romania was dominated by three 
ideological formations, each of which articulated a different vision of post-communist 
transformation.218 Perhaps the most dominant actor in post-1989 politics was a 
formation of post-communists, which initially merely sought continuity with the past 
(as far as seemed possible under the circumstances of the post-communist context). 
However, in its confrontation with the responsibilities of government and an 
increasingly outspoken opposition, it selectively incorporated elements of gradual 
reform in its discourse and political action (pursuing economic reforms as well as 
integration in European and international structures), and moved to the direction o f what 
one could call a social-democratic vision of political and economic transformation. I 
label the post-communist discourse as a discourse of limited change (see chapter 11). 
Secondly, a formation or coalition of traditional and newly formed political parties, 
which had as its common denominator a dedication to bring about a significant rupture 
with the communist past. This anti-communist coalition perceived as a general model of 
transformation a Western-type of democracy and market economy, complemented with 
an emphasis on the stimulation of a civil society (see chapter 11). Anti-communism and 
a general consensus on the ultimate goals of transformation could not however conceal 
significant ideological differences between the constituent parties. I label the overall 
discourse of the coalition as a discourse of radical change (see chapter 11). Thirdly, a 
less numerous but significant third formation of political parties were those on the 
extreme left and right, parties that strongly emphasised the need for continuity with the
218 Various Romanian analysts have estimated the role of ideologies and political discourses as 
relatively insignificant in understanding contemporary events, as the available discourses are seen as 
either incoherent and/or relatively similar to one another, and the struggle for political power as 
ultimately decisive (Barbu 1999; Pasti 1997; Pasti et ai 1996). Whereas the fact that the power 
struggle is an immanent factor of Romanian political life can hardly be denied, I contend that the 
actual direction and the parameters of political action cannot be understood without reference to the 
symbols and discourses used.
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communist past, and promoted an exclusivist nationalism, in favour of the Romanian 
ethnic majority and against the loss of sovereignty and identity that was perceived as 
being part and parcel of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Moreover, these 
parties shared a common scepticism regarding democratic procedures and pluralism. 
The discursive coalition o f the extremist parties with the post-communists between 
1993-1996 warrants a classification of its ideological position as among discourses o f 
limited change, although at the extremes o f this category, that is to say, as hardly 
promoting any change at all.
The perceptions prevalent in any of these formations were susceptible not only to a 
dominant international discourse of neoliberalism in economic policy-making but also 
(and increasingly so) to the overlapping but also distinct discourse o f European 
integration and the idea of a ’return to Europe' in a much broader sense. Additionally, 
these formations reacted to the others’ adoption and incorporation of certain concepts 
and ideas. Below, I will first analyse the crystallisation of the major political actors in 
post-1989 Romania, and subsequently the emerging political and economic institutional 
patterns. Chapter 11 contains an analysis o f the discourses of limited and radical 
change.
The post-communists. The so-called National Salvation Front that emerged as the 
'caretaker' government from the December revolution consisted predominantly of 
members of the Communist nomenklatura, from the second level of the state 
bureaucracy that had not been part of the inner circle of Ceau§escu's ruling elite.219 In 
addition, many former dissidents had joined the Front (such as Mircea Dinescu, Ana 
Blandiana, and Doinea Cornea, who had been highly critical of the Ceau$escu regime; 
see Blendea 1994). The Front attempted to legitimate its ruling position predominantly 
by claiming to have played a key role in the revolution, being essentially its 'emanation'. 
In addition, the Front presented itself as a 'mass movement', which was perceived as a 
superior organisation to that of a normal political party, as it embodied national
219 The most prominent post-communists included Ion Diescu, who had been a prominent member 
of the Communist party until 1971, and Silviu Brucan, another high-placed member of the 
Communist Party, and ex-ambassador to the United States and United Nations (Tismaneanu 1997: 
415).
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consensus (Tudor and Gavrilescu 2002: 96). The opposition qualified the post- 
communist vision and practice as that of a new ’single ruling party'. Additionally, the 
NSF sought to justify its position by taking measures in early 1990 that could be 
interpreted as populist, such as the restitution of land and the cancellation of detested 
measures made by Ceau§escu (the latter included the export of agricultural produce and 
restrictive policies on the usage of lighting and heating; see the NSF's statement of 22 
December 1989, Iliescu 1995a: 19-22; Gabanyi 1998: 137). In its television statement 
addressed to the nation, the NSF declared the removal o f power from the Ceau§escu 
regime, to dissolution of the old regime’s power structures, to dismissal o f the 
government o f the State Council and its institutions, and at the same time, that all state 
powers had been assumed by the Council of the National Salvation Front (Iliescu 
1995a: 17-23).
The NSF was the major victor in the May 1990 general elections obtaining 66 
percent of the votes. The only opposition party that managed to obtain a relatively 
significant amount of votes (7 %) was the party of the Hungarian minority. By winning 
the general elections so convincingly, the NSF could now further justify its ruling 
position by pointing to its democratic credentials. Within the NSF, however, different 
opinions regarding the meaning o f democracy and reform, in other words, about the 
process of transformation as such, became increasingly obvious during 1990. President 
Iliescu represented a conservative220 faction, which advocated the idea of an 'original 
democracy', meaning the incorporation of all political forces in the NSF which in 
practice would be an updated version of the former single ruling party (Blendea 1994: 
6), as well as 'social security', which indicated its adherence to gradual reforms with low 
social costs221 (see Pasti 1997: 215, 225). A progressive faction around prime minister 
Petre Roman represented an ideological current, which advocated more rapid
220 The labels 'conservative* and ’progressive’ are used here as indicating a position towards social 
change, rather than as a reference to a political doctrine.
221 It further indicates that responsibility for social solidarity as well as its substance were placed on 
the level of the state, or in other words, as coming from above, whereas society was predominantly 
conceived as a receptor, not as an active contributor.
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(economic) reforms as well as the establishment of a more 'authentic* democracy.222 
This conflict between conservative and reformist factions dominated the political scene 
from 1990 until early 1992.223
The outcome of the general elections of September 1992 changed the political 
landscape, as a minority government was formed by Iliescu's DNSF, the opposition o f 
the DC gained a much larger representation in the parliament, and the role of Roman's 
NSF became much less influential. In addition, the minority government o f the DNSF 
(the former conservative faction o f the NSF) chose to rely on the parliamentary support 
of three parties from the extreme right and left (the Greater Romania Party (GRP), the 
Party of National Union of Romania (PNUR) and the Socialist Labour Party (SLP)), all 
three being reactionary parties set up by important former Communists, promoting 
continuity with the past and exclusivist nationalism.
The PNUR was established in 1990, as a direct reaction against the political 
organisation of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, where in some counties the 
population contains a significant Hungarian minority. The priority around which the 
PNUR was formed was the defence of Romanian national interest, especially in its 
political basis Transylvania, where national sovereignty was perceived as being 
infringed by (particularly Hungarian) minorities (Gallagher 1997:31). By promoting the 
ethnic unity of Romanians against political fragmentation, the PNUR rejected the 
pluralism o f democratic systems and its promotion o f the national interest formed a
222 That at that moment there was still no consensus whatsoever on the major issues of the 
transformation was indicated by this 'return to the problems specific of 1990', that is to say, the 
definition of political democracy (Pasti 1997:228).
223 Two events eventually settled the conflict. Prime minister Roman resigned in September 1991, 
an event directly triggered by one of the numerous mineriadd, the marching on Bucharest of a group 
o f miners from the mining area o f the Jiu Valley. The miners protested against Roman’s reforms, 
whereas in the immediate past these mineriadd had been deployed against civil opposition to the 
NSF. Roman was replaced by the economist and technocrat Theodor Stolojan Secondly, during the 
National Convention of the NSF in March 1992, Roman's reform proposals were accepted (which, 
amongst others, contained the condemnation of any restoration of communist rule) and Roman was 
elected president of the party, which led to the departure of the Diescu faction from the NSF and the 
establishment of Iliescu’s own political party, the Democratic National Salvation Front (see Ionescu 
1992a, 1992b).
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direct continuity with the exclusivist nationalism that one element of the syncretic 
discourse of national Communism (Gallagher 1995: 196,198-9).
The Greater Romania Party, primarily based in the provinces of Moldavia and 
Wallachia, was founded by two prominent members of the ’proto-chronists* under 
Ceau$escu, Comeliu Vadim Tudor and Eugen Barbu (see chapter 6). The party rapidly 
gathered forces that were in one way or another linked to the former regime, for 
instance, ex-Security officers and members of the military. The GRP's message was 
essentially similar to the PNUR's, i.e. the promotion of the national majority against 
minorities (against Hungarians but also expressed in anti-semitism), opposition to 
interference by external forces in domestic matters, and a highly critical stance toward 
democratic procedures and pluralism. The third party in the coalition, the Socialist 
Labour Party, was set up by a group of former Communists and constituted the direct 
descendant of the dissolved RCP. Although initially it explicitly associated itself with 
the old regime, it later shed references to, for instance, people's ownership of the means 
o f production and the depiction of capitalism as a main enemy (Pasti 1997: 230).
The DNSF programme of a 'social market economy’, social solidarity, slow reforms, 
and a strong, central state, together indicated a rather conservative stance towards 
political reforms, a preference for gradual and restricted economic reforms, and a 
rejection of foreign models, were underwritten and complemented by the strongly anti- 
Western, exclusivist, anti-reform and pro-continuity outlook of the extremist parties (cf. 
Ionescu 1992c: 38-42; Neumann 1993; Pasti 1997: 221-38). The informal co-operation 
between the minority government and the extremist parties was formalised in 1994, 
which led to the inclusion of members of the PNUR in the government. In early 1995, 
the three parties and the government signed the so-called Four-Party Pact, giving all 
three parties access to government positions (Veiga 1997: 55).
During 1995-1996 the coalition fell apart as Iliescu's burgeoning strategy of Euro- 
Atlantic integration (including reconciliation with Hungary on the question of the 
Hungarian minority) could not meet the approval of the extremist parties. The first party 
to leave the coalition was the GRP, in general because of its disagreement with the 
increasingly pro-Western course of the Party o f Social Democracy in Romania (PSDR) 
(the new name of the DNSF, adopted in 1995), and directly because of its disapproval 
of Iliescu's proposal of a Hungarian-Romanian Treaty on the ethnic Hungarian minority
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in Romania (Gabanyi 1998: 286; Roper 2000: 77-8). In the following year both the SLP 
and the PNUR left the coalition, the latter because o f its fundamental opposition to the 
basic treaty with Hungary and, more generally, because of its continuous criticism of 
the Social-Democrats. By actively dissolving the coalition, the PSDR apparently sought 
to present itself as a moderate and social-democratic party (Shafir 1996a).
The anti-communist opposition. The opposition parties gathered in the Democratic 
Convention, which united self-proclaimed democratic and anti-communist forces 
against the ruling party and the extremists, became increasingly influential in Romanian 
politics. The coalition played only a minor political role in the period between the 
December revolution and the general elections of September 1992, when those forces 
that had been instrumental in the execution o f the Ceau§escus (the NSF) managed to 
transform their revolutionary credentials into political power, thereby creating 
continuity with the Communist regime, and practically dominating the government and 
the parliament, as well as the security services, the judiciary, and the mass-media (Pavel 
1992: 6). Only with the local and general elections o f 1992 did the DC manage to 
institutionalise its position as democratic opposition and to criticise from an intra- 
institutional position the immobility and central position of the NSF. The coalition was 
bom from the realisation that only if united could the opposition counter the post- 
totalitarian tendencies - in the sense of being its suspension between democracy and 
totalitarianism - of the governing party (Pavel 1992: 6). Initially, the coalition consisted 
of the three Tiistorical parties', the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania 
(DUHR), which represented the Hungarian minority, and the Civic Alliance Party 
(CAP), which was primarily made up of democratically-minded intellectuals.224 The 
coalition enlarged to comprise many other parties, including an ecologist party and 
various civic organisations, giving expression not only to the struggle for democracy but 
also to the consolidation of civil society (Pavel 1992: 6).
The anti-communist opposition in reality took a position similar to the dissident 
forces that in some other East-European countries (notably Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
224 The Civic Alliance Party formed the political extension of various civic organisations that had 
been formed after 1989, such as the Group for Social Dialogue and the Civic Alliance, organisations 
that themselves were intentionally non-political.
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Hungary) formed the counterpart of reform-minded communists in regime change 
(though the NSF was hardly regarded as a partner with whom to negotiate). As Romania 
under Ceau$escu had known very little organised resistance to the Communist regime 
and therefore knew no institutionalised critique of communism, critique after 1989 had 
to come from the newly emerging political actors. Partially as an outcome of their late 
emergence, the ’historical parties' - the Liberals, the peasantists, and the socialists - 
which tried to fill the 'democratic gap' lacked the legitimacy that anti-regime forces 
enjoyed in other countries (the most obvious examples being Solidarity in Poland and 
Charta 77 in Czechoslovakia). The ’historical parties' needed to legitimise themselves in 
the actual political context, which they could provisionally achieve by invoking their 
alleged democratic past (Pirvulescu 1994b: 5).
The most important of the 'historical parties' was the NPCDP, the successor of the 
interwar National Peasant Party, formed in 1990 by Comeliu Coposu (the secretary of 
Iuliu Maniu, the leader of the interwar party). The formation of the party was triggered 
directly by the NSF’s declaration of participation in the elections. The main political 
objective was to 'obtain power in the local and general elections o f 1992 by means of a 
common strategy' (Tudor and Gavrilescu 2002: 128). As the party's frame of reference 
was that of a restoration of the past, that is to say, the interwar system of a constitutional 
monarchy, its main inspiration came from a strong anti-communism and therefore 
opposition to the ruling NSF (Pirvulescu 1994b).
Similarly, in January 1990 the National Liberal Party was re-established as the 
successor party to the National Liberal Party that had dominated nineteenth-century and 
interwar Romanian politics. The National Liberal Party fared relatively well in the May 
1990 elections, but its role as the single representative of the liberal doctrine in 
Romanian politics quickly eroded after the elections as various liberal currents were 
institutionalised in rival liberal parties in the following years. The first faction to split 
off from the main party was composed of a group of young parliamentarians and 
entrepeneurs, representing the generational conflict between young pragmatists and the 
older generation which had experienced communist imprisonment (Pirvulescu 1994a: 
4).
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The Party of Romanian Social Democracy was re-established in the summer of 1990 
in an attempt to appeal to the working class, which, however, had already been 
successfully courted by the populism of the NSF (Vosganian 1992: 9).
Two other, rather dissimilar, parties were of importance in the coalition of anti­
communist forces, the party of the Hungarian minority (DUHR) and the 'civic liberal’ 
party, the CAP. The first represented various parties and organisations of the Hungarian 
minority and sought increased collective rights and cultural autonomy for national 
minorities. The latter was set up to create an alternative to the historical parties. At the 
time of its foundation, in 1991, the CAP explicitly presented itself as an alternative to 
the existing political parties, in that it actively promoted large-scale change, radical 
economic reform and rapid integration into European structures (Ionescu 1994: 8).
Despite the common goal to  defeat post-communism and create an ’authentic 
democracy', the democratic coalition partially disintegrated during the immediate years 
after the 1992 elections. The main element o f strife between the constituent parties was 
the domination of the peasant party in the coalition (Cornea 1994).225
In the run-up to the November 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections, the 
Democratic Convention comprised the peasant party, the 'historical' Liberal party, and 
some other liberal formations. Despite its rather volatile structure, the Europe-oriented 
and reform-minded Convention and its presidential candidate Emil Constantinescu won 
the elections, after a significant success in the local elections earlier that year. The 
victory of the opposition meant that for the first time since 1989 the emergence of 
political forces that sought a clear break with the communist past and the conscious 
pursuit o f a continuation of a pro-Westem project in Romania were in power (cf. 
Tismaneanu 1996). At the time of the elections, the larger democratic coalition (in fact 
consisting o f three coalitions) included the DC, the Social Democratic Union (SDU), 
headed by Petre Roman, the former prime minister, and the DUHR.
225 In a protest against the ‘dictatorship’ of the peasant party over the other members, the first party 
to leave the coalition was a small social-democratic party. The CAP and a Liberal party (the Liberal 
Party '93) left the coalition as well, leaving behind the peasant party, another small Liberal party and 
an ecological party (Roper 2000: 78).
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The most important reasons for this radical political change were, firstly, the fact that 
the PDSR had been discredited by severe socio-economic problems, such as continuing 
inflationary pressure and falling living standards. In addition, corruption scandals and 
the decline in popularity of president Iliescu played a role. The highly personalised 
political system around Iliescu came to be increasingly identified with the past 
(Tismaneanu 1997: 440). Secondly, the opposition was much better organised than in 
1992. With its ‘Contract With Romania*, a list of problems to be solved in 200 days,226 
modelled on the 1994 U.S. Republican Party campaign, it appealed to fears over social 
deterioration (Shafir 1996c). The government coalition was headed by Victor Ciorbea, a 
former trade union leader and at that time mayor of Bucharest. The new government 
claimed to be resolutely in favour o f Western-type of reforms, and, in order to underline 
the rupture with the past, immediately initiated an anti-corruption and crime campaign. 
Early EU and NATO entry negotiations were made a major foreign policy objective, 
although the diplomatic efforts were rewarded neither with NATO-membership nor 
with the inclusion of Romania in the first ‘wave* of enlargement. This constituted a 
major disappointment for a government whose legitimation was mostly based on its 
ability to implement rapid change, and of which the memberships of both the NATO 
and the EU were highly significant symbols. Partly related to this disillusionment, intra- 
coalition (and intra-party) struggles paralysed the government.
A major source of difficulty in the coalition was the fact that its cohesion was 
founded on a 'negative unity’, based on opposition to the former Communists from 
which a broad frame of reference was derived. This frame was essentially defined by a 
set of rather indeterminate goals, i.e. the need for rapid economic reforms, integration 
into Euro-Atlantic structures and the fight against corruption and crime (cf. Pavel 
1998b). Primary conflicts concerned the rhythm of economic reforms, measures 
concerning the 'correction' of the communist past (the restitution of land and property), 
and collective, cultural rights for national minorities (in particular the Hungarian 
minority). In December 1997, a government reshuffle was undertaken that was a direct 
consequence of a difference of opinion on the pace of economic reforms between the
226 The contract, based on pragmatism, included the restitution of (agricultural) property to rightful, 
i.e. pre-communist, owners, various measures concerning the amelioration of the agricultural sector, 
as well as social measures (a basic income) (Contract cu Romania 1996).
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NPCDP and the SDU (Baleanu 1998: 11; Pavel 1998b). In April 1998, after six months 
of political paralysis, prime minister Ciorbea was replaced by Radu Vasile, an economic 
historian. Ciorbea resigned because of the combined pressures stemming from domestic 
(the SDU) and international forces favouring the acceleration of reforms. The SDU had 
provoked a crisis in the governing coalition as it had criticised the NPCDP for its lack 
of decisiveness and inertia over reforms (Fati 2000). Vasile promised to go ahead with 
the reforms, admitting the continuity between his and the former government. Political 
problems within the governing coalition persisted, however. In September 1998, Vasile 
dismissed the Finance minister, Daianu, and the Privatisation minister, Dimitriu, in 
response to the continuous attacks on both ministers for failing to meet the planned pace 
of reform and privatisation. At the end of 1999, prime minister Vasile was replaced by 
Mugur Isarescu, former governor of the Romanian National Bank, an act which was 
primarily inspired by the rapidly falling popularity o f the government, especially in 
view of the elections planned for the end of 2000 (Romànici Liberà, 9-6-1999).
Iliescu’s PSDR emerged as the victor in the parliamentary and presidential elections at 
the end of 2000. The Social-Democrats demonstrated a much stronger discursive 
adherence to a Western-type social-democracy than previously and could therefore 
present themselves as a social alternative to the neoliberally inspired economic reform 
policies o f their predecessor. Additionally, this time they underscored their adherence to 
European integration and democratic values while presenting an economic reform 
programme with social-democratic elements. The former ruling coalition o f centre-right 
parties (by now only comprising the peasant party and some small parties whereas the 
National Liberal Party and the Democratic Party ran separately) suffered a round defeat. 
Only the party of the Hungarian minority was able to secure its 'normal' percentage of 6 
percent o f the votes. The coalition's inability to pursue a common agenda on reform and 
produce a coherent and locally relevant discourse (see chapter 11), or bring about a 
radical change with the past, along with repeated corruption scandals had weakened its 
position and credibility as capable of implementing decisive change. After the elections 
in 2000, the political landscape was then primarily shaped by the Social-Democrats, 
who were now perceived as the 'democratic option’, and the extreme right-wing party 
GRP which managed to obtain twenty percent of the votes by claiming to be the only
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non-establishment party and therefore not embroiled in corruption and ineffectual 
policy-making (Pop-Eleches 2000: 157; Popescu 2003: 328). But whereas in the 1992- 
1995 period one could still observe some elective affinity between the Social- 
Democrats and the extremists, the evolution of the Social-Democrats now prohibited the 
repetition of such a coalition. The Party of Social Democracy (as it was now called) 
formed a minority government, headed by Adrian Nastase, with the parliamentary 
support of the party for the Hungarian minority and the National Liberal Party. After 
some months, the NLP withdrew from the agreement, leaving the DUHR as the sole 
supporter o f the government.
10.3 The double transformation process
Conflicts over the interpretation of the meaning and function of reforms dominated the 
post-1989 period. Although the revolution itself entailed a dual critique -  systemic and 
political -  at the time of the collapse of the Communist regime there were virtually no 
coherent alternative discourses available that embodied a systemic critique and provided 
the revolutionaries with answers on how to construct a post-revolutionary order (cf. 
Offe 1996: 30). Thus, immediately after the regime change the transformation was left 
without a clear telos (as an outright restoration of communist discourse could not (yet) 
be legitimated, and alternatives in the form of an explicit endorsement o f Western 
models had still to be formulated clearly, as Westernisation as a discourse had been 
repressed and crowded out by the national-Communist discourse of Ceau$escu). Despite 
general disorder in terms of uncrystallised political forces and the lack of clear visions 
of change, reforms were generally interpreted as having a 'double' nature, re-introducing 
the market economy and allowing for political pluralism. The general, but minimal, 
consensus on the need for change was the outcome of, on the one hand, the widespread 
abhorrence of the socio-economic and political pathologies of 'really existing socialism’, 
and, on the other, the 'elective affinity' between dissenting thought under communism 
and European and Western societal models (cf. Bauman 1994: 19). In general, then, 
economic reforms were seen as entailing at least some reversal of the nationalisation of 
the economy (and thus the restitution of state property into private hands or the creation 
of other forms of property, the creation of a market, as well as a certain limitation to
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state intervention in the economy). Essentially then, there was consensus on the 
necessity of creating a capitalist economy, based on market conditions and rules (so as 
to create markets for goods, services, capital, and labour) and the creation of forms o f 
property other than state ownership. The primacy of economic reform in the overall 
transformation was, however, to become a major element of political conflict.
Similarly, the necessity of introducing a democratic form of government was shared 
by all significant political actors (consisting o f the (re-)establishment of civil rights in 
some form of social contract between state and society, and based on a constitution and 
the accountability of state power by means of a system of representation (parliament) 
and the separation of powers, cf. Offe 1996: 43). Nevertheless, as indicated above, the 
actual substance of democratic institutions, their meaning in the Romanian context, and 
the relation between economic and political reforms were object of continuous 
discontent.
The parameters for transformation were largely the result of an international 
environment in which the regulatory capacities of the state were deemed no longer 
applicable in the globalised world economy, and found their expression in the 
promotion of economic policies which emphasised deregulation and privatisation. In 
other words, the retreat of politics from the economy was promulgated, and social 
cohesion and solidarity were deemed only preservable by means of integration into the 
world economy and the stimulation of international competivity (Crouch and Streeck 
1997: 10). This view o f social change based ’on a strong belief in the market as a kind of 
meta-institution of social change' was strongly endorsed by international financial 
institutions, but also by social scientists and policy makers (Bonker et a l  2002). In 
Eastern Europe, such policies found an 'elective affinity' with those policy makers and 
political élites that agreed upon the complete failure of communism as a societal model. 
At the same time, this meant that those political élites that for a variety of reasons (close 
affinity with the Communist regime, fear o f loss of recently regained national 
sovereignty, social pressure) were not willing to follow a neoliberally inspired policy 
model were in a rearguard position in defending state intervention and upholding more 
traditional notions of social cohesion through state action.
In the analysis of reforms in the post-communist countries, this duality can be 
understood as an intricate and reciprocal relation between economy and politics. The
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dual nature is then not only defined by reference to two spheres in national society, but 
also by the fact that proposed reforms in each sphere provide some kind of solution for 
both the national and the social questions. Economic reforms are not only assessed and 
criticised on the basis of their implications for economic change, but also on the basis of 
their presumed social consequences for the wider community, and hence, the question 
of who is to take part in that community and on what basis irrevocably poses itself. 
Thus, in the neoliberal model, responsibility for dealing with the social question is 
placed on the level of the individual and civil society, implicitly promoting a thin model 
of citizenship, ultimately based on the individual right to private property and individual 
capacities. This however opens the way for a ‘social’ critique of neoliberal proposals, 
reproaching their consequences for society-wide solidarity, and, potentially turning into 
a ‘political’ critique seeking to defend the homogeneity of the national community as 
such. In contrast, in a traditional social-democratic model, responsibility for dealing 
with social marginalisation is placed on the level of the state, indicating a thicker model 
of citizenship based on a community of similarly eligible individuals. To define this 
community, some kind of common denominator is needed, such as the nation. Such a 
model is mainly open to an ‘economic’ critique pointing out the need for rationalisation 
and efficiency. Furthermore, the neoliberal model places national sovereignty within an 
international context, that is to say, as only fully realisable through integration into the 
international economy, whereas a traditional ’social-democratic' model emphasises the 
need for nation-state based sovereignty, i.e. for the state’s ability to act internally, to 
guarantee social rights etc.
The post-communist governments could not escape these questions, as their re­
opening had formed an important part of the revolution and their renewed solution 
would thus provide the ultimate meaning and legitimation of the revolution. Not only 
were actors in the international environment pushing for a clear break with the 
communist past, but also domestic politics actors, who strongly based their legitimacy 
and political position in anti-communism. Nevertheless, room for interpretation on how 
to pursue reforms was in Romania relatively large (compared to other post-communist 
countries), as there had been no sedimentation of (neo-)liberal ideas during the 
Communist regime, and therefore, at least initially, no influential social group could 
claim that these ideas had directly triggered the revolution. Furthermore, the critique on
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communism of the most powerful group in society, that had 'captured' the revolution 
was mostly limited to a critique of the dictatorial regime, not of the immanent concepts 
of Romanian national Communism such as étatism, egalitarianism and ethnic 
nationalism. Since initially, the communist system was not effectively critiqued by any 
significant political actor, the former Communists could offer a Third way' in pursuing 
reform, in which particular elements of the Communist regime survived, thereby 
differing from the internationally dominant neoliberal model.
The purpose of the following is not so much to provide a detailed overview o f 
economic programmes of transformation and an account of their consequences, but to 
outline the general strategies followed and the intentions of the political élites in power. 
The emphasis is on the scope and intended pace of significant reforms in the economic 
sphere, and their relation to the political purposes of transformation. Here, the 
distinction between choices for social justice and market efficiency/rationality is 
important.
Econom ic reforms
The post-communists. The former Communists of the NSF, who were in government 
from 1990 until late 1996, followed a policy line in which the preservation o f elements 
of communism - i.e. enduring state centralism, national sovereignty, interventionism, 
and social egalitarianism - constituted a core element, but in which the necessity to 
adapt to a changed geo-political context was simultaneously acknowledged. The 
significance of these two elements - preservation and adaptation - could be discerned in 
all attempts at economic reform. A substantive commitment to the preservation of 
national sovereignty, both internally (concentrated in the state) and externally, and to 
the prevention of the social dislocation of the population ultimately found its expression 
in a strategy composed of gradual institutional integration into international structures 
as well as state controlled domestic reform.
The post-communist approach to that part of economic transformation with 
potentially the most radical implications -  i.e. the retreat of the state from the economy 
or privatisation - exhibited this tension between preservation and change. Whereas a 
broad consensus existed on the need for privatisation as such among the Romanian 
political élites (cf. Ronnas 1992), the scope and pace o f the actual process was subject 
to resistance and the defence of an étatist vision. The manner in which the post­
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communists pursued privatisation essentially conformed to the main institutional 
objectives of its modernisation project, i.e. an interventionist state, an emphasis on 
social solidarity, and the avoidance of social polarisation in a 'social market economy' 
(see chapter 11).
Privatisation was initiated in 1990 and 1991 with issuing three laws concerning the 
transformation of socialist enterprises into privatisable and non-privatisable entities (the 
so-called process of corporatisation), land ownership, and the privatisation process. Its 
overall scope and progress were severely limited as a result of the division of state- 
owned enterprises into commercial enterprises subject to privatisation (53 percent of 
total state ownership) and so-called 'regies autonomes' which were insulated from 
privatisation (47 percent). In this way, state ownership and control were maintained. 
The regies autonomes were deemed to be situated in 'strategic branches of the national 
economy - armament, energy, mining and natural gas, the postal services and railway 
transportation - as well as in some areas belonging to other branches, as decided by the 
government’ (Law no. 15/1990, cited in: Negrescu 2000). Those companies designated 
as regies autonomes continued to be entitled to state subsidies and were not subject to 
bankruptcy. In this way, their functioning was effectively kept outside of the market 
environment. In the case of land ownership, despite initial adherence to the restitution of 
property, state ownership prevailed over private ownership. The right to restitution was 
limited so as not to affect agricultural productivity negatively, and state farms were 
excluded from the process. Furthermore, restituted property was not allowed to be sold, 
prohibiting the marketisation of land (Negrescu 2000).
The proceeding privatisation of those companies that had been designated as 
'commercial companies' was subject to continuing state involvement. The portfolios of 
commercial companies were redistributed to the State Ownership Fund and five 
regionally and sectorally based Private Ownership Funds.227 In the first Mass 
Privatisation Programme (1992), some 30 percent of the state capital entmsted to these 
intermediary institutions was distributed to the population, whereas 70 percent remained 
in the hands of the institutions. The institutions were regarded as temporary (they were
227 Despite the apparent independent and intermediary status of these institutions, they remained 
subject to government control as their boards of directors were appointed by the government (Earle 
and Telegdy 2001: 5).
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to function for a period of five years) and basically acted as intermediaries between 
private shareholders and the state, thus preserving the possibility for the state to monitor 
and control management (Cemat 2002: 81-2). In 1995, the Second Mass Privatisation 
Programme was to lead to an acceleration of the privatisation of state capital, this time 
by the issuing of non-tradable coupons, but the state often kept a large (majority) share 
in companies (Earle and Telegdy 2001: 8).228 The choice of method for the privatisation 
of state property - mass privatisation through the issuance of vouchers or coupons to the 
public - seems to indicate the post-communists' desire to legitimate the creation of 
capitalism and a market economy as such (by involving the population), and to invoke 
the principle of social justice (cf. Stark and Bruszt 1998, chapter 3, for this argument).
The post-communists hardly regarded privatisation (and concomitant claims to 
efficiency and rationalisation) as an objective in itself, but rather as an instrument for 
the creation of a social market economy which was to be based on the substantive goals 
of social solidarity and national prosperity. Rather than assuming such reasoning to be 
completely detached from explanations in the line o f 'political capitalism* and pure 
power politics (which are the most common reasons offered for the post-communist 
reluctance towards reducing state power), one should consider how the post­
communists defined political power in the first place. As their main objectives were to 
recreate a strong state in the service of the ethnic majority, and they perceived national 
sovereignty not only as a formal issue, but also as substantive independence from 
external interference, the strategies promoted by the opposition (such as a 'shock 
therapy* and a radical opening of the economy to foreign investment) were not only 
considered to be detrimental in terms of social solidarity, but also as undermining the 
political control of the national majority over principal resources (hence the post­
communists’ slogan 'we do not sell the country'). One could detect a similar rationale 
behind the post-communists’ approach towards other fields of macro-economic policy­
making. In general, what was most revealed in the policy-making of the post­
communist governments was, first, the conservation of administrative control (both
228 Eventually, the most common form of privatisation in the first half of the 1990s emerged as 
Manager and Employee Buy Out schemes (MEBO), often a spontaneous process stimulated by 
incentives given to firms' managers and employees in the Mass Privatisation Programs.
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central and local) over principal resources and their distribution, and, second, the 
maintenance of the large state enterprises (Pasti et al. 1996: 92).
As in privatisation, where the bulk of large state-owned enterprises were effectively 
removed from the process, in socio-economic policy-making the emphasis was on 
softening the costs of transition for the major part of the labour force employed in the 
regies autonomes229(cf. Pasti et a l  1996). These policies were justified as a continuous 
adherence to egalitarianism, a principle closely related to the maintenance of 
employment.230 At an early stage, such policies could still be located in the context of 
reparation, i.e. the neutralisation of the social policies o f Ceau§e$cu, which had led to 
widespread poverty during the 1980s.231 However, the NSF continued to adopt 
measures o f social relief, which followed not only a logic of populism (these measures 
were often taken during election periods232), but were at the same time consistent with
229 This was pursued through wage policies that entailed the regulation of wage development in 
order to control excessive wage demands by means of income policies, but at the same time sought 
to avoid a substantial decline in real wages by means of indexation and the adoption of a minimum 
wage (Jackson 2001: 396). Furthermore, various post-communist governments interfered by raising 
wage levels on an ad-hoc basis.
230 In the early 1990s, the post-communists clung to a principle of 'full employment* as the most 
important means of guaranteeing social equality and avoiding poverty and polarisation. By 1995, 
though, a minimum level of unemployment was accepted (Voicu and Voicu 1999:590-98).
231 In 1990, the NSF government provided for wage increases, the maintenance of price controls on 
essential goods, a restriction on the export of foodstuffs, increased imports (of consumer goods), 
and a general relief for workers by shortening the working week and allowing early retirement in 
order to decrease official unemployment levels (see Daianu 1999: 10; Stan 1997: 129). Specific 
groups in society were especially receptive to such policies, in particular industrial workers, 
peasants and the state bureaucracy, who, for their own reasons, feared the negative consequences of 
rapid transformation and the opening up of the country to the outside world (Baleanu 1998:4).
232 In the run-up to the September 1992 elections earlier adopted, more rigid, reform policies were 
substituted for policies that provided additional benefits to workers (Roper 2000: 93). Similarly, in 
the run-up to the November 1996 elections, the post-communist government countered a ‘market 
ethos* by increasing public spending. And especially after the local elections in June 1996, in which 
the PSDR performed poorly and the centre-right opposition won in almost all major cities, including 
Bucharest, the government introduced social measures (Financial Times, 9-7-1996; RFE, 21-8- 
1996).
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the post-communist emphasis on the prevention of social polarisation and the social 
protection of the workers.
Despite the overall emphasis on social solidarity and etatism, some elements of the 
neoliberal approach of marketisation were adopted (for instance, the reduction o f 
inflation to minimal levels, the stabilisation o f the state budget, and the creation of the 
institutional framework for markets). Yet, if these policies were in potential tension 
with strong forms of social solidarity, at the same time they could be easily understood 
as elements of crisis management and adaptation in a period of rapid economic decline 
and extremely high (two digit) inflation rates. The adoption of these measures did in 
itself not undermine the government’s main objectives and could further be understood 
through the NSF’s tendency to transform the post-communist outlook into a social- 
democratic one, i.e. by accepting some level of marketisation, liberalisation and 
stabilisation (cf. Adamson 2000). Indeed, when reformist forces within the post­
communist party did push for a marketisation strategy, which seemed to threaten the 
overall policy paradigm, it led to a profound crisis and division of the party. This was 
the case in the early 1990s, when prime minister Petre Roman attempted to introduce a 
neoliberally inspired stabilisation plan, supported by the IMF. The reform programme 
involved the acceleration of privatisation by means of the above-mentioned mass 
privatisation programme, price liberalisation and the removal o f subsidies, and a 
reduction in real wages from the beginning of 1991 (Smith 2001: 132-3). As mentioned 
earlier, Roman’s reform attempt led to both a split in the governing party and to serious 
social tensions that ultimately led to his resignation. When the successor government of 
the technocrat Theodor Stolojan continued reforms initiated by Roman, including a 
policy o f integration into the West-European and global economy (see below), these 
reforms did not substantially affect the main outline o f the post-communist programme. 
The Vacaroiu government (1992-1996) claimed to go against the ‘classical liberalism’ 
of its predecessors, although its four-year reform programme entailed partial 
privatisation (limited to trade, tourism, services, and small enterprises, not touching the 
regies autonomes), and stabilisation and liberalisation measures (Ionescu 1993).
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The anti-communist coalition. If the reform policies of the post-communists were 
characterised by conservatism, on the one hand, and a tendency towards a social- 
democratic understanding of reforms, on the other, the common denominator of the 
democratic coalition was its adherence to a 'market ethos' expressed in a neoliberal 
shock therapy. The coalition forcefully argued against a 'third way', and the coming to 
power of the opposition in 1996 was widely regarded as the first decisive rupture with 
the Communist regime. The crisis narration articulated by the coalition consisted 
primarily of anti-communism/anti-totalitarianism as well as (market) rationalisation, 
which portrayed the post-1989 period as one of a profound political crisis o f morality, 
authority, and credibility as well as of economic inefficiency and the irrationality of a 
centralised, planning state. In turn, this was directly linked to the continuity with the 
communist past embodied by the NSF/PSDR. Major proposals to transcend the crisis 
were found in the promotion of a constitutional state and the stimulation of civil society, 
as the 'single guarantee for the democratisation of life' (Voicu and Voicu 1999: 640-1). 
Civil society was at the same time identified with market dynamism and 
entrepeneurialism (see chapter 11).
The CDR promoted an economic programme that was based on the ’shortening of the 
transition’ and marketisation, and a political-economic strategy that essentially hinged 
on an explicit commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration and the opening up of the 
economy. In political practice the CDR followed a much more drastic approach, both in 
terms of scope and pace, than the preceding post-communist governments (see Daianu 
1999; de Menil 2003; Negrescu 2000). The privatisation process was extended to 
include the regies autonomes in 'mainstream' privatisation by converting them into 
commercial companies and by 'demonopolising' public utilities (although a continuing 
distinction was made between 'national companies' and commercial companies, which 
also meant that no former regie autonome was entirely converted into a commercial 
company) (Negrescu 2000). In August 1997, 2,750 companies were presented for 
privatisation, while 10 large state-owned enterprises responsible for major losses were 
to be privatised or closed (Stoica 2002: 107). In early 1998, privatisation was to go 
ahead with a further 1,600 companies and industrial restructuring, especially of big 
utilities, was to be accelerated. At the end of 1998, the State Ownership Fund tried to 
conclude major privatisation deals (RomTelecom, the Romanian Development Bank)
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and to close down major state-owned companies, apparently to stave off a threatening 
financial crisis in 1999 (Daianu 1999: 18). Nevertheless, while 'strategic* companies 
were now included in the privatisation process, the implementation o f privatisation 
deals proved in reality to  be complex, as major firms proved eventually difficult to sell 
and the revenues of sold firms turned out to be lower than expected (Tinteanu 1998). In 
1999, the only significant deal was the sale of the Romanian car company Dacia to the 
French Renault (Matyas 2000). In general, though, in the period 1997-2000, 
privatisation went ahead faster than before as it involved an increasing number of large 
companies, while a higher percentage of the state equity of the State Ownership Funds 
was privatised, and more privatisation transactions involved foreign investors (Negrescu 
2000).
The centre-right's commitment to the neoliberal reform design followed the triptych 
of privatisation, stabilisation and price liberalisation. Strong emphasis was placed on the 
immediate liberalisation of all prices by ending price controls, and the reduction in state 
expenditure. The latter was achieved through the cutting of subsidies to enterprises and 
agriculture, and by dropping state support for consumer prices (basic commodities and 
public transportation). The adoption of these measures was tightly linked to the 
provision o f credits by the IMF and the World Bank, which made further demands in 
terms of tight budgetary and inflationary policies and liberalisation of the exchange rate 
regime. In early 1997, Ciorbea made public the government’s reform programme, 
drafted with the World Bank and the European Union, which encompassed more than 
80 reform laws and consisted o f the complete removal of price controls, and the 
acceleration of privatisation in 3,600 companies in 1997, including the banking sector 
with major banks such as Bancorex and the Romanian Bank of Development (RFE, 10- 
4-1997). In addition, the programme announced the reorganisation, closure or sale of 
non-profitable state companies, the elimination of state subsidies as well as the reform 
of state farms (de Néve 1998: 943; Matyas 1998). Notwithstanding these reform efforts, 
at the end of 1997 the pace of reforms was criticised both by international institutions 
and internally by various parties in the ruling coalition, most importantly the 
Democratic Party. The latter accused the government of a lack of decisiveness in 
carrying out reforms, and of delaying privatisation (Stoica 2002: 114). A new 
programme of reforms was adopted in early 1998, which announced continued
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inflationary policies, the consolidation of the state budget as well as promises for the 
acceleration of restructuring of enterprises (Roper 2000; Stoica 2002: 117). The 
governmental crisis continued though, and could eventually only be resolved through 
the resignation of prime minister Ciorbea. After this resolution of the political paralysis 
which had lasted some six months within the governing coalition, a new economic 
reform programme was prepared, whose primary aims were to create macro-economic 
stability, institutionalise strict financial discipline, and discontinue the subsidisation of 
loss-making firms (Baleanu 1998: 23; Stoica 2002: 119). Another political crisis 
manifested itself at the end of 1999, when four major trade unions asked for the 
demission of prime minister Vasile, who was deemed incapable of reform (Pavel and 
Huiu 2003: 370-3). President Constantinescu and the NPCDP also withdrew their 
support for the prime minister, who was seen as the wrong candidate to lead the 
negotiations with the EU (Romania had been invited at the Helsinki summit of 
December 1999 to start negotiations). The new government led by the central bank 
president Isarescu adopted yet another programme for 2000, aiming at turning the tide 
of high inflationary pressures and economic decline, followed by a package of measures 
for fiscal relaxation to stimulate the economy (Stoica 2002:141).
The strategy o f the anti-communist coalition in the period 1997-2000 was primarily 
informed by a 'market ethos’, having as a primary objective the stimulation of the 
market economy in order to enhance efficiency and rationality in the economy and to 
bring about a decisive shift from a state controlled economy to an economy dominated 
by private actors. Its project o f marketisation was, however, compromised by two 
factors. First of all, the implementation of its economic strategy partially led to the 
suspension o f its political objectives such as decentralisation, formal-legal 
rationalisation, and the reduction of state intervention. This was discernible in the way 
the economic programme was implemented. The government mostly bypassed the 
parliament by issuing ‘emergency ordinances’ regarding key areas in economic reform 
(see Stoica 2002), therefore confounding rather than rationalising decision-making. In 
the privatisation process, a tendency towards the imposition of political control over the 
key institution in privatisation - the State Ownership Fund - could be observed. Further, 
the responsibilities of both the SOF and the Ministry of Privatisation were overlapping
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and vaguely defined (cf. Negrescu 2000). The latter clearly had an impeding effect on 
the pace of the privatisation process.
A second element, which compromised reform efforts was a fragile positive 
consensus over reform. As observed earlier, the coalition was primarily held together by 
a negative consensus in the form of anti-communism. When assuming government 
responsibilities (and thus having achieved its primary objective, defeating the post­
communists), the coalition proved to have rather little in common, apart from a broadly 
defined neoliberal programme. In particular after the failure to obtain NATO 
membership in 1997 (which could have served as an institutional ‘anchor’) an absence 
of consensus on major issues emerged (cf. Pavel and Huiu 2003). The absence o f 
consensus among the anti-communist, reformist forces can in itself be explained from 
the lack o f local discursive traditions on which to build for the construction of a 
radically different societal order. The one-sided reliance on external models and the 
failure to transpose these models into the local context made that the anti-communist 
coalition was open to various forms of critique (the social-democratic opposition was 
much more successful at constructing a balanced discourse, see chapter 11). The project 
encountered fierce criticism both from the political opposition and society as such (most 
significantly by trade unions). The coalition could not avoid widespread social 
dislocation in the form of unemployment and rapidly declining income levels. And 
because the CDR's solution for the social question resided in the stimulation o f 
continuous economic growth and the concomitant expectation of widespread 
amelioration of social life, the failed materialisation o f an economic upswing could only 
lead to a fierce ’social’ critique.233 This also caused the coalition to abandon its main 
objectives on various occasions, while attempting to cushion the effects of the economic 
reforms by increasing wage levels.234
233 The most important opposition party, the PSDR, claimed that the governing coalition was 
squandering national wealth through debt repayments. The government was further accused of 
perilising democracy through instigating social unrest and violence while pursuing a ’totalitarian 
attempt' at transforming the economy (PDSR 1999a).
234 Price liberalisation and privatisation measures, leading to closures and cuts in subsidies, led to a 
severe drop in living standards (which had already dropped by some 20 per cent since 1989, see 
Financial Times, 25-6-1997). Social dislocations led to serious social unrest in the form of a 
multitude of strikes and demonstrations. One of the gravest uprisings took place in one of the
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Political change
The political revolution of 1989 re-opened the so-called national question, i.e. the 
question o f what holds the community together, as it constituted a rupture with the 
fundamental premises o f the previous society. The former national Communist regime 
had been based on the fused identity of the Romanian ethnicity and the communist New 
Man. The revolution strongly questioned such an imposed identity, as it was concerned 
with reclaiming human autonomy and opening the political arena to alternative visions. 
Although the new regime reiterated the ethno-cultural conception of community and 
emphasised national unity against potential disruptive elements (embodied by the 
Hungarian minority, foreign powers as well as oppositional political forces), the 
revolution had irrevocably opened up the space for criticism of such an interpretation of 
national identity.
The post-communists. Despite the declaration of the NSF on 22 December 1989 that it 
would 'renounce the leading role of a single party and to establish a democratic and 
pluralist system of government' (lliescu 1995a), its behaviour in the first half of the 
1990s indicates, first of all, an attempt to limit as far as possible the discursive space 
that had been opened up by the revolution, and, secondly, to dominate that discursive 
space by introducing the concept of 'original democracy', a democracy based not on a 
pluralist representation of interests but on a national consensus embodied by the 
governing party. In addition, the post-communists reiterated the ethnic conception of 
community, as based on a shared language and culture. The new élite's perception of 
change consisted of the idea of 'controlled change', i.e. a certain amount of change was 
deemed necessary, but only within strictly defined limits.
The uneven struggle over the domination of discursive space and over political 
change in general came to the fore in the political process that led to the formulation and 
adoption of the new constitution. The constitution of 1991 was almost exclusively 
produced by the post-communists, as they directly took over executive as well as
historically most important industrial sectors and a major debtor to the state budget, the mining 
industry (Martin and Cristesco-Martin 1999: 397). As a direct reaction to government intentions to 
thoroughly restructure the mining industry, miners from the Jiu Valley started another mineriadâ on 
Bucharest in January 1999. Eventually concessions were granted by prime minister Vasile.
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legislative power from the Communist regime while the so-called Provisional Council 
of National Unity, which was to create the legal framework for the elections of the 
legislative assembly or parliament, only symbolically included opposition parties 
(Tudor and Gavrilescu 2002: 98; Weber 2001). Moreover, this 'constitutional pact' was 
only created after political and popular pressure arose against the political dominance of 
the NSF (Vosganian 1994: 6). The constitution that was eventually adopted in 1991 - by 
a parliament that consisted of 70 percent ruling party members whereas a majority o f 
two thirds was required (Weber 2000) - was a completely novel one, which meant that 
the post-communists could suggest a clear break with the past. Simultaneously they 
could prevent the re-introduction o f the constitution of 1923 (which would re-establish a 
monarchy), as favoured by the historical parties, and strongly anchor the republican 
form o f state in the constitution (Gabanyi 1998: 207). Therefore, the mode in which the 
NSF extricated itself from the Communist Party and was subsequently able to establish 
itself as the governing party ensured not only the impunity of ex-Communists and their 
political survival but also their continuity as political leaders (Barbu 1999: 152).
The opposition parties indeed voted against the new constitution in parliament, one 
of their arguments being the omission of an explicit reference to the separation of 
powers (Vosganian 1994: 7). The ruling party itself interpreted the role o f the executive 
as embodying in and of itself popular sovereignty. This was not only discernible in its 
institutional dominance, but also became clear in the relation between the government 
and those that chose to deviate from government opinion.235 The government barely 
tolerated critique of its position and legitimacy, which in some cases even led to 
violence against political and civic opposition.236 In substantial terms, the new 
constitution created a semi-presidential system, similar to the French one, in which the 
president has a relatively dominant position and disposed of extensive prerogatives. The
235 Within the ruling party itself similar tendencies towards limiting ideological expressions could 
be observed, especially in the conflict between president Eiescu and prime minister Roman, which, 
after the division of the NSF, lapsed into a kind of trench war, in which the legitimacy of each 
faction was strongly questioned by the other.
236 The most extreme example of the latter was when, in June 1990, and in response to a plea for 
support by president Iliescu, miners from the Jiu Valley marched on Bucharest and used widespread 
violence against peaceful protesters for democracy.
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president's powers include the nomination of the prime minister and the head of the 
Romanian Intelligence Service (Wiener 1997: 9). By dominating the process of 
constitution drafting and electoral legislation, the ruling party could favourably 
influence its dominance in the future government.237 Particularly in a context o f a rather 
disorganised and divided opposition the NSF was guaranteed of an electoral victory 
(Gabanyi 1998: 213).
Apart from limiting the possibility of expression for different perceptions o f a future 
Romanian society, the ruling party sought domination of this same discursive space by 
imposing, on the one hand, a vision of the state in which the ruling party dominates the 
political arena and embodies popular sovereignty, as expressed in the concept of 
'original democracy', and, on the other, a vision of society based on the promotion of a 
’national community* rather than a ’political community’ (cf. Barbu 1999: 141). The 
identification of the ruling party as the embodiment of popular sovereignty, to the 
detriment of parliamentary institutions and oppositional political parties, was an 
outcome of its self-proclaimed exclusive representation of the revolutionary masses and 
its character of mass movement, i.e., a movement comprising diverse national interests 
and therefore superior to a ’normal’ political party (Tudor and Gavrilescu 2002: 97). By 
imposing its particular vision of an ’original democracy’, the NSF crowded out other, 
more pluralist visions of a democratic system as proposed by the opposition, where 
inter-party competition and civil society were crucial aspects. Iliescu’s notion o f  original 
democracy was presented as an alternative to the notion of ’authentic’ democracy held 
by the opposition. Original democracy entailed the unification and government in 
consensus o f all political forces for the common good, and therefore skewed the idea of 
pluralist politics and inter-party competition (Pasti 1997: 162; Verdery 1996: 112). As 
Pasti (1997: 162-3) observes, the establishment of the Provisional Council for National 
Unity could be regarded as the institutionalisation of original democracy as it included 
virtually all political forces and embodied the idea of national consensus.
The emphasis of the need for consensus on reform and therefore the subordination of 
political forces to the ’national interest’ found further expression in the definition of 
national harmony as one of unity between explicitly Romanian forces. In this, the post­
237 Other elements also attributed to the ruling party's domination of the political field, for example
its control of state television.
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communists effectively moved against an understanding of the community as being a 
political community (as proposed by the opposition). Instead, they promoted an ethno­
cultural understanding of the community, which de facto meant the marginalisation o f 
national minorities and the denial of their demands for collective rights, such as local 
autonomy and cultural rights. It also meant, however, the marginalisation of those 
forces in society that sought to promote a vision of political community, in which social 
bonds have a political rather than ethnic nature.
The notion of a national community was institutionalised in the Romanian 
constitution of 1991. In principle, the constitution bases state sovereignty on the 
'majority ethno-nation' and not on individual citizens: 'National sovereignty resides with 
the Romanian people' (Article 2:1) and The State foundation is laid on the unity o f the 
Romanian people' (Article 4: 1) (Andreescu 2001: 273; Verdery 1996: 89; Weber 2001; 
233-4). At the same time, and distinct from the definition of the Romanian people as 
unitary and as the basis of sovereignty, the constitution employs the concept o f 
citizenship: "Romania is the common and indivisible homeland of all its citizens, 
without any discrimination on account of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, 
religion, sex, opinion, political adherence, property or social origin' (article 4:2). As 
Barbu (1999: 143) points out, the constitution seems to work with two conceptions o f 
citizenship, a pre-political one that is based on ethnic identity and serves as the basis for 
popular sovereignty, and another based on a political conception of citizenship in which 
all those residing on the territory enjoy certain rights and have certain obligations. As 
the identity rights are deemed unsatisfactory by some of the ethno-cultural groups, in 
particular the Hungarian minority in Transylvania (cf. Durandin 2000: 73-104), this 
ambiguity inherent in the constitution has led to various political and sometimes even 
violent conflicts over minority rights. Contestation of the essentially unitary definition 
of the state can be illustrated through the enduring conflict between those political 
parties that claim to rule in the name of the Romanian majority and the political party of 
the Hungarian minority.
A major part of this conflict is contained in the issue of collective rights for national 
minorities. The constitution of 1991 only refers to individual rights of minority 
members, whereas the party of the Hungarian minority has been pursuing local 
autonomy and the right to autonomous education and usage of the minority language.
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The Hungarian minorities’ pursuit for such rights has been most strongly denied by the 
extremist parties (most importantly the Party of National Union of Romania and the 
Greater Romania Party). The coalition with the extremist parties in parliament entered 
into after the elections of 1992 further impeded other perceptions of the national 
interest. The inter-ethnic debate centred on two major issues, demands for territorial 
autonomy and collective cultural rights by the political alliance of the Hungarian 
minority. Whereas the latter perceived the post-1989 political order as oppressing 
national minorities, the governing party interpreted the Hungarians' demands as 
irredentism and an infringement of Romanian sovereignty.238
As mentioned above, the changes of 1989 were informed by a generally shared 
renunciation of the Communist regime. At the same time, however, there was no clear 
understanding of or proposal for a future societal constellation. In this 'empty' ideational 
environment, the NSF adopted concepts that formed part of the anti-communist struggle 
all over Eastern Europe and which in Romania had especially been endorsed by the 
students and dissidents participating in the 'revolution from below'. One of the concepts 
that the NSF explicitly promoted on 22 December 1989 was the need for 'integration 
into the process of the construction of a united Europe, the common home of all the 
peoples of the continent' (Iliescu 1995a: 21). This expression of shared identity with 
Europe, or, in other words, the wish to once again undertake a project of modernisation 
inspired by Western Europe, showed, however, that the ideational context was not as 
empty as it seemed. Both the NSF and the democratic opposition promptly realised that 
a strategy of unbridled integration into Western structures would signify a drastic turn 
away from the past, and, therefore, would strongly problematise the role of ex- 
Communists in governing structures. Thus, where the NSF sought to limit change by 
promoting a specifically Romanian third way in which rapid integration and large-scale
238 These contrasting views led to incessant debates on educational legislation (the Hungarian 
minority claimed the right to a Hungarian university as well as the right to teach in the Hungarian 
language) as well as a tense political relation with Hungary. The relationship with the latter only 
improved in 1996 with a 'historical reconciliation’, when the governments of both countries signed a 
Basic Treaty, in which Hungary renounced territorial claims and Romania subscribed to upholding 
minority rights, a change in attitudes on both sides probably instigated by the desire to join the EU 
and NATO (Shafir 19966).
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reforms were deemed detrimental to the national interest, various oppositional groups 
organised against such a capturing of the revolution by forcefully arguing that the ’ideal 
of our revolution has been and remains a return to genuine values of democracy and 
European civilization’ (Timi$oara declaration 1990). In this way, the NSF tied itself to 
traditions of essentialism, in which Europe was interpreted as a threat to Romanian 
identity, whereas the democratic opposition (including the historical parties) sought to 
continue (or re-introduce) the tradition o f Westernism. The political evaluation of 
adherence to the European Union (and other European and Western institutions) did not 
merely consist of an examination of possible socio-economic and institutional 
implications, but was central to the positioning of political actors within the frame o f 
historically evolved perceptions on modernisation in Romania (cf. Verdery 1996: 104- 
30). While the NSF sought to reinsert itself in a relatively isolationist and essentialist 
tradition, it was vulnerable to criticism from both domestic and external actors, making 
it hard to completely reject Europe’. In addition, the governing party became 
increasingly susceptible to the ’coercive' effect that was the result of the conditionality 
involved in both IMF and EU economic support, as the NSFs expansionary policies in 
the early 1990s had made external economic resources absolutely necessary. The 
apparent paradox between the post-communists' indigenist and introspective approach 
towards modernisation, on the one hand, and its increasing search for insertion into the 
international environment from 1993 onwards, on the other, was not wholly 
contradictory. Although Iliescu and other more conservative elements in the NSF, and 
most certainly the extremist parties, were fiercely set against external interference in 
domestic affairs, they likely understood at the same time that serving the national 
interest could ultimately not do without recognition on the international level.
In the early 1990s, the post-communists seemed indeed to be rather reluctant to 
expand relations with organisations such as the EU and NATO. The limited nature of 
economic reforms undertaken by the NSF led to the exclusion of Romania from the 
Phare programme of the EU and to delays in negotiating a trade and co-operation 
agreement. The government's stance towards the ethnic conflicts in Transylvania and 
the violence used against the demonstrators in University Square in June 1990 led to 
condemnations from the EU, the Council o f Europe and NATO. Furthermore, the NSFs 
foreign policy was badly received as it showed a supportive attitude towards Milosevic
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as well as sympathy towards the Soviet Union (Phinnemore 2001: 252-3). At the same 
time, however, even if the NSFs strategy was rather conservative, it was certainly not 
entail a reactionary one aimed at re-installing communism or authoritarian isolationism 
(cf. Kligman and Verdery 1992). In fact, its economic approach was similar to 
Gorbachev's 'perestroika' in that it underlined the need for change but only by gradually 
introducing particular elements into the old system. Indeed, the NSFs more positive 
approach towards integration into Euro-Atlantic structures from 1993 onwards indicates 
that it perceived membership of international institutions as an integral element of 
national sovereignty.
The anti-communist opposition. The change in political power in 1996 was widely 
interpreted as a radical rupture with the past (see, for instance, Shafir 1996c; 
Tismaneanu 1997). Whereas in political-institutional terms such an interpretation might 
be justified - as most political scientists would agree, the peaceful electoral transition 
from semi-authoritarian to self-proclaimed democratic forces ‘proved’ the consolidation 
of democratic procedures -  a substantial shift in political and strategic practices 
amongst the new political class was much less evident (cf. Pavel and Huiu 2003).
In terms of its overall political discourse, the democratic ‘coalition of coalitions’ 
could rightfully be regarded as the political embodiment of Europeanist and universalist 
traditions in Romania. The governing coalition’s political programme (see chapter I I )  
was explicitly counterposed to the post-communist discourse and put strong emphasis 
on an 'authentic democracy’ (meaning a constitutional state with clearly divided political 
powers, in particular in terms of parliamentary autonomy), the development of civil 
society independent of the state, and a comprehensive transition towards a market 
economy (pointing to the necessity of private property for both civic freedom and 
private initiative). The coalition’s programme could justifiably be interpreted as a 
systemic critique of the communist and post-communist regime, and the promotion of a 
radically different societal order. This is exactly where the coalition claimed to be 
different from the post-communists. Such a programme of radical change was explicitly 
linked to those traditions in Romanian society, which supported Western conceptions 
and their emulation. The coalition considered Romania's natural place as being in
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Europe and the West, and therefore showed a strong ’elective affinity' with the projects 
of European integration and Atlantic military co-operation.
In this light, it is not surprising that in early 1997 the governing coalition opted for a 
strategy o f rapid emulation and Euro-Atlantic integration. The most immediate goal of 
the time was rapid integration into NATO structures, which, according to the new 
government, could take place already in the 'first round' of NATO enlargement after 
1989, together with states such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. This 
opportunity appeared in July 1997 at the NATO summit in Madrid, at which the 
members o f the first wave named. Eventual membership would evidently create a 
symbolic point of no return for the governing coalition, which in this way would be able 
to institutionalise a clear break with the (crypto-communist and isolationist) past. 
However, by focussing primarily on membership in international institutions, domestic 
reform was neglected or at least postponed. According to Dan Pavel, a well-known 
Romanian political scientist, the postponement of domestic reforms in the context of 
NATO admittance has created a pattern which was afterwards hard to break. The first 
six months o f the new government were marked by its efforts to maintain 'social peace’ 
and stability, relegating the decisive domestic break with the past announced in its 
programme to a future date. The first government of the democratic coalition under 
prime-minister Victor Ciorbea then initiated socio-economic policies that were 
characterised by a dual commitment to radical reforms and substantial social protection, 
which ran counter to the neoliberal logic pronounced in its programme (Pavel and Huiu 
2003: 354-5). Furthermore, the strategy o f rapid integration faltered (and so the 
institutionalisation of a clear rupture with the past), as the US government made clear as 
early as June 1997 that it would not support Romania’s bid for membership, therefore 
effectively postponing Romania's membership to a later 'wave' (see Gross and 
Tismaneanu 1997).
The institutionalisation o f a radical break with the past was to be based on a number 
o f principles: successful integration into the international ’circuit’, the establishment of 
an ’authentic democracy', and the comprehensive reform of the economy. If  the first 
element was not achieved with unequivocal success, this could not be primarily 
attributed to a defective political strategy on the part o f the governing coalition (in the 
Helsinki summit of the EU in December 1999 Romania was invited to begin
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negotiations for membership). A much more elementary incongruity between radical 
discourse and political action was apparent in the institutionalisation of the second 
principle, 'authentic democracy'. The anti-communism of the self-defined democratic 
opposition from 1990-1996 had been the main element of its identity and political 
strategy. Anti-communism was interpreted by the opposition as a return to the 'normal' 
state o f Romania. In order to reconstruct society on a new basis, the anomaly of 
communism had - according to the opposition - to be removed. On many occasions, the 
opposition evoked the ’crypto-communist', 'totalitarian', and 'authoritarian character* of 
the post-communist government and its project was to be based on an alleged 
diametrically opposed conception o f society. Political action to institutionalise a new 
order was however conspicuously absent in the ruling period of the coalition (1996- 
2000). The main political critique of the post-communists - i.e. the lack of a clear 
separation o f political power, the weak role of the parliament and the judiciary, and the 
decentralisation of political power239 - was not countered by any comprehensive 
constitutional and political reform (Pavel and Huiu 2003: 362, 378-9).
The absence of radical change was not only discernible in an institutional- 
constitutional, but also in a political-behavioral sense. The democratic opposition had 
reproached the government in the period 1990-96 for transferring parliamentary 
legislative powers to the executive, as the government implemented 'ordinances' with a 
legislative value which were not immediately subject to parliamentary discussion, 
voting and modification. Despite this critique, the governmental coalition continued 
these practices of bypassing parliamentary and thus creating an effective preponderance 
of the executive over the legislative.240 The legitimation for such political behaviour
239 One of the main critiques on the Constitution of 1991 by the opposition was its violation of the 
principle of the division of powers through control of the government over the judiciary and its 
possibility of issuing ‘ordinances', in this way bypassing the parliament. Furthermore, presidential 
powers were deemed excessive and undersupervised (Çtefanescu 1995:185-6).
240 Whereas in the period 1990-96 the goverment adopted 19 'emergency ordinances’ and 213 
'simple ordinances’, in the period 1996-1999, the numbers were 288 and 322 respectively (Pavel and 
Huiu 2003: 363). Another (higher) estimate is mentioned by Stan, who speaks of 20 emergency 
ordinances in the case of the Hiescu-regime, and 684 in the case of the Constantinescu-regime (Stan 
2002). Shafir (2001: 88) even speaks of the 'functional obliteration of the distinction between the 
legislature and executive’.
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was the alleged necessity o f rapid (economic) reform, which parliamentary scrutiny 
would slow down; reforms o f an economic nature thus inhibited democratic reforms (cf. 
Stan 2002). No systemic change and relatively little change in political behaviour when 
compared to the coalition's predecessor was then noticeable.
The interpretation of the formation of the new government in 1996 as a decisive tum 
towards a Western-type democratic system was to an important extent attributed to the 
fact that the party of the Hungarian minority was included in the governing coalition. 
The participation of the DUHR apparently indicated that the ruling élite was following a 
course o f inclusion towards national minorities (Shafir 2001: 95). This would entail that 
a strategy of 'nationalising nationalism' or the domination of the national majority over 
minorities was abandoned, and that a consensus between the demands of the Hungarian 
minority and the national majority position was sought. In short, it would indicate a 
shift to a more pluralistic and multi-national understanding of the nation-state, different 
from the definition of a national, unitary state contained in the constitution of 1991 (as 
well as the vision incorporated in the programme of the CDR of 1992). In 1997, a 
National Minorities Department was set up, whereas two emergency ordinances were 
adopted regarding local public administration (for instance, the use of bilingual street 
signs) and education in minority languages. However, by the end of 1997, the 
commitment of the governing coalition to inclusionary policies was placed in doubt, as 
members of the coalition turned against the amendments to existing laws that were 
proposed in the above-mentioned ordinances, using nationalist rhetoric (Andreescu 
2001: 276; Weber 2001: 236). When the laws were finally approved in July 1999, the 
original intent of the amendments had been considerably diluted (Shafir 2001: 96).
The general attitude o f the ruling coalition towards minority rights and the adoption 
o f a vision of pluralism and inclusion was apparently directly related to its desire to 
realise its primary objective, integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Both membership 
o f the EU and NATO required the resolution of internal conflicts over minority- 
majority relations and externally the friendly relations with neighbouring countries. 
W hen the objective of rapid integration faltered, the coherence and effectiveness of the 
ruling coalition was severely undermined (the Hungarian minority party threatened to 
leave the coalition in 1998), Romania's external image damaged, and radical, extremist 
forces resuscitated. The stance of the Democratic Convention and Petre Roman's
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Democratic Party against the demands of the Party of the Hungarian minority re- 
invoked an imaginary of national homogeneity, and in this way prolonged the conflict 
over the definition of nationhood and over the construction of the polity as such.
In sum, the anti-communist coalition failed to bring about a systemic rupture with the 
past, in which the ‘ground rules* laid down by the post-communists in the early 1990s 
were significantly altered. Rather, in particular instances the anti-communists seem to 
have been reproducing a logic of paternalism, state intervention, and obfuscated 
political rule, rather than institutionalising a minimalised state operating according to 
strict norms of formal-legal rationality. Furthermore, no distinctive break was made 
with an ethno-cultural conception of citizenship, which means that a major conflict line 
was protracted and the promulgated universalistic, legal-rational organisation o f the 
state as well as decentralisation of state competences were not fully effectuated.
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11. Transnational discursive paradigms: neoliberalism and 
‘Europe5
11.1 Neoliberalism and ‘Europe* as a ‘mobilising metaphor*
The transformations in Eastern Europe in the 1990s took place in what Offe calls a ’dual 
context or cognitive frame of reference and comparison' of, on the one hand, 
understandings formed in the past, especially (but not exclusively) during the 
experience with communism, and, on the other, those dominant in the West (Offe 1996: 
230). The latter can be said to combine two dominant discourses, neoliberalism and 
European integration. Taken as 'reference models' for the post-communist 
transformations, the two discourses tend to overlap in many respects, as both 
neoliberalism and European integration discourse call for an overall strategy of 
marketisation, and the implementation of structural adjustment policies in the form of 
privatisation, liberalisation and stabilisation, and hence point to the predominance of 
economic transformation in the overall process of change.241 Nevertheless, at the same 
time, the two discourses can be said to be in tension with one another. European 
integration not only signifies economic integration, but also entails a form of political 
integration as well as an adherence to social coherence within the European community. 
Below, I will first delineate neoliberalism as a frame of reference for Eastern Europe, 
and, subsequently, tum to Europe as a 'mobilising metaphor', while pointing to the 
mutual tensions involved.
Neoliberalism. Supply-side economics and the neoliberal programme of policy-making 
emerged strongly in the last three decades of the twentieth century, and formed the main
241 Whereas in neoliberalism this primacy of economics is dear, some have identified the project of 
European integration with a strong market-induced project, especially in the tum the project took 
from the mid-1980s onwards, starting with the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986, and 
continuing with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, and ultimately the formation of the European 
Monetary Union. A similar primacy of the economy is allegedly part of the accession process with 
Eastern Europe (see, for instance, Gowan 1995).
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alternative to the post-war model of welfarism. From the early 1970s onwards, the 
societal constellation in Western Europe designated by the label ‘welfare state’ became 
increasingly subject to a neoliberal critique that pointed to the major defects o f a project 
of modernisation based on the collective end o f social solidarity, realised on the level of 
the nation-state, through high levels of state involvement in the economy and in the 
provision o f public goods. Neoliberalism basically argued for a new project o f 
modernisation in which a general shift was to take place from the level o f the state to 
the level o f the private sphere (the market) and the individual (cf. Touraine 2001: 9). In 
this, protagonists of the neoliberal project argued for the primacy of the market 
economy in solving societal problems. This prominence of the market, or so the 
neoliberal critique claimed, would resolve two major crises of the modem political 
order, i.e. an economic crisis exemplified by stagnation in productivity levels and profit, 
and a political crisis expressed in a declining belief in the malleability of society. As the 
market was deemed more efficient in generating economic growth, the role of the state 
should be essentialised and minimalised, which, in turn, would release an entrepeneurial 
dynamic in society that would mark the return of Western societies to their previous 
high levels of economic growth and welfare provision. Additionally, it would free the 
state from the fiscal crisis it faced as ever higher demands were made on social 
provisions whilst productivity levels lagged behind, thereby creating a gap between the 
state’s expenditure and its income levels. In short, the market would resolve general 
problems o f economic stagnation, and provision and distribution of welfare. In a 
political sense, the increased intrusion of the post-war state in the private sphere was 
deemed to have reduced individual freedom in modem societies. The increased 
dependency of the individual on the state in economic matters (employment, income 
level, social provisions) inhibited his economic freedom, as his range of choice, and 
therefore the multiplicity of different understandings o f economic ends was limited by 
the singular understanding provided by the state. By recreating individual freedom 
through the retreat of the state -  and therefore coercion - from private life, the individual 
would again be free from constraints and interference from others in his own perception 
of the good life. Freedom from constraint in the economic sphere would therefore not 
only enhance the autonomy of the individual in pursuing economic ends but also further
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political freedom, understood as freedom from the interference of authority in private 
matters.
1. Cultural inspiration. The neoliberal programme claims universal validity as its 
beneficial consequences for efficiency, rationalisation, as well as enhanced political 
freedom are deemed to function practically in any societal setting. It is exactly its 
relegation of morality and substantive values to the private sphere that makes the 
neoliberal programme potentially relevant as a political programme of reform. At the 
same time, the denial of the necessity of dealing with substantive issues on the political 
level makes neoliberalism vulnerable to a political critique in which it is reproached for 
not addressing issues of national identity, the protection o f local values, and social 
solidarity.
2. Political foundations. The perception of freedom in neoliberalism is formulated in 
terms of a negative freedom, the individual is considered free if he is independent in the 
pursuit of his actions, and is unhindered by constraints imposed ‘from above* or from 
fellow citizens (Smart 2003: 97). The retreat of the state from society, effectively 
reducing the scope of government by limiting the spheres of society in which 
governmental interference is considered legitimate, leads then to the liberation of the 
individual from coercive tutelage from above, and creates the pre-conditions for true 
freedom of action. As the market is regarded as a neutral arrangement, without a 
coercive structure capable of interference in individual lives, individuals can pursue 
those actions which they consider to lead most directly to the maximisation of their own 
interests. The liberation of the economic from the political thus also means that the 
individual is independent in deciding on his own personal vision of the good life, not 
subordinated in any way to a singular collective vision, institutionalised in the state and 
imposed through state policies.
In as much as an individualised vision of the good life precludes any social solidarity 
organised at the nation-state level, neoliberalism rests on the classical liberal idea that 
social harmony is best guaranteed by the collective pursuit of individual self-interests 
which will create the ‘greatest good for the greatest number*242 (cf. Gill 1994: 79). In
242 Hayek refers to the beneficial effects of pursuing one’s self-interest in the following way: ‘[t]hat 
we assist in the realization of other people’s aims without sharing them or even knowing them, and
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neoliberalism, freedom is perceived as the individual freedom of choice between a 
variety of alternatives when engaging in action, which also means the freedom to enter 
into or to abstain from social relations. Social relations are perceived as consisting 
exclusively of ‘voluntary co-operation* focused on economic transactions, as co­
operation on the basis of other considerations (political, cultural) is considered as 
interference in other citizens* lives. Social relations are ultimately reduced to 
contractual relations, whereas considerations based on a ‘thicker’ understanding of the 
collective (which could constitute the basis for solidarity or social justice) are seen as 
interfering with individual freedom. The rejection of solidarity based on a ‘common set 
o f values and shared purposes’ leads to a society which is ‘means-connected’ rather 
than ‘ends-connected’ (Hayek, mentioned in: Smart 2003: 95). Moreover, the market is 
considered to be the source of a ‘peaceful reconciliation of divergent purposes* (Hayek, 
mentioned in: Smart 2003: 96). In essence, this means that a previously existing social 
solidarity is to be ‘privatised’ and left to the consideration of the individual.
3. Socio-political practices. Notwithstanding the fact that neoliberalism embodies a 
political project of furthering market relations and individual freedom of choice in 
society, there is ultimately no direct link between its economic assumptions and a 
specific political form o f organising society. As the market is its pinnacle, the neoliberal 
project needs a strong (though limited in scope) ’contextual’ state in order to protect the 
rules of the market and order in society. However, this does not mean that a free market 
necessarily requires a democratic political order.243 Despite the absence of a clear 
preference for a particular political form, most neoliberals invoke the democratic order, 
as Hayek does with his notion o f  a ‘legal democracy’ (see Held 1987), although their 
understanding entails a strongly limited form o f democracy, providing the constitutional 
framework for the functioning o f the market society, and ultimately being a ‘utilitarian 
device’ to safeguard liberty (Hayek, mentioned in: Held 1987: 249). Democracy is 
therefore limited in its ability to express popular sovereignty, as its functions are to be
solely in order to achieve our own aims, is the source of strength of the Great Society* (Hayek, cited 
in: Smart 2003: 95).
243 In fact, neoliberal politics have on occasion been implemented by authoritarian governments, 
such as in Chile in 1973 (cf. Gill 2002: 143).
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strictly circumscribed by the rule of law and should not go beyond the guaranteeing of 
individual autonomy.
Neoliberalism clearly separates the political from the economic, relegating the state 
to the former, whereas the market and civil society embody the latter. Although the state 
in neoliberal discourse is perceived as a ‘minimal state’, restricted in its tasks to the 
provision of law and order, and counterposed to the ‘Leviathan’ of the welfare state, it is 
at the same time a strong state. In other words, neoliberalism entails a ‘strategy for 
simultaneously increasing aspects of the state’s power while restricting the scope of the 
state’s actions’ (Held 1987: 243-4). Such a vision of the state appears to provide a 
solution to the perceived crisis of the welfare state. State intervention in the economy is 
reduced in favour of enhanced flexibility in production and labour markets, and in the 
assumed releasing of innovative forces in the private sector. Furthermore, a ‘minimal 
state’ responds to the needs o f the increased internationalisation of the economy as it 
leads to a more open, less regulated national market. In this sense, in the neoliberal state 
the only way of preserving national sovereignty is by integration into the international 
economy and the enhancing o f the competitiveness of the national economy (cf. Crouch 
and Streeck 1997). Therefore, despite a minimalised status, strong regulatory state 
action is needed to restructure the market and create a competitive environment, for 
instance by securing the free mobility of capital and the flexibilisation of labour.
European integration. The idea of ‘Europe’, or, in a more limited sense, the European 
integration process, can not be said to constitute a coherent strategy or discourse that 
provides modernising élites with a clear-cut model of modernisation, even though the 
impact of Europe on its (future) member states is substantial in its ‘direct’ influence in 
terms of policy and institutional transfer (as exemplified by the importance of the 
adoption of the acquis communautaire and the honouring of the Copenhagen criteria by 
aspiring member states). Yet, beyond its purely institutional impact, ’Europe' involves 
more than an economic project, as it equally invokes ideological and symbolic meaning 
(cf. Chiantera-Stutte 2002). Especially in the wake of T989’, one could speak of the 
importance of the idea of Europe as a ‘political idea and a mobilizing metaphor’ (Strath 
2002: 388). The latter is especially significant in the sense that it shapes the overall 
perceptions o f élites on modernisation, as it necessarily precedes possible policy and
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institutional transfers; élites first reflect on the necessity o f ‘Europeanisation’ in order to 
adhere to a project of integration. This also means that Europe becomes a powerful 
symbol in the political field, and its interpretation potentially creates strong dividing 
lines between political actors. At least three general understandings of Europe can be 
identified: a reading of Europe as a story of economic prosperity and thus as a reference 
model for economic reform; an understanding of Europe as a political model of civil 
and political rights; and Europe as a model for organising social solidarity on a political 
level.
In part, the project of European integration can be understood as a defensive reaction 
to globalising tendencies and the erosion of the welfare state in the form of a viable 
regional market. In this understanding, 'Europe' would predominantly concern an 
economic and institutional project, following a logic o f increased global economic 
competition. Another way of reading ‘Europe’, which may be at least partially 
compatible with the economic reading referred to above, is that it entails an ever 
increasing commitment to individualist liberalism. ‘Europe* then is about the 
guaranteeing of civil rights and the limitation of governments in exercising their 
powers, a guarantee which is nowadays threatened by globalisation, to which the 
process of European integration provides a safeguard (Friese and Wagner n.d.). An 
emphasis on the protection of minority rights by the EU, as well as the European 
Council and the OSCE, seems to confirm such a commitment to the protection of 
individual rights in Europe, but also to go beyond it (cf. Brubaker 1996: 105-6).244 A 
third reading of Europe is as holding out the promise o f maintaining some level of 
social justice, as it was embodied by the European welfare state during ‘les trentes 
glorieuses’. Europe is then not only about creating a common European market (through 
primarily negative integration, i.e., reducing regulations and restrictions on the 
movement of capital, goods, and persons, see Scharpf 1999), but also about preserving 
some level of social justice and cohesion in the face o f individualising market forces 
(although in reality this mostly takes the form of a rearguard action, whereas positive 
integration in the form of common political projects on a European level proves hard to 
realise, Scharpf 1999).
244 At the same time, commitment to civil rights is not confined to the EU and can hardly be said to 
be an ‘exclusively European goal’ (cf. Friese and Wagner n.d.; Offe 2000: 19).
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The EU holds out the promise of democratisation (an ‘external anchor*) for new 
members states, empirically founded on the consequences of the enlargement towards 
Southern Europe in the first half of the 1980s, and it is in this sense that Europe tends to 
be interpreted in Eastern Europe. Europe then constitutes a cultural and historical 
symbol for democracy, civil society, and human rights, an interpretation which accepts 
its signification as being formed by a long tradition of political liberalism, and the 
gradual (although at the same time strongly conflictual) expansion of democracy (cf. 
Friese and Wagner n.d.). As such, it provides a particular discursive symbol in the 
debates on modernisation and transition in Eastern Europe, and adherence to the idea of 
Europe' becomes a necessary confirmation of democratic credentials (cf. Schöpflin 
2001: 110).
(Neo-)liberalism and ’Europe' as fra m es  o f  reference in Eastern Europe 
The adoption of (neo-)liberalism by political élites in the East-European post­
communist context meant, above all, the expression o f the desire for a radical and rapid 
rupture with the past. The neoliberal doctrine of the minimal state and the market as the 
solution to social problems constituted a radical systemic critique of the communist 
system, as in essence it entailed the exact opposite to the communist path to 
modernisation, which had been characterised by an absolute belief in the malleability of 
society ‘from above* and a collectivist understanding of society. Neoliberalism in 
reality spelled anti-communism in its absolute rejection of any statist or organised 
project of modernisation - and therefore of any direct state interference in society -  and 
its portrayal of the market as the natural condition of society and therefore any deviation 
from that condition as an aberration (cf. Craiutu 1998). These assumptions endowed 
neoliberalism in post-communist societies with a strong element of polarisation, 
dividing political forces between those that feared and those that promoted rapid 
change, especially since the neoliberal reform strategy was seen as a means of 
eliminating ‘those interest groups that still occupied the institutions of the old regime’ 
(Bönker e t al. 2002: 6).
In its ‘pure* form however, neoliberalism is unworkable as a strategy of 
transformation, even if it represents the most clear-cut representation of a model of 
capitalism, as it eschews any kind of hybridisation (Szacki 1995: 138, 151). The 
'transition costs' and the tradition o f egalitarianism under communism both point to the
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necessity of adherence to some kind o f social solidarity if the new modernisation project 
is not to founder in the face of widespread social critique and resistance (cf. Offe 1996; 
Stark and Bruszt 1998: 1-2)245. Furthermore, a market society cannot be constructed 
without a strong state that imposes privatisation and extensive economic reforms ‘from 
above’246, and at the same time must uphold some level of social protection and 
security. Moreover, neoliberalism as a political strategy provides the instruments to 
dismantle, or at least to re-organise the state, but as a political doctrine that provides 
answers as to  how to build a new political order and how to integrate society around a 
new concept of collectivity, it is extremely limited. Neoliberalism thus proposes to 
create a new social order on the basis of individualism and market exchange, but has no 
real answer to questions of social well-being and collective belonging.
The failure of neoliberalism to provide convincing answers to both the national and 
the social questions was perhaps enhanced by its imported nature in post-communist 
Eastern Europe, just as communism had been in the 1940s. As such, it has few endemic 
roots in Eastern Europe, as the ‘proto-liberalism’ and ‘anti-politics* that could be found 
in Poland and Hungary in the 1980s were only partly overlapping and also contained 
strongly divergent elements (such as the emphasis on civil society as a moral 
community instead of a community based on economic relationships, see Garton Ash 
1989; Glasman 1994; Szacki 1995). Although there was an elective affinity between 
neoliberalism and those élites in Eastern Europe that were interested in a radical rupture 
with the communist order -  in terms of the promises of greater freedom and the 
possibility o f  greater control and efficiency that neoliberalism offered (Eyal et a l  1998:
245 Furthermore, even the implementation of neoliberalism means that some kind of 
‘constructivism’, against the pure nature of neoliberalism, is needed in a context of a highly ordered, 
hierarchised and controlled political system (Szacki 1995: 153-4).
246 The tasks which the post-communist élites faced were not only those of creating the institutions 
of a market economy but also of producing or at least stimulating agency to behave according to the 
rules of a market society (Eyal et a l  1998: 98). Whereas in the West the major task of neoliberals 
was to free the market from the entanglements of the state, that is to say, creating deregulation 
through re-regulation, in Eastern Europe the project involved the actual creation of a market where 
it had not existed before. In practice, this has often led to the persistence of links between the state 
and the economy, for instance in privatisation funds and bargains between the state and managers of 
private firms (cf. Eyal et a l  1998).
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90) neoliberal assumptions (individual responsibility and competitive, entrepeneurial 
behaviour) equally faced historically embedded social understandings with which it was 
not compatible, such as egalitarianism and collectivist, harmonious perceptions of 
society.247 In sum, the political project of neoliberalism in Eastern Europe cannot be a 
project o f merely ‘rolling back the state’ and re-establishing market relations where they 
had been absent. The dominant and 'tested' nature of the neoliberal model indicates an 
‘imperative’ element, as the only alternative available, but it remains limited in its 
confrontation with larger society and political opposition. The real meaning of 
neoliberalism must therefore be understood in an ‘interactionist’ framework, that is, by 
identifying the political élites who promote it, the way they interpret it, and how they 
relate to competitors, such as the post-communists and nationalist forces (cf. Stark and 
Bruszt 1998).
Two potential answers to the national and social questions (that neoliberalism is 
incapable of confronting) can however be found in, on one the hand, nationalism, and, 
on the other, a strong reliance on European integration, as a (partial) substitute for local 
traditions of liberal individualism and democracy. In the latter case, Europe' embeds a 
collective, national identity in the wider framework of Europe, which is predominantly 
interpreted as a community o f liberal values and norms (embodied in concepts such as 
'civil society', 'human rights' and a 'Rechtsstaat'), and can therefore provide legitimation 
to those political forces that have pursued a pre-dominantly anti-communist project. Its 
commitment to individualist liberalism is, however, prone to be in tension with 
definitions employed by political opponents, who may denounce the perceived loss of 
national identity and sovereignty, as well as social solidarity that European accession 
brings in its wake.
247 Eyal et a i (1998) identify five forms of affinity between the ‘monetarist technocrats’ and the 
dissidents in Central European societies, i.e., the rejection of societal malleability, self- 
governance/responsibility of individuals, self-regulation or governance ‘from afar’, the rule of law, 
and the civilising role of intellectuals (1998:95-9).
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11.2 Discursive contestation over reforms in  Romania248
Despite assertions to the contrary, at the moment that the old Communist regime broke 
down, the discursive space of modernising ideas in Romania was not completely void. 
On the one hand, the revolutionary forces (both masses and élites) immediately echoed 
slogans of freedom and popular sovereignty found elsewhere in the collapsing 
communist world, which despite their rather vague nature, clearly indicated some 
direction for radical change. On the other hand, the élites that controlled political power 
in the wake of the revolution themselves formulated a discourse, also relatively 
imprecise, but which similarly entailed an orientation for change, although it did 
reproduce many significant concepts from the former regime. The rupture constituted by 
the revolution was itself contested terrain, as some interpreted it as a complete break 
with the past system and the necessity to move away from the Communist regime and 
Ceauçescuism as quickly as possible (‘down with communism*), whereas others 
understood the rupture to be less dramatic and as only entailing a regime change ( ‘down 
with Ceauçescu’).
Consequently, the revolution institutionalised two major modernising discourses in 
post-communist Romania, one revolving around a radical rupture with the immediate 
past and the (re-)establishment o f a polity founded on popular sovereignty and 
individual freedom, the other ranging from an absolute denunciation of change to a 
milder conservatism favouring limited change (expressed in the re-articulation of 
concepts such as nation, social cohesion, and a strong state), although it also 
increasingly incorporated concepts indicating more radical changes (such as reform, 
market economy, privatisation, and European integration). These political discourses 
not only built on traditional concepts available in the domestic context, or on concepts 
derived from dominant discourses in the international sphere, but were interrelated. This 
reciprocity resulted both in an enduring polarisation between political forces, and in a 
selective incorporation of adversaries’ concepts into one’s own discourse.
248 This section draws on the extensive survey of political programs by Voicu and Voicu (1999), 
various political party programs and statements (in the form of speeches, articles and monographs) 
by members of political parties.
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11.3 Discourses of limited change
The post-communists that dominated in post-1989 Romanian politics avoided a 
sustained and systemic critique of the Communist project, despite initial statements to 
the contrary. The discourse of the post-communists was above all characterised by the 
condemnation of the excesses o f Ceau$escuism and a rehabilitation of what they saw as 
the true nature of communism (cf. Voicu 1993). The latter included the continuing 
commitment to a thick description of social bonds, based on social justice and equality, 
and the condemnation of alienation (the latter became increasingly visible in a vehement 
denunciation of ‘anarchic liberalism’, 'wild capitalism', and the negative consequences 
of marketisation). While the post-communists did admit to a profound social, political, 
and economic crisis, they interpreted it as a result of a crisis of state authority, not as 
one of ‘etatism* as such (cf. Voicu and Voicu 1999: 592). In the early 1990s, their 
discourse could be characterised as ‘revisionist socialism’ (Adamson 2000), an 
approach that belatedly took issue with Stalinism and therefore pleaded for the gradual 
introduction of political and economic liberties. Nevertheless, the post-communists 
explicitly opposed the adoption of any vehement criticism (inherent in neoliberalism, or 
its East-European variant ‘transitology’) which condemned the politically oppressive 
features and the immanent inefficiency of any kind of state interventionism and 
recreated the ‘pensée unique’ in the East European context. The post-communists* 
adherence to a uniquely Romanian 'third way' was strengthened by the ‘discursive 
alliance* formed from 1992 onwards (until 1995), with those political forces on the 
extreme left and right that not only opposed reforms but even favoured a return to the 
old system (cf. Voicu 1993: 7).
1. Cultural inspiration. If one places the post-communists* interpretation of 
modernisation into the context of the two main tendencies for understanding 
modernisation in the history of the Romanian modem state -  on the one hand, 
traditionalism or particularism, and, on the other, occidentalism or westemism -  one 
notices a disproportionate -  in times of revolutionary changes - accentuation on the 
conservation of prior existing structures and institutions, and a persistent emphasis on 
the uniqueness of the Romanian situation and the need for the reproduction of this 
distinctness, in defiance of universal recipes for change.
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The particularism that formed a predominant element in the national Communist 
project was primarily based on the promotion of national unity and cohesion, and 
thereby the suppression o f domestic diversity. Secondly, national Communism was 
based on a vision of national sovereignty or self-determination, which strongly opposed 
universalism and supported a world vision based on the diversity and uniqueness o f 
societies. National unity and sovereignty were formulated against the external threats o f 
both Soviet imperialism and occidentalism. The inspiration or reference model for the 
early post-communist or social-democratic project was based predominantly on these 
concepts embedded in national traditions.
The post-communist project o f the early 1990s contained two key elements. The 
preservation of national unity and social cohesion. Both of these concepts were 
articulated to oppose concepts that were raised by domestic oppositional forces as well 
as external observers. The post-communists reproduced the emphasis on national unity 
and cohesion in their populist project of conserving social cohesion and homogeneity 
against the diversifying and potentially disruptive effects of Western (neo-)liberalism 
and individualism. In addition, the national unitary state was to be protected against the 
potentially centrifugal forces of Hungarian separatism/irredentism as well as from the 
pluralist democratic opposition. Instead of a continuous renunciation of the 
egalitarianism and the radical and isolationist nationalism of the past - as both the 
internationally dominant neoliberal approach and the domestic opposition called for - 
these concepts were reintroduced by the post-communists. The second key element in 
the post-communist project was therefore the protection of national sovereignty, seen as 
the only way to secure national unity and continuous social cohesion. The embodiment 
of national sovereignty, first by the NSF and by later the PSDR, was articulated as a 
conditio sine qua non for the protection of the national interest and specific national 
values, whereas opposition parties were portrayed as threats to the nation and social 
equality. While opposition forces were promulgating universalist concepts of pluralist 
democracy, privatisation, and the market economy, the post-communists introduced 
alternative concepts, such as the social market economy and original democracy, based 
on both traditional particularism (the national value of homogeneity) and universalism 
(social justice).
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The essentially isolationist and particularist strategy of the post-communists in the 
early 1990s (primarily formulated against the integrationist strategy of the domestic 
opposition) shifted towards a conception of modernisation into which some universalist 
concepts of the opposition were introduced, although always adapted to post-communist 
discourse.249 The central tenets of national unity and social solidarity were coupled with 
the notions of European integration and post-industrial society as explicit objectives of 
the social-democratic programme. Authentic modernisation was defined as a 
combination of the 'fulfilment o f the aspirations for freedom, democracy, social justice, 
solidarity and well-being', whereas 'national reconstruction' could only be achieved in 
simultaneous accordance with domestic demands for reform and evolutions elsewhere 
(Europe and the world) (PDSR 1997). Instead of renouncing foreign influence and 
putting the emphasis on the undermining potential of integration in international 
structures, the PSDR redefined Europe as a 'social Europe', which is 'not only founded 
on financial and monetary criteria, but also on the construction of an integrated market 
which is able to generate jobs and offer protection to the disadvantaged categories' 
(PDSR 1997).
In this way, its social-democratic doctrine could be presented as linking up with 
universal tendencies (in which the social role of the state is reconsidered), while 
simultaneously defending the national interest by correcting the erosive consequences of 
market society. Thus, where an unconditional opening up would expose Romania to the 
forces of globalisation which would heighten social polarisation and inter-ethnic 
conflict and therefore undermine national unity and social cohesion, the social- 
democratic doctrine offered a form of international integration whilst maintaining 
domestic levers of correction. Neoliberal models were considered as already outdated in
249 Perhaps the most striking example of this is the assertion of the concept of 'participatory 
democracy* (democrapei participative), adopted by the PDSR in 2000, which has evidently been 
formulated against the concept of civil society as endorsed by contending political forces (in 
particular the intellectualist Civic Alliance). Participatory democracy is defined as a shift of political 
activities towards citizens, groups, and local communities, with the endorsement of increased civic 
participation in public life. At the same time, the PSD reclaims the concept of civil society as 
necessarily representing the whole of society, instead of just 'a few elitist groups and circles' (PSD 
2000b), thereby denouncing an intellectual domination of civil society and giving a popular 
interpretation to the concept.
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the developed world, and therefore not worth repeating (PDSR 1997). Thus, the PSDR 
promoted the 'integration of Romania in the multifunctional structures o f the developed 
world, considering that this represents today a natural framework for the affirmation of 
national identity and to keep the unitary character of the Romanian state' (PDSR 1997).
2. Political foundations. Post-communist discourse evolved from conservatism and 
populism, stressing stability and social reparation, and reformism o f a social-democratic 
type (cf. Adamson 2000). Throughout the 1990s, the social democrats placed a 
continuous emphasis on a collectivist understanding of autonomy, rather than 
emphasising individual liberty (as its political opponents did). In political terms, the 
prominence of the collectivity in its modernising discourse was expressed in a call for 
‘national unity*, ‘national cohesion’, original democracy’, and the reference to internal 
and external threats to the Romanian nation (the first being embodied by the political 
opposition, the second by the ‘Hungarian threat’), as well as a continuous reference to 
forms of social cohesion and social justice through a ‘social market economy’, a ‘social 
state’, and the avoidance of social polarisation.250 Whereas the stress of national unity 
indicates the need to avoid any kind of division of the collectivity and therefore 
apparent weakness in the face of potential adversaries, the centrality of social cohesion 
and solidarity shows an imaginary o f a strong embeddedness of the individual in the 
larger community, and, in turn, his or her dependence on the survival and flourishing of 
that community. In a historical sense, this collectivism reveals a continuity with the 
‘holist’ perception of the nation, as an undifferentiated social whole, which was 
manifest in national Communism, Fascism and nationalist Liberalism. Likewise, the 
dominant interpretation o f freedom in the post-communist/social-democratic project 
demonstrates a strong inclination towards this positive kind of freedom, i.e., a freedom
250 The internal threat - the centre-right opposition - was accused of ‘preparing the apocalyptic end 
of the country’, ‘destroying national wealth by restituting property to the big landowners’, and thus 
favouring a particular social class instead of the national interest, and heightening social problems 
(unemployment, housing). The external threat to the nation - the Hungarian radicals -  was seen by 
Iliescu as gaining particular prominence when the party of the Hungarian minority was about to join 
the centre-right governmental coalition, which in his opinion would lead to a federalisation of the 
country, organised by Hungarians and the opposition who betrayed the national interest (Diescu’s 
remarks in the second round of the presidential elections in November 1996, see $tefSnescu 1998: 
257-8, see also PDSR 1999b).
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that can only be realised when certain fundamental conditions are in place and which 
gives priority to a substantively defined common good rather than individual 
emancipation from oppressive state power.
Indeed, throughout the various party platforms of the social-democrats issued during 
the 1990s, there is a repeated reference to ‘the common interests of all Romanian 
citizens’, the necessity ‘to correct the numerous social injustices inherited from the 
communist regime*, the promotion of ‘equality and social solidarity as principal values’, 
‘to avoid division and polarisation of society’, and the ‘equality of chance’ (see Voicu 
and Voicu 1999: 590-602; see also PDSR 1997,1999a, 2000a). In its 1995 programme, 
the social-democrats stated: ‘[i]n the vision of the PDSR, equality is not an abstract 
concept, since one cannot realise the freedom of its fellow men if one does not assure 
their equality. For us, [equality] is related to the refusal of social polarisation, poverty 
and the limits on motivations and development, brought about by the inequality of 
income’ (cited in: Voicu and Voicu 1999: 596-597). The collectivist interpretation of 
freedom is flanked by, or perhaps more accurately, understood within an interpretation 
of communal bonds that finds its basis in an ethnic, exclusivist definition of the nation. 
Such a perception is not universally shared by all those in the PSDR and has not always 
been expressed with equal force, but it has emerged often enough to be considered an 
important part of the party’s discourse. This vision accentuates those communal bonds 
that are based on language, a shared history (and a certain reading of that history), and 
an ethnicity that invokes as a counter-image the Hungarian minority and others that are 
deemed to pose a threat to the unity of the Romanian people. As such, the social- 
democratic project can be seen as a continued commitment to the (as yet unrealised) 
collective self-determination of the Romanian ethnic majority.251
3. Socio-political practices. Despite the ostensible general consensus among the 
political forces in Romania on the direction of political reforms -  i.e. the establishment 
of a democratic political system and party pluralism -  the actual implications o f  such a
251 In a statement issued in 1999, the PSDR affirmed that 'the only chance for our individual and 
collective existence is represented by the Romanian national state, unitary and independent. It is a 
sacred truth for all that our liberty is tied to Romanian sovereignty, while anything which causes 
damage to this belief and which aims at the dissolution of the Romanian state, with all its dramatic 
consequences, will meet with an immediate response by the PDSR' (PDSR 1999b).
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choice have been evaluated rather differently by those same political forces. The post- 
communists have adhered from the beginning to the concept of democracy, without 
however making clear what was meant by this. From some of their more significant 
political actions and choices as well as from positions taken on crucial political issues 
however one can arrive at an understanding of their conception of democratic society. In 
particular in the early 1990s, the post-communists emphasised a vision of political 
society in which it was not so much the state that represented the various interests o f 
civil society (and therefore constituted in its entirety an essentially neutral political body 
in which popular sovereignty was embedded), but rather it was the ‘umbrella* or mass 
party which incorporated all national interests and represented the national interest as a 
unified and indivisible whole. This principle o f national consensus is explained aptly by 
Vladimir Pasti:
National consensus means that, beyond a group or personal interests, beyond any options, there 
is a unique solution, the best one, the solution imposed by reality if, assisted by technicians and 
specialists, one comes to know it well enough. This basic solution is just as inflexible and 
inexorable as the laws of gravitation. In order to stress its absolute character, it is considered as 
representing the national interest and, [as] nobody can rise against the national interest, a 
consensus emerges about it (Pasti 1997: 164).
In this perception, the post-communists were the interpreter of the common good, to 
which other parties and social forces could subscribe, but about which in essence no 
significant discussion was possible. Perhaps the most concise expression of this vision 
was to be found in Iliescu’s concept of ‘original democracy*, which was to comprise all 
the political forces in the country and which was an extension in time of the unity 
embodied in the National Salvation Front, i.e., a ‘unity o f necessity* in the context of a 
profound political, economic and social crisis (§erb 1994: 3; Blendea 1994: 6). 
Although the concept of ‘original democracy’ failed to rally the majority of the political 
forces behind it (as the opposition took strong issue with the concept), a diluted version
252of it -  ‘national consensus* - remained a part of the post-communists* vocabulary. 25
252 In its 1997 program, the PSDR called for a new political and social consensus around the 
'national objective' of 'modernisation and development of Romania' (PDSR 1997). Similar 
statements can be found in subsequent programs. In 1999, the PSDR called for the substitution of 
social confrontation and the dictate of shock therapy with dialogue and consensus (PDSR 1999c).
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The tendency to view popular sovereignty as embodied in the post-communist mass 
party and much less so in the rules of the political system and political institutions was 
complemented by the party’s claim to represent, in its essence, the Romanian majority, 
a pre-political community and an indivisible whole in itself, which could therefore be 
represented by a single ruling body.253
Modes o f  legitimation
The new political project initiated by the post-communists in 1990 was at first 
legitimised by the revolutionary credentials of the National Salvation Front (reference to 
which continued until the mid-1990s, see Iliescu 1995a, b; Voicu and Voicu 1999). This 
form of ‘revolutionary’ legitimacy was based on the formal re-instalment of popular 
sovereignty as the basis of political authority, and was thus in essence a denunciation of 
the arbitrary rule of the Ceau$escu-clan in favour of the procedural and impersonal 
legitimacy found in democratic political systems. However, partly because this 
‘revolutionary legitimacy* quickly wore thin as a result of contradictory political actions 
and the highly visible gap between the pronounced rupture with the former order and its 
continued existence in real terms, the post-communists introduced others forms of 
legitimacy. They started out with a form of populist nationalism, defending 
egalitarianism, social cohesion and national unity, thereby pre-empting widespread 
anxiety about socio-economic deterioration as well as the loss of national sovereignty in 
the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet empire. In the first instance, this populist 
nationalism invoked traditional legitimacy, in the sense that post-communists tried to 
preserve norms and traditions that formed an intrinsic part of the former regime. At the 
same time, these values constituted the core of the new project and therefore equally 
invoked a ‘goal-rational form* of legitimation, identifying the substantive goals of the 
new project and making them an integral part o f their model of the future societal order. 
Nevertheless, critique from both the domestic opposition and international actors of 
these values undermined their legitimating merit, by pressing for the introduction of
253 Iliescu, other members of the post-communist party, and most vigorously the radical nationalist 
parties frequently denied the right of the Hungarian ethnic minority to invoke regional ‘ethnic 
autonomy’ in Transylvania as this would allegedly lead to the dismemberment of the Romanian 
unitary state and thus go against the national interest.
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elements of rational-legal legitimacy, i.e. by seeking to enhance efficiency in the 
economy as well as diffusing impersonal norms in state structures. In spite of this 
criticism, the post-communists-tumed-social-democrats retained the predominance of 
values such as social cohesion in their political project, by becoming ever closer in 
appearance to European social democrats, they invoked a form of derived legitimacy.
Strategic-institutional objectives
It was not only in politico-philosophical, conceptual terms but also in political-strategic 
ones that post-communist discourse increasingly comprised integrationist, universalist 
arguments, without however shedding the original main tenets of national unity and 
social solidarity.
1. Societal progress. In a sense, one could say that the post-communists denied the 
need for (systemic) transformation. Soon after the changes in 1989 the post-communists 
began to stress stability and social equilibrium as the primary objectives of their project, 
thereby negating the need for a complete dismantling of state and societal structures. 
Two observations with regard to their understanding o f  socio-economic progress can be 
made. First of all, the emphasis on social solidarity and stability signified a rather direct 
continuity with the communist period. The primacy o f such objectives identified a 
centralised and interventionist state as the main actor in organising and sustaining socio­
economic progress. Only through the continued action of the state could social cohesion 
be guaranteed (in the face of the disruptive forces of the post-communist transition) and 
general welfare be maintained. In this sense, according to the post-communists, it was 
exactly the (partial) suppression of pluralism and differentiation that would enable the 
Romanian economy to weather the storm of transition and preserve the national interest. 
The second observation regards then the primarily collectivist understanding of socio­
economic progress and its affinity with a homogeneous, unitary understanding of the 
nation. In contrast to neoliberal visions of the generation of general welfare through the 254
254 As the current prime minister Adrian NSstase has put it: ‘The political configuration of 
contemporary Europe is much more than a conjuncture, it is proof of a unity of belief which defines 
Europeans. From this point of view, the Romanian electorate has demonstrated that it has already 
entered Europe, in view of the majority's choice for a party which defends social-democratic 
values’ (cited in: Cemat 2001).
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actions o f detached individuals, the post-communists emphasised the need to prevent 
social division and polarisation, to collectively sustain an effort to realise social 
cohesion. Such arguments against the 'chaos' and 'anarchy* of liberalism hold strong 
affinities with the historically embedded argument for a 'national unitary state', the aim 
of which was to secure national wealth for the Romanians as a collectivity.
2. Collective self-determination. The post-communist programme of modernisation 
evolved around the preservation o f national unity and the promotion of the national 
interest. In this sense, a good part of the party’s political behaviour was related to the 
prevention of the (perceived) disintegration of the traditional Greater Romanian state as 
formed in 1918 (although the retrieval of Moldova was never particularly high on the 
political agenda). The post-communist party connected the national interest and national 
unity with the preservation o f the 'national unitary state*. Thus, preservation meant 
leaving intact the centralised, unitary Romanian state. In the early 1990s, the PSDR 
regarded this purpose as best served by the relative isolation of Romania from the 
integrationist and liberal trends followed elsewhere in Eastern Europe. This strategy, 
which partly continued the collectivist and isolationist arguments of national 
Communism, was redefined from 1993 onwards, when integration into Euro-Atlantic 
structures was acknowledged as a policy objective. The shift from an isolationist to an 
integrationist stance did however not undermine the fundamental attachment to the 
national unitary state. Integration was primarily perceived in a formal, legal sense, 
serving the purpose of securing international recognition of Romanian national 
sovereignty. The substantive domestic policy goals implied in Euro-Atlantic integration 
(such as the decentralisation of state power) were to a far lesser degree part of the post­
communist vision.
3. Political representation and control. While the denunciation o f the tyranny of the 
communist regime was deemed an integral part of the revolution of 1989, the approach 
of the NSF and later the PSDR towards democracy, pluralism, and the autonomy of 
society remained ambiguous. In the early 1990s, the idea of the obsoleteness of political 
parties was suggested, while large-scale mass movements were deemed fully 'modem', 
thereby renouncing the particularism of the historical parties and acclaiming the positive 
and dynamic character of the NSF (Pavel and Huiu 2003: 28-9). At various points, the 
PSDR proposed the necessity o f a national consensus behind the crucial objectives of
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modernisation and economic development, apparently favouring socio-economic 
reforms over political debate and reform.255
In spite of the lost legitimacy o f étatist socialism and in defiance of the minimalist 
conception of the state outlined in neoliberalism, the post-communists pursued a 
‘maximalist’ vision of the state throughout the 1990s. The post-communists promoted 
an interventionist state whose primary role was to guarantee social solidarity, equality 
and to avoid social polarisation by mitigating the social consequences of economic 
reforms (cf. Nastase 2001: 101-2; Voicu and Voicu 1999). Instead of following the 
neoliberal discourse o f the minimal state (as often happened elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe), the post-communists promoted a maximum state, characterised by a powerful, 
paternalistic government with a dominant role in the economy. In principle, the post­
communists followed the same path as elsewhere in that they promoted a retreat of the 
‘patronage state’ from society, both in a political sense, through the simultaneous 
circumscription of the powers o f the state and the guarantee of human and civil rights in 
the constitution, and in an economic sense, through the reduction o f the state’s role in 
the economy by means o f privatisation and the creation of a legal framework for a 
relatively autonomous market.
Notwithstanding this formally acknowledged necessity of the withdrawal o f the state, 
the post-communists’ vision of the state went beyond the limited idea of the dual role o f 
the state, i.e. as both the guarantor of a civil sphere and as the immanently value-free 
place where popular sovereignty was located. In the post-communist perception, the 
state was to actively interfere in society, so as to guarantee the ends of social solidarity 
and justice, and to prevent social polarisation. The post-communists therefore placed 
social responsibility at the state level, in sharp contrast with the neoliberal vision which 
places social responsibility at the individual level (or, alternatively, at the meso-level o f 
civil society). The post-communists diagnosed the post-1989 situation as a ‘crisis of 
identity of civil society, of social groups and individuals, marked by a political 
disorientation and the weakening confidence in norms and moral values’, in conjunction 
with the emergence of various social problems, all o f which were accentuated in a
255 In its 1997 program for instance the PSDR claims that Romania is already a constitutional state, 
with mature and consolidated democratic institutions, and since political pluralism is a fact, this 
forecloses any further debate on democratic quality (PDSR 1997: 3).
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‘crisis of the authority of the state’ (cited in: Voicu and Voicu 1999: 592, 595, 596; see 
also PSD 2000a).
A primary solution to all this has been identified by the post-communists in a 
recovered authoritative state, defined as a ‘social state’, which ‘within the functioning of 
the mechanisms of the market economy, seeks to satisfy the social needs of classes and 
social groups, particularly o f those less favoured’, having the right to ‘prevent and 
correct social distortions created by an uncontrolled economic development’ (cited in: 
Voicu and Voicu 1999: 592, 595). In other words, the social state as a ‘national 
institution of solidarity’ is to promote the primary values of equality, social solidarity 
and cohesion (PSD 2000a).
In tension with the predominant statist and paternalist tendency, however, was the 
essential role the post-communists attributed to privatisation from 1993 onwards. In this 
they introduced a crucial (neo-)liberal concept into their reform discourse - the 
acceptance of a (gradual) withdrawal of the state - without however discarding the main 
concepts of a ‘social state’ and a ‘social market economy* (cf. Voicu and Voicu 1999: 
595). In 1996, the party went as far as to call for an acceleration of privatisation, 
whereas in 1997 the perceived role of the state was transformed into one guaranteeing a 
framework for the development of society. In this adapted version of the state, direct 
intervention is restricted to the stimulation of the private sector, although indirect 
intervention to prevent polarisation is still envisaged256 (Voicu and Voicu 1999: 599- 
601; PSDR 1997; PSD 2000a; Nastase 2001: 113-114).
11.4 Discourses of radical change
The discourses of radical change and against post-communist continuity were mainly 
articulated in Romania by two opposition groups, the re-established ‘historical parties’ -  
the National Liberal Party and the National Peasant Party -  and the newly formed civic- 
liberal party, the CAP. The opposition’s perception of modernisation can therefore be 
understood as largely being based on two currents of thought, i.e. (neo-)liberalism in its 
various guises and christian-democracy (cf. Gabanyi 1998). The opposition represented 
those parties that formulated a critique o f the Communist project on a systemic level,
256 The 1997 program thus referred to the need for both the principles of economic efficiency and 
social protection, denouncing radical solutions to economic reforms (PDSR 1997).
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therefore eschewing any kind of continuity with the immediate past and strongly 
opposing the forces pursuing the status quo.
1. Cultural inspiration. As already mentioned, the coalition's ’essential objective' was 
’to detach completely from communism*. The identification of communism as an 
externally imposed anomaly underpinned the coalition claim for a return to the 'spiritual 
traditions o f responsibility, tolerance, and enlightened patriotism, which have laid the 
basis for the modem Romanian state' (CDR 1992: 529). Here, the anti-communist 
project was directly linked with pre-communist Liberal-nationalist traditions of 
modernisation, which in themselves had been based on the emulation of the West. 
Furthermore, there was a  close affinity between the anti-communism of the coalition 
and the internationally dominant (neo-)liberalism promulgated by international 
institutions and experts. Both hinged on a suspicion of the state and (political and 
economic) interference in society. Against the particularist tendencies in the post­
communist project, the democratic coalition promulgated a universal conception o f 
democracy and of the market economy. As mentioned above, the opposition’s 
conception of politics was directly formulated as a reaction to the post-communist 
concept of ‘original democracy’, and was defined as the ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ conception 
of democracy, as it followed Western standards (cf. Verdery 1996: 112). The (ré­
introduction of democracy in Romania was perceived as the re-affirmation of a long 
historical trend of Europeanisation and démocratisation.257 In a similar vein, post­
communist concepts such as the 'social market economy’ were criticised for their 
prolongation of communist centralism and their evasion of the unquestionable necessity 
of establishing capitalism.258 For an economic transformation to be successful, the 
necessary liberal institutions - found in all advanced economies and therefore having a 
'tested* nature - had to be adopted.
257 The opposition presidential candidate, Emil Constantinescu, formulated this as follows in his 
election program: ‘The experience of older generations shows us that, undo- a intelligent and 
generous government, the Romanians have succeeded in transforming the country, in some 
decennia, from a rural province, poor and non-significant, into a modem and democratic state’ 
(Constantinescu 1996). Similarly, the CAP, in one of its statutes, identified two possible directions 
for Romania, Bolshevist Asiatism or Western, European standards. According to the CAP, Romania 
had already belonged to Europe by virtue of its traditions, since 1848 (Verdery 1996: 116).
258 See, for instance, Çerbànescu (1993: 13): To look for a third way is a chimera'.
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The almost unconditional adoption of Western, allegedly universally valid concepts 
and models created in itself tensions between the logics innate in these models. One of 
these tensions was the consequence of the invocation of liberal notions such as 
'tolerance', 'social dialogue', and the necessity of the state to refrain from giving moral 
direction to citizens' lives. The approach towards politics inherent in these notions, 
i.e., the acceptance o f an inherent measure o f conflict and difference of opinion in 
society, and the understanding of politics as being based on institutionalised conflict, 
was in potential contradiction with the strong emphasis on the vision of the state as 
representing first and foremost the Romanian ethnic majority, thus a form of 
particularism. The latter re-introduced a particularist, substantive value into politics, 
which was often understood as preceding any other consideration. In a similar vein, an 
undiluted adherence to the primacy of the economy as found in the neoliberal model is 
potentially in tension with the upholding of the values of a particular community and 
the national interest.
2. Political foundations. The democratic coalition denounced the continuity o f any 
statist project as an impediment to the emancipation of the individual, whose freedom 
was seen as the most crucial element in the transformation to a new societal order. The 
need for negative liberty was strongly emphasised, through the ‘guarantee of individual 
liberty’ and ‘the inviolable right of individual property’, which were considered the 
basis of individual and general welfare. The National Liberal Party, for instance, 
understood the crisis o f the state as the result of the lack of consideration for the 
fundamental rights of citizens, the lack o f curtailment of state power, and the 
overwhelming presence of the state in society. Therefore, the first priority was to effect 
the retreat of the state from society in order to create a ‘real democracy’, based on 
individual property rights and free competition in a free market economy (Voicu and 
Voicu 1999: 617). Modernisation was seen as the confirmation of the primacy of the 
individual in society, and the crucial role of a middle class and free initiative in a stable 
new order. 259
259 In the 1992 program of the CDR the following was asserted: ‘The state should not be obliged to 
assure, automatically and by whatever means, the wellbeing of its citizens. It has the duty to offer 
the necessary protection and conditions so that single [individuals] can create themselves a decent 
life, according to their own values and their own labour’ (CDR 1992: 531).
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Instead o f promulgating a paternalistic and protective state (as the post-communists 
did), the democratic coalition underlined the repressive features of the state and argued 
strongly for the protection of the citizen against the abuses of state power (see, for 
instance, AC 1990a, b). The abuse of power was not only to be protected through a 
legally embedded constitutional state, but was furthermore to be based on a strong 
distinction between the state and (civil) society. The latter 'reunites all forms o f social 
life independent from the state, the central and local administrations' (CDR 1992: 530). 
Moreover, the absence of civil society was the premise on which dictatorship and 
poverty were based. In the CDR's definition of civil society, political liberalism and 
democracy were explicitly linked with economic liberalism: 'Civil society means: the 
exercise o f individual and collective liberties, the unrestricted exercise of human rights, 
the opening of democracy to public life, the encouragement of private property, the 
accelerated privatisation of state property, [and] all the elements necessary for the 
ensurance o f a profitable economy, of the prosperity o f every citizen and every family’ 
(CDR 1992: 530). Furthermore, the CDR holds that 'private property is the 
indispensable condition for the authentic expressivity o f a human person' (CDR 1992: 
541), and similarly promoted liberal individualism as a primary element in 
modernisation, placing the liberal individual within a civil sphere that needs to be 
protected from state interference. Civil society was further the sphere in which the 
individual finds common values and social solidarity as 'the guarantee o f liberty and 
democracy can not be offered other than by the consolidation of civil society in its 
relationship with the state’ (cited in: Cristea 1993: 9; see also Voicu and Voicu 1999: 
625-6).
The opposition shared the ‘totalitarian’, political critique of communist society, in 
which the main problem of communism is identified as statist intrusion in all spheres of 
society. In most post-communist societies the remedy to this was found in the adoption 
of a neoliberal strategy of retreat by the state from public life and the strict curtailment 
of the state’s powers and duties, in order to effect a shift away from a concentration of 
power in the state towards a much larger degree of autonomy invested in society. 
Indeed, in the CAP’S vision of modernisation, the resolution of the crisis of civil society 
is of prime importance, a crisis which manifests itself in a condition of apathy and a 
lack o f involvement of the citizen in resolving societal problems (Voicu and Voicu
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1999: 623). The primary objective of modernisation was thus less collective autonomy 
and independence from external interference than the emancipation of the individual in 
relation to the state, and the belief that such an emancipation would lead to the best 
possible realisation of the common good. This position brings with it a different view of 
the individual itself who should embody responsibility, willingness to cooperate and 
solidarity with fellow citizens.
3. Socio-political practices. The post-communist programme for modernisation put 
substantive objectives - the national interest and social solidarity - at the forefront. The 
pursuit of these objectives allegedly legitimised an interventionist state as well as 
restricted political reform. For their part, the democratic coalition interpreted this 
programme as an unmistakable sign of conservatism. As the democratic coalition held 
as its primary objective the complete eradication of communism from society260, it 
needed to formulate a radical political programme proposing mechanisms through 
which the communist societal logic could be undone and an alternative societal order be 
constructed. In many ways, the coalition found such a programme in what I above 
labelled the dominant discourse o f neoliberalism. In both an economic and political 
sense, the coalition proposed the rebuilding o f order on the basis o f legal-rational, 
procedural norms as the most effective means to counter the collectivism, state 
repression, alleged illusions o f the malleability of society, and inefficiency of 
communism (both in its pre-1989 form and in its supposed reincarnation, the PSDR).
The main conceptual argumentations of the democratic coalition regarded: a. a 
constitutional and minimal state, b. a strict separation between the state and (civil) 
society, and, c. the creation of an autonomous economic society. Regarding the state 
and political rule, the concepts of an 'authentic democracy' and the 'constitutional state' 
were counterposed to the post-communist concept of 'original democracy'. The concept 
of authentic democracy underlined the need for the subjugation of the state to diverse 
societal interests and unrestricted popular influence in politics; the constitutional state 
and its division between powers and legal, procedural workings were proposed to
260 The 1992 program of the CDR reads: The essential objective is to take down communism 
completely, through clarifying consciousness and changing mentality, through rebuilding the 
constitutional state, stimulating the economy and assuring social security, through reintegrating 
national territory, and reintegrating Romania into the European circuit* (CDR 1992: 529).
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counter arbitrary state power, the manipulation of the state by singular interests, and 
illegitimate state intervention in society. Similarly, with regard to the economy, the 
'omnipotent and paternalistic state* which characterised both communism and post­
communism needed to be replaced by a state that was merely a 'partner to civil society* 
(Cristea 1993: 9).
State-society relations needed drastic transformation according to the democratic 
coalition. The insistence on the state and the establishment of (civil) society as a sine 
qua non for a successful transformation was based on two kinds - political and 
economic - of reasonings. First o f all, the state as such was deemed a symbol of inertia, 
conservatism, oppression, and the communist past, whereas civil society represented 
dynamism and change. Because it was not in the state's interest to downsize itself, only 
the direct representation o f civil society (outside of the state) could serve society's own 
interests. From this it followed that an omnipresent state would stifle society, impeding 
the latter's natural inclination towards responsibility and autonomy (cf. Tanase 1993: 7). 
The crisis in post-communist Romania was not merely related to the excesses of the 
Ceau§escu tyranny but to the suppression of society that flowed from the communist 
system itself. The withdrawal of state from society was then a necessary condition for 
the re-emergence of authentic values and for society to function properly.261 As 
communism had created a 'new m an' who had lost religious faith and belief in his 
fellowmen, a new societal project needed to reverse this trend and recreate authentic 
values of responsibility and tolerance.
The democratic coalition therefore put great emphasis on human and civil rights, and 
on the creation of a civic sphere in which fundamental rights were protected from state 
interference. The second underlying reasoning that demonised the state and favoured 
independent societal forces was o f an economic nature. Thus, the political and economic 
arguments were linked by their identification o f civil society as the only possible basis 
of a real transition. Here, the argument ran that only the absolute guarantee of private 
property would free society from oppression as it was the only way to limit state 
interference in the economy (the political argument ran parallel to this but was not the 
same: it emphasised the need to create institutions for the popular control of the state).
261 Thus the CDR pleaded for the 'moral resurrection of the nation through the return to the
fundamental values of liberty, rights, solidarity, and faith' (CDR 1992: 530).
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Private property constituted the origin of citizen autonomy and responsibility and was 
expected to release forces of entrepeneurialism and competition that would ultimately 
benefit general welfare.262
Modes o f  legitimation
The democratic coalition primarily invoked a derived mode of legitimation in its claim 
to political authority. Its programme of modernisation predominantly referred to 
HuropeanisationAVestemisation, that is integration into Western structures, and the 
emulation o f Western models and institutions. In this way, the coalition invoked derived 
legitimacy by referring to the 'tested nature' and universal validity of these models. In 
order to gain local relevance, these models needed to be locally embedded by means of 
their evident applicability to local problems and exigencies. The anti-communists 
claimed this relevance by utilising the logic of formal-legal rationality in its struggle 
against alleged communist continuity. Anti-communism was equated with the 
transparency, impersonal functioning, and legal justice of the constitutional state, which 
was counterposed to the arbitrary, corrupt, and opaque nature of the post-communist 
authority. Formal-legal rationality was therefore given an explicit function in the 
conflict over political authority and the right pathway to transition. In addition, the anti­
communist coalition referred to its own democratic and Europeanist roots in Romanian 
history, invoking a form of traditional legitimacy in a project, attempting to break 
decisively with the immediate past. Communism was regarded as an anomaly in the 
country’s history, whereas the preceding, Europeanist tradition was identified as the true 
Romanian tradition.263 In this way, the re-established historical parties could claim to be 
the heirs of the ’authentic’ traditions of democracy, whereas the post-communists were 
clearly the inheritors of the nefarious communist regime (cf. Pavel and Huiu 2003: 104).
262 Here, arguments for democracy and an economic market economy were often explicitly linked: 
'There does not exist any alternative for a democratic party but to sustain the private sector' (Tànase 
1993: 7).
263 See footnote 255.
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Strategic-institutional objectives
The institutional programme of the anti-communist coalition directly confronted the 
alleged institutional continuity of the post-communists, founding its institutional 
strategy to a large extent on integration into Western structures.
1. Societal progress. The socio-economic proposals of the democratic coalition 
reveal a strong adherence to the logic of differentiation and government ‘from afar'. 
Through the creation of a distinct societal sphere, the market economy or civil society 
(which in the coalition's understanding seems to add up to the same thing), and the 
creation o f autonomous economic agents, the middle class, a virtuous circle is created. 
'Only economic liberalism, with which initiative and entrepeneurial spirit are associated, 
will take the place of completely counterproductive egalitarian collectivism and statist 
paternalism' (§erbanescu 1993: 2). The market economy is expected to generate not 
only general welfare through the entrepeneurial and competitive behaviour of 
individuals, but also to provide the best means for social protection (through the 
institution o f private property and the institutions of civil society). Many crucial aspects 
of the transformation are then expected to be resolved in the market economy. Among 
these are the economic restructuring of former state enterprises, the creation of 
employment and domestic capital, and the emergence of a motivated and responsible 
work force (cf. Tanase 1993).
2. Collective self-determination. The conception of collective self-determination or 
autonomy of the democratic coalition was formulated against what was deemed a form 
of prolonged tyranny of post-communism. Against the strategy of national consensus 
promulgated by the post-communists, the democratic coalition proposed the effective 
implementation of the ideals of the December revolution. These ideals comprised two 
related issues: internally, the effective shift of power from the state and its institutions to 
the people, and, externally, the discontinuation of Romania’s isolation from the West. 
With regard to the first ideal, i.e., popular sovereignty, the coalition proposed various 
formal, institutional modes of strengthening the influence of the people on politics. The 
most important aspect of their claim to 'authentic democracy* was the demand for 
effective parliamentary rule, in which all the legislative powers would belong to the 
parliament (thus diminishing excessive presidential powers). In addition, the strict 
separation o f political powers was called for, something that was seen as insufficiently
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dealt with in the constitution of 1991. As I have indicated above, along with political- 
institutional reforms the coalition was a fierce supporter of the development of an ’extra- 
parliamentary’ civil society and a participatory democracy (this was in particular 
espoused by the CA and the CAP). In political-strategic terms, the calls for the effective 
establishment of a constitutional state and against a continued 'party-state' were in 
concomitance with the coalition's demand for the purification of politics from the 
former Communist nomenklatura and members of the Securitate.
With regard to the second ideal, the decisive integration of Romania into the 
European and international orders, the coalition continuously pleaded an integrationist 
strategy, i.e., the rapid integration of Romania into the Euro-Atlantic and European 
structures. The integrationist strategy was to fulfil three of the coalition's primary 
objectives. The coalition regarded international integration as a complementary way of 
strengthening internal civil and human rights and the democratic system. In this sense, 
the adherence to international standards was tantamount to the emulation of a political 
model. Secondly, in a geo-political sense, integration into NATO would guarantee 
national security and stability, thereby preventing potential claims on Romanian 
national territory. Thirdly, integration into the European and world economy would best 
serve Romanian national economic prosperity. The last two points reveal that the 
coalition's strategy - just as the post-communist one - evolved to an important extent 
around the notion of national interest. Whereas the post-communists in the early 1990s 
regarded an isolationist course as the best way to preserve territorial integrity and 
economic prosperity, the democratic coalition countered this idea with an 
'internationalist' strategy which was considered much more effective in promoting the 
national interest (see Verdery 2000: 90-1).
3. Political representation and control. The democratic coalition's programme of 
modernisation comprised two 'logics' with regard to political and socio-economic 
spheres. In politics, as mentioned above, the coalition promulgated above all the 
establishment of a constitutional state. In institutional terms, this meant not only the 
strict separation between legislative, executive and judiciary powers, but also the 
reduction of an oversized, centralised state. According to the coalition, the logic of the 
state should be reduced to one of protection of the constitution and the law. Its functions 
were to be minimised to administrative, diplomatic, and military functions and the
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assurance of social protection (CDR 1992: 530). Moreover, an explicit point in the 
coalition’s programme was decentralisation and local administration, increasing the 
scope for increasing local autonomy and diversity (CDR 1992: 531, 535).
In a similar vein, in the economic sphere the state needed to be confined to the 
essential functions of regulation and the guaranteeing of the market economy and 
private property. In sharp contrast to the post-communist conception of the state as a 
social state, the democratic coalition proposed a form of minimal state. The main 
difference between the two conceptions is the endorsement (or not) of the malleability 
of society. The minimalist conception of the state strongly doubts any possibility o f 
shaping society 'from above' and therefore proposes a 'contextual' state rather than an 
interventionist one.264 In contrast to the post-communist programme, the coalition 
pleaded for a substantial shift o f initiative for action from the state to society. Such a 
shift could only be successful if an actual basis for societal autonomy was created, i.e., 
private property. In marked contrast with the post-communist economic outlook, the 
coalition pleaded for a 'profound' kind of privatisation which would strongly reduce the 
presence of the state in the economy and would ensure competition and efficiency in the 
entire economy. The coalition argued for the 'progressive elimination of all constraints 
on the formation, development and functioning of the private sector' (CDR 1992: 542). 
Profound' privatisation also meant that property nationalised during the communist 
period was in principle eligible to be restituted, including agricultural land. As in the 
neoliberal paradigm, the elevation of the market economy as the prime solution for 
social problems and general welfare was endorsed by all opposition parties. According 
to the NLP, it was therefore necessary to create a minimal state, in which ‘primary 
incomes are the basis for individual welfare and have to be obtained to a much larger 
extent through free activity in the market economy*, whereas the redistribution of
264 In the democratic coalition, the party that positioned itself on the centre-left and had promulgated 
a strongly social outlook in the early 1990s stated the following in its 1997 program: 'social- 
democracy has renounced the illusion that governmental intervention can ameliorate the market 
mechanism, transforming it from imperfect into ideal. The market needs to be left to produce 
wealth' (cited in: Voicu and Voicu 1999: 613). The NLP pleaded for a 'minimal state, without an 
active role, whose actions need to be "reduced to the impediment of the violation of law s"' (Voicu 
and Voicu 1999: 619).
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incomes was to be carried out on the basis of a criterium of stringent necessity (Voicu 
and Voicu 1999: 620). The state was therefore to gradually retreat from the economy 
and renounce any active economic role, whereas a strong market economy was to 
enhance modem state capacities (Voicu and Voicu 1999: 620). In principle, state 
involvement in the economy ( ‘dirigism’) was viewed by the Liberals as potentially 
damaging for society and therefore the principal role of the state was to allow the 
smooth functioning of the market and economic enterprise (Cristea 1993: 9). Not only 
was the reduction of the role of the state deemed essential, so too was an increasing 
rationalisation of state activities and increasing decentralisation. Despite the consensus 
on the neoliberal assumptions of a minimal state265, the crucial role of a ‘transitory 
state’ in reforms was acknowledged, as the transformation of a totalitarian order in itself 
creates the need for a non-societal, neutral actor to create the contours o f a new society. 
The radical reduction of the state to key functions as described in the concept of a 
'minimal state' did not, therefore, mean the proposal of a weak, non-interventionist state. 
This was not the case as, in the first place, a 'transitory state' was deemed necessary to 
correct for the social consequences of the transition. In the second place, because 
reducing the size of the state could not be carried out without the intervention o f the 
state itself. Thirdly, a strong, even if minimal, state was needed to guarantee the 
functioning o f the market.
265 The christian-democratic party initially underlined a more significant role for the state in the 
functioning of public services and social protection, but by 1996 a much more reduced role of the 
central state in favour of the private economy and local government was endorsed (Voicu and Voicu 
1999: 637).
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Conclusions
Even if the definition of modernisation used in this study -  as political projects aiming 
at the reconstruction of the socio-political order on the basis of the idea of human 
autonomy - is not shared by the reader, and in consequence, my treatment of particular 
discourses and political projects as inherently modem is contested, the historical- 
empirical analysis of Romania’s experience with modernity should anyhow lead to the 
questioning of the equation of modernisation with Westernisation or Europeanisation as 
well as to scepticism towards assumptions of convergence. It should have become 
evident that, first o f all, modernisation and the interpretation of modernity is less of a 
homogeneous and universal experience than assumed in the notions of convergence and 
singularity o f modernity, and, secondly, that any particular experience with modernity is 
circumscribed by the historical-situational confrontation between (constellations of) 
actors, paradigmatic external reference points, and internal traditions, interpretations, 
and exigencies.
The Romanian experience with modernity
The analysis of the genesis of modernity in the Romanian principalities reveals that the 
original Romanian modem experience differed significantly from the Western one. 
Rather than consisting of either a more or less faithful emulation of Western modernity 
or a complete rejection, the particular constellation of actors that emerged as 
modernisers combined elements from both the rational, liberal model and the alternative 
vision of romanticism. The nineteenth-century origins of Romania’s experience with 
modernity are significant and constitutive of later understandings and political projects 
in two ways.
First, the project of nation-building and state-formation that dominated much o f the 
19th century institutionalised a modem society in which the autonomy of the cultural- 
linguistic collectivity was predominant. In other words, independence and autonomy as 
political concepts evolved around the Romanian nation as a reified, supra-individual 
entity whose existence and development were the primary objectives of the modem 
state. The cultural-linguistic collective constituted the main constituent of the political
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project for the modernisation of the Romanian Principalities. It informed the idea of 
independence (independence of the Romanians as a specific nation), the idea o f unity 
between two (or three) prior separated territories, and the primary basis for the 
establishment of the boundaries, membership, and objectives of the new, modem 
nation-state.
Second, the first political project of modernisation -  national-Liberalism -  brought 
forth the crystallisation o f the two major understandings of modernity in Romania: 
universalism or emulationism and particularism or indigenism. Although both 
perceptions were themselves open for different interpretations and, moreover, never 
exhausted the discourse o f a particular modernising élite, they almost unfailingly 
constituted the ultimate reference points. During the nineteenth century, one could 
therefore speak of the institutionalisation of discursive traditions of modernity, which 
have been embedded in local culture and have been continuously reproduced as well as 
altered through time.
If the nineteenth-century political project of national-Liberalism is read in a strictly 
modernist way, its failure to cause an absolute break with the past would have to be 
understood as a failure to introduce modernisation as such. The absence of a revolution 
that disrupts the presence from the past and is subsequently institutionalised in 
structures, which unmistakably inhabit the modem, would preordain such a political 
project from its very beginning. In contrast, in this study my aim has been to detect the 
modem in the non-modem, and to juxtapose different understandings of modernisation 
with the Western archetype. Read in such a way, the origins of Romanian modernisation 
show a different image. The national-Liberal project was indeed based on a 
combination o f  traditional, particularist and universal, Europeanist elements, but this 
fact neither precluded its modem nature, nor supposed a gradual disappearance of 
traditional elements under pressure o f universal, modem ones. What makes the origins 
of Romanian modernisation relatively distinct is the fact that its first experience with 
modernity was based on a collectivist understanding of the subject of modernisation, 
rather than an individual one. In other words, a cultural-linguistic collectivism was 
constitutive o f its conception of modernisation, rather than Western individualism.
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The dual foundations of this understanding -  liberalism and romanticism -  resulted 
in a form of particularist universalism in which the archetypal elements of 
modernisation -  rationalisation, civil and political rights, bureaucratisation and state- 
formation -  were subsumed under the primary objective of national unification and 
independence. Instead of renouncing the past as such, in Romanian Liberalism a 
reconsideration of tradition took place, in which elements from the past were selected 
that served as the basis for the construction of a modem society. Thus, ‘[L]ooking at 
tradition as at a mere break is tantamount to ignoring major aspects of modernization 
which appeared precisely as a result o f the confrontation between the wish to renovate 
and the wish not to waste the intellectual experience amassed along the centuries’ (Duju 
1981: 180). In other words, rather than to understand the central place of the Daco- 
Roman nation in the national-Liberal programme as a residual factor of tradition, it 
should be regarded as both a reaction to the potential engulfment of Romania by either 
universalistic Western modernity or by surrounding empires, and as a particular 
understanding of the concept of self-rule and emancipation.
I have argued that two main deviations of the nineteenth-century Romanian project 
of modernisation with Western modernity can be discerned. First of all, the predominant 
attention for the emancipation of the denied nation from foreign tyranny instead of the 
liberation of the oppressed individual from the despotic ruler and the interference of 
religion. This also entailed that a complete rupture with the old order was a less 
important preoccupation than the retrieval of earlier existing rights and the bringing to 
full development of the collectivity. Secondly, instead of promulgating a political order 
purely based on legal norms and procedural rules against the nefarious influence of 
arbitrary absolutist rule or religion, the Romanian nation-state was founded on the 
substantive notion of the nation, thereby creating a state which had as its primary 
mission the protection and development of the nation. The outlook of the modernising 
élites in nineteenth-century Romania shows strong affinity with Brubakers’ concept of 
‘nationalising states’, i.e., ‘states that are conceived by their dominant élites as nation­
states, as states of and for particular nations, yet as “incomplete” or “unrealized” nation­
states, as insufficiently “national” in a variety of senses’ (Brubaker 1996: 79). As 
elaborated in chapter 4 and 5, the Liberal nationalist project contained important general 
features of such a ‘nationalising state’. In political-institutional terms, the Liberals’
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main objective was to assure an internationally recognised, ‘constitutionally 
independent* nation-state, the guarantee of state power and economic resources and 
activities in Romanian hands (for instance through the denial of citizenship and property 
rights to non-Romanians), and the creation of a stable internal order which was 
invulnerable to internal contestation (primarily of the peasantry) and external 
interference. In terms of socio-economic structures, the Liberal project was to a large 
extent about the gaining of absolute control over both economic resources and activities 
by ethnic Romanians. Listian policies and in the 1920s and 30s attempts at autarchy 
(‘prin noi inline’) served the purpose of state control over the key roles and resources in 
the Romanian economy.
It is important to keep in mind that the Liberal project not merely entailed the 
instrumental usage of the state for purposes o f class interest but that elements in its 
programme went beyond such considerations in promoting political rights for all 
Romanians, the unification of all Romanians in one state, and in its visions of 
amelioration of the common good through education and wide-scale socio-economic 
development. In addition, the Liberal project promulgated as its most significant 
objective the emancipation of the Romanian nation as such, an imaginary that not only 
was widely accepted as an objective, but could also be invoked against liberalism as a 
project.
From a modernist and in particular an economic determinist perspective, the fascist 
reaction to liberal modernity can either be understood as a purely anti-modem, 
reactionary movement in which the main tenets of modernisation -  rationalisation, 
democratisation, and industrialisation -  are refuted, or as a partially modem 
phenomenon, i.e. a project in which some modem aspects are incorporated, in particular 
regarding industrialisation and economic development, but which overall ran counter to 
or were in tension with the overall anti-modem intentions of fascists (see Herf 1983). 
Only recently more balanced accounts of the fascist ‘revolt against modernity’ have 
been proposed that go beyond normative and/or economic, determinist interpretations of 
modernity and indicate modem aspects in fascist movements which reveal a complex 
relation with and alternative interpretation of modem society rather than an absolute 
refutation (see, in particular, Eisenstadt 1999; 2000). It is from the latter perspective that
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I have considered the emergence of Romanian Fascism and have interpreted its 
significance for the Romanian pattern of modernisation.
Romanian Fascist ideology was formulated primarily as a critique against two 
elements of the Romanian interwar political and socio-economic context: the Liberal 
political project and its institutions, and the alleged threats stemming from the Jews and 
communists to Romanian society. In spite of Romanian Fascisms’ drawing 
predominantly on internal critical discursive traditions (nationalism, peasantism, 
Junimist ‘critical thought’, cf. Volovici 1991; Hitchins 1995), its overall political 
programme reflected many of the main concerns of German national socialism, Italian 
fascism, and other European fascisms. The Iron Guard as well as the intellectual 
movement promulgated a profound contempt for the formal-rational, bureaucratic logic, 
and parliamentarism or ‘institutionalised conflict’ of liberal, bourgeois society and 
rejected any elevation o f the atomistic individual to the position of primary unit of 
society. Romanian Fascists paralleled their counterparts in Western Europe in their 
proposal for the creation of a State-as-One that reflected the People-as-One (cf. Lefort 
1986), thereby eradicating the internal divisions of class society. As in German 
national-socialism, the Romanian Iron Guard singled out the Jew as the external Other, 
the embodiment of all the vices o f civilisation. From 1933 onwards, the experiences of 
Nazi Germany and fascist Italy turned into more explicit ‘reference societies’ while 
intellectuals became more open in their support for fascism.
In the Romanian interwar context, fascism constituted not merely a systemic critique 
on the artificial, emulated, and derived liberal structures, but it also provided, even if 
imprecisely perceived, a vision o f an alternative modem order to be realised by a 
revolutionary reconstruction of existing society. The alternative order explicitly 
incorporated notions of popular sovereignty (in which the people was equated with the 
nation and abstracted from any individual volition), national emancipation (not in 
institutionalist, constitutional terms as in liberalism, but through a cultural-spiritual 
regeneration), and a new civilisation comprising a new man (both of which would 
substitute the thoroughly compromised homo economicus o f liberalism but still referred 
to the Enlightenment ideals of the malleability of society and the perfectibility of man, 
cf. Eisenstadt 1999).
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At the same time, many tenets o f the Fascists clearly entailed non-modem or pre­
modem features. The return to the ‘organically developed’ rural village community as 
an alternative to the artificial city, the denial o f reason as an instrument of 
comprehending the world in favour of unreflective traditions and the mystical union of 
man with nature, the exemplary and messianistic role of the elite to the detriment of 
autonomous individual thought, all contained strong elements of the negation o f human 
autonomy.
The proposed alternative resonated strongly in the interwar period, because it 
reconnected with visions that had been counterposed to liberalism from the 1860s 
onwards and which had promised the representation of the mral population, and seemed 
to offer a popular alternative to the restricted, elitarian nature of the Romanian Liberal 
state.
Romanian Fascism entailed a form of radicalist particularism, in that it only accepted 
native, traditional sources as input for the reconstruction of society. The alleged 
artificiality and incompatibility o f liberal structures with the Romanian character was 
primarily an outcome of their foreign and derived nature. In this, however, the 
Romanian Fascists not merely sought discontinuity with the Liberal project of 1848, 
which was seen as an illegitimate rupture with the authentic Romanian past, but at the 
same time formulated a radical response to the national question, equally significant in 
the Liberal project. Romanian Fascism continued the national quest for emancipation, 
initiated by the Liberals, but moved from a predominantly institutional-constitutional 
and economic plane to the level o f cultural independence. In this way, the Fascists not 
only formulated an alternative to liberalism, but even more continued the emphasis on 
the liberation o f the Romanian collective by means of a programme of modernisation 
which explicitly parted from essential Romanian characteristics. The substantive 
specificity of Romanian Fascism was constituted by a fusion of Eastern Orthodox 
religion and traditionalist, communal ruralism as the main component of Romanian 
collective identity (Hitchins 1995). It is significant that religion in this equation seemed 
not refer to the subjugation o f a societal order to transcendental and other-wordly norms 
(which would be non-modem in its denial of human autonomy), but rather understood 
religion as the main component of national identity and thus as a marker of 
membership, a boundary-creating mechanism, and the primary substantive objective
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around which to build a new state. In addition, to Orthodox religion characteristics were 
contributed that distinguished it sharply from Western religion and culture (collectivism 
and a contemplative nature). Fascism could thus also be understood as a radicalised 
project for national emancipation rather than merely a reactionary call for the return to 
the past.
Even though Romanian Fascism proposed an alternative model of modem society, 
transcending the differentiation and artificial structures of liberal society and offering a 
more complete integration of the Romanian nation as well as a more meaningful 
independence and form of collective autonomy, the alternative offered should be 
understood as only a partial or ‘fragmented1 form of modernisation. The primacy of 
political and cultural elements in the project led to the negligence of socio-economic 
matters. In this sense, the Fascist project lacked any developmentalist strategy and 
hardly had any response to the question of economic modernisation, apart from an 
emphasis on asceticism, sacrifice and anti-materialism. Similarly, Codreanu’s 
conviction that ‘the country is going to ruins for the lack of men, not for the lack of 
programs’ (1973 : 244) indicated the Iron Guard’s predisposition for deeds rather than 
elaborated political programmes. This primacy of action however meant that the 
Fascists never elaborated detailed programmes for the institutionalisation of the Fascist 
project and could not offer a coherent and viable alternative order in strategic- 
institutionalist terms. Its status remained one of a movement rather than a governing 
party, further attested by the disorder that characterised its four month-rule at the end of 
1939. The Romanian Fascists thus never really had to confront their ideas with the 
reality of constructing a new order. In this sense, the ultimate significance of the Fascist 
project lay in the profound influence it had on interwar politics and on the demise of the 
Liberal project, and, more importantly, in its reinforcement of a collectivist 
interpretation o f modernity and in the radicalised imaginary it created o f an 
independent, authentic Romanian nation.
The other main rival of the liberal project of modernity in the twentieth century was 
without doubt communism. Whether communism has been considered as the ‘epitome 
of modernity’ or as a ‘failed modernity’ (Feher et al. 1983; Janos 1991; Sztompka 1993; 
cf. Ray 1996; 1997), most theoretical considerations that acknowledge modem aspects
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of communism have focused on its continuity with the Enlightenment ideas of 
rationalisation and mastery of nature in the form of a radical emphasis on the 
maximisation of resources and a far-reaching bureaucratisation of society (in particular 
of the economy). Thus, communism has been often perceived as a pathological or 
deviational interpretation of Western capitalism or as a variation of modernity 
understood in a particularly technocratic way (von Beyme 1994: 45). Although I do not 
deny this rationalist, developmentalist dimension to communism, I have suggested that 
communism has other significant modem aspects, the consideration of which widens 
the analysis and helps to understand communism as a specific project of modernisation 
rather than as a distorted interpretation of Western modernity.
Analysing communism as an alternative understanding and project of modernisation 
brings to the fore various aspects that go beyond its characterisation as merely an 
attempt to ‘catch up* with the West (although communism entailed also that), while it 
encourages to consider aspects that are normally neglected by understandings of 
communism as a ‘failed modernity’ which see its contemporary heritage only in a 
negative way (as a ‘fake modernity’, Sztompka 1993). To a significant extent, 
communism entailed a radical critique of the archetypal institutions o f Western 
modernity, i.e., capitalism, democracy, and the nation-state.
In other words, communism challenged the Western model for its ‘non-completion 
or perversion of the original vision of modernity’ (Eisenstadt 1999: 109). Capitalism 
was criticised for its disintegrating effects on society, its subordination and alienation of 
human beings, and its unrestrained pursuit of materialist objectives (the primacy of the 
economy), whereas democracy was seen as the mere extension of the rule of the 
dominant class and as capable o f guaranteeing only formal liberties, without therefore 
realising a radical and complete form of freedom for all members of society. The 
alternative proposal of modem society made in communism was a proposal for the 
supersession of the complications o f modem, Western society; in this sense, it can be 
understood as a different interpretation of modernity. The transcendence of Western 
society was proposed in a number of ways: by the substitution of fully rational planning 
for the anarchic and disintegrating effects of the market economy; by the re- 
appropriation of the economy by the collective (thereby eliminating class antagonisms); 
by the replacement of individual rationalities by a ‘social rationality’, putting the
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collective before particular interests (Bauman 2001: 262-64); by the reunification of the 
people in a singular entity; and by the representation and guidance of the singular entity 
and its singular will by the party-state.
The communist model emerged from a systemic critique on Western liberalism and 
proposed an alternative and revolutionary way to construct modem society, to transform 
man and society, and to bring about a collective form of emancipation (cf. Eisenstadt 
1999). The most conspicuously modem aspect was constituted by communism’s claim 
to construct a ‘carefully designed, rationally managed, and thoroughly industrialized’ 
society (Bauman 2001: 61). The emphasis on accelerated and comprehensive 
industrialisation by means of central planning of an allegedly superior kind of 
rationalism was one of the most significant ways of realising collective autonomy. But 
it was not the only one. The communist project equally emphasised collective well­
being and liberation to the detriment of individual interests, therefore claiming to realise 
a more comprehensive kind of freedom than possible in liberal modernity. Communism 
thus proposed a way of societal integration and unity as an answer to the destruction of 
social bonds by modernity (Amason 1998: 161). Furthermore, the communist party- 
state was deemed a more direct and full expression of popular sovereignty than possible 
in Western pluralist democracy. The construction of a ‘patronage state’ (Bauman 2001: 
58-60) which realised a positive, collective kind of freedom by means of strict control 
and mobilisation of society for the common good was the institutional expression of 
this.
I have argued (following Shoup 1962) that in the case of the East European satellite 
states communism was imposed by the Soviet Union, but that the dynamics of the 
Stalinist model (‘socialism in one country’) made subsequent retrieval o f local 
autonomy and therefore the re-emergence of local traditions a possible, though not an 
inevitable development. In addition, I have pointed to the ‘elective affinity’ of the 
Stalinist model with local aspirations, which made the emulation of Soviet communism 
not merely a one-way ‘transfer of institutions’ but provided local élites with a model 
which could substitute supposedly failed attempts at mimeting Western democracy and 
capitalism and forcefully redirect these countries on a course of modernisation. Most 
significantly in the phase of de-Stalinisation the East European countries could (within
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certain limits) formulate an alternative approach towards communism and attempt to 
construct a locally distinct form o f  communism, more suited to local traditions.
The Romanian local pattern consisted o f a  perseverance in a Stalinist approach 
towards the construction of socialism, legitimised by and embedded in a form of 
nationalist particularism. Rather than following bloc-wide trends of de-Stalinisation, 
limited openness and differentiation, and experimenting with reform socialism, the 
Romanian pathway that eventually crystallised re-emphasised a hypercentralised and 
dedifferentiating approach, controlled by a singular, ever smaller core élite entrenched 
in the party-state. I have argued that the Romanian interpretation of national 
Communism combined the emancipatory components of the overall communist model 
(the eradication of material scarcity, the liberation and unity of the collective) with the 
unifying and integrating aspects o f local traditions of radical nationalism. In Romanian 
Communism, the strong emphasis on collective emancipation was maintained, while 
perceived not only in terms o f a transcendence o f the complications of Western 
modernity, but also in terms of the emancipation of the nation and the preservation of its 
traditions. The latter provided the means for the legitimation of a nationalist course of 
enduring Stalinism in a moment o f bloc-wide pressure for fundamental change (de- 
Stalinisation) (Jowitt 1971; Shafir 1985). National Communism went beyond the pure 
instrumental usage of nationalism and isolationism in that it reintroduced a substantive 
notion of particularism/traditionalism. The reactivation of a tradition of indigenism 
meant that the Communist project was more and more founded on nativist elements. In 
this sense, emancipation was allegedly not only realised through the outrunning of the 
Western model, but even more so through a reconciliation with local traditions, which 
presupposed a more profound, radical, and authentic form of emancipation than was 
possible in the original Marxist-Leninist model.
The distinct features o f Romanian national Communism consisted of the decisive 
pursuit of negative collective liberty, i.e., the right to self-determine the national 
pathway without the sustenance o f interference from the outside, blended with the 
pursuit of collective positive liberty. The latter consisted o f two components: ‘full social 
and national liberation'. The first entailed the belief in socialist emancipation through 
the rationalisation of society by means of centrally planned industrialisation, based on 
the ‘scientific’ insights of Marxism-Leninism and through a ‘dictatorship over needs’.
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The second component consisted of particularist nationalism, which promulgated the 
superior aspects of the homogenous nation based on the traditions of the Romanian 
‘Daco-Roman’ nation. The ‘historical mission of the defence of the national interest* 
and the autonomous pursuit o f the ‘national will* were amalgamated with the 
continuous rationalisation of society through ‘socialist industrialisation*. Both 
components could be invoked for the comprehensive mobilisation of the entire 
population for the dual objectives of social and national emancipation.
In terms of political practice, the Romanian Communists emphasised from the early 
1960s onwards the indispensable right to national self-determination of socialist states, 
which externally entailed the call for formal ‘constitutional independence* and 
internally allowed for the restructuring of the state around the ‘national interest*. The 
pursuit of national sovereignty meant the redirection of socialist industrialisation to 
purely national objectives, i.e., the comprehensive modernisation of Romania and the 
steady improvement of its political, socio-economic and cultural autonomy. In 
structural-institutional terms, the ideological shift from internationalism to particularist 
nationalism permitted the Communist leadership to insulate Romanian Communism 
from reformist tendencies in the wider communist bloc, to stave off emerging pluralism 
in both the technocratic and humanist intellectual fields, and to continue a totalitarian, 
essentially Stalinist project. Political power remained concentrated in an ever smaller 
élite around Ceauçescu (while preventing the emergence of autonomous nuclei both 
inside and outside the party), whereas the state retained the character of a paternalist or 
‘patronage’ state whose control and guidance were reinforced by both a singular, 
dogmatic reading of Marxism-Leninism-cum-nationalism and the singularity of the 
power centre. In economic terms, the original Stalinist interpretation of economic 
industrialisation through the one-sided stimulation of heavy industry and extensive 
growth to the detriment of both the consumer industry and agriculture was retained, 
while economic planning stemming from the singular centre remained imperative. 
Though during the Ceauçescu years the ultimate objective of industrialisation formally 
changed from socialism to a ‘multilaterally developed socialist society*, the basic 
commitment to the radical transformation o f the country into a comprehensively 
industrialised state remained unaltered.
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The collapse of the communist systems in 1989 has been predominantly interpreted as 
evidence of the viability and singularity o f Western modernity. The Soviet model is 
equated with a ‘failed modernity’ whose premises and heritage are understood as 
dysfunctional and impediments in the construction o f an authentically modem society 
(cf. Amason 2000a; Bönker et al. 2002). The singular reading of modernity comprises 
the assumption of an inevitable rapprochement or convergence of the former communist 
countries towards a Western standard, translated in the institutional constellation o f a 
democratic market economy. The emphasis is therefore not on possible variations and 
divergence of the former communist countries in their new projects of modernisation, 
but rather on their ability to reproduce the Western model in their local context. Instead 
of taking an interpretive and non-normative approach towards (conflicting) projects o f 
modernisation that have been emerging in post-communist Eastern Europe - contrasting 
different visions of modernity rather than counterposing ‘modem’ visions with the 
remnants of ‘traditional’, communist ones - modernist approaches have been mostly 
engaged in trying to explain the non-conformation of post-communist realities with 
assumptions of convergence towards a Western model.
Critique on the modernist approach has taken issue with the uni-linearity, teleology, 
and normativeness of mainstream ‘transitology’ (Bönker et a l  2002; Eyal et a l  1998; 
Stark and Bruszt 1998), but has not yet sufficiently moved away from an essentially 
singular reading of modernity. The assumption that a superior (and therefore singular) 
model exists seems still to be (often implicitly) present in approaches that argue for 
variety and divergence (see chapter 2). My suggestion for one possible way leading 
away from modernist argumentation is based on a reading of modernity as possibly 
comprising a variety of understandings of its meaning (chapter 3).
The case of post-communist Romania seen from this perspective is indeed 
exemplary. The politics o f transformation in Romania were dominated in the 1990s by 
two different -  historically informed - understandings of modernisation (in the post­
communist context referred to as transition). The two dominant traditions of dealing 
with modernity in the Romanian context -  particularism and Westernism -  constituted 
the primary ingredients in a polarised political landscape in which post-communists 
(building on a particularist understanding) were pitted against a coalition of anti­
communists (building on the tradition of Europeanism) (cf. Pavel and Huiu 2003).
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Conflict over the direction and substance of transformation was grounded in different, 
conflictive interpretations of the meaning o f modernisation in the Romanian post­
communist context. These interpretations themselves were constructions that emerged 
out o f the confrontation between historically formed, local traditions o f thought and 
contemporary transnational discursive paradigms (neoliberalism and European 
integration). The post-communists, who dominated the political landscape in the first 
half o f the 1990s, avoided a systemic critique of communism while restricting their 
criticism of the immediate past to a political critique of Ceauçescuism. As the post­
communists understood the political crisis to be largely a crisis of political authority, 
they did therefore not see the need for a complete rupture with the past. This meant that 
the post-communists had no elective affinity with the neoliberal paradigm whatsoever, 
as neoliberalism in the context of the post-communist transformations entailed a radical 
anti-communism as its main tenets were the radical opposite of what (post-)communism 
stood for (the ‘patronage’ state, collectivism, positive freedom and substantive 
rationality).
The particular discursive legacy o f Romanian national Communism was recreated in 
two ways. First, by emphasising the need for social cohesion and state intervention in 
the economy the etatist, paternalist legacy of communism was reproduced. Secondly, by 
underlining an alternative from the transnational paradigms in the form of a Romanian 
third way, and unrestrained national sovereignty and independence, the legacy of 
national particularism was re-articulated. In order to legitimise its rejection of Western 
models and to prevent a powerful oppositional discourse from arising, the post­
communists formulated a local alternative model, based on the notions of ‘original 
democracy’, ‘national consensus’, and the ‘social state’ and ‘social market economy*, 
all notions promulgated against the anti-communist opposition and transnational 
discursive paradigms.
During the 1990s, partly under influence of the critique of the opposition as well as 
from international actors, the post-communists modified their isolationist, particularist 
position by incorporating notions of the oppositional discourse (itself strongly 
influenced by the transnational paradigms), which articulated more radical change 
(regarding the nature of the state and international integration). The incorporation of 
these notions led, however, not to a radical departure from the earlier interpretation of
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modernisation o f the post-communists, but to the rather successful crystallisation of a 
discourse o f ‘social-democracy’ which formed a syncretic composition of both the 
earlier particularist discourse and elements of universalism and reformism. The post­
communists were therefore capable of legitimating their position by reference to local 
traditions (nationalism, uniqueness, as well as social solidarity) and to the reformism as 
promulgated by international institutions as well as the anti-communist forces. In 
political-strategic terms, the post-communists institutionalised the undivided ‘national 
unitary state’ (in service o f the ethnic majority and against demands of the Hungarian 
national minority for regional autonomy), national consensus around the ‘national 
objective o f the modernisation and development of Romania’ (showing intolerance 
towards political pluralism), and state paternalism, as the central state continued to be 
the guarantor o f national unity and social cohesion.
It was the anti-communist opposition -  relatively disorganised in the early 1990s but 
becoming an increasingly important political force from 1992 onwards -  that widely 
adopted the transnational discursive paradigms. The political discourse of the anti­
communists consisted of an unyielding critique on communism in both its pre-and post- 
1989 manifestations and the adoption of the major tenets o f neoliberalism. It articulated 
a systemic critique of communism as not merely an aberration in its excessive form of 
Ceau§escuism but as an inherently non-viable and oppressive system. The anti­
communist programme promulgated the need for legal-based negative, individual 
liberty, the strong reduction of the size and functions o f the state in favour of civil 
society and economic actors, the need for a legally circumscribed state rather than a 
paternalist one, and the primacy o f the economy in solving societal problems. In 
addition, the coalition strongly supported a ‘return to Europe’ and international 
integration as means to a radical transformation of Romanian society. The unbridled 
hostility to leftism of the majority of the self-proclaimed democratic coalition, its 
critique of the state as inherently bureaucratic and ‘totalitarian’, and the re-evaluation of 
the individual as the constitutive element o f society coincided with the transnationally 
dominant neoliberal programme for the restructuring of the state. On the one hand, the 
emphasis on liberal individualism constituted a profound rupture with the collectivisms 
of the past. On the other, the anti-communist coalition consisted of re-established 
historical parties that claimed continuity with their interwar predecessors and their
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democratic, liberal and Europeanist programmes. In this reading of the Romanian past, 
communism was an aberration and the return to democracy and capitalism was deemed 
a re-affirmation of authentically modem trends of Europeanisation and démocratisation 
in Romania.
Despite the actively asserted paradigm of neoliberalism by international institutions, 
experts, and social scientists (its impact is assessed in a somewhat exaggerated way by, 
e.g., Burawoy 1992; Gowan 1995), and within Romania by the anti-communist 
coalition, the post-communists were able to pursue for a prolonged period of time a self- 
proclaimed alternative to both Western models and the discredited communist system. 
This was not only due to the absence of organised dissenting forces during national 
Communism and their complicated (re-)grouping after 1989, but more importantly 
because of the pronounced discourse of order, stability, and social cohesion in times of 
profound change and insecurity. The perseverance of the post-communists should then 
primarily be explained from, first, their capacity to institutionalise significant 
components of their programme (setting the ‘ground rules’ of society in the constitution, 
controlling the privatisation process and general socio-economic reforms), and, second, 
their ability to ‘crowd out’ the discursive arena both by control over the means of mass 
communication and through the articulation of a discourse which built on the strongly 
embedded notions of collectivism, particularism, and ethno-cultural integration. This 
discourse successfully discredited the oppositional discourse and transnational^ 
dominant ideas of reform, as liberalism and Europeanism had been thoroughly 
undermined during both communist and pre-communist times and were easily equated 
with foreign domination and loss of independence.
The electoral victory of the anti-communist coalition in November 1996 has been 
widely interpreted as the return of Romania to an authentic path of modernisation, based 
on the Western understandings of democracy and capitalist society. The anti-communist 
coalition in this reading performed the role of a ‘functional élite’. Nevertheless, the 
electoral victory of the anti-communist coalition can hardly be read as a decisive rupture 
with past in terms of a widely shared acceptance of its systemic criticism; rather, the 
economic mismanagement and corruption identified with the post-communists were the 
immediate causes of their (temporary) retreat. So, where the programme of the anti­
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communist coalition itself constituted a historically unprecedented rupture with the 
dominant pattern of modernisation in Romania based on collective autonomy, integral 
nationalism, and etatism, the anti-communists were not able to embed their 
emulationist/universalist discourse sufficiently in the local discursive context to create a 
convincing crisis narration of the notions of collective autonomy, positive freedom, 
ethno-cultural integration and social cohesion. In addition, the coalition itself from time 
to time promulgated integral nationalism in tension with professed individualism and 
legal-rationalism. I argue that the governing period of the anti-communist coalition can 
be read as a failure to produce a discursive break with the dominant pattern of 
modernisation and to institutionalise the main tenets of its alternative modernisation 
programme. On the normative level, the anti-communists failed to promulgate a 
discourse that was sufficiently embedded/legitimated in the Romanian context. Its 
neoliberal, emulationist, individualist discourse ran counter to historically firmly 
embedded collectivist, nationalist perceptions (in terms of discursive traditions as well 
as political and economic institutions). The individualist, legal-rational, and universalist 
components were open to critiques o f  a political nature -  as detrimental to the national 
interest -  as well as of a social nature -  as resulting in social polarisation and 
disintegration.
On the level of institutional discourse, institutionalisation and political practice, the 
most vulnerable element of the anti-communist programme of modernisation was its 
relation to collective autonomy/independence and national integration. Both its 
reference to the need for a civic conception of nationhood and citizenship and for 
unmediated integration into Euro-Atlantic integration seemed to imply a loss of 
sovereignty, autonomy, and social cohesion. The anti-communists failed moreover to 
realise a positive consensus in terms of a political project (complementing its negative 
consensus on the totalitarian nature of post-communism). Ambiguity towards legal- 
rationalism and individualism as well as discontent on the scope and pace of socio­
economic reforms undermined the coherence o f its programme. The outcome of this 
lack o f a positive consensus was an only very limited institutionalisation of its primary 
tenets (no comprehensive reform o f  political institutions, no decisive advance towards 
Euro-Atlantic integration, and an only limited reform of socio-economic institutions).
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Some theoretical considerations
The Romanian experience with modernity indicates that a singular, unitary reading of 
modernity as a phenomenon that ultimately leads to the convergence and unification of 
modem societies (as currently indicated by the term globalisation) is unsustainable. The 
emergence and diffusion of Western modernity should be understood as having resulted 
in a range of reactions and alternatives to the Western main pattern, thereby creating 
variations of the Western pattern as well as distinct alternatives. In this sense, the 
experience of ‘later modernising societies* can better be understood as producing 
varieties of modernity rather than as aberrations or deviations from a main pattern. The 
Romanian case shows a variation o f the Western pattern in that it demonstrates its own 
distinct features (statism, integral nationalism) which are partially the result of the 
structural impact of alternative forms of modernity on the Romanian experience (in 
particular, fascism and communism). In themselves these distinct features do not give 
shape to a sustained alternative pattern, but they do constitute a distinct legacy with 
significant consequences for the present.
Modernity is not a monolithic whole, which prescribes a singular uni-linear course from 
the traditional Gemeinschaft to the modem Gesellschaft. Rather, the ‘original’, Western 
pattern evoked reactions from ‘later modernising societies’, whose élites adopted some 
of the main tenets of Western modernity but adapted these tenets to local circumstances 
thereby constructing different visions. The Western pattern has thus functioned as a 
main ‘reference point’ without exhausting the experiences of other societies. A key role 
in the production of different understandings of modernity has been played by political 
and cultural élites (cf. Eisenstadt 1992; Kaya 2004). If modernity can have different 
connotations in particular contexts, an analytical search for those modernising agents 
that exhibit the Western mind-set forecloses the identification of agents with alternative 
programmes. The analysis is then restricted to the identification of ‘functional élites’, 
‘change agents’, or ‘interactionist-individualist élites’ (Kaminski and Kurczewska 
1995), i.e., those agents that portray the right dynamic and rational attitude which is 
necessary for a decisive rupture with the old system and who are capable o f designing a
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programme of modernisation which coincides with Western self-understandings o f 
modernity.266
As the impact of programmes of modernity takes place in different historical-societal 
contexts, these programmes interact with different settings of conflict, and can be 
adopted by various political and cultural élites. Therefore, a plurality of modernising 
agents has to be acknowledged (cf. Kaya 2004: 4). For instance, rather than being 
sustained by an emerging bourgeoisie (one of the most significant modernising actors in 
Western Europe), the Liberal nationalist project in nineteenth-century Romania was 
initiated by parts of the gentry who not only engaged in a thorough reconstruction of the 
societal order, but who also produced a significantly different interpretation of 
modernisation by primary pursuing the objectives of collective self-determination and 
unification of the Romanian nation. The analysis of modernisation needs not to be 
concerned with the identification of substitutive ‘functional élites’ but rather shift its 
focus to a plurality of (constellations of) actors, and conflicts and interactions over the 
meaning of modernisation in particular societies. In principle, various élites and their 
programmes should be analysed as potentially harbouring projects of societal 
reconstruction, rather than relegating some projects to the status of conservatism 
whereas others are identified as dynamic and progressive.267 Likewise, modernisation 
creates conflict in itself as any (re-)construction of the social order leads to the 
institutionalisation of particular values and to the suppression of others. Therefore, 
modernisation creates tensions between those that build the new order and those whose 
values and visions are not represented and who are (effectively or perceptively) 
excluded (cf. Eisenstadt 1978; Wagner 1994: 25). In this way, modernisation 
exacerbates tensions in society and can result over time in the emergence of counter- 
élites, which contest the existing order and promulgate an alternative project.
266 As Kaminski and Kurczweska argue: *We find more of the interactionist-individualist type of 
élites in the Baltic states, where such traditions have survived from the interwar period, than in 
Bulgaria and Romania. This suggests that the first three societies will probably make faster progress 
in developing their democratic and market institutions than in the latter* (Kaminski and Kurczweska 
1995: 150).
267 Cf Stark and Bruszt: ‘[W]e should not be too quick or too confident in our a priori ability to 
distinguish strategies of survival from strategies of innovation’ (Stark and Bruszt 1998: 7).
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Next to a plurality of modernising agents, a multiplicity of programmes of 
modernisation should be considered Although the dominance of the Western pattern of 
modernity should be acknowledged, its diffusion gave rise to reactions and alternative 
constructions o f understanding modernity. Thus, although programmes of (political and 
economic) liberalism have constituted and been understood as the dominant vision of 
modernity, these programmes have evoked counter-visions that entailed different 
solutions to the questions of liberty and self-rule as raised by liberalism (in the most 
radical form in the programmes of fascism and communism, see the chapters 8 and 9). 
As the condition of modernity is founded on the notions of human autonomy and the 
malleability of society, any concrete, institutionalised solution for modem society is 
temporary and essentially contestable. Any programme of modernisation is based on 
multi-interpretable concepts (liberty, democracy, progress) which -  due to their general 
and abstract nature -  are open for different interpretations and thus to critique regarding 
their unfulfilled status.
This leads me to a final point, i.e., the multiplicity of institutional configurations that 
can underpin modem society. Multiple programmes of modernisation lead to multiple 
forms of institutions, in which key tenets of modernity are institutionalised in different 
ways. Thus, the configuration of democracy, the market economy, and the nation-state 
has constituted the main pattern of Western modernity,268 but cannot be seen as 
exhausting the institutional patterns that can be imagined and realised. Different 
configurations have figured in alternative projects of modernisation (the most durable 
pattern has been constituted by the communist project).
In sum, Westernisation is a significant component of modernisation in later modernising 
societies, not as an offshoot of a master process of modernisation, but rather as one 
(contested) proposal among others. In pursuing projects of modernisation, actors can 
follow different rationalities (emulation or self-imitation; past- or future-oriented; 
totalising or pluralistic) and often seek to institutionalise very distinct sets of values and 
ideas. Rather than having the inevitable choice between the preservation of traditions, 
on the one hand, or the complete rupture with the traditional order, on the other,
268 Another interpretation of the archet>pal Western constellation is capitalism, industrialism and the
nation-state, see Giddens 1990.
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modernising élites can pursue the construction of variegated orders in which both 
rational-legal elements and substantive elements can be present. In later modernising 
societies, it is the intersection o f external models, local, indigenous traditions, and the 
creativity o f agency that results in ‘varieties o f modernity*.
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Summary
The debate on the ‘transitions * in Eastern Europe has been strongly informed by two 
assumptions: the singularity of Western modernity and the convergence of Eastern 
Europe towards it. By postulating convergence and equating modernisation with 
Westernisation, the greater part o f intellectual activity has been rather unsusceptible to 
the supposition of possible diversity in the modernisation of Eastern Europe. Only 
recently, diversity (and therefore history) has been taken as an explicit point of 
departure. In this study, I will tie in with historicised approaches by starting from an 
approach of ‘varieties of modernity’. I acknowledge thereby the possibility of different 
pathways to modernity as well as variety in understanding modernity itself.
Modernisation is understood here not as a process which leads to an ultimately 
integrated and unified modem society, but as (successive) political projects pursued by 
modernising agents who seek to reconstruct society on the basis of their specific 
understanding of modernity. This also means that conflict over the understanding of 
modernity is an immanent factor o f modernisation and that institutionalised projects of 
modernisation are always open to critique. More specifically regarding modernisation in 
Eastern Europe (perhaps also relevant to other 'later modernising’ societies), 
modernisation projects are for a significant part constructed under the influence of 
external ideas and models. Modernisation in these societies is not necessarily expressed 
in an indiscriminate emulation o f external models, but takes the form of a selection of 
elements from external models in an encounter with locally accumulated experiences 
and understandings.
I apply this conception of modernisation to the case-study of a single - relatively 
under-researched - Eastern European country, Romania. I use a historical-sociological 
approach with an emphasis on a conceptual analysis o f modernising discourses. The 
political-institutional part of my analysis of various projects of modernisation is 
concerned with the identification o f major modernising agents (political and cultural 
élites) and the institutional patterns (political-legal institutions and socio-economic 
structures) created by these modernisers in the last two centuries. The analysis of
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agency and institutional patterns is 'embedded* in the reconstruction o f understandings 
of modernisation held by modernising agents.
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